Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1985-076

1985-076Kanag

Texte intégral

ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
July 5, 1985
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 85- 76
Howard Schwartz
Judicial Administrator
Kansas Judicial Center, 3rd Floor
301 West 10th
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Act Regulating
Traffic; Arrest and Issuance of Citations -- Failure
to Comply With Citation; Suspension of License;
Reinstatement Fee
Synopsis: As amended by chapter 78 of the 1985 Session Laws,
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-2110 provides that a district or
a municipal court shall inform the division of
vehicles of the Kansas Department of Revenue of any
person who fails to appear following the issuance of a
traffic citation. Upon receipt of such a report, the
division shall suspend the license of the violator
until notified of compliance by the court. The court
shall also assess a reinstatement fee of $25 for
each charge on which the person failed to make
satisfaction, with such fee in addition to any fine,
costs or penalties which may be imposed. If a traffic
citation contains more than one charge, the $25 fee
should be assessed on each of the charges, with the
word "charge" being equivalent to "count." Cited
herein: K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-2110, as amended by
L. 1985, ch. 78.
Dear Mr. Schwartz:
As Judicial Administrator for the Kansas Unified Judicial System,
you request our opinion concerning an amendment to K.S.A. 1984
8-2110, L. 1985, ch. 78, which was effective on May 16, 1985.
While there is no question about the basic intent of the
amendments to the statute (i.e. the assessment of a
reinstatement fee in those cases where failure to comply with
traffic citations has led to suspension of an individual's
license to drive), you inquire about the way in which the
reinstatement fee should be imposed. Specifically, you ask
whether the fee, which is set at $25, should be imposed for each
violation for which a person is charged, or whether a single
suspension should result in the imposition of but one
reinstatement fee.
As amended, K.S.A. 1984 8-2110 states as follows:
"(a) Failure to comply with a traffic citation
means failure either to (1) appear before any
district or municipal court in response to a
traffic citation and pay in full any fine and
court costs imposed or (2) otherwise comply
with a traffic citation as provided in K.S.A.
1984 Supp. 8-2118 and amendments thereto.
Failure to comply with a traffic citation is a
misdemeanor, regardless of the disposition of
the charge for which such citation was
originally issued.
"(b) In addition to penalties of law applicable
under subsection (a), when a person fails to
comply with a traffic citation, except for
illegal parking, standing or stopping, the
district or municipal court in which the
person should have complied with the citation
shall mail notice to the person that if the
person does not appear in district or municipal
court or pay all fines, court costs and any
penalties within 30 days from the date of
mailing, the division of vehicles will be
notified to suspend the person's driving
privileges. Upon the person's failure to
comply within such 30 days, the district or
municipal court shall notify the division of
vehicles. Upon receipt of a report of a
failure to comply with a traffic citation
under this subsection, pursuant to K.S.A.
8-255, and amendments thereto, the division of
vehicles shall notify the violator and suspend
the license of the violator until satisfactory
evidence of compliance with the terms of the
traffic citation has been furnished the
informing court. Upon such compliance the
informing court shall notify the division of
vehicles and the suspension or suspension
action shall be terminated.
"(c) When the district or municipal court
notifies the division of vehicles of a failure
to comply with a traffic citation pursuant to
subsection (b), the court shall assess a
reinstatement fee of $25 for each charge on
which the person failed to make satisfaction
regardless of the disposition of the charge
for which such citation was originally issued.
Such reinstatement fee shall be in addition to
any fine, district or municipal court costs
and other penalties. The court shall, at
least monthly, remit all reinstatement fees to
the state treasurer who shall credit such
moneys to the motor vehicle operating fund."
(Emphasis added.)
From the above, it may be observed that the amended statute
provides only one suspension per traffic citation, regardless of
how many charges may be included in the citation. Such a
suspension is open-ended, and may be lifted only through
compliance by the violator with the terms of the citation, which
include appearance at a court date and, if so ordered, payment of
a fine or compliance with any other penalty imposed by the court.
In determining whether the reinstatement fee should be imposed
for every charge, even if a number of such charges exist in a
single citation, we are guided by basic principles of statutory
construction. As noted in Southeast Kansas Landowners Ass'n v.
Kansas Turnpike Authority, 224 Kan. 357 (1978):
"The fundamental rule of statutory
construction, to which all others are
subordinate, is that the purpose and intent of
the legislature governs when that intent can
be ascertained form the statutes. Easom v.
Farmers Insurance Co., 221 Kan. 415, Syl. 2,
560 P.2d 117 (1977); Thomas County Taxpayers
Ass'n v. Finney, 223 Kan. 434, 573 P.2d 1073
(1978); Brinkmeyer v. City of Wichita, 223
Kan. 393, 573 P.2d 1044 (1978)." 224 Kan. at
367.
The court also has provided guidance in ascertaining the
legislature's intent, and we believe the following statement of
the court to be of relevance here:
"A primary rule for the construction of a
statute is to find the legislative intent from
its language, and where the language used is
plain and unambiguous and also appropriate to
the obvious purpose the court should follow
the intent as expressed by the words used and
is not warranted in looking beyond them in
search of some other legislative purpose or
extending the meaning beyond the plain terms
of the Act. (Alter v. Johnson, 127 Kan.
443, 273 Pac. 474; Hand v. Board of
Education, 198 Kan. 460, 426 P.2d 124; City
of Overland Park v. Nikias, 209 Kan. 643,
498 P.2d 56; Hunter v. Haun, 210 Kan. 11,
499 P.2d 1087.)" City of Kiowa v. Central
Telephone & Utilities Corporation, 213 Kan.
169, 176 (1973).
Of similar import is the court's pronouncement in Lakeview
Gardens, Inc. v. State, ex rel. Schneider, 221 Kan. 211
(1976):
"[T]his court must ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the legislature. In so doing
we must consider the language of the statute;
its words are to be understood in their plain
and ordinary sense. (Hunter v. Haun. 210
Kan. 11, 13, 499 P.2d 471.) When a statute is
plain and unambiguous this court must give
effect to the intention of the legislature as
expressed rather than determine what the law
should or should not be. (Amoco Production
Co. v. Armold, Director of Taxation, 213 Kan.
636, 647, 518 P.2d 453; Jolly v. Kansas
Public Employees Retirement System, 214 Kan.
200, 204, 519 P.2d 1391.)" 221 Kan. at 214.
With the above principles in mind, we have little difficulty in
concluding that the reinstatement fee which is mentioned in
subsection (c) of the statute should be implied for each charge
contained in the citation rather than only once per citation.
Had the legislature desired to assess only a single reinstatement
fee, the language contained in subsection (c) which states "each
charge on which the person failed to make satisfaction regardless
of the disposition of the charge" would be surplusage, a result
which is to be avoided if possible. American Fidelity Insurance
Company v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company, 3 Kan.App.2d 245
(1979).
Further, we note that other jurisdictions have construed the term
"charge" as being synonymous with the term "count." State v.
Puckett, 39 N.M. 511, 50 P.2d 964, 965 (1935); State v.
Thornton, 142 La. 797, 77 So. 634, 636 (1918). See also People
v. Toney, 13 Cal. Rptr. 756 (Cal.App. 1961) and State v.
Dye, 14 Ohio App.2d 7 237 N.E.2d 250 (1968). As a single
indictment, complaint or citation may contain a number of counts
or charges, we believe the legislature was specific in its intent
to impose the reinstatement fee for each separate offense. While
it is true that a license may be suspended only once, when the
fee is viewed as a punitive measure, we believe the legislature
intended to more strictly punish those individuals who fail to
appear in response to a number of different counts, rather than a
single count, which may be contained in a traffic citation.
Additionally, we have been informed that the division of vehicles
has interpreted the 1985 amendments to K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-2110
as requiring the assessment of the $25 fee for each charge
contained in the traffic citation. While not conclusive, the
interpretation given to a statute by the agency charged with its
enforcement is entitled to weight when the statute is construed.
Shawnee Mission Medical Center v. Kansas Department of Health
& Environment, 235 Kan. 983 (1984).
In conclusion, as amended by chapter 78 of the 1985 Session Laws,
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 8-2110 provides that a district or a
municipal court shall inform the division of vehicles of the
Kansas Department of Revenue of any person who fails to appear
following the issuance of a traffic citation. Upon receipt of
such a report, the division shall suspend the license of the
violator until notified of compliance by the court. The court
shall also assess a reinstatement fee of $25 for each charge on
which the person failed to make satisfaction, with such fee in
addition to any fine, costs or penalties which may be imposed.
If a traffic citation contains more than one charge, the $25 fee
should be assessed on each of the charges, with the word "charge"
being equivalent to "count."
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
JeffreyS.Southard
Deputy Attorney General
RTS:JSS:crw
election" as used in K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 25-432(e) refers to an
election other than the mail ballot election which is held on
the same date. It does not refer to each individual question
upon which a voter may exercise his or her choice. Therefore,
K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 25-432(e) does not prohibit the submission
of more than one question on a single mail ballot. This
conclusion is, of course, subject to the understanding that
compliance has been had with all other statutory provisions
relating to the submission of specific questions to the voters.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Mary F. Carson
Assistant Attorney General
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