Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-149

1985-149Kanag

Texte intégral

November 6, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 149
Charles E. Simmons
Chief Legal Counsel
Kansas Department of Corrections
700 Jackson
Topeka, Kansas 66603-3798
Re: Criminal Procedure -- Code of Criminal Procedure;
Costs in Criminal Cases -- Liability for Costs
Synopsis: K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-3801(c) requires the
Department of Corrections to reimburse a county for
jury fees paid by the county for prosecutions
resulting from crimes committed while a defendant
is on parole or conditional release status from a
state correctional institution. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-3801; K.S.A. 28-150; 21-4204;
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-3717, as amended by L. 1985,
ch. 111, §2; K.S.A. 60-1501.
Dear Mr. Simmons:
As chief legal counsel for the Department of Corrections, you
request our opinion on the scope of K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
22-3801(c). That statute deals with liability for costs in
criminal cases, and section (c) provides:
"Whenever jury fees are paid by the county
in a case in which the defendant was a
person who had been committed to an
institution under the control of the
secretary of corrections and had not been
finally discharged or released from the
institution, the department of corrections
shall reimburse the county for jury fees
paid by the county. The reimbursement
shall be paid from funds made available by
the legislature for that purpose."
(Emphasis added.)
This statute should be read in conjunction with K.S.A. 28-150,
which states the general rule that jury fees in civil and
criminal cases shall be paid by the county.
You seek our opinion as to whether the Department of
Corrections (DOC) is required to pay certain court costs
resulting from the prosecution of persons who are parolees or
who are on conditional release for crimes committed while on
such status. You state that in the past the DOC has
interpreted K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-3801(c) as being applicable
only to those instances where an inmate was prosecuted for a
crime committed while the inmate was physically located in his
or her assigned institution, or during an escape from such
facility. Given the content of applicable case law, we must
reach an opposite conclusion, i.e. parolees and persons on
conditional release are included as well.
It is well established that both a parolee and a conditional
releasee are in the "legal custody" of the Secretary of
Corrections. See Johnson v. Stucker, 203 Kan. 253 (1969);
State v. Garton, 8 Kan.App.2d 142 (1982). We believe
that a defendant who is still in the legal custody of the
DOC falls within the purview of K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-3801(c)
as someone who has not been "finally discharged or released
from an institution." Therefore, the DOC is required to
reimburse the county for jury fees paid by the county for
prosecutions resulting from crimes committed while the
defendant is on parole or conditional release status.
Both the Kansas Supreme Court and the Kansas Court of Appeals
have addressed the issue of when a parolee becomes free from
the custody of the state, and we believe their holdings are
determinative of the question you ask. In Johnson v.
Stucker, supra, the court addressed the issue of whether
habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for judicial review
of the action of the state board of probation and parole.
(K.S.A. 60-1501 offers the writ of habeas corpus to any person
"who is . . . restrained of liberty.") The court found that
habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy, stating that while
it is true that a paroled prisoner has been conditionally
released from actual custody, he remains in "legal custody" of
the institution from which he is released, and constructively
is a prisoner of the state. 203 Kan. at 259.
In State v. Garton, supra, the Kansas Court of Appeals
addressed the issue of when the five-year period commences
to run for a parolee under K.S.A. 21-4204(1)(b). Defendant
appealed from a conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm under the statute, which prohibits a person from
possessing a firearm who has been convicted of a felony or has
been released from imprisonment for a felony within five years
preceding such violation. Defendant conceded that his arrest
for possession of a firearm occurred within five years of his
final release. However, he argued that his release from
imprisonment for a felony must be computed from the date of
his parole, rather than from the date of his final release
from custody.
The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating that parole is a
conditional release from physical custody, not a reduction of
sentence or a pardon. K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-3717(g), as
amended by L. 1985, ch. 111, §2(h). The parolee remains in
the legal custody of the state, and so is constructively a
prisoner. Johnson v. Stucker, supra, K.S.A. 1984
Supp. 22-3717(g), as amended. The court noted that while on
parole, the parolee remains subject to arrest for violation of
the conditions of his parole. K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-3717(g) as
amended. In addition, any recommitment ordered by the Kansas
Adult Authority must of necessity be to serve any unexpired
portion of the parolee's sentence. Thus, the court of appeals
held that defendant's release from prison for commission of a
felony for purposes of K.S.A. 21-4204(1)(b) did not occur on
his parole date, but rather on the date of his final release
from custody. Likewise, we feel that a parolee or conditional
releasee has not been "finally discharged or released from the
institution" for purposes of K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 22-3801(c)
until he has completed his parole time and his imposed
sentence is over, thus releasing him from the legal custody of
the Secretary of Corrections.
Our decision on this matter is further supported by the
Supreme Court case of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,
33 L.Ed.2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593 (1972). In describing the
function of parole in the correctional process, the Court
stated:
"The essence of parole is release from
prison, before the completion of sentence,
on the condition that the prisoner abide
by certain rules during the balance of the
sentence. To accomplish the purpose of
parole, those who are allowed to leave
prison early are subjected to specified
conditions for the duration of their
terms. These conditions restrict their
activities substantially beyond the
ordinary restrictions imposed by law on an
individual citizen."
In short, the Supreme Court clearly indicated that a defendant
on parole from confinement in a penal institution does not
have the same privileges and freedoms as an ordinary citizen,
even though he is no longer physically confined by the state.
We accordingly conclude that the scope of K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
22-3801(c), when considered with the Kansas and United States
Supreme Court cases construing the meaning of parole for
purposes of discharge and release, should be interpreted
broadly. Prisoners on parole or conditional release are still
under the "legal custody" of the Secretary of Corrections
until such time as they have completed serving their
sentences. Although they are no longer physically confined
to an institution, constructively they are still prisoners of
the state. As such, they have not been "finally discharged or
released from the institution" under K.S.A. 1984 Supp.
22-3801(c). Therefore, the Department of Corrections is
required to reimburse a county for jury fees paid by the
county for prosecutions resulting from crimes committed while
a defendant is on parole or conditional release status.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN /
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
JeffreyS.Southard
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JSS:BPA:crw

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