Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-165

1982-165Kanag

Texte intégral

August 4, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-169
Howard Schwartz
Judicial Administrator
Kansas Judicial Center
301 West Tenth
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Arrests, Cita-
tions, Procedures and Penalties -- Appearance Bonds;
Use of Credit Cards
Synopsis: Chapter 44 of the Laws of 1980 amended K.S.A.
8-2107 to allow the use of a credit card to post
bond on certain enumerated offenses. Such cards,
issued by banks, allow the violator to deposit a
draft with the arresting officer, which draft is
returned upon the violator's appearance for fur-
ther proceedings before the court, or, alterna-
tively, is forfeited upon nonappearance. The with-
holding of a predetermined amount by the issuer
of the card from the amount posted as bond is not
a violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§1601 et seq., in that there is no credit trans-
action which is subject thereto. Neither is there
a violation of anti-trust laws by virtue of two
or more banks entering into agreements to purchase
such drafts at such a discount, provided such
agreements are drafted by a state agency and then
presented to such banks for their signature. Cited
herein: K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-2107, as amended by L.
1982, ch. 47, K.S.A. 16a-3-206, 16a-6-117, K.S.A.
50-101, 15 U.S.C. §1, 15 U.S.C. §1637, 12 C.F.R.
226.2, 12 C.F.R. 226.6, 12 C.F.R. 226.7.
Dear Mr. Schwartz:
As Judicial Administrator for Kansas, you request our opinion
on two questions arising from the provisions of K.S.A. 1981
Supp. 8-2107 (as amended by L. 1982, ch. 47, §1). That sta-
tute provides, among other things, that persons given cita-
tions for certain traffic offenses may elect to post bond in
lieu of surrendering their driver's license, as security for
their appearance at a later date for a hearing. You raise
two questions concerning potential violations of truth-in-lending
or anti-trust laws due to a feature of the statute that allows
such bonds to be posted by means of a credit card issued
through a bank.
Although K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-2107 was amended by the 1982
Legislature (L. 1982, ch. 47), the amendment was minor and
leaves intact the particular provisions which are the subject
of your inquiry. At subsection (a), the statute provides
that whenever any person shall be halted by a member of the
state highway patrol or any other police officer under any
of the violations set out at subsection (e), and is not
given an immediate hearing, the officer may require the per-
son to surrender his or her driver's license (in exchange
for a receipt). As an alternative, subsection (c) provides:
"In lieu of depositing a valid driver's li-
cense with the halting officer as provided in
subsection (a), the person halted may elect
to give bond in the amount specified in sub-
section (e) of this section for the offense
for which the person was halted, and in the
event such person does not have a valid dri-
ver's license, such person shall be required
to give such bond. Such bond shall be sub-
ject to forfeiture if said person halted does
not appear at the court and at the time spe-
cified in the written notice provided for in
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-2106. Such bond may be a
cash bond, a bank card draft from any valid
and unexpired credit card approved by the di-
vision or a guaranteed arrest bond certificate
issued by either (1) a surety company author-
ized to transact such business in this state
or (2) an automobile club authorized to trans-
act business in this state by the commissioner
of insurance. If any of the approved bank
card issuers redeem the bank card draft at a
discounted rate, such discount shall be charged
against the amount designated as the fine for
the offense. In the event such bond is not
forfeited, the amount of the bond less the dis-
count rate shall be reimbursed to the person
providing the bond by the use of a bank card
draft." (Emphasis added.)
Bank credit cards have been subject to the federal
Truth-in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq.) since the Act's enact-
ment in 1969. Regulation Z, promulgated by the Federal
Reserve Board to implement the Act, treats such cards as
"open-end credit plans," and defines them at 12 C.F.R.
§226.2(x), as follows:
"'Open-end credit' means consumer credit ex-
tended on an account pursuant to a plan under
which (1) the creditor may permit the customer
to make purchases or obtain loans, from time
to time, directly from the creditor or indi-
rectly by use of a credit card, check, or
other device, as the plan may provide; (2) the
customer has the privilege of paying the bal-
ance in full or in instalments; and (3) a fi-
nance charge may be computed by the creditor
from time to time on an outstanding unpaid
balance."
Under Truth-in-Lending laws, disclosures are required at two
stages. (15 U.S.C. §1637(a) and (b).) An initial disclosure
must be made prior to the first transaction on the bank card
account that details the general terms of the agreement.
Included are such things as conditions under which a finance
charge may be imposed, the method of determining the balance
upon which a finance charge will be imposed, the method of
determining the amount of finance charge, and identification
of other charges that may be imposed as part of the plan,
together with their method of computation. (12 C.F.R. §226.6.)
The second stage involves disclosures in each periodic state-
ment which include such terms as the outstanding balance in
the account at the beginning of the statement period, speci-
fied information regarding each extension of credit during
the period, the amount of any finance charge added to the
account, and an identification of the amounts credited to the
account during the period. (12 C.F.R. §226.7). It should
be noted that the above are also the law of Kansas, by virtue
of K.S.A. 16a-3-206 and 16a-6-117.
However, simply because a bank card is used to post an appear-
ance bond, it does not necessarily follow that there is a
transaction which is subject to the Truth-in-Lending Act.
The standard for determining when the Truth-in-Lending Act
applies was set out in Tom Benson Chevway Rental & Leasing,
Inc. v. Allen, 571 S.W.2d 346 (Tex.Civ.App. 1978), cert. den.
442 U.S. 930. "To invoke the Truth-in-Lending Act and Regu-
lation Z, four conditions must be satisfied:
111 . First, there must [be] a "creditor"
-- one who regularly extends or arranges for
the granting of consumer credit. Second, the
debtor must be a natural person. Third, the
transaction must be a "consumer credit trans-
action" consisting of three component charac-
teristics: (1) it must be a credit transac-
tion; (2) it must require the payment of a fi-
nance charge or be payable in more than four
installments; and, (3) it must be conceived
for a consumer or agricultural purpose. Fin-
ally, the credit extension must not come with-
in the statutory exemptions . . . ." Boyd,
"Consumer Law," 8 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1077 (1977)."
In our opinion, it is doubtful whether the issuance of a traf-
fic citation and the subsequent posting of an appearance bond
could be termed a consumer credit transaction within the
scope of the Truth-in-Lending Act. Under the definition of
"consumer credit" found at 12 C.F.R. §226.2(p), the credit
must be extended in a situation where "money, property or
service" is the subject of the transaction, categories which
do not include the posting of a bond which is either returned
to the violator or applied to his fine in the event of for-
feiture. Neither the State nor the highway patrol or a police
department can be deemed a seller, in that none is engaged
in any form of sales activity within the ordinary course of
business. Accordingly, in our opinion, the transaction con-
templated by K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-2107(c) between a violator
and a law enforcement agency is not within the scope of the
Truth-in-Lending laws at either the state or federal level.
We further note that any charge made to the violator by the
bank card company would already be covered by disclosures
made initially when the account was opened.
For your second inquiry, you raise the concern that banks
which enter into a collective agreement, or which sign iden-
tical individual agreements, to service appearance 1- 3s posted
with credit cards may violate federal or state an :rust
laws. Specifically, 15 U.S.C. §1 provides in part:
"Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal . . . ."
K.S.A. 50-101, in declaring trusts to be against public
policy, states:
"A trust is a combination of capital, skill,
or acts, by two or more persons, firms cor-
porations, or associations of persons or either
two or more of them, for either, any or all of
the following purposes:
"First. To create or carry out restrictions
in trade or commerce, or aids to commerce, or
to carry out restrictions in the full and free
pursuit of any business authorized or permitted
by the laws of this state.
"Second. To increase or reduce the price of
merchandise, produce or commodities, or to
control the cost or rates of insurance.
"Third. To prevent competition in the manu-
facture, making, transportation, sale or pur-
chase of merchandise, produce or commodities,
or to prevent competition in aids to commerce.
"Fourth. To fix any standard or figure, where-
by its price to the public shall be, in any
manner, controlled or established, any article
or commodity of merchandise, produce or com-
merce intended for sale, use or consumption
in this state." (Emphasis added.)
In our opinion, any problem of an antitrust nature could be
avoided here by the imposition of a uniform agreement by an
agency of the state, e.g., your office or the state banki
board. It has been previously held that antitrust laws e
not violated by acts which are authorized and regulated
state statute. North Little Rock Transportation Co. v.
Casual Reciprocal Exchange, 85 F.Supp. 961, aff'd 181 F.2d
174 (D. Ark. 1949). Where the restraint is the result of
valid governmental action, no violation can be found since
§1 of Title 15 and K.S.A. 50-101 forbid only those trade
restraints and monopolizations that are created, or attempted,
by acts of individuals or combinations of individuals or
corporations. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr
Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) rehearing denied
365 U.S. 875.
Therefore, if a state agency were to dictate the rate at
which the banks will discount the credit extended for the
appearance bond transaction, or were to draw up the agreement
to which banks could become signatories, any resulting re-
straint would be the result of valid governmental action.
See U.S. v. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc.,
672 F.2d 469 (13th Civ. 1982) and Gas Light Company of
Columbus v. Georgia Power Company, 313 F.Supp. (E.D. Georgia
1970). In the latter case, the district court held that the
actions of a state-wide electric utility and a public utility
holding company which allegedly constituted a conspiracy to
eliminate gas as a competitive energy source, were not sub-
ject to anti-trust statutes, where the practices were the
result of an order of the state public service commission,
pursuant to a comprehensive statutory scheme, and were sub-
ject to continuing regulation.
In conclusion, Chapter 44 of the Laws of 1980 amended K.S.A.
8-2107 to allow the use of a credit card to post bond on cer-
tain enumerated offenses. Such cards, issued by banks, allow
the violator to deposit a draft with the arresting officer,
which draft is returned upon the violator's appearance for
further proceedings before the court, or, alternatively, is
forfeited upon non-appearance. The withholding of a pre-
determined amount by the issuer of the card from the amount
posted as bond is not a violation of the Truth-in-Lending Act,
15 U.S.C. §§1601 et seq., in that there is no credit trans-
action which is subject thereto. Neither is there a viola-
tion of anti-trust laws by virtue of two or more banks enter-
ing into agreements to purchase such drafts at such a discount,
provided such agreements are drafted by a state agency and
then presented to such banks for their signature.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
JeffreyS.Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle

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