Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-087

1982-087Kanag

Texte intégral

April 14, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-87
The Honorable Stephen R. Cloud
State Representative, Thirtieth District
Room 182-W, Statehouse
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Counties and County Offices -- Planning and
Zoning -- Inapplicability of County Home Rule
Powers
Synopsis: The act which originally created township zoning
boards, L. 1939, ch. 164, was nonuniform in its
application due to language contained in section 1
(now K.S.A. 19-2901). By virtue of amendments in
1981 (L. 1981, ch. 122), the nonuniform language
was removed, leaving K.S.A. 19-2901 through 19-2910
and 19-2912 and 19-2913 uniform in their applica-
tion and thus not subject to the home rule power
of a county under K.S.A. 19-101a et seq. While
K.S.A. 19-2911 does contain a subsection which is
nonuniform, the nonuniformity is a result of a
legislative act which did not amend the remaining
sections of K.S.A. 19-2901 et seq. Thus, the non-
uniformity of K.S.A. 29-2911 does not affect the
uniform applicability of these other sections.
Furthermore, as the nonuniform language was part
of an act affecting central business district re-
development bonds, K.S.A. 19-101a(a), Eleventh,
acts to prevent a county from exempting itself
from even this single statute. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 12-1774, K.S.A. 19-101a, 19-101b,
19-2901, 19-2911, L. 1979, ch. 52, §121, L. 1980,
ch. 91, L. 1981, ch. 122, §1.
Dear Representative Cloud:
As State Representative for the Thirtieth District, which
comprises the City of Lenexa and Monticello Township in
Johnson County, you request the opinion of this office on
several questions involving the statutes dealing with town-
ship zoning boards. Specifically, you inquire concerning
the uniform applicability of these statutes and whether
Johnson County may charter out from them through the use of
its home rule authority.
In examining your request, it is apparent that two inter-
related issues are involved. An initial issue which must
be addressed is the uniform applicability of the various leg-
islative enactments on township zoning, as contained in
Chapter 19, Article 29 of Kansas Statutes Annotated. Second,
the effect of two recent amendments to one such statute,
K.S.A. 19-2911, must be considered. The first amendment,
L. 1979, ch. 52, §121, was part of an act which dealt with
the issuance of special obligation bonds in connection with
central business district redevelopment projects. Due to
the changes made by this act, as well as those made by the
1980 legislature (L. 1980, ch. 91), additional questions are
presented as to the power of a county to exempt itself from
all or portions of the township zoning statutes and establish
its own procedures.
The statutes which now appear as K.S.A. 19-2901 et seq. were
originally enacted in 1939 at chapter 165 of the Session Laws
for that year. At the outset, section 1 of the act (now at
K.S.A. 19-2901) contained provisions which made the act's
application nonuniform across the state. By 1981, following
numerous amendments, K.S.A. 19-2901 stated that the provisions
of the act did not apply to counties:
"(a) Having a population of not less than
thirteen thousand (13,000) and not more than
fourteen thousand five hundred (14,500) with
a total assessed taxable tangible valuation
of not less than thirty-two million dollars
($32,000,000) nor more than thirty-seven mil-
lion dollars ($37,000,000); or
"(b) having a population of more than twenty
thousand (20,000) and with a total assessed
taxable tangible valuation of less than thirty-
two million dollars ($32,000,000); or
"(c) having a population of not less than
twenty-three thousand (23,000) and not more
than thirty thousand (30,000) and with a total
assessed taxable tangible valuation of more
than sixty-three million dollars ($63,000,000)
and less than seventy-three million dollars
($73,000,000); or
"(d) having a population of not less than
thirty-six thousand (36,000) nor more than
forty-five thousand (45,000) with a total as-
sessed taxable tangible valuation of not less
than eighty-five million dollars ($85,000,000)."
In our opinion, the presence of this language in K.S.A. 19-2901
had the effect of rendering the rest of the sections of the
original act nonuniform. We are persuaded to this conclusion
by the analogous city home rule case of City of Junction City
v. Griffin, 227 Kan. 332 (1980), where the Court held, in
effect, that a "legislative enactment," within the meaning
of our constitutional provisions granting home rule powers
to cities (Kan. Const., Art. 12, §5), meant a single bill
enacted into law, i.e., a single legislative act. From this,
the Court also concluded that, unless the entirety of a leg-
islative enactment is uniformly applicable, cities may exempt
themselves from the application of all or any portion of such
enactment, by use of their home rule powers.
In the absence of contrary case law regarding county home
rule powers, we believe it appropriate to apply such reason-
ing in determining whether an act of the legislature is uni-
formly applicable to all counties, so as to preclude the
exercise of county home rule powers. (See K.S.A. 19-101a,
19-101b.) Thus, we believe that the entirety of the 1939
act (L. 1939, ch. 165) was nonuniform in its application,
since the first section thereof limited its application to
certain counties.
It should also be noted that a separate act of the 1980
Legislature, L. 1980, Ch. 91, amended K.S.A. 19-2911, which
statute had been enacted as section 11 of the original act.
By this latter act, the legislature amended only the single
statute by inserting a provision for urban counties. While
this provision served to make that particular statute non-
uniform, the limited scope of the act did not affect the
rest of the original act. This may be contrasted with the
situation in Griffin, supra, where the nonuniform section
existed as part of the original act.
In view of the above two nonuniform statutes, by 1981 the
whole of the original act had been rendered nonuniform.
Accordingly, in the absence of other factors, Johnson County
could have enacted a charter resolution on the subject of
township zoning. Indeed, we are informed that such a reso-
lution was passed by the Board of Commissioners in April,
1981. However, given other changes which have taken place,
it would be our opinion that at present the county has no
such authority.
One of these changes occurred in 1981, when the legislature
removed the nonuniform language from K.S.A. 19-2901 (L. 1981,
ch. 122, §1). Had not the charter resolution been repealed
prior to July 1, 1981, it would have been negated as of that
date, the effective date of the amendment to 19-2901. This
is due to K.S.A. 19-101b(d), which states:
"Each charter resolution passed shall control
and prevail over any prior or subsequent act
of the board and may be repealed or amended
only by charter resolution or by an act of
the legislature uniformly applicable to all
counties." (Emphasis added.)
Thus, the nonuniformity of 19-2901 is no longer a basis for
a charter resolution exempting Johnson County from all or
any portion of the original act. Moreover, as noted above,
K.S.A. 19-2911 had been amended prior to 1981 so as to no
longer be considered part of the original act for the purpose
of determining the uniform or nonuniform application of the
original act. Accordingly, the change in K.S.A. 19-2901 was
of no effect on the applicability of K.S.A. 19-2911, due
to the nonuniform language which remained in the latter sta-
tute.
However, it is our opinion that a separate basis exists for
concluding that even this latter statute is beyond the
county's power to alter under home rule. This is due to yet
another act, L. 1979, ch. 52, §121, which amended subsection
(b) of the statute to read as follows:
"The county commissioners, on or before the
date prescribed by law for the certification
of tax levies to the county clerk, shall cer-
tify such budget as finally approved to the
county clerk and said county clerk shall make
a tax levy on all the tangible property in the
township equal to the amount of such budget
and an amount to pay a portion of the princi-
pal and interest on bonds issued under the
authority of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 12-1774, and
amendments thereto, by cities located in the
county which is to be derived from ad valorem
taxation except that the rate of levy so made
shall not exceed one-fourth (1/4) mill." (Em-
phasis added.)
At the same time, K.S.A. 19-101a was amended by the addition
of a new clause Eleventh, which states:
"[C]ounties shall be subject to all acts of
the legislature requiring the levying of taxes
to pay a portion of the principal and interest
on bonds issued by cities under the authority
of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 12-1774, and amendments
thereto . . . ."
When the nonuniform, urban county language was added to K.S.A.
19-2911 in 1980, subsection (b) was re-enacted unchanged, and
thus continued to contain a provision for the repayment of
any bonds issued by authority of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 12-1774.
The 1980 act is therefore an act of the legislature covered
by the Eleventh clause of K.S.A. 19-101a, and is therefore a
matter which is exempt from the scope of county home rule.
In conclusion, the act which originally created township
zoning boards, L. 1939, ch. 164, was nonuniform in its appli-
cation due to language contained in section 1 (now K.S.A.
19-2901). By virtue of amendments in 1981 (L. 1981, ch. 122),
the nonuniform language was removed, leaving K.S.A. 19-2901
through 19-2910 and 19-2912 and 19-2913 uniform in their
application and thus not subject to the home rule power of
a county under K.S.A. 19-101a et seq. While K.S.A. 19-2911
does contain a subsection which is nonuniform, the nonuniform-
ity is a result of a legislative act which did not amend the
remaining sections of K.S.A. 19-2901 et seq. Thus, the non-
uniformity of K.S.A. 19-2911 does not affect the uniform
applicability of these other sections. Furthermore, as the
nonuniform language was part of an act affecting central
business district redevelopment bonds, K.S.A. 19-101a(a),
Eleventh, acts to prevent a county from exempting itself from
even this single statute.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF KANSAS
"Jeffrey S. Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:hle

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