Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1983-079

1983-079Kanag

Texte intégral

May 19, 1983
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 83- 79
Mr. Howard Schwartz
Judicial Administrator
Kansas Judicial Center
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Cities and Muncjpalities--Code for Municipal
Courts; General Provisions--Municipal Court;
Jurisdiction
Synopsis: No provision of the Code of Procedure for Municipal
Courts, or any other statutory provision, grants
general authority to cities to penalize ordinance
violations by imprisonment for a term commensurate
to that of a felony. Further, cities do not have
such authority under constitutional home rule powers,
since punishment of serious offenses, for which a
term of imprisonment in excess of one year may be
imposed, is not a "local affair," as said term is
used in Article 12, §5 of the Kansas Constitution.
However, where the state of Kansas has, by statute,
delegated to cities the authority to impose such a
sentence with respect to a particular ordinance
violation, a municipal judge may validly impose the
sentence. The state of Kansas has delegated such
authority with respect to third or subsequent
violations of Section 31 of the Standard Traffic
Ordinance of Kansas Cities, but has not delegated
such authority with respect to violations, for a
third or subsequent time, of Section 192 of said
Ordinance. Cited herein: K.S.A. 8-262, 8-1401,
8-1568, 8-2001, 8-2204, 12-4101, 12-4104, 12-4509,
12-4510, 13-401, 13-424, 13-601, 14-401, 14-439,
14-801, 15-440, 15-501, 20-1401, 20-1403, 20-1424,
20-1428, 20-1501, 20-1502, 20-1601, 20-1603, 20-1801,
20-1803, 20-1901, 20-1902, 20-2001, 20-2002, 20-2101,
20-2102, L. 1965, ch. 90, §1, L. 1973, ch. 61, §12-4702,
Kan. Const., Art. 12, §5.
* *
Dear Mr. Schwartz:
You request our opinion concerning several jurisdictional questions
confronting municipal courts. Your questions, and our responses
and discussion relative thereto, are set forth below.
"1. In Kansas, may a municipal court judge
validly impose a sentence of confine-
ment greater than one year? If so,
in what facility is the sentence of
confinement to be served?"
Prior to the adoption of the Kansas Code of Procedure for Municipal
Courts, K.S.A. 12-4101 et seq., various statutes provided for the
operation and establishment of "police courts" and "city courts"
in Kansas cities. See G.S. 1949 (and Supplements thereto), 13-601,
14-801, 15-591, 20-1401, 20-1424, 20-1501, 20-1601, 20-1801, 20-1901,
20-2001, and 20-2101. The jurisdiction of police courts and city
courts, in criminal proceedings, was limited, by statutory provisions,
to misdemeanor or petty offenses. See G.S. 1949 (and Supplements
thereto), 13-424, 14-439, 15-440, 20-1403, 20-1428, 20-1502, 20-1603,
20-1803, 20-1902, 20-2002, and 20-2102. Upon adoption of the Kansas
Code of Procedure for Municipal Courts (or, as to some of the city
courts, shortly prior thereto or shortly thereafter), statutes
relating to procedure and jurisdiction in police courts and city
courts were repealed, and the following statutory jurisdiction
was prescribed by the Code for municipal courts:
"The municipal court of each city shall
have jurisdiction to hear and determine
cases involving violations of the ordinances
of the city." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A.
12-4104.
We do not think that by enacting the above-quoted jurisdictional
statute, the Kansas Legislature intended to grant general authority
to cities to prescribe penalties (for ordinance violations) which
are in excess of those traditionally set for misdemeanors, and to
generally expand the jurisdiction of municipal tribunals so as to
permit the imposition of such penalties by municipal judges.
In regard to the lack of any general authority of cities to
prescribe penalties commensurate to those set for felonies, it
should first be noted that upon enactment of the Code of Procedure
for Municipal Courts, the legislature repealed statutory provisions
(K.S.A. 13-424, 14-439, and 15-440) which authorized cities to
impose fines and imprisonment for ordinance violations. L. 1973,
ch. 62, §12-4702. However, rather than indicating a legislative
intent to authorize cities to prescribe any term of imprisonment
for an ordinance violation, it is our opinion that the repeal
of these statutes simply reflected legislative recognition of
city home rule powers emanating from Article 12, §5 of the Kansas
Constitution. The legislature had previously, in 1965, repealed
statutes (K.S.A. 13-401, 14-401, 15-401) granting to cities the
general authority to enact ordinances, upon express recognition
that, after the effective date of the Home Rule Amendment, it
was no longer necessary for the legislature to confer upon cities
powers over their local affairs and government. See L. 1965,
ch. 90, Preamble, §1. Therefore, in our opinion, the enactment
of the Code of Procedure for Municipal Courts, and repeal of
the aforesaid statutes, do not constitute general authority
for cities to penalize ordinance violations by imprisonment
for a term commensurate to that of a felony. Further, we are
unaware of any Kansas statute which grants such general authority.
Having concluded that certain statutory provisions relating to
the authority to adopt ordinances, and penalize violations there-
of, were repealed because of the Home Rule Amendment, we are
impelled to consider whether a city may, pursuant to home rule
powers, punish an ordinance violation by imprisonment in excess
of one year. In considering whether said punishment is permis-
sible, it should first be noted that the Home Rule Amendment
empowers Kansas cities to determine only "their local affairs
and government." Further, the Kansas Supreme Court has held
that Kansas cities need not rely on enabling statutes in order
to act by ordinance in matters of local concern, City of Junction
City v. Lee, 216 Kan. 495, 498 (1975), and that the enactment
of the state's criminal code does not preempt cities from
enacting ordinances defining and penalizing criminal conduct.
Garten Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Kansas City, 219 Kan. 620,
624 (1976). Additionally, this office has previously opined that,
where the state of Kansas has declared an act or omission by
law to be a felony, municipalities are without authority to
prescribe misdemeanor sanctions for the same conduct. See
Kansas Attorney General Opinion No. 81-222. However, neither
the Kansas Supreme Court, nor this office, has had occasion to
consider, generally, whether a penalty provision, authorizing
a term of imprisonment in excess of one year, is a "local affair,"
for purposes of determining the validity of an ordinance adopted
pursuant to home rule powers.
As no Kansas case addresses the question of whether a city
ordinance may, pursuant to home rule powers over local affairs
and government, prescribe "felony-level" sanctions for violations
thereof, we must turn elsewhere for guidance. McQuillin, a
recognized authority on the law of municipal corporations,
indicates that serious offenses are not a "local concern,"
stating as follows:
"In many jurisdictions the rule is that
felonies and high, gross or indictable
misdemeanors cannot be dealt with by
ordinance under general power, since they
are regarded as of statewide and not local
concern. Conversely, an ordinary or minor
misdemeanor, petty offense or mere infraction
of law is a proper subject for an ordinance."
(Emphasis added.) [Footnotes omitted.]
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3rd Ed.)
§23.06.
We concur in the above-stated rule, which is followed in many
jurisdictions, and it is our opinion that punishment of serious
offenses, for which a term of imprisonment in excess of one
year may be imposed, is not a "local affair," as said term is
used in Article 12, §5 of the Kansas Constitution. Therefore,
in our judgment, a city ordinance may not, pursuant to home
rule powers, prescribe a term of imprisonment in excess of one
year for violations thereof.
As a city has no general authority to adopt an ordinance which
authorizes a sentence of confinement greater than one year, it
follows that a municipal court judge, whose jurisdiction is
limited to sentencing persons found guilty of violating ordinances
(K.S.A. 12-4104 and 12-4509), may not ordinarily impose a sentence
of confinement greater than one year. However, as will be dis-
cussed below, where the state of Kansas has, by statute, delegated
to cities the authority to impose such a sentence with respect
to a particular ordinance violation, a municipal judge may
validly impose such a sentence, and, pursuant to K.S.A. 12-4510,
the sentence is to be served by confinement in the city jail.
"2. If a city in Kansas adopts the Standard
Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities
(League of Kansas Municipalities: 1982),
does a municipal court have jurisdiction
to hear and determine a case in which a
person is alleged to have violated section
192 of the Standard Traffic Ordinances
for a third or subsequent time, in that
K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 8-262 makes such third
or subsequent violation a felony?"
Section 192 of the Standard Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities
provides as follows:
"Any person who drives a motor vehicle
on any public highway of this city at
a time when his privilege so to do is
canceled, suspended or revoked shall
upon a first conviction be punished by
imprisonment for not more than six (6)
months or fined not to exceed $1,000,
or both. Every person convicted of
violating this section shall upon a
second conviction be punished by impris-
onment not to exceed one year or fined
not to exceed $2,500, or both. Every
person convicted of violating this section
shall upon a third or subsequent conviction
be punished by imprisonment of not less
than one year and a maximum term which
shall be fixed by the court at not less
than two years nor more than five years
or fined not to exceed $5,000, or both.
No person shall be convicted under this
section if such person was entitled at the
time of arrest under K.S.A. 8-257 to the
return of such person's license or was, at
the time of arrest, eligible under K.S.A.
Supp. 8-256 to apply for a new license
to operate a motor vehicle. Every person
convicted under this section shall be sen-
tenced to at least 5 days imprisonment and
fined at least $100 and upon a second or
subsequent conviction shall not be eligible
for parole until completion of at least
five days imprisonment. (K.S.A. Supp.
8-262)" (Emphasis added.)
The provisions of the above-quoted section are identical to
those of subsection (a) of K.S.A. 8-262, except that the statute
prescribes the penalties for violations thereof by characterizing
them as class B and A misdemeanors, and class E felonies, re-
spectively. In Kansas Attorney General Opinion No. 82-155,
this office opined that a city ordinance covering the offense
proscribed by K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-262 must contain the same
penalties found in the statute, and that the imposition (by a
municipal court) of a sentence commensurate with a class E felony
did not violate the constitutional right to trial by jury.
However, we did not, in said opinion, consider whether the
imposition of a sentence equivalent to a class E felony, for
a third conviction of violating an ordinance which is identical
to K.S.A. 8-262, was within the jurisdiction of a municipal
court. We now consider said issue for the first time.
As noted in our response to question number one, above, a municipal
court has jurisdiction to impose a sentence of confinement greater
than one year only where the state of Kansas has, by statute,
delegated to cities the authority to impose such a sentence with
respect to a particular ordinance violation. We are unaware of
any delegation of authority, either express or implied, which
would permit a city to impose a penalty commensurate to a class E
felony for a third violation of a city ordinance covering the
offense proscribed by K.S.A. 8-262(a). We conclude, therefore,
that a municipal court does not have jurisdiction to hear and
determine a case in which a person is alleged to have violated
section 192 of the Standard Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities
for a third or subsequent time.
Although you have not requested an opinion relative thereto,
we are impelled to consider whether a municipal court would
have jurisdiction to hear and determine a case in which a person
was charged with violating, for a third and subsequent time,
section 31 of the Standard Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities,
which section sets forth an ordinance provision identical to
K.S.A. 8-1568(a) (fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer).
The last cited statute is part of the Uniform Act Regulating
Traffic on Highways, K.S.A. 8-1401 to 8-2204, and the application
of said Act is governed by the following statutory provision:
"The provisions of this act shall be
applicable and uniform throughout this
state and in all cities and other polit-
ical subdivisions therein, and no local
authority shall enact or enforce any
ordinance in conflict with the provisions
of this act unless expressly authorized;
however, local authorities may adopt ad-
ditional traffic regulations which are
not in conflict with the provisions of
this act." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A.
8-2001.
In City of Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360, 365 (1957),
the Kansas Supreme Court, in construing the forerunner of the
above-quoted statute, held that the underscored language, above,
authorized cities to "adopt additional traffic ordinances which
are not in conflict with the provisions of the Uniform Act."
An ordinance identical to K.S.A. 8-1568(a) (such as Section
31 of the Standard Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities), including
the "felony-level" sentence provided for a third and subsequent
conviction, would not, in our judgment, conflict with the provisions
of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways. Additionally,
in our opinion, by virtue of the underscored portion of K.S.A.
8-2001, above, the state of Kansas has delegated to cities
the authority to impose a sentence commensurate to that pre-
scribed by K.S.A. 8-1568(a), where a city has adopted a "parallel"
ordinance covering the offense proscribed by said statute.
Therefore, in our judgment, a municipal court has jurisdiction
to hear and determine a case in which a person is charged with
violating, for a third and subsequent time, Section 31 of
the Standard Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities.
As your third and fourth questions, relating to sentencing,
confinement and parole for "felony-level" violations of section
192 of the Standard Traffic Ordinance for Kansas Cities are moot
since we have concluded that a municipal court does not have
jurisdiction to hear and determine such a case, we will not
respond to said questions herein.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:TRH:jm

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