Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-131

1985-131Kanag

Texte intégral

September 27, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 131
The Honorable Eric Yost
State Senator, 30th District
104 Post Oak Road
Wichita, Kansas 67206
Re: Constitution of the United States -- Fourteenth
Amendment -- Right to Privacy; Ability of State to
Regulate or Prohibit Abortion
Synopsis: The decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35
L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), permits a state to regulate or
even prohibit abortion after the stage of
viability, except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, to preserve the life
or health of the mother. Such regulations must be
narrowly tailored to fit the precise state interest
at stake. As a result, attempts to specify a
particular time during a pregnancy when viability
occurs or to interfere with the judgment of the
attending physician have been struck down as
unconstitutional, although general prohibitions on
post-viability abortions have been upheld. Cited
herein: U.S. Const., Fourteenth Amend.
Dear Senator Yost:
As State Senator for the 30th District, you request our
opinion concerning the ability of a state to regulate or
prohibit abortions after the time the fetus reaches
viability. You state that it is your reading of the cases in
this area that such actions on the part of a state have been
sanctioned by the courts, and request our opinion
accordingly. As there are no Kansas statutes involved, we
must direct our inquiry to the pertinent federal court
decisions which have been rendered on this subject since 1973.
As is universally recognized, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93
S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), is the landmark case in this
country dealing with abortion. The Supreme Court in Roe
found that women possess fundamental rights of privacy under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
and that a woman's "right of privacy . . . is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy." Id. at 153. Because the abortion decision
involves a fundamental right, "the Court has held that
regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
'compelling state interest'." Id. at 155 [citing Kramer
v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886,
23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969)].
However, the decision in Roe did not give a woman an
absolute right to an abortion, but rather balanced her
rights against the state's interests. These state interests
are defined in relation to the different stages of pregnancy.
From the stage prior to the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision is left to the woman and her physician;
during this stage there is no compelling state interest that
justifies regulation. Id. at 163. But cf. Planned
Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri v.
Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 416, 103 S.Ct. 2517, 76 L.Ed.2d 733
(1983) (requirement of pathology report for first trimester
abortions upheld because it furthered important state health
objectives without interfering with a woman's exercise of her
right); Planned Parenthood Association v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976) (minor informed
consent and record keeping requirements in first trimester
upheld). From the stage subsequent to the end of the first
trimester but prior to viability, the state may regulate
abortion, procedures in ways that are reasonably related to
maternal health, because of the state's compelling interest
in promoting the health of the mother. It is the the third
stage, that subsequent to viability, which is relevant to the
question you present. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
In discussing viability, the Roe court stated: "With
respect to the state's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the 'compelling' point is at viability. This
is because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id. at 163.
The Court defined "viable" as "potentially able to live
outside the womb, albeit with artificial aid," and noted that
"[v]iability is usually placed at about seven months (28
weeks) but may occur earlier, even at 24 weeks." Id. at 160.
Because of the state's compelling interest at the point of
viability, it may "regulate, and even proscribe, abortion,
except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother."
Id. at 163-164. Since the decision in Roe, several state
statutes defining viability or regulating abortions during the
final stage have been challenged as unconstitutional.
One of the first cases to be decided in response to Roe
occurred in Kentucky. The decision appears in the case law as
Wolfe v. Schroering, 388 F.Supp. 631 (W.D. Ky. 1974),
and involves a number of the sections of Kentucky law enacted
after Roe. One such section provided that once it can
reasonably be expected for the fetus to have reached
viability, no abortion shall be performed except to preserve
the life or health of the mother. In upholding this section
(although others were struck down), the federal district court
found:
"The Roe decision clearly gives the state
the right to regulate the abortion procedure
or even proscribe abortions after the point
of viability of the fetus has been reached.
This Court finds no objection to the wording
of this section. The words ' . . . may
reasonably be expected to have reached
viability . . . .' are within the scope of
the Supreme Court decision and are
sufficiently narrow to permit medical
judgment to determine viability. Viability
cannot be determined by the state; the
decision is a medical one and must be left
to the professional medical judgment of the
woman's physician just as in any other
medical procedure. As medical technology
advances, the point at which viability may
be determined will change. Therefore, as
long as viability is the standard or the
compelling point, a definite period of weeks
cannot be set by the state or the courts."
Id. at 637.
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, supra,
Missouri's abortion law was challenged. One of the challenged
provisions was the definition of "viability" as "that stage of
fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be
continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or
artificial life supportive systems." The court upheld this
definition, saying it was in accord with the definition in
Roe. The court went on to conclude: " . . . it is not the
proper function of the legislature or the courts to place
viability, which is essentially a medical concept, at a
specific point in the gestation period. The time when
viability is achieved may vary with each pregnancy, and the
determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and
must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible
attending physician." Id. at 64. Accordingly, no time
limit may be assigned to define the point of viability, and
the efforts of states to do so have been held invalid. See,
e.g., Hodgson v. Lawson, 542 F.2d 1350 (8th Cir.
1976) (Minnesota statute presumed viability after 20 weeks;
held invalid), Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.
La. 1980) (24 weeks; same result).
The next Supreme Court case to deal with the question of
viability was Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 99 S.Ct.
675, 58 L.Ed.2d 596 (1979). In this case, the court held that
a Pennsylvania statute which required a doctor to make a
determination of viability before performing an abortion was
void for vagueness. The statute read as follows:
"Every person who performs or induces an
abortion shall prior thereto have made a
determination based on his experience,
judgment or professional competence that
the fetus is not viable, and if the
determination is that the fetus is viable
or if there is a sufficient reason to
believe the fetus may be viable, shall
exercise that degree of professional
skill, care and diligence to preserve the
life and health of the fetus which such
person would be required to exercise in
order to preserve the life and health of
any fetus intended to be born and not
aborted and the abortion technique
employed shall be that which would provide
the best opportunity for the fetus to be
aborted alive so long as a different
technique would not be necessary to
preserve the life and health of the
mother." (Emphasis added.)
The second part of the statute subjected doctors who failed to
make the determination or to exercise professional care in
doing so to criminal and civil liability.
The Court found the statute unconstitutionally vague for three
reasons. First, it was unclear whether the physician was to
apply an objective or subjective standard in determining
viability. Id. at 391. Secondly, the phrase "may be
viable" could refer either to viability or to some point prior
to viability. This provision was found to have a chilling
effect on physicians who might perform abortions near the
point of viability. Id. at 391. Third, the vagueness was
aggravated by "the absence of a scienter requirement."
Although a physician may be subject to civil or criminal
penalties for failure to comply with the requirements, there
was no mention of intent. The Court saw "a profound chilling
effect on the willingness of physicians to perform abortions
near the point of viability in the manner indicated by their
best medical judgment." Id. at 396. See also Margaret S.
v. Edwards, supra, (statute requiring doctor to use method
most likely to preserve life of fetus impermissible, as it did
not give consideration to preservation of maternal health).
Colautti also reinforces the holding of Danforth that
viability is to be determined solely by the physician. 439
U.S. at 389.
It should not be assumed, however, that the federal courts
have never permitted some regulation of post-viability
abortions. In Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City,
Missouri v. Ashcroft, supra, the court upheld a second
physician requirement during abortions of a viable fetus. The
requirement was upheld because it reasonably furthered the
state's compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable
fetuses. However, there is an important qualification to this
holding, for Ashcroft is based on an assumption that the
Missouri statute had an implied exception to the second
physician requirement when there is an emergency situation.
Id. at 485, n. 8.
Further, in American College of Obstetricians v.
Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283 (3rd Cir. 1984), several of
Pennsylvania's abortion laws were again challenged. Abortions
after viability were prohibited, with the statute making it a
felony to "intentionally, knowingly or recklessly perform or
induce an abortion when the fetus is viable." Constitutional
challenges were raised to the two permitted defenses: (1) the
unborn child was not viable at the time of the abortion; or
(2) the abortion was necessary to preserve the life or health
of the mother. Both of these defenses relied on the doctor's
"good faith" and "best medical judgment."
The first defense was challenged as unconstitutional with the
argument that it placed the burden on the physician to prove
his innocence. In response, the court cited Simopolous v.
Virginia, 462 U.S. 506, 103 S.Ct. 2532, 76 L.Ed.2d 755
(1983), which held that while a state can place the burden on
the defendant to invoke medical necessity as a defense, the
burden of proof of lack of medical necessity must then shift
to the prosecution. Thus the court rejected the challenge to
the first defense. As to the second challenged defense, the
court was careful to take cognizance of the Supreme Court's
definition of maternal "health," which is broadly defined and
includes "all factors - physical, psychological, familial, and
the woman's age - relevant to the well-being of the patient."
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d
201 (1973). Those challenging the statute argued that the
Pennsylvania Legislature did not include all of these factors
in its definition of maternal health. While another part of
the statute expressly excluded psychological and emotional
impact from the definition of health, because no such
qualifications were stated in the viability section the court
construed the statute as constitutional, relying on the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to construe "health" as does
the Supreme Court of the United States. 737 F.2d at 299.
While the court expressly stated its concern over the chilling
effect of criminal sanctions, because there was no evidence of
such an effect it did not determine the issue. Id. at
299-300.
Another recent case dealing with the regulation of abortion
after viability is Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th
Cir. 1984). That case involved an Illinois statute which
imposed a standard of care on physicians performing abortions
on fetuses which are "viable" similar to that found in
Colautti, supra. The statute did not specify who was
to make the viability determination, the physician or an
assistant. The court held that: "when the state prescribes
such standards, it must afford due deference to the
conclusive viability determination of the attending
physician. In addition, the state must precisely tailor its
standards of care to the particular state interest at stake,
so that its statute precisely notifies physicians and their
assistants as to what conduct by them the state purports to
condemn." Id. at 460. Another invalid section of the
statute imposed criminal liability on physicians who perform
abortions on a fetus that may possibly be viable. Because the
state's interest in fetal life become compelling only at or
after viability, its interest in protecting fetal life cannot
justify a statute which could apply to some pre-viability
abortions. Id. at 461.
From a review of the above cases, it may be observed that all
decisions subsequent to Roe have merely applied or
"fine-tuned" principles which were laid out in the 1973
decision. This is true in all aspects of the abortion
question, including the issue of viability. While Roe set
forth, and subsequent cases have reaffirmed, the power of a
state to prohibit abortions after the stage of viability, this
power is limited to such an extent that most state efforts to
put it into practice have been deemed unconstitutional.
Federal courts have remained steadfast to the Roe doctrine
which places the life and health of the mother in a paramount
position, so that even a total prohibition on post-viability
abortions must contain an exception for such considerations.
Further, both the decision as to the status of the mother's
life and health and the viability of the fetus must be left to
the professional medical judgment of the woman's attending
physician. Accordingly, except where a state enacts a general
prohibition, as did Kentucky (see Wolfe v. Schroering,
supra), or defines viability in general terms (Danforth,
supra), it will be difficult for any statute imposing
concrete limits on abortion to pass constitutional muster
given the current state of the federal law.
In conclusion, the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147
(1973), permits a state to regulate or even prohibit abortion
after the stage of viability, except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, to preserve the life or health
of the mother. Such regulations must be narrowly tailored to
fit the precise state interest at stake. As a result,
attempts to specify a particular time during a pregnancy when
viability occurs or to interfere with the judgment of the
attending physician have been struck down as unconstitutional,
although general prohibitions on post-viability abortions
have been upheld.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Jeffrey S. Southard
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JSS:crw

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