Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-123

1983-123Kanag

Texte intégral

August 17, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 123
The Honorable Robert A. Thiessen
Judge of the Municipal Court
City Hall, Third Floor
455 North Main
Wichita, Kansas 67202
Re: Automobiles -- Serious Traffic Offenses -- Driving
While Under Influence of Alcohol; Definition of
"Imprisonment"
Synopsis: As amended by L. 1983, ch. 37, K.S.A. 8-1567(c)
provides that persons convicted for the first
time for the offense of driving while under the
influence of alcohol shall be sentenced to not
less than 48 hours' imprisonment or 100 hours of
public service. The term "imprisonment" includes
not only actual incarceration in jail, but may
refer to any situation in which the defendant's
liberty is restrained and he or she is subject
to additional sanctions should an escape be made.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 8-1567, as amended by
L. 1983, ch. 37.
Dear Judge Thiessen:
As Judge of Division No. 1 of the Wichita Municipal Court,
you request our opinion on a question of interpretation which
has arisen from the wording of the Kansas statute which pro-
scribes driving while under the influence of alcohol, K.S.A.
8-1567, as amended by L. 1983', ch. 37. The City of Wichita
has taken action under subsection (n) of the statute to enact
a municipal ordinance which contains the same minimum penal-
ties as does the statute. Accordingly, any interpretation of
the penalty provisions of the statute can also be applied to
the corresponding sections of the ordinance.
You inform us that the municipal court is considering ways
in which to deal with the increasing number of persons who
are sentenced as first time offenders under the ordinance.
As is the case in subsection (c) of the statute, a person
convicted of a first violation of the ordinance shall be
sentenced to not less than 48 hours' imprisonment or 100
hours of public service, as the court in its discretion .may
determine. You inquire whether the minimum time which must
be served as "imprisonment" can be spent at a location other
than a jail or security facility. You give the example of
a program by which such offenders would be required to "check
in" to an enclosure such as a gymnasium or armory where they
would remain for 48 hours. Food would be brought in and
classes presented by personnel from the community alcohol
and drug safety action program. While the facility would not
be converted into a jail, it would be made clear to the indi-
viduals participating that they could not come and go as they
pleased, and that to do so would result in the imposition of
more restrictive penalties by the court. However, we note
that you have not requested our opinion as to the specific
details by which such a program would be set up or adminis-
tered.
In our opinion, the concept of such a program would be per-
mitted under both the statute and the city ordinance, given
the traditionally broad interpretation which courts have
given to the term "imprisonment." In its general sense, im-
prisonment is the restraint of one's liberty which is imposed
as punishment by a court or other lawful tribunal. United
States v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014 (D. Ore. 1908). While it
amounts to a physical detention of the defendant's person,
it is not necessary that ,the restraint be behind prison bars.
United States v. Curran, 297 F. 946, 950 (2nd Cir. 1924).
Individuals placed in hospitals or rehabilitation facilities
by court order have been held to be legally imprisoned for
purposes of criminal laws which punish escape from custody.
Commonwealth v. Jones, 211 Pa.Super. 366, 236 A.2d 834 (1967),
State v. Michels, 30 A.D.2d 666, 292 N.Y.S.2d 323, 325 (1968).
Even an individual on furlough from a correctional institution
was held to be still imprisoned for the purposes of a
statute providing criminal sanctions for breaking prison.
Commonwealth v. Bey, 221 Pa.Super. 405, 292 A.2d 519, 521
(1972). In short, restrictions on individual liberty which
are imposed by a court, even if not a total deprivation,
have been widely held to constitute imprisonment. Therefore,
it is our conclusion that the situation which you present
would satisfy the statutory requirement concerning imprisonment.
In conclusion, as amended by L. 1983, ch. 37, K.S.A. 8-1567(c)
provides that persons convicted for the first time for the
offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol
shall be sentenced to not less than 48 hours' imprisonment
or 100 hours of public service. The term "imprisonment".
includes not only actual incarceration in jail, but may
refer to any situation in which the defendant's liberty is
restrained and he or she is subject to additional sanctions
should an escape be made.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Jeffrey	S.Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle

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