Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-181

1985-181Kanag

Texte intégral

December 20, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 181
A. J. Albertini
Crawford County Commission
312 Webster Street
Pittsburg, Kansas 66762
Re: Taxation -- Miscellaneous Provisions -- Transfer of
Moneys From County General Fund
Synopsis: A board of county commissioners' use of general
fund moneys directly toward a road and bridge
obligation does not violate the dictates of K.S.A.
79-2934. Although this statute prohibits a county
from transferring moneys from its general fund to
any other specific fund, it sets no limitations on
the purposes for which moneys from the general fund
can be directly spent. Cited herein: K.S.A.
79-1946; 79-2927; 79-2934; Kan. Const., Art. 11,
55.
*
Dear Mr. Albertini:
As a member of the Board of County Commissioners of Crawford
County, you request our opinion as to the legality of
transferring moneys from the county general fund.
Specifically, you inform us that the commission has recently
made two payments to a construction company, under your
protest, for work performed on several different road projects
in the county. One payment was made from the road and bridge
fund in August, while the second came from the general fund
sometime later. Although the billing covered six different
projects dating back to 1981, and totaled almost $100,000, you
do not question that the work was actually performed for the
county, or that the money was actually owed to the
construction company. Rather, you question the payment of the
bill because of its tardiness, and because the county used its
general fund moneys to satisfy its road and bridge obligations.
This office is unable to offer an explanation for the
tardiness of the bill, but we have been informed by the
Crawford County engineer that the road and bridge construction
work, over which this dispute has arisen, was satisfactorily
performed and completed by the construction company. Further,
we concur with your belief that moneys cannot be diverted from
one county fund to another. This conclusion is supported by
K.S.A. 79-2934, which states in relevant part:
"No part of any fund shall be diverted to
any other fund, whether before or after
the distribution of taxes by the county
treasurer, except as provided by law
It
In our opinion, the statute prohibits the county from
transferring moneys from its general fund to any other
specific fund, i.e. the road and bridge fund. However, we
believe the statute sets no limitations on the manner in which
moneys from the general fund can be directly spent on specific
expenditures for the county. We believe that a county
commission's expenditure of general fund moneys directly
toward a road and bridge obligation does not violate the
dictates of K.S.A. 79-2934. This conclusion is consistent
with the Kansas Supreme Court's decision in School Dist.
No. 40, Ford County v. Board of Comm'rs of Clark County, 155
Kan. 636, modified 156 Kan. 221 (1942), and with prior
Attorney General Opinion No. 76-277, issued by Attorney
General Schneider in 1976, which addressed a similar problem.
In School Dist. No. 40, Ford County v. Board of Comm'rs of
Clark County, the court examined the legal effect of Article
11, §5 of the Kansas Constitution. That section states:
"No tax shall be levied except in
pursuance of a law, which shall distinctly
state the object of the same; to which
object only such tax shall be applied."
The court established the general rule that where money is
raised by levy of taxes for specific purposes, it may not be
diverted to another purpose. Although we agree with this
interpretation of legislative intent, in our opinion this
section is not applicable to the situation at hand. The
moneys which were expended to meet the road and bridge
obligation of Crawford County was raised for the general
purpose of meeting the general expenses of the county. This
general levy is authorized by K.S.A. 79-1946, which states in
relevant part:
"The board of county commissioners of each
of the several counties is hereby
authorized to fix a rate of levy annually
to meet and defray the current general
expenses of the county . . . ."
Thus, it is our opinion that this transfer of funds was both
constitutionally and statutorily authorized.
In Attorney General Opinion No. 76-277, the question of
whether a city may budget moneys for bond and interest
purposes and expenditures in its general fund was addressed.
The opinion noted that although the precise limits of
permissible expenditures from the general fund has never been
clearly defined, there are no statutory restrictions or
delineations of the permissible uses of a city general fund.
The opinion described the purpose of the general fund as such:
"Defined in a most general sense, the
general fund is the fund for which the
municipality accounts for all revenues and
expenditures for which it does not make
provision by other funds. Certainly,
there is no statutory or constitutional
basis for a conclusion that the payment of
municipal indebtedness or interest thereon
is, as a matter of law, an unlawful
general fund expenditure, or a purpose for
which general fund monies may not be
spent."
The opinion concluded that there was no constitutional or
statutory reason why the proceeds of a general fund levy could
not be expended for payment of municipal indebtedness and
interest therein. Likewise, we believe nothing prohibits a
county from expending moneys in its general fund for the
direct payment of a road and bridge obligation, assuming that
the expenditure has been budgeted pursuant to K.S.A. 79-2927.
Just as the former opinion's conclusion was unaffected by the
existence of a separate bond and interest levy made for the
identical purpose, we find the use of the general fund for
this special purpose expenditure to be legal, notwithstanding
the existence of a separate road and bridge fund which could
also have been used to satisfy the county's obligation.
In conclusion, it is our opinion that a county commission's
use of general fund moneys directly toward a road and bridge
obligation does not violate the dictates of K.S.A. 79-2934.
Although this statute prohibits a county from transferring
moneys from its general fund to any other specific fund, it
sets no limitations on the purposes for which moneys from the
general fund can be directly spent.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Barbara P. Allen
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JSS:BPA:crw

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.