Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-065

1982-065Kanag

Texte intégral

March 12, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82- 65
Curtis E. Campbell
Frigon & Campbell
Cimarron, Kansas 67835
Re: Criminal Procedure -- Code; Arrest -- Jurisdiction
of Municipal Law Enforcement Officers
Synopsis: Law enforcement officers employed by a city may, pursuant
to the implied authority contained in K.S.A. 1981 Supp.
8-1001 and K.S.A. 22-2401a, transport an arrested person
beyond the territorial limits of the city employing such
officers for the respective purposes of administering a
chemical test of the person's blood or breath and
incarceration in the county jail. Cited herein: K.S.A.
1981 Supp. 8-1001, K.S.A. 19-1930, 22-2401, 22-2401a.
*
Dear Mr. Campbell:
On behalf of the City of Montezuma you have requested our opinion as to
the authority of a city marshal to transport arrested persons beyond the
corporate limits of the city for the purpose of accomplishing a Chemical
test pursuant to K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1001 or for incarceration.
The jurisdiction of a municipal law enforcement officer is set out in
K.S.A. 22-2401a which provides, in pertinent part:
"Law enforcement officers employed by any city may exercise
their powers as law enforcement officers anywhere within the
city limits of the city employing them and outside of such
city when on property owned or under the control of such
city. Such officers also may exercise such powers in any
other place when in fresh pursuit of a person."
From the foregoing it is clear that the legislature has limited the
territorial jurisdiction of city law enforcement officers as a general
rule. That general rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions,
i.e., fresh pursuit of an offender or when a request for assistance
is made by law enforcement officers of another jurisdiction. K.S.A.
22-2401a(3).
We believe that the two situations you have described also constitute
statutory exceptions to the general rule cited above and that the
language of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1001 (chemical test) and K.S.A. 22-2401
(power of arrest) necessarily imply authority to transport persons beyond
city boundaries in such situations.
The general rule set forth at 67 C.J.S. Officers, §197, p. 649, provides
that:
"Generally, the duties of a public office include those
lying fairly within its scope, those essential to the
accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office
was created, and those which, although incidental and
collateral, serve to promote the accomplishment of the
principal purposes."
In accord with this general principle is the following statement of
the Kansas Supreme Court in The State, ex rel., v. Younkin, 108 Kan.
634 (1921):
"While the powers of a public officer or board are those
and those only which the law confers, yet when the law does
confer a power or prescribe a duty to be performed or
exercised by a public officer, the powers granted and duties
prescribed carry with them by necessary implication such
incidents of authority as are necessary for the effectual
exercise of the powers conferred and duties imposed. In
Throop on Public Officers, §542, the correct rule is stated:
"'The rule respecting such powers is, that in addition to
the powers expressly given by statute to an officer or a
board of officers, he or it has, by implication, such addi-
tional powers as are necessary for the due and efficient
exercise of the powers expressly granted, or as may be
fairly implied from the statute granting the express
powers.' (See, also, Comm'rs of Brown CO. v. Barnett,
14 Kan. 627.)" Id. at 638.
Other cases have also considered the concept of implied powers in
situations where, without them, the governmental agency would have no
way to carry out its express statutory powers. See, e.g., Edwards
County Commissioners v. Simmons, 159 Kan. 41 (1944); Womer v. Aldridge,
155 Kan. 446 (1942); The State, ex rel., v. Wooster, 111 Kan. 830 (1922);
The State, ex rel., v. Younkin, 108 Kan. 634 (1921); Young v. Regents
of State University, 87 Kan. 239 (1912); and Brown County v. Barnett,
14 Kan. 627 (1875).
Additionally, it is well established that statutes in pari materia
should be construed together so as to harmonize their respective pro-
visions, if reasonably possible to do so [Callaway v. City of Overland
Park, 211 Kan. 646, 650 (1973)], and statutes need not be enacted at the
same time in order to be regarded as being in pari materia. Claflin v.
Walsh, 212 Kan. 1, 8 (1973). As noted in Marshall v. Marshall, 159 Kan.
602, 606 (1945):
"It is the function and duty of courts to reconcile apparent
inconsistencies in laws to the end that all may be given
full force and effect in their intended field and scope of
operation. Whenever that reasonably can be done it never
should be held that one law overturns or destroys another."
(Citations omitted.)
With the foregoing principles of law in mind we will now address your
specific inquiries. K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1001 provides, in part:
"Any person who operates a motor vehicle upon a public
highway in this state shall be deemed to have given
consent to submit to a chemical test of breath or blood,
for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content
of his or her blood whenever he or she shall be arrested
or otherwise taken into custody for any offense involving
operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating
liquor in violation of a state statute or a city ordinance
and the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe
that prior to arrest the person was driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor. The test shall be
administered at the direction of the arresting officer."
Thus, law enforcement officers are by statute expressly authorized to
have a chemical test of breath or blood administered at their direction.
We believe that the express authorization of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1001
creates an implied power to expand the jurisdictional limitations of
K.S.A. 22-2401a in the event the capability of having such a chemical
test performed within the city limits is lacking. It is our conclusion
that the intent of K.S.A. 1981 Supp. 8-1001 cannot be thwarted by the
absence of equipment or personnel within the city limits. We would note,
however, that the distances traveled to accomplish a chemical test
should be reasonable and that the closest available source should be
utilized.
With respect to your second question, the authority of a law enforcement
officer to effect an arrest is set out in K.S.A. 22-2401, which provides:
"A law enforcement officer may arrest a person when:
"(a)He has a warrant commanding that such person be
arrested; or
"(b)He has probable cause to believe that a warrant for the
person's arrest has been issued in this state or in another
jurisdiction for a felony committed therein; or
"(c)He has probable cause to believe that the person is
committing or has committed
"(1)A felony; or
"(2) A misdemeanor, and the law enforcement officer has
probable cause to believe that:
"(i) Such person will not be apprehended or evidence of the
crime will be irretrievably lost unless such person is
immediately arrested; or
"(ii) Such person may cause injury to himself or others or
damage to property unless immediately arrested; or
"(d) Any crime has been or is being committed by such person
in his view."
From the foregoing it is clear that under selected circumstances it is
necessary for a law enforcement officer to effect an arrest and thereafter
incarcerate the individual. It is my understanding from your request
that the City of Montezuma does not have detention facilities and your
inquiry involves the authority of the city marshal to transport an
arrested person to the county jail for incarceration.
The legislature has clearly contemplated situations such as the one you
describe, as is evidenced by K.S.A. 19-1930, which provides, in part:
"The sheriff or the keeper of the jail in any county of the
state shall receive all prisoners committed to the sheriff's
or jailer's custody by the authority of the United States
or by the authority of any city located in such county and
shall keep them safely in the same manner as prisoners of the
county until discharged in accordance with law. The county
maintaining such prisoners shall receive from the United
States or such city compensation for the maintenance of such
prisoners in an amount equal to that provided by the county
for maintenance of county prisoners and provision shall be
made for the maintenance of such prisoners in the same manner
as prisoners of the county. The governing body of any city
committing prisoners to the county jail shall provide for
the payment of such compensation upon receipt of a statement
from the sheriff of such county as to the amount due therefor
from such city." (Emphasis added.)
Since a city law enforcement officer is authorized by law to make arrests
and is further authorized to lodge such arrested persons in the county
jail, it is our opinion that a city law enforcement officer is clearly
vested with the authority to transport arrested persons to a county
jail which is located outside the territorial limits of the city employing
the officer. We believe the foregoing statutes when considered in
pari materia create an implied authority to act beyond the limitation
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imposed by K.S.A. 22-2401a. We would note, however, that our research
reveals no statutes authorizing a city law enforcement officer to transport
an arrested person to and incarcerate an arrested person in the county
jail of another county.
Very truly yours,
of/
ROBERTT.STEPHAN
Attorney General
RTS: J Ee : may

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