Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-115

1982-115Kanag

Texte intégral

May 26, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 115
The Honorable Robert D. Miller
State Representative
One Hundred-Tenth District
Room 175-W, Statehouse
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Destruction of
Records and Documents -- Time Limitations
Synopsis: The disposal or destruction of documents in the
control of the county clerk is governed by speci-
fic statutes which require that county documents
and records be retained seven, fifteen, or twenty
years depending upon the nature of the document.
Cited herein: K.S.A. 19-254, K.S.A. 19-325,
K.S.A. 12-120, K.S.A. 12-121, K.S.A. 60-2702.
Dear Representative Miller:
You have requested an opinion regarding the length of time
the Ellis County Clerk must preserve certain county records
and documents. The correspondence from the Ellis County
Clerk, attached to your opinion request, states that the
county clerk's office is "crowded for storage space" which
presumably prompted the opinion request.
The Ellis County Clerk compiled a "List of Reports and Docu-
ments Etc." which contains twenty-one separate document and
record items. That list is as follows:
1. Expenditure & Revenue Analysis - monthly reports
2. Copies of checks
3. Delinquent Warrant Lists
4. Delinquent Tax Sale Lists
5. Payroll Claim Vouchers
6. Other Payroll Information (W-2 forms etc.)
7. Purchase Orders
8. Time Cards
9. Intangible Tax Certificates (K - 200)
10. Game License Copies
11. Contract & Agreements (Obsolete)
12. Insurance Policies (Obsolete)
13. Petitions
14. Resolutions
15. Probate Court Orders
16. Notes of Commissioners Minutes
17. Quarterly Reports such as KPERS, Social Security, Unemploy-
ment Insurance
18. Adopted Budgets
19. Tax Abstracts
20. Valuation Abstracts
21. Data Processing Printout used in preparation of annual
tax and assessment roles
As a preliminary matter it is necessary to consider relevant
statutes. K.S.A. 19-254 states:
"The board of county commissioners of any
county and any one or more elected officers
of such county having previously offered to
the state historical society and having re-
ceived notice in writing from said society
that it has no interest therein, may jointly
petition the district court having jurisdic-
tion in such county for permission to destroy
any records, papers, or documents which are
more than twenty (20) years old and which
are located in or on any county-owned property
or building, except court records. Notwith-
standing the provisions of this section, elec-
tion records may be destroyed as provided by
K.S.A. 19-256, 25-2708, 25-2709 and 25-3301."
K.S.A. 19-256 provides:
"This act [K.S.A. 19-254 to 19-258, inclusive]
shall apply to all records, papers and docu-
ments which are more than twenty (20) years
old except court records and election records."
K.S.A. 19-325 states:
"The county clerk of each county may destroy
the following papers after such papers have
been on file in the county clerk's office for
a period of fifteen (15) years: (1) No pro-
perty tax statements (personal). (2) Nontax-
able personal property statements, both tan-
gible and intangible. (3) Warrants both ori-
ginal and duplicates canceled by board of
county commissioners. (4) Claims presented
and allowed by board of county commissioners.
(5) County treasurer's daily statements to
county clerk. (6) Township trustee's and
township clerk's annual reports. Notwithstand-
ing the provisions of this section, all such
papers which shall have been on file in the
county clerk's office for fifteen (15) years
prior to the taking effect of this act may be
destroyed."
K.S.A. 19-326 states:
"For the purpose of this act [K.S.A. 19-326,
19-327] the words 'documents' and 'records'
mean:
"(a) No property assessment sheets;
"(b) personal property assessment sheets;
"(c) real estate assessment sheets;
"(d) oil assessment sheets;
"(e) county vouchers;
"(f) individual records of commissioners pro-
ceedings, whichever same are recorded in com-
missioner's journal;
"(g) annual reports of township officers;
"(h) township and school district budgets;
"(i) books of list residents or enumeration
that are not dated for year taken, or have
become illegible;
"(j) county treasurer's daily statements to
county clerk;
"(k) deputy assessors and township officers'
bonds; and
"(1) county officers' bonds."
K.S.A. 19-327 provides:
"The county clerk and the county assessor of
each county may dispose of or destroy all such
documents and records which have been on file
in such office for a period of seven years
from date of filing of same which have thereby
become obsolete and for such reason it is un-
necessary to preserve same for the protection
of the welfare of the officer, county or pub-
lic good, except those documents described in
subsection (b) and (c) of K.S.A. 19-326 will
not be destroyed until they have been on file
or of record for fifteen years: Provided,
Such destruction or disposal of any such docu-
ments or records shall not be made until ap-
proval of same shall be made by the board of
county commissioners and shown by the minutes
of said board."
The above-quoted statutes all relate to retention and dispo-
sal of county records. Statutes which relate to the same
thing or which have a common purpose are in pari materia and
should be construed together as if they comprised a single
law. See 82 C.J.S. Statutes, §366, p. 801-803, Graham v.
Corporon, 196 Kan. 564, (1966), Sutton v. Frazier, 183 Kan.
33 (1958). Therefore, construing K.S.A. 19-254, 19-256,
19-325, 19-326, and 19-327 in pari materia, indicates that
all county records and documents (except court and election
records) must be retained for twenty years, unless the docu-
ment or record is listed in either K.S.A. 19-325 or 19-326(b)
or (c), in which case retention is required for fifteen years,
or is listed in any of the remaining subsections of K.S.A.
19-326, in which case retention is required for seven years.
Thus, to determine whether the documents and records specified
on the list prepared by the Ellis County Clerk are subject
to a retention period of less than twenty years requires a
comparison of such list with the provisions of K.S.A. 19-325
and 19-326. Although such comparison reveals some identify
between the documents and records listed in K.S.A. 19-325
and 19-326 and the documents and records listed by the Ellis
County Clerk, not all of the latter are specifically addressed
by the pertinent statutes. Hence, it must be determined
whether these statutes may be construed to include documents
and records not explicitly listed therein.
The interpretation of the subject statutes requires the appli-
cation of basic tenets of statutory construction. It is
well-settled that statutes should be construed to effect the
intent of the legislature. Coleman v. Brotherhood State
Bank, 3 Kan. App.2d 162 (1979). It is generally held that
the intended scope of a statute may not be enlarged or amended
by interpretation. Schroder v. Kansas State Highway Commission,
199 Kan. 175 (1967). Instructive in this regard is Chief
Justice Johnston's opinion in Alter y. Johnson, 127 Kan. 443
(1929), where he stated:
"In interpreting a statute the safer rule for
us to follow is to ascertain the true intent
of the legislature. That intent is to be de-
rived in the first place from the words used,
and when that intent is apparent and is appro-
priate to the obvious purpose of the act we
should give that intent effect rather than to
search for another meaning, although we might
think some other policy would be effectual
• • • • " Id. at 447.
Also relevant here is the rule of statutory construction
which provides that the insertion or inclusion of one thing
implies the exclusion of another (expressio unius est exclusio
alterius). In In Re Olander, 213 Kan. 282 (1973), the Supreme
Court of Kansas observed that this maxim could be applied in
determining legislative intent which is not otherwise mani-
fest. The opinion also cautions that the maxim should not
be used "to override or defeat a clearly contrary legislative
intention." 213 Kan. at 285.
The maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius was applied
in Olander, supra, to determine whether the legislature in-
tended to authorize persons other than those specified in
K.S.A. 22-2513 to apply for orders permitting eavesdropping.
In Olander an assistant district attorney had made applica-
tion to the court for an eavesdropping order. The statute
in question specified that only the attorney general, assist-
ant attorneys general, or county attorney could validly make
such application. The opinion held that, even though the
county attorney had delegated the authority to the assistant
county attorney to apply for the eavesdropping order, the
statute was "intended to limit strictly the class of persons
who may apply for an order permitting electronic surveillance"
and that an assistant county attorney was not statutorily
designated to do so. The Olander opinion deals with an ex-
tremely sensitive area of constitutional law and individual
rights which, no doubt, influenced the Court's restrictive
interpretation of the subject statute. However, the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius has also been applied
in less sensitive areas of the law.
In State v. Showers, 34 Kan. 269 (1885), the defendant had
been convicted of violating a section of the liquor law as
it read prior to legislative amendment. The Supreme Court
of Kansas reversed the conviction because the legislature
had amended the liquor law to exclude the defendant's acts
as illegal. The court applied expressio unius est exclusio
alterius and held that had the legislature intended to pro-
hibit defendant's acts the applicable statute would have so
specified. See, also, Southwestern Iron and Steel Industries
v. State, 597 A.2d 981 (Ariz. 1979), Goebel v. Thornburg
Township, Delaware County, 303 A.2d 57 (Pa. 1973), Collins
v. National Aniline Div., Allied C. & D. Corp., 186 N.Y.S.
2d 979 (1959), and Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th
Ed. 1975) §47.23, p. 123 and the authorities cited therein.
The six listed items in K.S.A. 19-325 and the twelve listed
items in K.S.A. 19-326 are not broad categories of documents
and records. Rather, the listed items are documents and
records that refer to specific information. The maxim of
expressio unius est exclusio alterius applied to K.S.A. 19-325
and K.S.A. 19-326 would lead to the conclusion that only the
specified records and documents listed therein are subject
to the respective fifteen-year and seven-year retention re-
quirements. This conclusion generates the corollary that all
other county documents and records are subject to the twenty
year retention requirement of K.S.A. 19-254 et seq.
Further support for this conclusion is apparent when the
statutory authority of county clerks regarding document re-
tention policy is contrasted with the authority of city offi-
cials in this area. K.S.A. 12-120 lists eleven specific
document and record items and required retention periods
for each. However, K.S.A. 12-121 permits city officials to
exercise broad discretion in this area. K.S.A. 12-121 states:
"Nothing in K.S.A. 12-120 shall be deemed to
apply to records, documents or papers not
specifically mentioned nor to authorize the
destruction of records, documents or papers
which in their nature should be preserved
permanently, nor to prohibit destruction of
records, documents or papers obviously of
only temporary value after a reasonable time."
This broader grant of authority could be statutorily con-
ferred on county clerks. However, the legislature has made
a distinction between city and county powers in this area,
which distinction has a net result of restricting the autho-
rity of county clerks.
Arguably, the broad language of K.S.A. 19-327, read apart
from K.S.A. 19-326, would allow the disposal of all "obsolete"
documents after retention for seven years. However, the re-
quirements of K.S.A. 19-327 relate only to the listed items
in K.S.A. 19-326. These statutes were originally enacted as
a single legislative act with two separate sections. (See
L. 1947, ch. 216, §§1,2.) With this in mind, it is readily
apparent that the only purpose of K.S.A. 19-326 is to define
"documents" and "records" for use in K.S.A. 19-327. Hence,
the retention and disposal requirements of K.S.A. 19-327 re-
late only to the "documents" and "records" listed in K.S.A.
19-326.
Therefore, in our judgment, the following documents from the
county clerk's list are within the scope of K.S.A. 19-325 and
K.S.A. 19-326 or other document retention law. Each will be
discussed separately.
1. Payroll Claim Vouchers - These records are covered by
19-326(e) and should be retained at least seven years pursu-
ant to K.S.A. 19-327.
2. Probate Court Records - Attention is directed to K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 60-2702a (Sup.Ct.R. 108) which governs the reten-
tion, maintenance, reproduction, and disposal of original
court records.
3. Notes of County Commission Meetings - These records are
covered by K.S.A. 19-326(f) and should be retained at least
seven years pursuant to K.S.A. 19-327. Please note here
that these statutes permit disposal of the records only after
documentation of commissioners' proceedings are recorded in
a commissioners' journal.
4. Adopted Budgets - To the extent that adopted budgets are
individual records of commission proceedings, and if same are
recorded in the commissioners' journal, adopted budgets also
would be covered by K.S.A. 19-326(f) and should be retained
at least seven years pursuant to K.S.A. 19-327.
The balance of the documents and records listed by the Ellis
County Clerk are not specifically within the scope of either
K.S.A. 19-325 or K.S.A. 19-326. Therefore, these documents
are subject to the retention requirements of K.S.A. 19-254.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
Robert Vinson Eye
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RVE:hle

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