Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-098

1982-098Kanag

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April 28, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 98
Marlin Johanning
City Attorney
City Hall
515 Kansas Avenue
Atchison, Kansas 66002
Re: Cities and Municipalities--Ordinances of Cities--
Applicability of Initiative and Referendum Ordinances
to Placement of Traffic Control Devices
Synopsis: A proposed ordinance concerning the use of traffic
control devices at designated intersections within
the territorial limits of a city is an administrative
ordinance, and is not a proper subject of an initiative
petition under the provisions of K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
12-3013. Cited herein: K.S.A. 8-1401, 8-1424,
8-1432, 8-2004, 8-2005, and K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 12-3013.
Dear Mr. Johanning:
You request our opinion as to whether a proposed ordinance
concerning the placing of traffic control devices at designated
intersections of city streets is a proper subject of an initiative
petition.
A determination of your inquiry necessarily involves consideration
of the concepts of initiative and referendum, which are codified
in K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 12-3013. This statute "provides a procedure
whereby a city's electors may initiate by petition any proposed
ordinance 'except an administrative ordinance' (and except certain
other types of ordinances not relevant here)." City of Lawrence v.
McArdle, 214 Kan. 862, 863 (1974). The exception for administrative
ordinances leaves with the electors the power to initiate ord-
inances that are legislative in character.
The legislative-administrative dichotomy is perhaps the strongest
of the several tests applied by the Kansas Supreme Court in
determining the appropriateness of initiative. It should be
noted that the Court has taken a conservative approach in ap-
plying these tests, which fact was specifically recognized
in McArdle, supra at 870. To more fully understand the Court's
approach to this issue, a review of its pertinent decisions
is appropriate.
In Rauh v. City of Hutchinson, 223 Kan. 514 (1978), the Court
reaffirmed the principles set forth in McArdle, quoting at
length from the syllabus of the prior decision, including:
"1. The operation of the initiative and
referendum statute is to be confined with
a considerable degree of strictness to
measures which are quite clearly and fully
legislative and not principally executive
or administrative.
"'2. One crucial test for determining that
an ordinance is administrative or legislative
is whether the ordinance is one making a new
law or one executing a law already in exis-
tence. Permanency and generality of ap-
plication are two additional key features
of a legislative ordinance.
"'3. Acts constituting a declaration of
public purpose and making provisions for ways
and means of its accomplishment may be generally
classified as calling for the exercise of
legislative power. Acts dealing with only
a small segment of an overall policy question
are generally of an administrative character.'"
223 Kan. at 519.
Further insight is gained from Rauh, where the Court quotes
with approval section 16.55 of 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
(3rd Ed.), p. 212, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
"'It has been said, however, that if the
subject is one of statewide concern in which
the legislature has delegated decision-making
power, not to the local electors, but to the
local council or board as the state's designated
agent for local implementation of state policy,
the action receives an 'administrative' char-
acterization, hence is outside the scope of
the initiative and referendum.'" (Emphasis
added by court.) 223 Kan. at 519.
The last-quoted rule as to the scope of the initiative and
referendum statute is pertinent in considering your inquiry.
The regulation of highway traffic is a matter of statewide concern,
a fact which has been recognized in this state by adoption of the
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, K.S.A. 8-1401 et seq.
A part of that act, K.S.A. 8-2005, concerns local traffic-control
devices, and provides as follows:
"(a) Local authorities in their respective
jurisdictions shall place and maintain
such traffic-control devices upon highways
under their jurisdiction as they may deem
necessary to indicate and to carry out
the provisions of this act or local traffic
ordinances or to regulate, warn or guide
traffic. All such traffic-control devices
hereafter erected shall conform to the state
manual and specifications.
"(b) Local authorities in exercising those
functions referred to in subsection (a)
shall be subject to the direction and control
of the secretary of transportation with
respect to highways and streets designated
by the secretary as connecting links in the
state highway system."
The terms "local authorities" and "highways," as used in K.S.A.
8-2005, are defined in K.S.A. 8-1432 and 8-1424.
In accordance with the above-quoted provisions of K.S.A. 8-2005,
it is our opinion that the placing of traffic control devices
within the territorial limits of a city is a matter which has
been delegated [subject to the control and jurisdiction of the
secretary of transportation as prescribed in K.S.A. 8-2004(b)
and 8-2005(b)] to the city governing body. Further, in our
judgment, a proposed ordinance concerning the use of such devices
is an administrative ordinance, and is not a proper subject of
an initiative petition under the provisions of K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
12-3013.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:TRH:jm

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