Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1986-126

1986-126Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL September 2, 1986
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 86- 126
Robert J. Watson
City Attorney
Justice Center
8500 Antioch
Overland Park, Kansas
Re: Cities and Municipalities--Code for Municipal
Courts; Proceedings After Arrest and Prior to
Trial--Municipal Court Diversion; Driving Under the
Influence
Synopsis: Because the 1986 repeal of the prohibition of
k diversion for drivers having a blood-alcohol
concentration of .20 or higher is remedial
legislation, it is to be given retrospective
effect. In determining whether diversion is in the
interests of justice and the community, the factors
to be considered by the city prosecutor are not
affected by L. 1986, ch. 185, §1. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 12-4414; K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 12-4415(b)(3),
as amended by L. 1986, ch. 185, §1.
*
Dear Mr. Watson:
You have requested our opinion concerning the offering of
diversion programs to defendants who were arrested for alcohol
related offenses and whose blood alcohol concentrations
(BAC) were .20 or more. Specifically you inquire whether
defendants charged with alcohol related offenses after June
30, 1985, but before July 1, 1986, may be offered diversion.
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 12-4415(b)(3) provided that a defendant
whose BAC was .20 or greater was not eligible for
diversion. This provision became effective July 1, 1985.
However, L. 1986, ch. 185, §1 repeals K.S.A. 1985 Supp.
12-4415(b)(3). The dispositive question therefore is whether
§1 of L. 1986, ch. 185 is to be given retrospective
application. In our opinion, it is.
The availability of diversion is a privilege. No right to
diversion exists by statute or by common law. See, e.g.,
State v. Greenlee, 228 Kan. 712, 720 (1980). The
provisions of K.S.A. 12-4412 through K.S.A. 12-4418 merely
establish procedures by which a diversion program may be
offered if, in the judgment of the city prosecutor, it would
benefit the interests of justice and the community. K.S.A.
12-4414. In State v. Augustine, 197 Kan. 207 (1966),
it was noted that substantive law is "that which declares what
acts are crimes and prescribes the punishment therefore."
Id. at 209. In contrast, remedial legislation is defined as
that which provides methods or procedures, abridges
superfluities of former laws, and which remedies defects
therein. Remedial statutes are distinguished from substantive
statutes in that the latter confers a substantive right. In
re Estate of Brown, 168 Kan. 612, 617 (1950). The
legislative action in prohibiting diversion for those
defendants whose BAC was .20 or greater was substantive in
nature because the legislature was dictating the punishment
for a D.U.I. offense. In repealing this prohibition, however
the legislature is no longer prescribing the punishment, but
rather leaving it to the discretion of the prosecuting
attorney and providing procedural mandates. The purpose of
the 1986 amendment is to retract a cumbersome law which has
proven difficult to administer. See III Journal, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, April 2, 1986, att. III. There
is no indication that the repealing statute was enacted to
affect substantive rights. Accordingly, we believe that, as
opposed to substantive legislation, the amended section of
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 12-4415 is remedial in nature.
Generally, a statute operates prospectively, unless the
language of the statute itself clearly indicates a contrary
legislative intent. Tew v. Topeka Police & Fire Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 237 Kan. 96, 103 (1985). In this
instance, there is no indication in the statute that the
legislature intended retrospective application. However, the
general rule of construction is modified where the statutory
change is remedial and does not prejudicially affect the
substantive rights of the parties. Davis v. Hughes, 229
Kan. 91, 101-103 (1982). Where the change merely affects
1.
the procedure, as in this instance, based on the foregoing
rules of statutory construction the statute should be given
retrospective effect. Additionally, in this particular
situation the amendment serves as a benefit to the parties
involved rather than a detriment, thus there is no prejudicial
effect.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that the 1986 amendments to
K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 12-4415 apply to alleged offenders charged
after June 30, 1985. Drivers who have a BAC of .20 or
higher may be offered diversion if, in the judgment of the
city prosecutor, the interests of justice and the community
would be benefited. Factors which are to be considered appear
in K.S.A. 1985 Supp. 12-4415(a), and are unchanged by the
1986 amendments.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Julene L. Miller
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JLM:jm

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