Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-165

1987-165Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL November 23, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 165
John Badger
Acting Chief Counsel
Kansas Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services
Docking State Office Building, 6th Floor
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Mentally Ill, Incapacitated and Dependent Persons;
Social Welfare--Social Welfare--Durational
Requirements
Synopsis: The state must show a compelling state interest to
justify a durational residency requirement for
participants of the general assistance program. If
such an interest exists, it would justify the
disparate treatment between those receiving ADC
and those receiving GA benefits. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 39-720; K.A.R.
through 75; 30-4-90;
*
30-4-34;
45 C.F.R.
*
30-4-50;
§223.40.
*
30-4-70
Dear Mr. Badger:
As counsel for the State Department of Social and
Rehabilitation Services, you have requested our opinion
concerning eligibility for public assistance. Specifically
you inquire whether SRS may implement a thirty day residency
requirement for applicants who wish to receive general
assistance.
An initial distinction must be made between a requirement of
bona fide residency and a requirement of residency for a
specified duration. A state may require that services it
provides for its residents be enjoyed only by its residents.
A bona fide residency requirement does not deny equal
protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S.
321, 328 (1983).
Freedom to travel is a basic constitutional right. That
freedom includes the right to enter and abide in any state of
the union. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338
(1972). Durational requirements which create a penalty for
exercising that right must be the least drastic means to
achieve a compelling state interest. Id. at 343. Such is
required in light of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
While we have not been informed as to exactly what state
interest would be furthered by a proposed regulation which
imposes a thirty-day durational requirement, we feel
compelled to comment on two arguments which have been rejected
by the United States Supreme Court. First, a state may not
use a durational requirement to save money. Memorial
Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1973).
Secondly, administrative convenience is not an interest which
is sufficiently compelling to justify a durational
requirement. Id. Under the heading of administrative
convenience, the court in Memorial Hospital noted that the
durational requirement is overbroad as a means to
determine bona fide residency. Id., at 267. Finally,
budget predictability has been rejected as a sufficient
justification. Id., at 268-69.
The state has a valid interest in preventing fraud.
Shapiro, 394 U.S., at 637. Whether or not that interest
is sufficiently compelling may depend on whether less drastic
means would achieve the same result. In Memorial Hospital,
it was noted that criminal statutes specifically made it
unlawful to file an untrue statement to obtain hospitalization
at county expense, and therefore the one-year durational
requirement was excessive. 415 U.S., at 268. In K.S.A.
39-720, similar acts are defined as theft and thus criminal
prosecution is an available means of dealing with fraud.
However, we are unable to determine whether that penal section
adequately achieves the same objective as would a 30 day
durational residency requirement.
While Memorial Hospital and Shapiro both dealt with
durational requirements of one year, we believe that the rules
laid down in those cases still obtain. The state must show a
compelling state interest to overcome the penalty for
exercising the right to travel when a durational requirement
is imposed, whether the length of the requirement is one month
or twelve months. Further, the method used to achieve a
compelling state interest must be as unobtrusive as possible.
Our opinion thus far has been limited to a durational
requirement for General Assistance (GA). That category of
assistance is funded only by the state. Federal law prohibits
a state from imposing a durational requirement for receipt
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (ADC) benefits.
45 C.F.R. §233.40. Assuming a compelling state interest
exists which would justify a durational requirement, the
question then arises whether requiring durational residency
for programs funded solely by the state, but not for programs
funded by the federal government, creates unequal treatment
between identifiable classes such that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would be violated.
Regulations for public assistance programs are found in K.A.R.
30-4-34 et !2a . Eligibility requirements for ADC are
listed in K.A.R. 30-4-70, and requirements for GA are listed
in K.A.R. 30-4-90. The requirements of K.A.R. 30-4-50 must be
met to participate in either program. In addition to the
above, the eligibility factors in K.A.R. 30-4-70 through
30-4-75 must be met in order to participate in the ADC
program. Those factors are not required for GA. Rather, GA
is available to those who meet the basic requirements of
K.A.R. 30-4-50, are not eligible for a federal program, have
not been eligible for and refused vocational rehabilitation
services, and do not refuse authorization for the department
to file a claim for reimbursement from the social security
administration for the amount of assistance provided.
We believe that the distinctions between the two programs do
not create suspect classifications, nor do they involve
fundamental interests of participants. Disparate treatment as
to the proposed durational residency requirement would be
created by a federal condition for the state to receive funds,
not by the state's distinction between classes of recipients.
Since no suspect classifications or fundamental interests are
involved in the differential treatment, the requirement would
be presumed constitutional, and the classification would have
to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or lacking a legitimate state
interest to be displaced on equal protection grounds.
Farley v. Engelken, 241 Kan. 663, 667-68 (1987). We
believe that if the state has an interest sufficiently
compelling to overcome the penalty for exercising the right to
travel, then such an interest would justify discrepancies
between ADC and GA recipients.
In conclusion, in our opinion the state must show a compelling
state interest to justify a durational residency requirement
for recipients of the general assistance program. If such an
interest exists, it would justify the disparate treatment
between those receiving ADC and those receiving GA benefits.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Mark W. Stafford
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:MWS:jm

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.