Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-224

1982-224Kanag

Texte intégral

October 21, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 224
Rod Symmonds
Lyon County Attorney
Courthouse
Emporia, Kansas 66801
Re: Taxation--Gross Earnings from Money, Notes and
Other Evidence of Debt--Maximum Rate of Tax;
Tax Situs
Synopsis: The "new intangibles tax law," 1982 HB 3142
(L. 1982, ch. 63), effectively limits, to 3%,
the rate that can be levied against the gross
earnings derived from money, notes and other
evidence of debt, because money, notes and other
evidence of debt having a tax situs in any city
do not have a tax situs in a township. Therefore,
a gross earnings tax levied by a board of trustees
of a township does not apply to earnings derived
from money, notes and other evidence of debt
owned by persons who reside within the corporate
limits of any city located in such township.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 68-518c, K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
79-3109 (now repealed), K.S.A. 79-3111 (now
repealed), 79-3115 (now repealed), 80-907,
80-908, 80-932, 80-1413, 80-1503; L. 1982, ch.
63, §1; L. 1982, ch. 407, §1.
*
Dear Mr. Symmonds:
Your predecessor requested our opinion concerning the provisions
of 1982 House Bill No. 3142 (HB 3142), now found at chapter 63
of the 1982 Session Laws of Kansas. This is the "new intangibles
tax law." The specific inquiries presented for our consideration
are as follows:
"(1) Can townships levy intangibles tax
on residents of the third class cities
located within the township?
"(2) Does House Bill 3142 retain a maximum of
3% that can be levied against the gross
taxable income [sic], with .75% of that
amount available to the county, and 2.25%
for the city or township?"
It is our understanding that the Board of Trustees of Americus
Township has imposed the tax at the maximum rate authorized,
2.25%. The Board believes this tax levy is applicable to the
gross earnings derived from intangibles owned by people who reside
within the corporate limits of Americus City, a city of the third
class which is located within the boundaries of Americus Township.
In response to your inquiries, we note initially that, in certain
instances, people who reside in third class cities are subject to
taxes imposed by the board of trustees of the township in which
the city is located. For example, under K.S.A. 80-932, the
board of trustees of a township is authorized to levy a property
tax to fund the expenses of caring for and maintaining cemeteries.
Under this statute, the tax is payable by persons who live in third
class cities which are located in the township. However, not all
taxes levied by a board of trustees of a township are payable by
residents of third class cities located within the township. See,
e.g., K.S.A. 68-518c, 80-907 and 80-908, 80-1413, and 80-1503,
each of which authorizes a township tax, but excludes from the
tax property located in cities of the third class. Thus, in deter-
mining whether a tax imposed by a board of trustees of a township
is applicable to residents of third class cities, reference must
be made to the provisions of the statute which authorizes the
imposition of the tax.
Subsection (c) of section 1 of HB 3142, in part, provides:
"In the year 1982 or any year thereafter,
the township board of any township is here-
by authorized to adopt a resolution imposing
a tax for the benefit of such township upon
the gross earnings derived from money, notes
and other evidence of debt having a tax situs
in such township. The rate of tax shall be in
the amount of 1/8 of 1% of the total gross
earnings, or any multiple thereof not exceeding
an amount equal to 2 1/4% of the total gross
earnings derived from such money, notes and
other evidence of debt during the taxable year
of the taxpayer ending during the last pre-
ceding calendar year." (Emphasis added.)
However, subsection (b) of that section authorizes "the governing
body of any city . . . to pass an ordinance imposing a tax for
the benefit of such city upon the gross earnings derived from
money, notes and other evidence of debt having a tax situs in
such city." (Emphasis added.) This subsection also provides:
"The rate of tax shall be in the amount of
1/8 of 1% of the total gross earnings, or
any multiple thereof not exceeding an amount
equal to 2 1/4% of the total gross earnings
derived from such money, notes and other
evidence of debt during the taxable year
of the taxpayer ending during the last
preceding calendar year."
Subsection (a) of section 1 of this new law authorizes the board
of county commissioners to levy a tax at a rate not exceeding 3/4
of 1% of the total gross earnings derived from money, notes and
other evidence of debt.
This law does not state, in express terms, that gross earnings
shall have a tax situs in either a city or a township, and not
both. However, based upon well-established rules of statutory
construction, we believe this was the intent of the legislature.
In Brown v. Keill, 224 Kan. 195 (1978), the Kansas Supreme Court
said:
"The fundamental rule of statutory construc-
tion, to which all others are subordinate, is
that the purpose and intent of the legislature
governs when that intent can be ascertained
from the statute, even though words, phrases
or clauses at some place in the statute must
be omitted or inserted. (Farm & City Inc. Co.
v. American Standard Ins. Co., 220 Kan. 325,
Syl. ¶3, 552 P.2d 1363 [1976].) In determin-
ing legislative intent, courts are not limited
to a mere consideration of the language used,
but look to the historical background of the
enactment, the circumstances attending its pas-
sage, the purpose to be accomplished and the
effect the statute may have under the various
constructions suggested. (State, ex rel., v.
City of Overland Park, 215 Kan. 700, Syl. 1(10,
527 P.2d 1340 [1974].)" Id. at 199.
Also, in State, ex rel., v. Murphy, 183 Kan. 698 (1958), the
Court said, at page 702: "Legislative intent must be determined
with reference to the situation and existing conditions at the
time of enactment."
It is a well-known fact that the provisions of HB 3142 were
enacted in response to the decision of the Kansas Supreme Court
in Von Ruden v. Miller, 231 Kan. 1 (1982). In this case, the
Supreme Court struck down, as unconstitutional, subsection (b)
of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 79-3109. The Court held that this subsection
authorized local units of government to reduce or eliminate the
statewide 3% tax imposed under subsection (a) of the same statute.
This, the Court held, was an unauthorized delegation of legislative
authority. Id. at Syl. 117.
The decision of the Supreme Court was rendered March 5, 1982.
It had the effect of maintaining or, in many locales, of re-
establishing the statewide tax, in an amount equivalent to 3%
of the gross earnings derived from money, notes and other evidence
of debt. Without legislation, therefore, all persons receiving
earnings from money, notes and other evidence of debt would have
been subject to this tax, at the rate of 3%, subject to certain
exemptions prescribed by law.
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Von Ruden, two
bills concerning intangibles taxation were enacted. One, of
course, was HB 3142. The other was 1982 House Bill No. 3130
(HB 3130), L. 1982, ch. 407. Under the provisions of HB 3130,
the state-imposed intangibles tax (K.S.A. 79-3108 et seq.) was
repealed. However, HB 3142 authorized the imposition of a "local
intangibles tax." The minutes of both the Senate and House
Assessment and Taxation Committees and those of the Senate and
House Ways and Means Committees indicate that the Revisor of
Statutes, who had been requested by the committees to explain
the provisions of HB 3142, advised the committees that the bill
"attempts to maintain the status quo for those local units of
government which are the beneficiaries of intangibles tax."
(Minutes of the House Committee on Assessment and Taxation,
March 17, 1982, p. 2.) Similar statements appear in the minutes
of the Senate Committee on Ways and Means, for April 6, 1982,
at pages 2-3. But, what was the "status quo?"
Under K.S.A. 79-3115 (now repealed), the county would have
received 3/4 of 1% of the tax collected and the city or town-
ship in which a taxpayer resided would have received the re-
maining 2 1/4% of the tax revenue. Pursuant to K.S.A. 79-3111
(now repealed), the director of taxation would have certified
to the county clerk of each county the amount of intangibles
tax to be levied in the county and each city or township in the
county. Under the certification from the director, an amount of
intangibles tax owed by a particular taxpayer would have been
paid to the county and to the city or the township in which
the taxpayer resided. The place of residence of a taxpayer
was determined by specific inquiries included in the intangibles
tax return. If a taxpayer resided in an incorporated city, the
taxpayer was not to provide the name of the township in which the
city was located. Thus, the provisions of the "state-imposed"
intangible tax, which allowed counties, cities and townships to
fix the rate of the tax, were interpreted and administered by the
director of taxation as providing that taxpayers residing in any
incorporated city did not owe taxes to a township. This had always
been the interpretation given to, and the method of administering,
the provisions of the "state-imposed" intangibles tax, K.S.A. 79-3108
et seq. (now repealed).
In regard to this, we find pertinent the following statement of
the Court in Rogers v. Shannahan, 221 Kan. 221 (1977):
"It is presumed the legislature had and
acted with full knowledge and information
as to the subject matter of the statute,
as to prior and existing law and legislation
on the subject of the statute and as to the
judicial decisions with respect to such prior
and existing law and legislation." Id. at
225.
We assume, therefore, that the legislature was fully aware of
the provisions of K.S.A. 79-3115 and the manner in which the
provisions it adopted in HB 3142 had been interpreted in the past.
Except for the additional exemptions which are provided and the
fact that the rate of tax is no longer fixed by statute, the
"gross earnings" tax in HB 3142 perpetuates the essential provisions
of K.S.A. 79-3108 et seq., virtually without change. Accordingly,
consistent with established rules of statutory construction and
the testimony presented to the committees of the 1982 Legislature
which considered HB 3142, we must conclude that the provisions
of HB 3142 do, in fact, reflect an underlying legislative intent
to preserve the "status quo" achieved by the essential provisions
of the prior law. Thus, in order to effectuate the legislature's
intent and purpose [see Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v.
Dickerson, 229 Kan. 622 (1981), and the cases cited therein at
630], HB 3142 must be construed as requiring that the intangibles
of a taxpayer who resides in a city have a tax situs in such city
and not in the township in which the city is located, thereby
effectively perpetuating the prior law's 3% limitation on the
tax which may be imposed. In our judgment, such interpretation
is the only means for preserving the "status quo" sought by the
legislature.
Clearly, if HB 3142 is interpreted to provide that the residents
of third class cities are subject to a county intangibles tax,
a city intangibles tax, and a township intangibles tax, the status
quo is not maintained. Under such interpretation, those people
could be required to pay as much as 5 1/4% of the gross earnings
they receive from money, notes and other evidence of debt, as
taxes under HB 3142. This total would be comprised of a county
tax of 3/4 of 1%, a city tax of 2 1/4%, and a township tax of
2 1/4%. Under the prior law, those people were subject to a
maximum tax of 3%. In addition, both the city and the township
in which these people reside would receive proceeds from the
intangibles tax levy. This was not true under the provisions
of K.S.A. 79-3111 and 79-3115, which were discussed above.
In summary, therefore, we are of the opinion that, under HB 3142,
the maximum amount of levy that can be imposed upon money, notes
and other evidence of debt is 3%. In our judgment, HB 3142 must
be interpreted as specifying that intangibles having a tax situs
in a city do not have a tax situs in a township. Thus, a gross
earnings tax levied by a board of trustees of a township does
not apply to earnings derived from money, notes and other evidence
of debt owned by persons who reside within the corporate limits
of a city located in such township.
Finally, we encourage the legislature to consider stating spe-
cifically its position in regard to this matter, whenever it
considers other legislative clarifications of the provisions
of HB 3142.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Rodney Jr. Bieker
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RJB:jm

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.