Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-151

1982-151Kanag

Texte intégral

July 8, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 151
The Honorable James Francisco
Senator, Twenty-sixth District
Statehouse, Room 136-N
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Size, Weight and Load of
Vehicles -- Powers of Local Authorities
Synopsis: Because the legislature has preempted the field of regulating
the size and weight of vehicles, counties may exercise their
legislative powers in this area only pursuant to express
statutory direction or authority granted in K.S.A. 8-1912.
In absence of express statutory authority, a county may not
create the position of weight inspection agent for the purpose
of enforcing the vehicular size and weight limitations
applicable on county roads. Such is the duty of the county's
sheriff and his deputies. Cited herein: K.S.A. 8-1424,
8-1432, K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1901, 8-1910, 8-1912, K.S.A.
8-2001, 8-2204, 19-101a, 19-813.
*
Dear Senator Francisco:
You state that the Sedgwick County Commission passed a resolution
establishing weight limitations for vehicles traveling county roads
in Sedgwick County. Additionally, the resolution creates the position
of weight inspection agent and vests authority in said agent to make
weight checks, stop traffic, issue notices to appear and arrest individuals
who violate the provisions of the resolution. It is our understanding
that the agent will not be commissioned as a deputy sheriff, but rather,
will exercise law enforcement authority solely by virtue of the resolution,
You ask whether the county may validly establish such weight limitations
and create law enforcement positions under its home rule powers.
K.S.A. 19-101a grants counties the authority to "transact all county
business and perform such powers of local legislation and administration
as they deem appropriate" (emphasis added), subject to certain enumerated
limitations. The first such limitation prohibits counties from using
home rule powers where legislation exists which is uniformly applicable
to all counties.
The Kansas Supreme Court has recently interpreted county home rule provisions
for the first time in Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Board of Greeley County
Commissioners, 231 Kan. 225 (1982). In that case, the court first noted
the similarities between home rule powers granted to counties in K.S.A.
19-101a and home rule powers granted to cities in Article 5, Section 12
of the Kansas Constitution, then looked to case law interpreting city
home rule for guidance. The court stated:
"The legislature may reserve exclusive jurisdiction to
regulate in a particular area when an intent is clearly
manifested by state law to preempt a field by uniform laws
made applicable throughout the state." (Citations omitted)
Id. at 227.
Thus, determining whether the legislature has preempted a particular
field involves a two-part test. The first is whether the legislative
intent to preempt the field is clearly manifested in the law. The
second is whether the law is uniformly applicable throughout the state.
See also City of Junction City v. Griffin, 227 Kan. 330, 336 (1980).
With these principles in mind, we have considered the authority of a
county to legislate regarding the size, weight and load of vehicles
travelling on county roads. The pertinent statutory provisions are
found at K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1901 et seq. These sections are included
in the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways (see K.S.A. 8-2204),
which is codified in Articles 14 to 22, inclusive, of Chapter 8 of
Kansas Statutes Annotated. This act is uniformly applicable throughout
the state "and in all cities and other political subdivisions therein."
K.S.A. 8-2001.
Hence, this act, including the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1901 et seq.,
applies uniformly to all counties, and the second of the two tests
for legislative preemption has been met.
As for the other test, i.e., clear expression of legislative intent to
preempt the field, we note that K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1901 states in
pertinent part: "[T]he maximum size and weight of vehicles herein
specified shall be lawful throughout this state, and local authorities
shall have no power or authority to alter said limitations except as
express authority may be granted in this article." In our opinion,
this language clearly indicates the legislature's intent to reserve
unto the state the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the size and weight
of vehicles. There is a clear expression of legislative intent that
local authorities may act only pursuant to express statutory direction
or authority, and counties are included within the scope of this limitation
by virtue of the definition of "local authorities" in K.S.A. 8-1432, which
states:
"'Local authorities' means the Kansas turnpike authority
and every city, county and other local board or body
having authority to adopt ordinances or regulations
relating to vehicular traffic under the constitution
and laws of this state."
Moreover, since the provisions of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1901 et seq. are
applicable on "any highway," county roads are subject to such provisions,
due to the definition of "highway" in K.S.A. 8-1424, as follows:
"'Highway' means the entire width between the boundary
lines of every way publicly maintained when any part
thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes
of vehicular travel."
Therefore, in our opinion, the legislature has clearly preempted the
field of regulating the size and weight of vehicles. Not only are the
pertinent statutes uniformly applicable throughout the state, but they
contain a clear expression of legislative intent to reserve to the
legislature the exclusive jurisdiction of this area. Thus, counties may
act in this area only pursuant to .express statutory direction or authority.
Here, we note that K.S.A. 8-1912 specifically permits local authorites
to enact local legislation regarding weight limitations on highways in
certain circumstances. K.S.A. 8-1912 states:
"(a) Local authorities with respect to highways under
their jurisdiction may prohibit, by ordinance or resolution,
the operation of vehicles upon any such highway or impose
restrictions as to the weight of vehicles to be operated
upon any such highway, for a total period of not to exceed
ninety (90) days in any one (1) calendar year, whenever
any said highway by reason of deterioration, rain, snow or
other climatic conditions will be seriously damaged or
destroyed unless the use of vehicles thereon is prohibited
or the permissible weights thereof reduced.
"(b) The local authority enacting any such ordinance or
resolution shall erect or cause to be erected and maintained
signs designating the provisions of the ordinance or resolution
at each end of that portion of any highway affected thereby,
and the ordinance or resolution shall not be effective
unless and until such signs are erected and maintained.
"(c) Local authorities with respect to highways under their
jurisdiction also, by ordinance or resolution, may prohibit
the operation of trucks or other commercial vehicles, or may
impose limitations as to the weight or size thereof, on
designated highways, which prohibitions and limitations
shall be designated by appropriate signs placed on such highways:
Provided, That adjacent premises to such restricted streets
may be served, and such restrictions shall not apply to any
street which is a connecting link of the state highway system,
unless a satisfactory alternate route is provided and has been
approved by the secretary of transportation.
"(d) The secretary of transportation likewise shall have
authority as hereinabove granted to local authorities to
determine by resolution and to impose restrictions as to the
weight or size of vehicles operated upon any highways under
the jurisdiction of said secretary and such restrictions
shall be effective when signs giving notice thereof are
erected upon the highway or portion of any highway affected
by such resolution."
Local authorities may exercise powers of local legislation regarding size
and weight of vehicles only in conformance with the foregoing statute.
However, we are unable to determine whether the Sedgwick County resolution
complies with all the requirements set forth therein, e.g., as to whether
appropriate signs or access roads are provided for. Thus, we are unable
to determine whether the resolution falls within the scope of K.S.A. 8-1912.
If it does not, said resolution cannot be adopted by virtue of the preemption
of the field by the legislature.
We must now determine whether the county may create the position of
weight inspection officer by resolution. K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1910(a)
provides in part:
"Any police officer or properly designated department
of revenue agent or employee having reason to believe that
the gross weight of a vehicle or combination of vehicles
or the gross weight on any axle or tandem axles is unlawful
is authorized to require the driver to stop and submit to
a weighing of the same . . ."
Under this uniformly applicable statute only a police officer or a desig-
nated department of revenue agent or employee is authorized to stop vehicles
for the purpose of weight checks. There is no express grant of power con-
tained in the act which would permit a county to create a new law enforcement
officer to enforce weight limitations on county roads. Because the legislature
has preempted the field, such an express grant would be necessary before the
county could take such action. The reason for such a rule was discussed by
the Kansas Supreme Court in Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Board of Greeley
County Commissioners, supra, as follows:
"The rule denying power to a local body when the state
has pre-empted the field is a rule of necessity based
upon the need to prevent dual regulation which would
result in uncertainty and confusion . . . ." Id. at 228.
K.S.A. 19-813 vests law enforcement authority for the county in the county
sheriff and his officers. In our opinion, creation of an additional law
enforcement arm of the county would create the dual regulation and its
attendant problems which the rule is intended to prevent. Therefore, the
county may not create the position of weight inspection agent under its
home rule powers.
In conclusion, therefore, it is our opinion that the legislature has
preempted the field of regulating the size and weight of vehicles. Thus,
counties may exercise their legislative powers in this area only pursuant
to express statutory direction or authority. Accordingly, a county may
not establish size and weight limitations on county roads, except in
accordance with the provisions of K.S.A. 8-1912. Further, in the absence
of express statutory authority, a county may not create the position of
weight inspection agent for the purpose of enforcing the vehicular size
and weight limitations applicable on county roads. Such is the duty of
the county's sheriff and his deputies.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Brenda L. Hoyt
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:JEF:BLH:may

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