Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-172

1986-172Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL December 15, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86- 172
Timothy J. Chambers
Reno County Attorney
Law Enforcement Center
210 West First Street
Hutchinson, Kansas 67501
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles--Uniform Act
Regulating Traffic; Rules of the Road; Serious
Traffic Offenses--Restrictions on Plea Bargaining
in Prosecutions for Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol or Drugs
Synopsis: K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1567(o) provides that no plea
bargaining agreement may be entered into "for the
purpose of permitting a person charged with a
violation of" K.S.A. 8-1567 and amendments, or any
parallel city ordinance, "to avoid the mandatory
penalties established by [that] section." A plea
negotiation agreement to reduce the charge from
driving under the influence (K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
8-1567) to reckless driving (K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
8-1566) in exchange for a guilty plea would be in
violation of this section if the purpose of the
agreement is to allow avoidance of the mandatory
penalties established for a DUI conviction.. The
conviction for a violation of K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
8-1567 is itself part of the mandatory penalties
imposed under that section because of the effect
such a conviction has on enhancing the sentence of
a subsequent DUI conviction. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1566; 8-1567; 12-4415, as
amended by L. 1986, ch. 185, §1; 22-2908, as
amended by L. 1986, ch. 185, 52.
Dear Mr. Chambers:
As County Attorney for Reno County, you request our opinion
regarding the K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1567(o) restriction on plea
negotiations in certain cases involving driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). In your request letter
you describe a specific situation in which, pursuant to plea
negotiations, the charge was amended from "driving under the
influence" to "reckless driving," though the defendant was
sentenced to the penalties required for driving under the
influence. In view of the fact that this defendant will not
have the conviction for driving under the influence on his
record, and that a subsequent conviction for driving under the
influence cannot be enhanced by the present conviction for
reckless driving, you question whether K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
8-1567(o) has been violated.
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1567(o) provides as follows:
"No plea bargaining agreement shall be
entered into nor shall any judge approve a
plea bargaining agreement entered into for
the purpose of permitting a person charged
with a violation of this section, or any
ordinance of a city in this state which
prohibits the acts prohibited by this
section, to avoid the mandatory penalties
established by this section or by the
ordinance. For the purpose of this
subsection, entering into a diversion
agreement pursuant to K.S.A. 12-4413 et
seq., and amendments thereto, shall
not constitute plea bargaining."
Three elements must be met before this subsection will be
deemed to have been violated. First, there must have been
plea negotiations. Second, these negotiations must lead to an
agreement the purpose of which is to permit the person charged
with a violation of driving under the influence of alcohol or
drugs to avoid the mandatory penalties established for such
violation. Third, the agreement must actually permit
avoidance of the mandatory penalties. A 1983 Kansas Supreme
Court case discusses K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1567(o):
"Let us consider what this provision does
and what it does not do. It prohibits
plea bargaining for the purpose of
permitting one charged with DUI to avoid
the mandatory penalties established by the
act.
"It does not prohibit plea bargaining in
any other type of case, nor does it
prohibit plea bargaining in cases where
DUI is charged when the purpose of the
plea bargain--and its ultimate effect--is
not to permit the accused to avoid the
mandatory DUI penalties. It does not
interfere with or curtail the power of the
prosecutor to review the evidence in good
faith and determine what charges should be
filed, or to amend or reduce the charges
as initially filed, or to dismiss the
prosecution.
"As an example, assume that a defendant is
charged with DUI, driving left of
center, failing to signal and failing to
stop at a stop sign. If the prosecutor
reviews the evidence and concludes that
the evidence is adequate to sustain
convictions on all charges, the plea
bargaining prohibition could work two
different ways.
"(1) Defense counsel offers to enter a
plea of guilty to all charges except DUI
if the State will dismiss (or reduce) that
one. The prosecutor may not accept and
the court may not approve such a plea
bargain as it would permit the defendant
to avoid the mandatory penalties
established by the statute.
"(2) Defense counsel offers to enter a
plea of guilty to the DUI charge if the
State will dismiss the remaining traffic
charges. The prosecutor may, if he or she
wishes, accept, and the court may approve
such a plea bargain, since the accused
would not thereby avoid the penalties
established by the DUI law.
"Let us assume that upon the filing of the
same four charges, the prosecutor reviews
the evidence and concludes that the
evidence is not sufficient to sustain a
conviction of DUI since the breath test
results were negative and the arresting
officer's testimony alone is
insufficient. A plea bargain is
unnecessary because charges which cannot
reasonably by proven should not be
maintained or used for 'leverage.' The
prosecutor should voluntarily dismiss or
reduce the DUI charge. Once this has
been done, there is no prohibition upon
plea bargaining as to the remaining
traffic charges." State v. Compton,
233 Kan. 691, 695, 696 (1983).
Plea bargaining is "the process whereby the accused and the
prosecutor negotiate a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case." Gifis, Law Dictionary, p. 153 (1975).
"Plea negotiations can center around the
defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser
offense, or to only one or some of the
counts in a multi-count indictment. In
return, the defendant seeks to obtain
concessions as to the type and length of
his sentence or reduction of counts
against him." Id., at 154.
The reduction of a charge, however, does not necessarily
signify the existence of plea bargaining. It may be that the
prosecutor has reviewed the evidence and determined that it is
insufficient for a conviction of driving under the influence,
and that the charge of reckless driving is more appropriate
under the circumstances. If this is done without negotiating
with the defendant for a plea in return for the reduction, it
is not a result of plea bargaining. A reduction of the charge
in this situation would not be a violation of K.S.A. 1985
Supp. 8-1567(o) because it does not constitute a plea
bargaining agreement.
You have indicated in your request letter that the reduction
from DUI to reckless driving was done pursuant to a plea
agreement. The question becomes, therefore, whether the plea
agreement was entered into for the purpose of permitting the
person charged to avoid the mandatory DUI penalties and
whether these penalties were actually avoided.
It is important to note three rules of criminal procedure
relevant to your particular inquiry. First, a prosecutor
cannot promise that a defendant will receive a specific
sentence in return for a plea. He may only promise to
recommend a particular sentence. Second, there must be a
factual basis to support the guilty plea. In other words, the
defendant cannot plead guilty to a crime wholly different than
the one he is charged with having committed. Finally, the
sentence must conform to the crime; the judge cannot exceed
the statutory guidelines in sentencing the defendant for the
crime to which he has plead guilty. In answering your
specific question, we are assuming that none of these
standards have been breached.
The term "penalty" has been variously defined by the different
courts in this country. It has been restricted to refer only
to deprivation of property or some right, such as the
enjoyment of liberty, in some instances [see Levy Motor
Vehicle Operator's License Case, 194 Pa.Super. 390, 169 A.2d
596, 597 (1961); State v. Cowen, 231 Iowa 1117, 3 N.W.2d
176, 179, 182 (1942)1, and used loosely in others "to embrace
all the consequences visited by law on the heads of those who
violate police requirements." Burrows v. Delta Transp.
Co., 106 Mich. 582, 64 N.W. 501, 507 (1&95). See also
State v. Finley, 199 Kan. 615, 620 (1967). Reading K.S.A.
1985 Supp. 8-1567(o) in pari materia with the other
subsections in that statute and those of related statutes, it
is our opinion that the term "penalty," as used in K.S.A. 1985
Supp. 8-1567(o), should be read broadly to include the effects
of having a DUI conviction on the individual's record and
possible use of that conviction to enhance the sentence of a
subsequent DUI conviction.
It is the paramount rule of statutory construction that the
purpose and intent of the legislature governs when that intent
may be ascertained from the statute. In re Estate of
Estes, 239 Kan. 192, 195 (1986); State v. Thompson, 237
Kan. 562, 563 (1985). Reading K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1567 in
its entirety and giving effect to all its various provisions,
it is apparent to us that the legislature has intended a
mandatory scheme of sentencing, which includes an enhanced
sentence for second, third and subsequent convictions. For
example, in certain circumstances diversion may be granted to
a first time offender under K.S.A. 1985 Supp.8-1567. See
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 22-2908, as amended by L. 1986, ch. 185,
§2; K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 12-4415, as amended by L. 1986, ch.
185, §1. However, under K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1567(j)(1), a
diversion is to be considered as a conviction "[f]or purposes
of determining whether a conviction is a first, second, third
or subsequent conviction in sentencing under [that statute]."
This illustrates the legislature's intent to enhance
sentencing for multiple violations of driving while under the
influence, even if the offender is given a "break" the first
time around. To allow the reduction of the charge from DUI
to reckless driving, and in so doing to allow the person
charged to avoid an enhanced sentence upon a subsequent
conviction, would be contrary to the intent of the
legislature.
Thus, it is our opinion that K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 8-1567(o)
precludes a plea bargaining agreement in which the charge is
reduced from driving under the influence to reckless driving
in exchange for a plea of guilty to the reckless driving
charge. This is so even if it is possible to sentence under
the DUI law and such penalties are actually imposed, because
part of the "mandatory penalties" established by K.S.A. 1985
Supp. 8-1567 are the fact that the DUI conviction goes on
the individual's record and may be used in the future to
enhance the sentence of a subsequent DUI conviction.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
JuleneL.Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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