Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-128

1987-128Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTO RN EY G ENER AL September 1, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 128
The Honorable Alicia L. Salisbury
Senator, 20th District
1455 S.W. Lakeside Drive
Topeka, KS 66604-2556
Re: Crimes and Punishments, General Provisions --
Preliminary -- Defendant Presumed Innocent
Re: Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
-- Amendment 14; Rights and Immunities of Citizens
-- Arrest Without Conviction as Bar to Right of
Immunity
Synopsis: Topeka Code Section 34-193(6), which does not
permit persons who have been previously arrested,
but not convicted on drug charges, to obtain a
license to carry a firearm while employed as a
security guard, is violative of both state law and
the Constitution of the United States. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 21-3109; U.S. Const., 14th
Amendment.
*
Dear Senator Salisbury:
You have asked for an opinion regarding the constitutionality
of Topeka Code Section 34-193(6).
Topeka Code Section 34-193(6) provides for the mandatory
denial of a license to carry a firearm to an individual
seeking employment as a security guard if that person "has a
record of arrest for controlled substance abuse or a record of
violent acts against persons or property, within 10 years
immediately preceding the date of application." You question
whether an ordinance may constitutionally deny a license to a
person on the basis of an arrest when no charges were ever
filed against the person.
A city has broad police power to enact laws for the health,
safety and welfare of its citizens. Delight Wholesale Co. v.
City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 99 (1969). Clearly,
mandating the licensing of persons to carry firearms as
security guards involves the public safety and is, therefore,
within the police power of a city. However, the Kansas
Supreme Court stated in State v. Pendarris, 181 Kan.
560, 566 (1957):
"The fixed rule and basic standard by
which the validity of all exercises of the
police power is tested is that the police
power of the state extends only to such
measures as are reasonable and that all
police regulation must be reasonable under
all circumstances."
Further, the police power of a city is limited as follows:
"While the police power is wide in its
scope and gives a governmental body broad
power to enact laws to promote the health,
morals, security and welfare of the
people, and further, a large discretion is
vested in it to determine for itself what
is deleterious to health, morals or is
inimical to public welfare, it cannot
under the guise of the police power enact
unreasonable and oppressive legislation or
that which is in violation of the
fundamental law." Delight Wholesale Co.
v. City of Overland Park, 203 Kan. 99,
Syl. S4 (1969). See also Gilbert V.
Mathews, 186 Kan. 672, 677, (1960),
and Little v. Smith, 124 Kan. 237,
(1927).
The city ordinance in question prohibits anyone arrested,
rather than convicted, from obtaining the license needed for
employment as a security guard. Written in this manner, the
ordinance denies an individual the presumption of innocence
which is provided by both state law and the United States
Constitution. K.S.A. 21-3109; U.S. Const., 14th Amend.
Almost 93 years ago the United States Supreme Court said:
"The principle that there is a presumption
of innocence in favor of the accused is
the undoubted law axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at
the foundation of the administration of
our criminal law." Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394,
403, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1864).
More importantly, in Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners,
353 U.S. 232, 241, 77 S.Ct. 752, 757, 1 L.Ed.2d 796, 803
(1957), the court stated:
The mere fact that a man has been arrested
has very little, if any, probative value
in showing that he has engaged in any
misconduct. An arrest shows nothing more
than that someone probably suspected the
person apprehended of an offense. When
formal charges are not filed against the
arrested person and he is released without
trial, whatever probative force the arrest
may have had is normally dissipated.
Finally, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 6
L.Ed.2d 447 (1979) the Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine
in stating:
"Presumption of innocence is doctrine . .
. and may also serve as an admonishment to
judge accused's guilt or innocence solely
on basis of evidence adduced at trial and
not on basis of suspicions that arise from
arrest, indictment, or custody . . ."
The ordinance in question applies to persons arrested rather
than convicted, thereby associating an individual's arrest
with guilt absent proof of guilt. It denies an individual the
presumption of innocence provided by law and hence, is an
invalid exercise of the police power of the city.
In conclusion, Topeka Code Section 34-193(6), which does not
permit persons who have been previously arrested but not
convicted, on drug charges to obtain a license to carry a
firearm while employed as a security guard, is violative of
both state law and the U.S. Constitution.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Brenda L. Braden
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BLB:cy

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