Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-196

1982-196Kanag

Texte intégral

September 8, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 196
John A. O'Leary, Jr.
State Bank Commissioner
818 Kansas
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Banks and Banking -- Bank Holding Companies --
Definition of Bank Holding Company
Synopsis: The participation of Fourth Financial Corporation
in the ownership of Coffeyville Bancshares, Inc.,
a company which is to own all of the voting shares
of the First National Bank of Coffeyville, will
not, as a matter of law, render Fourth Financial
Corporation a "bank holding company" within the
meaning of K.S.A. 9-504(a). Such participation
will not afford Fourth Financial Corporation any
legal right to directly or indirectly own, control
or hold with power to vote 25% or more of the vot-
ing shares of said bank, and it will have no legal
basis for controlling in any manner the election
of a majority of the bank's directors. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 9-504, 9-505c, 77-201.
*
Dear Commissioner O'Leary:
You have requested our advice on the proposed acquisition of
the First National Bank of Coffeyville, Kansas (hereafter
referred to as "First National") by Coffeyville Bancshares,
Inc. (hereafter referred to as "CBI"). Specifically, you
have asked whether such acquisition would offend the Kansas
bank holding company statutes (K.S.A. 9-504 to 9-595c, inclu-
sive).-
In view of our recent opinion (No. 82-195) regarding the appli-
cability of these statutes to the application for a national
bank charter in Garden City, Kansas, we think it unnecessary
to reiterate much of what we said there regarding the federal
Bank Holding Company Act (BHCA) and its comparability to our
statutes. Suffice it to state that, in our judgment e ven
though our statutes were originally patterned after the BHCA,
subsequent amendments to the BHCA have established distinc-
tive requirements and presumptions in the BHCA which are not
present in our statutes. Thus, to the extent that the admin-
istrative and judicial interpretations of the BHCA and the
rules and regulations adopted by the Federal Reserve Board
thereunder involve application of these distinctive federal
provisions, we do not believe such interpretations to be
persuasive to our construction of the Kansas statutes.
In addition, it is appropriate to repeat the caveat entered
in our previous opinion, that our consideration of inquiries
of this type must necessarily be limited to questions of law.
Our opinions must be predicated on an established set of facts,
since the application of the same legal principles to differ-
ing factual circumstances may produce opposite conclusions.
As state bank commissioner, you have the responsibility for
determining the facts essential to the resolution of questions
arising under our banking laws, and it is your obligation to
make the requisite policy decisions as to the application of
our laws to a given set of facts. Hence, we trust that the
statutory interpretations and legal principles enunciated in
this opinion and in Opinion No. 82-195 will better enable
you in the future to exercise your judgment regarding bank
holding company questions involving the application of these
interpretations and principles.
In this instance, it is our understanding that CBI has been
formed as a Kansas corporation for the purpose of acquiring
virtually all of the voting shares of First National. Thus,
it is proposed that CBI will become a one-bank holding com-
pany. The question under this proposal arises from the fact
that Fourth Financial Corporation (FFC), the parent corpora-
tion of the Fourth National Bank and Trust Company of Wichita,
Kansas, will be a stockholder of CBI.
As disclosed by CBI's amended articles of incorporation and
by its application to the Federal Reserve Board to acquire
the common stock of First National, CBI has three classes of
stock -- class A common, class B common and cumulative pre-
ferred. The shares of both classes of CBI's common stock
are voting shares. An individual (hereafter referred to as
"Stockholder") will own all 10,000 shares of class A common,
while FFC will own all 3,330 shares of class B common. Thus,
FFC will own 24.98% of the common stock of CBI.
FFC also is to own all of the 73,500 shares of CBI's preferred
stock. With one exception, the preferred stock is nonvoting
stock. The sole exception to the preferred stock's nonvoting
status is provided in CBI's amended articles of incorporation
at paragraph (f) of Article Fourth, as follows:
"(f) While any preferred stock is outstanding,
the Corporation, without first obtaining the
consent, either expressed in writing or by the
affirmative vote at a meeting called for that
purpose, of the holders of at least a majority
of the total number of shares of preferred
stock then outstanding, shall not change or
alter the rights, preferences, or privileges
of the preferred stock."
Thus, as the sole preferred stockholder, FFC is entitled to
exercise voting power with respect to such stock only if CBI
proposes to "change or alter the rights, preferences or pri-
vileges of the preferred stock," and such voting power may
be exercised only to approve or disapprove such proposal.
We also have reviewed the amended and restated stockholders'
agreement entered into by FFC, Stockholder and CBI. The
essential elements of this agreement are as follows:
(1) FFC and Stockholder each agree to purchase their respec-
tive shares of common and preferred stock, as noted above;
(2) FFC is provided an option for a period of ten years to
purchase all of Stockholder's class A common stock, but such
option is expressly conditioned on the legality of such pur-
chase under pertinent state and federal laws, including the
Kansas bank holding company statutes;
(3) If FFC's option is not exercised within the prescribed
time, Stockholder is provided a one-year option to purchase
all of FFC's common and preferred stock;
(4) FFC expressly recognizes that it is prohibited from
taking any action which would constitute control of CBI
within the contemplation of the Kansas bank holding company
statutes;
(5) In the event neither Stockholder nor FFC exercises its
option to purchase the other's stock, both will "exert their
best efforts" to cause CBI to sell First National and to be
liquidated and dissolved; and
(6) The transfer of CBI's stock held by either Stockholder
or FFC is restricted. If either Stockholder or FFC proposes
to dispose of any of its shares of stock, the other shareholder
and the corporation are provided the right of first refusal
at a specified price per share. FFC's present incapacity to
acquire additional shares of voting stock is recognized by
this provision. Further, in the event there is a proposed
transfer of any of Stockholder's shares, FFC is given the
right to offer to sell all of its common and preferred stock
to Stockholder. If FFC is unable to either purchase the
stock proposed to be transferred by Stockholder or to sell
all of its stock to Stockholder, both FFC and Stockholder,
upon FFC's request, shall jointly cause the assets of CBI
to be sold and CBI liquidated. The agreement affords substan-
tially the same powers to Stockholder.
Finally, we note from CBI's application to the Federal Reserve
Board that FFC is the guarantor of CBI's purchase of stock
from First National's existing stockholders. However, such
guarantee does not vest in FFC any power to acquire such stock,
in the event of CBI's default.
It is within this factual context that we have considered
whether the arrangement described above results in FFC becom-
ing a "bank holding company," as that term is defined in
K.S.A. 9-504(a). Unless FFC satisfies the requirements of
this definition, it is unnecessary to consider the proscriptions
regarding bank holding companies in the succeeding statutes.
Under K.S.A. 9-504(a), a "bank holding company" is defined as
meaning:
"any company: (1) Which directly or indirect-
ly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote,
twenty-five percent (25%) or more of the vot-
ing shares of each of two (2) or more banks
or of a company which is or becomes a bank
holding company by virtue of this act; (2)
which controls in any manner the election of
a majority of the directors of each of two (2)
or more banks; or (3) for the benefit of whose
shareholders or members twenty-five percent
(25%) or more of the voting shares of each of
two (2) or more banks or a bank holding com-
pany is held by trustees; and for the purposes
of this act, any successor to any such company
shall be deemed to be a bank holding company
from the date as of which such predecessor
company became a bank holding company. Not-
withstanding the foregoing (A) no bank shall
be a bank holding company by virtue of its
ownership or control of shares in a fiduciary
capacity, except where such shares are held
for the benefit of the shareholders of such
bank."
Essential to an understanding of this definition is the mean-
ing of "company," which is defined in subsection (b) of that
statute to mean
"any corporation, business trust, association,
or similar organization, but shall not include:
(1) Any corporation the majority of the shares
of which are owned by the United States or by
any state; (2) any corporation or community
chest, fund, or foundation, organized and op-
erated exclusively for religious, charitable,
or educational purposes, no part of the net
earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual, and no sub-
stantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempt-
ing to influence legislation; or (3) any part-
nership."
By virtue of paragraph (1) of K.S.A. 9-504(a), a company is
a bank holding company if it "directly or indirectly owns,
controls, or holds with power to vote, twenty-five percent
(25%) or more of the voting shares of each of two (2) or more
banks." We are advised that FFC presently owns substantially
more than 25% of Fourth National Bank and Trust Company of
Wichita. Hence, if the proposal considered here results in
FFC directly or indirectly owning, controlling or holding
with power to vote 25% or more of First National's voting
shares, FFC must be regarded as a bank holding company under
our statutes.
From all of the documents provided us, it is clear that FFC
will not directly own, control or hold with power to vote
any of the voting shares of First National. All voting shares
of First National are to be owned by CBI. There is nothing
to indicate that any entity other than CBI will have any
direct ownership of or control over these shares. Thus, under
the facts set forth above, any ownership, control or power
to vote FFC may have regarding First National's voting shares
would be derived indirectly from its participation in CBI.
The proposal before us discloses four ways in which FFC is
involved with CBI, i.e., (1) as holder of 24.98% of CBI's
voting shares, (2) as holder of all shares of CBI's cumulative
preferred stock, (3) as a party, along with Stockholder and
CBI, to the stockholders' agreement discussed previously,
and (4) as guarantor of CBI's purchase of stock from First
National's existing stockholders. It is appropriate to con-
sider each of these relationships to determine whether any
of them by itself or all of them collectively provide FFC
with indirect ownership, control or power to vote 25% or more
of First National's voting shares. In so doing, we have been
guided by the conclusions reached in our previous opinion
(No. 82-195), in which we considered whether a one-bank hold-
ing company's ownership of stock in a company which owned all
of a bank's voting shares provided the existing one-bank hold-
ing company with indirect ownership or control of the bank's
voting shares. In order to avoid unduly burdening this opin-
ion, we invite your attention to the conclusions expressed
in that opinion regarding the prerequisites for determining
the existence for such indirect ownership or control.
Since all of First National's voting shares will be owned by
CBI, the board of directors of CBI will exercise direct con-
trol over these shares. As holder of 24.98% of CBI's voting
shares, with the remaining 75.02% of such shares owned by
Stockholder, FFC does not own the shares of common stock
necessary to elect a majority of CBI's directors. Hence,
solely by virtue of its ownership of 24.98% of CBI's voting
shares, FFC will not, as a matter of law, have any control
over First National's voting shares.
We previously noted that the only voting power FFC has as
the owner of all of CBI's preferred stock is to approve or
disapprove any proposed change in the rights, preferences or
privileges of the preferred stock. CBI's application to the
Federal Reserve Board and its amended articles of incorpora-
tion both reflect a total capitalization for CBI in the amount
of $8,683,000. Of that amount, $7,350,000 will be derived
from FFC's purchase of preferred stock. Viewed from this
perspective, it is apparent that CBI's amended articles of
incorporation have afforded FFC, as sole preferred stockholder,
a veto power respecting any change or alteration in the rights,
preferences or privileges of the preferred stock which would
impair its significant capital investment. However, FFC has
no power to initiate any such change or alteration, and there
is no provision in CBI's articles of incorporation for the
conversion of preferred stock to common stock.
The rights and preferences of preferred stockholders are set
forth in Article Fourth of CBI's Articles of Incorporation.
In paragraph (b) thereof, these stockholders are entitled to
receive an annual, cumulative dividend prior to any dividend
being paid to common stockholders. And in paragraph (e) of
this article, preferred stockholders are accorded first prefer-
ence in the distribution of CBI's assets in the event of its
liquidation. FFC's authority extends only to the preservation
of these rights and preferences. As a matter of law, there-
fore, FFC's voting power respecting its preferred stock does
not directly or indirectly affect CBI's ownership or control
of First National's voting shares, or otherwise affect CBI's
management prerogatives respecting First National.
Although the stockholders' agreement provides FFC with an
option to purchase all of the class A common stock held by
Stockholder, such option is expressly conditioned on the
legality of such purchase under our bank holding company
statutes. Hence, if these statutes are not amended so as to
permit FFC's total ownership of First National's voting shares
by virtue of its ownership and control of CBI, such option
may not be exercised. With this limitation, there is no
basis for concluding that this option has any legal effect
on the management or control of CBI or its ownership of First
National's voting shares.
Similarly, we do not find the "restrictive transfer" provi-
sion in the stockholders' agreement vests in FFC any right
to control First National's voting shares. This provision
is directed at the shares of CBI's various classes of stock
held by Stockholder and FFC. Although it provides FFC a
right of first refusal, in the event Stockholder proposes to
transfer shares of class A common stock, and provides in the
alternative an opportunity for FFC to sell all of its stock to
Stockholder, FFC does not have the right to designate or
approve the transferee in the event such transfer is permitted.
Under these circumstances, we are unable to conclude as a
matter of law that these contractual restraints on the trans-
fer of Stockholder's shares of CBI provides FFC with any con-
trol over First National's voting shares.
At this point it is appropriate to note that there are a
myriad of judicial definitions of "control." Each that we
have reviewed is couched within the framework of a particular
statutory provision or within the context of a particular set
of facts, and we have discovered none which is precisely
applicable to the situation considered here. Hence, as di-
rected by established rules of statutory construction, we
have accorded this word its plain and ordinary meaning. Lake-
view Gardens, Inc. v. State, ex rel., Schneider, 221 Kan. 211,
214 (1976). See, also, K.S.A. 77-201, Second. Accordingly,
we believe "control" within the context of K.S.A. 9-504(a)(1)
means "to exercise restraining or directing influence over."
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1968), p. 496.
Thus, in considering the restrictive transfer provision with
respect to the definitional requirement in K.S.A. 9-504(a)(1)
that a company must control more than 25% of the voting shares
of each of two or more banks, we do not find this contractual
provision to have created a legal right in FFC "to exercise
restraining or directing influence over" First National's
voting shares.
However, two other provisions of the stockholders' agreement
appear to have a direct impact on First National's voting
shares, to wit: (1) If neither Stockholder nor FFC exercises
its options under the agreement, the parties agree to cause
CBI to sell First National and to be liquidated and dissolved;
and (2) under the "restrictive transfer" provisions of the
agreement, if the proposed transfer cannot be made and the
various alternative stock dispositions cannot be effected,
there is agreement to cause the assets of CBI to be sold and
CBI liquidated, if either of the shareholders objects to the
transfer and requests such action.
In Attorney General Opinion No. 82-195, we noted that the
Kansas bank holding company statutes were patterned after
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA). And even though
the federal and Kansas statutes reflect different regulatory
philosophies (i.e., the BHCA regulates both single and multi-
bank holding companies, while Kansas merely prohibits the
latter), we believe it reasonable to assume that both Congress
and the Kansas Legislature of 1956 were responding to the
same issue. We also noted in our prior opinion that the
problem sought to be controlled by Congress through the BHCA
was the undue concentration of control of banking activities
in those business entities that may be used as media for ac-
quiring and maintaining in perpetuity management and control
of bank shares or assets. Congress was concerned, in part,
with the "concentration of commercial bank facilities in a
particular area under a single control and management." 2
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News (1956), p. 2483. See, also,
First Lincolnwood Corp. v. Board of Governors, 560 F.2d 258,
260 (7th Cir., 1977). We believe these authorities disclose
an evident intent to regulate those companies which have the
ability to govern or manage a bank's operations or assets by
exercising a "restraining or directing influence over" the
bank's voting shares.
In our judgment, therefore, the definitional requirements of
K.S.A. 9-504(a) regarding control of a bank's voting shares
should be viewed from the perspective of the problem sought
to be remedied by the legislation. See, e.g., State, ex rel.,
v. Murphy, 183 Kan. 698, 702 (1958). Accordingly, we note
that FFC's rights under the stockholders' agreement respecting
First National's voting shares relate in each instance to
CBI's ownership of these shares. However, it would not
appear that any of these contractual provisions provide FFC
with a "restraining or directing influence over" these shares,
so as to permit FFC to govern or manage First National's
operations or assets. In fact, we believe it would be appro-
priate for you to conclude that FFC's contractual authority
to cause CBI's dissolution and liquidation, thereby causing
CBI to dispose of First National's voting shares, is clearly
consonant with the legislative objective underlying the bank
holding company statute, i.e., to preclude the perpetual
corporate management of bank shares and assets.
Here, we believe the questions for your determination are
whether FFC's contractual rights foster the perpetual manage-
ment and control of these shares or the assets of First
National, or do they promote an undue concentration of com-
mercial bank facilities under a single control and ,management.
We believe the facts presented here would warrant your nega-
tive answer to these questions and a conclusion that FFC's
exercise of these contractual prerogatives would mitigate,
rather than enhance, the possibility for perpetual corporate
management and control of First National's shares and assets.
As to FFC acting as guarantor for CBI's purchase of stock
from First National's existing stockholders, we noted previ-
ously that FFC has no authority as guarantor to acquire such
stock in the event of CBI's default. A default affecting
FFC's liability as guarantor would be the consequence -of CBI's
under capitalization by reason of Stockholder's failure to
pay for subscribed shares of CBI's class A common stock. Thus,
FFC would be left to pursue its legal remedies against Stock-
holder, and under such circumstances, there is no basis for
concluding that, as a matter of law, FFC would directly or
indirectly own, control or hold with power to vote First
National's common stock.
Based on the foregoing conclusions, therefore, it is our
opinion that FFC will not, as a matter of law, indirectly
control 25% or more of the voting shares of First National.
That is, whether considered separately or collectively, FFC's
ownership of CBI's common stock, its voting power respecting
its preferred stock of CBI, its rights and powers under the
stockholders' agreement and its guarantee of CBI's purchase
of First National's voting shares do not, in our judgment,
provide FFC with any legal right to exercise a restraining
or directing influence over the management and control of
First National. Thus, it is our opinion that FFC is not a
"bank holding company" pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A.
9-504(a)(1).
We have reached a similar conclusion regarding the provisions
of paragraphs (2) and (3) of K.S.A. 9-504(a). Considering
these in reverse order, we note that the proposal before us
does not involve companies whose shares are held by trustees.
Hence, paragraph (3) has no application to our analysis.
K.S.A. 9-504(a)(2) provides that a company is a "bank holding
company" if it "controls in any manner the election of a
majority of the directors of each of two (2) or more banks."
We previously stated that, as sole stockholder of First
National, CBI controls the election of the entire board of
directors of First National. Such control is exercised
through CBI's board of directors, and our previous discussion
herein has indicated that FFC does not own sufficient voting
stock in CBI to elect a majority of CBI's directors. Further,
our previous analysis also reflects that FFC will not-have
any legal basis for indirectly controlling CBI's directors
with respect to their control of First National's voting
shares. Accordingly, it is our opinion that FFC has no
legal basis under the proposal considered here for controlling
in any manner the election of a majority of First National's
directors.
Before concluding, it is important to reiterate that we neces-
sarily have confined this opinion to questions of law which
are attendant upon the facts presented to us. Thus, we have
limited our opinion to a consideration whether Fourth Finan-
cial Corporation, under the proposed acquisition of the vot-
ing shares of the First National Bank of Coffeyville, has any
legal right or basis for owning, controlling or voting 25%
or more of these shares or controlling the election of a
majority of the bank's directors. We have found no such
legal right or basis, either by virtue of its ownership of
stock in the bank's parent company, by virtue of guaranteeing
the parent company's obligation or through its agreement with
the parent company and its other stockholder. This is not
to suggest, however, that it is not possible for Fourth Finan-
cial Corporation to exercise, in fact, the requisite control
over the management and policies of the bank. This, of course,
is a question of fact which cannot be resolved at this time,
but as State Bank Commissioner, you have general supervisory
power over the banking industry, and it is thus your preroga-
tive to monitor the Fourth Financial Corporation's participa-
tion in the ownership of the bank holding company to assure
that no violation of our bank holding company statutes occurs.
In summary, therefore, it is our opinion that the participa-
tion of Fourth Financial Corporation in the ownership of
Coffeyville Bancshares, Inc., a company which is to own all
of the voting shares of the First National Bank of Coffeyville,
will not, as a matter of law, render Fourth Financial Corpora-
tion a "bank holding company" within the meaning of K.S.A.
9-504(a). Such participation will not afford Fourth Finan-
cial Corporation any legal right to directly or indirectly
own, control or hold with power to vote 25% or more of the
voting shares of said bank, and it will have no legal basis
for controlling in any manner the election of a majority of
the bank's directors.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:hle

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