Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-153

1987-153Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL October 16, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 153
Frank A. Caro, Jr.
General Counsel
Kansas Corporation Commission
Fourth Floor, Docking State Office Building
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1571
Re: State Boards, Commissions and Authorities--State
Corporation Commission--Corporation Commission;
Qualifications and Oaths of Members, Secretary and
Attorney
Synopsis: The clear and unambiguous language of K.S.A. 74-605
prohibits a commissioner from serving as a duly
elected member on the state committee of a
political party. The statute does not, however
expressly prohibit a commissioner from serving as a
delegate or alternate to a national party
convention, and therefore it is our opinion that
the statute permits such activity. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 74-605.
Dear Mr. Caro:
As General Counsel for the Kansas Corporation Commission you
request an opinion regarding the qualifications placed on a
corporation commissioner. Specifically, you inquire whether
K.S.A. 74-605 precludes a commissioner from serving either as
a duly elected member on the state committee of a political
party or as a chosen delegate or alternate to his or her
national party convention.
K.S.A. 74-605 states in part:
"No person owning any bonds, stock or
property in any railroad company or other
common carrier or public utility, or who
is in the employment of, or who is in any
way or manner pecuniarily interested in,
any railroad company or other common
carrier or public utility, shall be
eligible, except as hereinafter provided,
to the office of commissioner, attorney or
secretary of said commission, nor shall
such commissioner, attorney or secretary
hold any office of profit or any
position under any committee of any
political party, or hold any other
position of honor, profit or trust under
or by virtue of any of the laws of the
United States or of the state of Kansas.
Said commissioners shall be qualified
electors of the state, and shall not while
such commissioners engage in any
occupation or business inconsistent with
their duties as such commissioners."
(Emphasis added.)
Generally, the purpose of statutes that restrict the political
activities of public employees is not to arbitrarily restrict
those employees from politics, but to promote the integrity of
civil service by freeing them from political pressures. See
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct.
556, 91 L.Ed. 75 (1947). However, in order to withstand
constitutional challenge, a statute prohibiting political
activity must give adequate warning of what activities are
proscribed. The statute must adequately describe the
proscribed conduct in terms that the ordinary person
exercising ordinary common sense can understand and comply
with. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 608, 93 S.Ct.
2908, 2914, 37 L.Ed. 830, 837 (1973); United State Civil
Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 579, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2897, 37 L.Ed.2d
796, 816 (1973).
The Kansas statute in question, K.S.A. 74-605, expressly
prohibits, upon threat of dismissal, a commissioner from
simultaneously holding the office of commissioner and holding
any office of profit, any position under any committee of any
political party or any other position of honor, profit or
trust under the laws of the state or the federal government.
In keeping with Broadrick and Letter Carriers, supra,
we must determine first whether the proscribed conduct is
adequately described in terms that an ordinary person
exercising common sense can understand and comply with, and
second whether the conduct in question, serving as state
committeeman or as a delegate to a national convention s comes
within the plain and understandable language describing the
proscribed conduct in K.S.A. 74-605.
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37
L.Ed. 830 (1973) a statute similar to K.S.A. 75-605 was
challenged as vague, failing to distinguish between proscribed
and permitted conduct. The challenged paragraph of 74 Okla.
Stat. Ann. §818 states:
"[7] No employee in the classified
service shall be a member of any national,
state or local committee of a political
party, or an officer or member of a
committee of a partisan political club, or
a candidate for nomination or election to
any paid public office, or shall take part
in the management or affairs of any
political party or in any political
campaign, except to exercise his right as
a citizen privately to express his opinion
and to cast his vote." (Emphasis added.)
The U.S. Supreme Court found that the language was not vague
and further that it was all but frivolous to suggest that it
failed to adequately warn of what activities it proscribes.
413 U.S. at 607, 93 S.Ct. at 2913, 37 L.Ed.2d at 837. But
cf. Lecci v. Cahn, 360 F. Supp. 759 (Ed. N.Y., 1973).
Given no ambiguity in the language of K.S.A. 74-605, does
serving as state committeeman come within the proscribed
conduct? Kansas courts have not addressed this issue, but
other jurisdictions with statutes similar to ours, have found
that membership as a committeeman comes clearly within the
proscribed conduct of being a member of a committee of a
political party. In Wasniewski v. State Civil Service
Commission, 299 A.2d 676 (Pa. 1973) an employee was found to
have violated the following pertinent part of 71 P.S.
§741.904: "No person in the classified service shall serve as
a member of any committee of any political party" when he
served as a committeeman for the Democratic Party in the
31st Ward, 23rd division in Philadephia. See Jackson
v. Coffrey, 368 N.E. 2d 1259 (Ohio 1977) (membership on a
county party central committee found within proscription of
being an officer in any political organization); See also
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct.
556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947) (membership and service as a ward
committeeman was within the prohibition of §9 of the Hatch Act
prohibiting an active part in political management and
political campaigns). We are persuaded by these other
jurisdictions and thus it is our opinion that serving as a
state committeeman comes within the proscribed activity found
in K.S.A. 74-605.
Conversely, it is our opinion that serving as a delegate to a
national party convention does not come within the proscribed
activity found in K.S.A. 74-605. We are persuaded by both our
conclusion that the language of the statute is clear and
understandable and by case law from other jurisdictions. In
Louisville v. FitzGerald, 600 S.W.2d 456 (Ky. 1978) the
Kentucky Supreme Court addressed whether, under a statute
similar to ours, a civil service employee was precluded from
serving as a delegate to a national party convention. The
statute, K.R.S. 90-220(2) prohibited service as a "member of
any campaign committee or governing committee of any political
organization." The court states: "This court holds that those
acts which are not prohibited in plain and understandable
language or by necessary implication therefrom are
permitted." 600 S.W.2d at 457. We agree.
Generally in cases where the courts have found a violation,
the express language of the statute has given reasonable
notice of what activity is proscribed. See generally,
"Validity, construction, and effect of state statutes
restricting political activities of public officers or
employees," 51 A.L.R. 4th 702 (1987). But c.f.
Louisville Lodge No. 6, Fraternal Order of Police v.
Burton, 518 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1975) (while the prohibition
against candidacy was not express, it was so obvious as to be
considered as expressed in plain and understandable language.
518 S.W.2d at 779). In addition, statutes expressly
prohibiting a person from being a delegate to a convention
have also included express language prohibiting membership in
a committee of a political party, thereby refuting the
necessary implication argument. See Weaver v. Shaffer,
290 S.E.2d 244, 250 (W. Va. 1980); Haines v.
Commonwealth, State Civil Service Comm., 428 A.2d 759 (Pa.
1981).
In conclusion, it is our opinion that the clear and
unambiguous language of K.S.A. 74-605 prohibits a commissioner
from serving as a duly elected member on the state committee
of a political party. The statute does not, however expressly
prohibit a commissioner from serving as a delegate or
alternate to a national party convention, and therefore it is
our opinion that the statute permits such activity.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Guen Easley
RTS:JLM:GE:jm
Assistant Attorney General

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