Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1987-070

1987-070Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL April 16, 1987
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 87- 70
Keith R. Henley, Chairman
Kansas Corporation Commission
Fourth Floor, Docking State Office Building
Topeka, Kansas 66612-1571
Re: Oil and Gas--Crude Oil or Petroleum; Production and
Sale--Assessment of Costs of Administering 55-601
to 55-613, Disposition of Moneys
Synopsis: The statutory and regulatory scheme found in K.S.A.
1986 Supp. 55-609(c), 55-711(c) and K.A.R. 82-3-206
imposes an assessment to pay the conservation
division expenses and administrative costs. Under
this scheme the first purchaser pays the assessment
and deducts it from payment of production to
producers and royalty owners. Generally, as a
matter of federal constitutional law, the federal
government and Indian tribes are exempt from state
taxation absent congressional consent. In our
judgment there is implicit consent to tax the
federal government in 30 U.S.C. §189 which
authorizes a tax against a lessee of the federal
government. This federal statute has been
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court to authorize
the tax against the lessee "as if the government
were not concerned." There is also congressional
authorization to tax the mineral interests of
Indian tribes if the interests result from a lease
issued to a non-Indian lessee pursuant to the
1924 Act found in 25 U.S.C. §398. However, this
authorization does not exist in the Indian Mineral
Leasing Act of 1938 found in 25 U.S.C. §396a.
Therefore Indian mineral interests resulting from a
lease issued to a non-Indian lessee pursuant to
the 1924 Act are not exempt and those pursuant to
the 1938 Act are exempt from the statutory and
regulatory scheme in question. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-609, 55-711, U.S. Const.,
Art. IV, §3, cl. 2; 30 U.S.C. §189, 25 U.S.C.
§§396a; 398.
Dear Mr. Henley:
As former Chairman of the Kansas Corporation Commission Mr.
Lennen requested our opinion concerning the statutory and
regulatory scheme found in K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-609(c),
55-711(c) and K.A.R. 82-3-206 that imposes an assessment based
on the volume measure of production of oil and gas to pay the
conservation division expense and oil and gas conservation
administration costs not otherwise provided for.
Specifically, he inquired whether mineral interests owned by
the federal government or its entities or Indian tribes are
exempt from the payment of assessments under this statutory
and regulatory scheme.
K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-609(c) [oil] and K.S.A. 1986 Supp.
55-711(c) [gas] state:
"Assessments imposed on the basis of a
volume measure of production under the
authority of this section shall be
reported and remitted in the manner
provided in K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 79-4230 [on
the mineral severance tax return forms]."
K.A.R. 82-3-206 states:
"An oil conservation assessment to pay the
conservation division expenses, and oil
and gas conservation administration costs
not otherwise provided for, shall be made
as follows: (a) A charge, as established
by the commission, on each barrel of crude
oil or petroleum marketed or used each
month shall be assessed to each producer.
The charge and assessment shall only apply
to the first purchase of oil from the
producer.
"(b) The first purchaser of the production
shall deduct the assessment per barrel of
oil marketed or used from the lease each
month before paying for production, and
shall remit the assessment to the
conservation division when the purchasers
make their regular oil payments.
"(c) The remittances shall be made each
month in a single check. The purchaser
shall account for the deductions under
this order on the regular payment
statements to producers and royalty owners
or other interested persons."
Under this statutory and regulatory scheme the first purchaser
remits the assessments to the conservation division and then
deducts them from the payment to producers and royalty
owners. For purposes of your question we will assume that the
mineral interests held by the federal government and Indian
tribes are royalty interests.
This statutory and regulatory scheme calls for an "assessment"
to be charged. While in legal parlance an "assessment" and a
"tax" do not have the same meaning, they have often been
employed synonymously. Commercial National Bank v. Board of
County Commissioners, 201 Kan. 280 (1968). In determining
whether a charge is an assessment or a tax, the name given the
charge is not controlling; rather it is the reason for the
charge that determines its nature. 70 Am.Jur.2d Special
and Local Assessments §1 (1973). General authority defines a
tax as an enforced exaction to raise revenue for general
governmental purposes. 70 Am.Jur.2d Special and Local
Assessments §1 (1973); 41 Words and Phrases, Tax, Taxation
170 (1965). Clearly conservation, as the preservation of
natural resources, benefits the general public, and as such is
a general governmental purpose. See generally Copper
Valley Mach. Works, Inc. v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595 (1981).
These exactions go to paying the costs of the conservation
division expenses and are therefore a tax. See generally
United States v. State of Maryland, 471 Fed. Supp. 1030,
1036 (D.Md. 1979).
We will first address whether the federal government is exempt
from the tax. Unquestionably the federal government has
authority to exercise complete dominion and control over all
activities on public domain lands, including the regulation of
all oil and gas operations conducted thereon. The United
States Constitution, at Art IV, 53, cl. 2 states:
"The Congress shall have the power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the Territory or
other property belonging to the United
States. . . ."
However, the fact that the United States has authority to
regulate and control a particular activity does not prevent a
state from regulating the activity, so long as there is
Congressional authorization. See, Northern Nat. Gas Co.
v. State Corp. Comm., 372 U.S. 84, 83 S.Ct. 646, 9 L.Ed.2d
601 (1963).
In Section 32 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, 41
Stat. 450, codified in 30 U.S.C. §189, Congress provides the
necessary authorization to tax the lessee of federal land.
"Nothing in this chapter shall be
construed or held to affect the rights of
the States or other local authority to
exercise any rights which they may have,
including the right to levy and collect
taxes upon improvements, output of mines,
or other rights, property, or assets of
any lessee of the United States."
Construing this section, the U.S. Supreme Court explained:
"Congress . . . meant by the proviso to
say in effect that, although the act deals
with the letting of public lands and the
relations of the [federal] government to
the lessees thereof, nothing in it shall
be so construed as to affect the right of
the states, in respect of such private
persons and corporations, to levy and
collect taxes as though the government
were not concerned.
"We think the proviso plainly discloses
the intention of Congress that persons
and corporations contracting with the
United States under the act, should not,
for that reason, be exempt from any form
of state taxation otherwise lawful."
Mid-Northern Oil Co. v. Walker, 268
U.S. 45, 48-50, 45 S.Ct. 440, 441, 69
L.Ed. 841, 843 (1925). (Emphasis in
original.)
The Supreme Court again construed section 32 of the Mineral
Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. §189) and cited the above
language in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S.
609, 101 S. Ct. 2946, 69 L.Ed.2d 884 (1981). The question
presented in Commonwealth was whether a severance tax on
coal imposed by the State of Montana against producers
violated the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United
States Constitution. The severance tax on the output of
Montana coal miners included coal mined on federal land. In
coming to the conclusion that the tax did not violate the
Commerce or Supremacy Clause, the Court considered whether the
Montana tax was not "otherwise lawful" (language in Walker)
because it conflicted with the purpose of the Mineral Leasing
Act of 1920. The Court reasoned that the possibility that the
Montana tax could result in reducing the royalty payments to
the Federal government was not sufficient to make the tax
inconsistent with the Mineral Leasing Act.
The Court states:
"By definition, any state taxation of
federal lessees reduces the 'economic
rents' accruing to the Federal Government,
and appellants' argument would preclude
any such taxes despite the explicit grant
of taxing authority to the States by
§32." Commonwealth Edison Co. v.
Montana, 453 U.S. at 632, 101 S.Ct. at
2961, 69 L.Ed.2d at 904.
The explicit grant of taxing authority provided by Section 32
of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. §189) clearly
allows the taxing of the lessee under the statutory and
regulatory scheme in question. However, while implicit in the
language of Section 32, there is no explicit authorization to
tax the mineral interests held by the federal government.
Since the federal government is not subject to any form of
direct taxation without congressional consent, McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat (U.S.) 316, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819), we must now
determine whether the tax in question is valid' against the
federal government as an indirect tax.
A nondiscriminatory, indirect tax whose legal incidence does
not fall on the federal government is permissible, since the
tax does not hinder the federal government's functions or the
exercise of sovereign power. United States v. City of
Leavenworth, 443 F.Supp. 274 (D. Kan 1977). See
United States v. State of Maryland, 471 F.Supp. 1030 (D.Md.
1979). See also Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe,
306 U.S. 466, 59 S.Ct. 595, 83 L.Ed. 927 (1938) and United
States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39, 84 S.Ct. 1518, 12 L.Ed.2d 713,
(1964).
United States v. Leavenworth, 443 F.Supp. 274, involved a
franchise fee imposed by a city ordinance upon all utility
companies doing business within the city limits of
Leavenworth, Kansas. Reviewing all applicable authorities,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the fee as applied
to the United States on the ground that the fee's legal
incidence did not fall upon the United States. Similarly and
in accordance with the reasoning in Leavenworth, the legal
incidence of the statutory and regulatory scheme in question
does not fall on the federal government because 1) the
assessment does not fall directly upon the property of the
United States, 2) the legal liability for payment falls on the
first purchaser, and 3) the statutory and regulatory scheme do
not purport to authorize any penalties for nonpayment such as
liens or encumbrances upon government property, and finally 4)
there is no requirement that the first purchaser pass all or
any of the financial burden on to the United States [the
regulation requires that the purchaser "account for the
deduction.") See United States v. Maryland, supra,
(involves an environmental surcharge upheld as a valid tax
against agencies of the federal government.)
In conclusion, it is our judgment that there is implicit
consent to the tax (if not express consent) in Section 32 of
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and that case law supports the
nature of the tax as a nondiscriminatory, indirect
exaction. Accordingly, it is our opinion that the mineral
interests owned by the federal government are not exempt from
the payment of assessments under the statutory and regulatory
scheme of K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-609(c), 55-711(c) and K.A.R.
82-3-206.
We now turn to the question of whether mineral interests owned
by Indian Tribes are exempt. As a matter of federal
constitutional law, the question of whether a state may tax or
regulate activities on Indian lands where non-Indians are
involved is determined by whether, in the specific context,
the exercise of state authority would violate federal law.
See generally White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracher, 448 U.S. 136, 100 S.Ct. 2578, 65 L.Ed.2d 665,
(1980) and Israel, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Inst. 3-57 (1984).
Generally, state laws may be applied to tribal Indians on
their reservations if Congress has expressly so provided.
California, et al. Appellants v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians et al., U.S. , 107 S.Ct. 1083,
L.Ed.2d , 55 U.S.L.W. 4225 (1987). This very recent U.S.
Supreme Court case deals with whether the State has criminal
jurisdiction on Indian land. In a lengthy footnote the Court
addresses state taxation of Indian tribes, and clearly sets
forth the per se rule.
"In the special area of state taxation of
Indian tribes and tribal members, we have
adopted a per se rule. In Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985),
we held that Montana could not tax the
Tribe's royalty interests in oil and gas
leases issued to non-Indian lessees
under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of
1938. We stated: 'In keeping with its
plenary authority over Indian affairs,
Congress can authorize the imposition of
state taxes on Indian tribes and
individual Indians. It has not done so
often, and the Court consistently has held
that it will find the Indians' exemption
from state taxes lifted only when Congress
has made its intention to do so
unmistakably clear.' Id., at 765. We
have repeatedly addressed the issue of
state taxation of tribes and tribal
members and the state, federal, and tribal
interests which it implicates. We have
recognized that the federal tradition of
Indian immunity from state taxation is
very strong and that the state interest in
taxation is correspondingly weak.
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to
rebalance these interests in every
case. In Mescalero Apache Tribe v.
Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973), we
distinguished state taxation from other
assertions of state jurisdiction. We
acknowledged that we had made repeated
statements 'to the effect that, even on
reservations, state laws may be applied
unless such application would interfere
with reservation self-government or would
impair a right granted or reserved by
federal law. . . . Even so, in the
special area of state taxation, absent
cession of jurisdiction or other federal
statutes permitting it, there has been no
satisfactory authority for taxing Indian
reservation lands or Indian income from
activities carried on within the
boundaries of the reservation, and
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, [411 U.S. 164 (1973)], lays to
rest any doubt in this respect by holding
that such taxation is not permissible
absent congressional consent. Ibid.
(Emphasis added.) '" California v.
Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 107
S.Ct. at 1091, 55 U.S.L.W. at 4228.
(Emphasis in original.)
In determining whether there is congressional consent,
Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 105
S.Ct. 2399, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985), (cited in the footnote) is
particularly relevant. The case involved several Montana
taxes, among them Oil and Gas Conservation, Mont. Code Ann.
§82-11-101 et seq. (1983), that provided for an
assessment to be fixed against each barrel of crude petroleum
originally produced in order to defray the expenses of
enforcing the oil and gas laws and the operations of the Board
of Oil and Gas Conservation. Mont. Code Ann. §82-11-131
(1983). The Supreme Court held that Montana could not tax the
royalty interests in oil and gas leases issued to non-Indian
lessees pursuant to the. Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch.
198, 52 Stat. 347, codified at 25 U.S.C. §396a et seq.
(1938 Act). The Court considered whether the 1938 Act
incorporated the tax authorization of Indian lands by a 1924
statute, Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244,
codified at 25 U.S.C. §398 (1924 Act) which states:
"Unalloted land on Indian reservations
other than lands of the Five Civilized
Tribes and the Osage Reservation . . .
may be leased . . . for oil and gas
purposes. . . .: Provided, That the
production of oil and gas and other
minerals on such lands may be taxed by the
State in which said lands are located in
all respects the same as production on
unrestricted lands, and the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized and directed to
cause to be paid the tax so assessed
against the royalty interest on said
lands."
In addition to finding that the 1938 Act did not incorporate
the tax authorization of the 1924 Act, the court assumed for
purposes of this case that the 1924 Act's tax authorization
remained in effect for leases executed pursuant to the 1924
Act. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. at
767, 105 S. Ct. at 2404, 85 L.Ed.2d at 760.
Therefore it is our opinion that mineral interests owned by
Indian tribes are exempt from the Kansas statutory and
regulatory scheme when the interests result from a lease
issued to a non-Indian lessee pursuant to the 1938 Act
and are not exempt when the interests concern a lease issued
pursuant to the 1924 Act.
In conclusion, the statutory and regulatory scheme established
by K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 55-609(c), 55-711(c) and K.A.R. 82-3-206
imposes a tax. In our judgment, the mineral interests held by
the federal government are not exempt from this tax pursuant
to the implicit authority of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
found in 30 U.S.C. §189. The mineral interests held by Indian
tribes are exempt if they result from a lease issued to a
non-Indian lessee pursuant to the Indian Mineral Leasing Act
of 1938 found in 25 U.S.C. §396a. But the mineral interests
are not exempt if they result from a lease pursuant to the Act
of 1924 found in 25 U.S.C. §398 that specifically authorizes
the tax.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
GuenEasley
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JLM:GE:jm

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