Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1988-028

1988-028Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL March 1, 1988
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 88- 28
Gene Porter
Barton County Attorney
P.O. Box 881
Great Bend, Kansas 67530
Re: Counties and County Officers -- County Attorney --
Duties
Public Health -- Alcoholism and Intoxication
Treatment -- Change of Venue; Hearing Procedure
Synopsis: K.S.A. 65-4041(A) does not require the county
attorney who represented the applicant in the
initial filing to continue that representation
after a change of venue has been granted. However,
K.S.A. 65-4041 and 65-4053 allow the district court
to which venue has been changed to tax the costs of
the proceeding to the county of residence. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 19-702; 19-703; K.S.A.
22-2616; K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2912; K.S.A.
60-609; 61-1907; 65-4031; 65-4032; 65-4034;
65-4036; 65-4041; 65-4053.
Dear Mr. Porter:
As Barton County Attorney you request our opinion on the
duties of a county attorney under K.S.A. 65-4001 et seq.
You inform us that the issue arose in the context of an
alcohol commitment proceeding initially filed in Barton
county but subsequently moved to Saline county pursuant to a
change of venue order issued as authorized by K.S.A. 65-4041.
K.S.A. 65-4001 et seq. contains statutory procedures
whereby a person may be detained for treatment in a state or
private alcohol treatment facility. A protective custody
order issued pursuant to K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 59-2912, K.S.A.
65-4034(A) or K.S.A. 65-4031, may be used to initially detain
a proposed patient. K.S.A. 65-4032 provides the procedure
whereby it is determined whether a proposed patient is an
alcoholic or incapacitated by alcohol and allows an order for
further treatment to be made.
An application made under K.S.A. 65-4032 may be filed in the
district court of the county of the proposed patient's
residence or presence. In the instant case the application
was initially filed in Barton county. K.S.A. 65-4041(A)
allows venue to be changed from the resident county to the
district court of the county in which the treatment facility
or state institution is located. This is often done to
facilitate procedures and accessibility of witnesses required
for the hearing.
K.S.A. 65-4036 states that "[i]f the applicant is not
represented by counsel, the county or district attorney shall
represent the applicant. . . ." The original application was
made in Barton county, and thus, if the applicant was not
represented by counsel, the Barton county attorney had the
original duty to represent the applicant.
K.S.A. 65-4041 states that "[a]ny district court to which
venue is transferred shall proceed in the case as if the
application had been originally filed therein. . . ." When a
change of venue is properly made, the court to which the
change is taken is vested with jurisdiction which is as full
and complete as if the action had been originally commenced in
that county. 92 C.J.S. Venue § 207 (1955). A change of
venue does not vacate any proceedings taken in the case before
the change was granted. 77 Am. Jur. 2d Venue § 86
(1975). Thus, a change of venue merely moves the matter to
another court and does not change the parties to that matter.
See generally, K.S.A. 22-2616, 60-609, and 61-1907. We
must therefore determine whether the county from which venue
was moved is considered a party in a proceeding such as this,
and if not, whether the county attorney has any duty to
continue representation of the applicant in a district court
located in another county.
A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the
purpose and intent of the legislature governs. Harris
Enterprises, Inc. v. Moore, 241 Kan. 59 (1987). The
purpose of K.S.A. 65-4001 et seq. is to provide for the
care and treatment of individuals in alcohol treatment
facilities. The purpose of K.S.A. 65-4036 appears to be the
assurance of representation of the applicant. That purpose
does not automatically make the county a party to the matter
nor mandate continued representation of the applicant by the
same county attorney.
The duties of a county attorney have historically been limited
to certain legal services rendered to the county. See
Commissioners of Leavenworth County v. Brewer, 9 Kan.
307 (1872); Heinz v. Shawnee County Commissioners, 136
Kan. 104 (1932); Nichols v. Shawnee County, 76 Kan.
266 (1907); and Attorney General Opinions No. 87-179, 87-147,
and 81-186. It is presumed that the legislature acted with
full knowledge of prior law, Rogers v. Shonahan, 221
Kan. 221 (1976), and thus, when enacting K.S.A. 65-4001 et
seq., the legislature is presumed to have been aware of
previous statutes and case law delineating and limiting the
county attorney's duties.
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 19-702 sets forth the general duties of a
county attorney:
"Except as otherwise provided in this
section, it shall be the duty of the
county attorney to appear in any court
having jurisdiction within the county and
prosecute or defend on behalf of the
people all actions and proceedings, civil
or criminal, in which the state or the
county is a party or interested."
(Emphasis added).
The scope of statutory duties of a county attorney is further
set forth in K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 19-703:
"Each county attorney, when requested by
any judge of the district court of the
county, shall appear on behalf of the
state before such judge, and prosecute all
complaints made in behalf of the state of
which such judge has jurisdiction; and
upon like request shall appear before such
judge and conduct any criminal examination
which may be had before such judge and,
except as otherwise provided in subsection
(b) of K.S.A. 19-702, and amendments
thereof, shall also prosecute all civil
suits before such judge in which the
county is a party or interested."
(Emphasis added).
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 19-703 mandates the appearance of the
county attorney before any judge of the district court of the
county. It does not necessarily extend to orders made by
judges of district courts in other counties.
K.S.A. 65-4001 et seq. does not make the county in which
the proceedings were initiated a party to the proceedings.
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 19-703 and 19-702 mandate that a county
attorney appear only in matters to which the county is a party
or interested. We must therefore conclude that the county
attorney of the resident county has no continuing duty to
represent the applicant in the court to which venue was
removed.
However, the resident county may have a fiscal interest
pursuant to K.S.A. 65-4011 and 65-4053. K.S.A. 65-4041
provides:
"Any district court to which venue is
transferred shall transmit a statement of
any court costs incurred and a certified
copy of all pleadings and orders in the
case to the district court of the county
of the residence of the patient or, if the
county of residence is not ascertainable,
to the secretary."
K.S.A. 65-4053 sets forth the entities responsible for the
payment of costs connected with the proceeding:
"The costs shall be taxed to the estate of
the patient, to those bound by law to
support such patient or to the county of
the residence or nexus of the patient as
the court having venue shall direct.
• • •
(C) Any district court receiving a
statement of costs from another district
court shall forthwith approve them for
payment out of the general fund of its
county, except that it may refuse to
approve them for payment only on the
grounds that the patient is not a resident
of its county. In such case it shall
transmit the statement of costs to the
secretary." (Emphasis added).
These provisions indicate legislative intent to allow the
placement of fiscal responsibility on the resident county.
This fiscal responsibility is not dependent upon
representation by that county's attorney nor does it
necessarily expand the scope of duties required of a county
attorney. The fiscal responsibility of the county is not
dependent upon nor affected by any action of the county, but
rather is constant in nature. Thus, this responsibility does
not constitute an interest requiring representation under
K.S.A. 1987 Supp. 19-702.
The legislature may statutorily expand the scope of duties
required of a county attorney (see e.g. K.S.A. 22-2616),
and under K.S.A. 65-4001 et seq. it has done so. However,
this particular legislative expansion of duties does not go
beyond the scope of duties established under K.S.A. 1987
Supp. 19-702 and 19-703 to require representation by the
county attorney before another county's court in a matter to
which the county is not a party or is not interested.
It is therefore our opinion that when a change of venue has
been granted pursuant to K.S.A. 65-4041(A), the county
attorney of the county in which the application was initially
filed does not have a statutorily imposed duty to continue
representing the applicant. However, K.S.A. 65-4041 and
65-4053 indicate that the resident county may retain certain
fiscal responsibilities connected with the costs of the
proceeding. We are cognizant of the burden this
interpretation of K.S.A. 65-4001 et seq. places upon the
county attorneys in those counties where such treatment
facilities are located. It may therefore be appropriate to
seek a legislative solution or clarification.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Theresa Marcel Nuckolls
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:TMN:bas

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