Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-190

1982-190Kanag

Texte intégral

September 3, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-190
Mt. Keith D. Hoffman
Dickinson County Attorney
325 Broadway
Abilene, Kansas 67410
Re: Infants -- Visitation Rights of Grandparents --
Appointment of Guardian Ad Litem for Minor Child
or Counsel for Indigent Parent
Synopsis: In a proceeding to determine grandparent visitation
rights pursuant to K.S.A. 38-129, the appointment
of a guardian ad litem for a child or an attorney for an
indigent parent, is not statutorily required. Furthermore,
visitation does not generally involve the type of inter-
ference with parental rights which necessitates such due
process safeguards as the appointment of counsel or a
guardian ad litem. However, a court may decide that,
in certain circumstances, due process considerations
justify appointment of counsel or a guardian ad litem.
In the event of such appointments, the court is
authorized to assess these expenses against either
party pursuant to K.S.A. 38-131. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 38-129, 38-131, 38-821.
*
Dear Mr. Hoffman:
As Dickinson County Attorney, you request our opinion on three questions
concerning petitions for grandparent visitation pursuant to K.S.A.
38-129. Specifically, you inquire whether the court must appoint a
guardian ad litem for children involved in a proceeding under Chapter 38
of the Kansas Statutes Annotated. Your second inquiry concerns the
necessity of appointing counsel for the indigent parent of a child
involved in a visitation proceeding. Finally, you ask how the fees
should be assessed if the court appoints a guardian ad litem or an
attorney for the indigent parent.
K.S.A. 38-821 requires that a district court judge appoint a guardian
ad litem for children "in all hearings pursuant to the juvenile
code." (Emphasis added.) It is important to note that the juvenile
code is wholly contained in Article 8 of Chapter 38 of the Kansas
Statutes Annotated. K.S.A. 38-129 is not a part of the juvenile code
and, consequently, the requirement of appointment of a guardian ad
litem set forth in K.S.A. 38-821 is inapplicable to visitation
proceedings under K.S.A. 38-129.
In Heilman v. Heilman, 181 Kan. 467 (1957), the Kansas Supreme Court
discussed the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent a child
at a custody hearing. Upholding the trial court's refusal to appoint
a guardian ad litem, the Kansas Supreme Court stated:
"Here the minor child, although being the 'subject' of
the litigation, was not a party litigant. He was present
in court, as were his mother and grandmother to whom a
divided custody order previously had been granted. Perhaps
in a given case, and under peculiar and unusual circumstances,
it would be proper to appoint a guardian ad litem to represent
a minor child at a custody hearing, but there is nothing in
the case before us to indicate the court erred in not
following such procedure." Id. at 470-71.
The language of Heilman indicates that the Kansas Supreme Court considers
the appointment of a guardian ad litem in custody cases to be discretionary,
as opposed to mandatory. The court has traditionally held that in custody
proceedings, "the paramount consideration of the court is the welfare
and best interests of the child. The court has recognized in a long
line of cases that the trial court is in the best position to judge
whether the best interests of a child are being served . . . ."
Gardner v. Gardner, 192 Kan. 529, 532 (1964). See also Patton v.
Patton, 215 Kan. 377, 380 (1974).
Certainly visitation and custody proceedings are comparable, with the
qualification that visitation rights are not as formidable as custody
rights. Therefore, it is reasonably apparent that no greater protection
need be afforded children involved in visitation proceedings than is
required for their counterparts in custody cases.
Thus, in our opinion, the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a
Child involved in a visitation proceeding pursuant to K.S.A. 38-129
is not statutorily required and is purely a matter of judicial discretion.
Your second inquiry concerns whether a court must appoint counsel for
an indigent parent of a child involved in a grandparent visitation
proceeding. We are unable to locate any statute which requires appoint-
ment of counsel in a visitation case. However, in a case involving
severance of parental rights, the Kansas Court of Appeals stated:
"[T]here is no doubt that the relationship of natural
parent and child is a fundamental right of which neither
may be deprived without due process of law as guaranteed
by the Constitution of the United States and the Kansas
Bill of Rights. Nor can there by any doubt that, in such
case, the right to counsel, either retained or appointed,
is essential to due process." In Re Boehm, 3 Kan.App.2d
325, 326 (1979).
In Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), the
United States Supreme Court discussed appointment of counsel in the
context of proceedings to terminate parental rights. The Court stated
therein: "The pre-eminent generalization that emerges from this Court's
precedents on an indigent's right to appointed counsel is that such a
right has been recognized to exist only where the litigant may lose
his physical liberty if he loses the litigation." Id. at 25. Applying
this presumption to the area of parental rights, the Supreme Court
emphasized: "This Court's decisions have made plain beyond the need
for multiple citation that a parent's desire for and right to 'the
companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children'
is an important interest that undeniably warrants deference and, absent
a powerful countervailing interest, protection." Id. at 27, citing
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
The Supreme Court originally defined the elements to be evaluated in
deciding what due process requires in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319
(1976), as follows:
"[O]ur prior decisions indicate that identification
of the specific dictates of due process generally requires
consideration of three distinct factors: first, the
private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's
interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail."
Id. at 334-35.
Referring to Mathews, the Court in Lassiter emphasized: "We must
balance these elements against each other, and then set their net
weight in the scales against the presumption that there is a right
to appointed counsel only where the indigent, if he is unsuccessful,
may lose his personal freedom." Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services,
452U.S.at27.Weighingtheelementsin	Lassiter, the Court ultimately
concluded that the Constitution does not require the appointment of
counsel in every parental termination proceeding, deciding instead to
"leave the decision whether due process calls for appointment of
counsel for indigent parents in termination proceedings to be answered
in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of course, to
appellate review." Id. at 31-32.
In a case involving a deprived child hearing, the Kansas Supreme Court
enunciated essentially the same type of due process evaluation, declaring:
"Constitutional due process requires the State to
appoint counsel for an indigent parent in a deprived
child hearing under K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 38-817 whenever
the parent, unable to present his or her case properly,
faces a substantial possibility of loss of custody and
permanent severance of parental rights or of prolonged
separation from the child." In Re Cooper, 230 Kan. 57,
68-69 (1981).
Construing the cited cases, it is our opinion that the decision to
appoint counsel for an indigent parent in a proceeding involving
parental rights lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. The
factors to be considered and balanced by the court in reaching a
decision include: "[T]he private interests at stake, the government's
interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous
decisions." Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. at 27.
Therefore, it is our opinion that appointment of counsel is not statutorily
required in visitation proceedings. Furthermore, we feel that although
the granting of visitation rights to a grandparent generally would not
seem to be a significant enough interference with parental rights to
justify the appointment of counsel for indigent parents, it is conceivable
that a court, in its discretion, might conclude that due process consid-
erations justify appointment of counsel.
Your final inquiry concerns the assessment of guardian ad litem or
attorney fees in the event a court determines that such appointments
are necessary. K.S.A. 38-131, pertaining to grandparent visitation
proceedings, states: "Costs and attorneys' fees may be awarded to
either party as justice and equity may require." We believe guardian
ad litem fees are properly considered costs and, therefore, are
effectively provided for by K.S.A. 38-131, as are attorney fees, in the
event the judge decides to assess such fees and costs against either
party. However, we note that this provision is entirely discretionary.
In the rare event that a judge decides to appoint a guardian ad litem
or attorney, but decides not to assess the costs and fees to either
party, there seems to be no provision for payment of these expenses.
We are unable to locate any authority which provides a fund, or other
means, designed to absorb such costs. We believe that any discussion
on how this apparent oversight might best be resolved is most properly
a matter for legislative consideration.
In summary, it is our opinion that, in a proceeding pursuant to
K.S.A. 38-129, the appointment of a guardian ad litem for a child or
an attorney for an indigent parent, is not statutorily required.
Furthermore, we believe that visitation does not generally involve
the type of interference with parental rights which necessitates such
due process safeguards as the appointment of counsel or guardian ad
litem. However, in cases involving children, the court historically
has wide discretion in fulfilling its duty to promote the child's
best interests. Therefore, it is conceivable that a court may, in
its discretion, decide that, in certain circumstances, due process
considerations justify appointment of counsel or a guardian ad litem.
In the event of such appointments, the court is authorized to assess
these expenses against either party pursuant to K.S.A. 38-131. However,
if the judge should decide not to assess fees and costs to either party,
there is no provision for the payment of such expenses.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Mary B. Mudrick
Assistant Attorney General

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