Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1982-062

1982-062Kanag

Texte intégral

March 9, 1982
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 82-62
Michael G. Moroney
Legal Counsel
Wyandotte County Sheriff's Office
816 North 9th Street
Kansas City, Kansas 66117
Re: Counties and County Officers -- Sheriff -- Special
Deputies in Counties Over 100,000
Synopsis: The authority of a special deputy appointed pursuant to
K.S.A. 19-805a to exercise general law enforcement powers
is not equal to that of a "law enforcement officer" as such
term is defined by the Kansas Criminal Code. The authority
of a special deputy to exercise general law enforcement
powers is limited by K.S.A. 19-805b to certain specified
premises or in the event of riot, sabotage, serious disturbances
or breach of the peace. Thus, a special deputy is prohibited
from carrying a concealed firearm when not engaged in the
performance of his or her statutorily authorized duties..
Cited herein: K.S.A. 19r805, 19-805a, 19-805b, 21-3110(10),
21-4201, 22-2401a.
Dear Mr. Moroney:
On behalf of the Wyandotte County District Attorney and Sheriff, you
have requested the opinion of this office concerning the authority of
special deputy sheriffs, appointed pursuant to 19-805a, to assert the
general powers of a law enforcement officer and to carry concealed
firearms when they are not on official duty.
We are limiting our consideration to your specific inquiry as to appointments
pursuant to K.S.A. 19-805a, and nothing herein should be construed as an
opinion regarding appointments or limited appointments made in accordance
with K.S.A. 19-805.
A "law enforcement officer" is defined by the general definition section
of the Kansas Criminal Code, K.S.A. 21-3110(10), as
"any person who by virtue of his or her office or public
employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public
order or to make arrests for crimes, whether that duty
extends to all crimes or is limited to specific crimes."
By definition, then, when a law enforcement officer may act as such is
not limited. That is, when a law enforcement officer is not officially
on duty he retains his authority to act as an officer within his or her
territorial jurisdiction (see K.S.A. 22-2401a). [Cf. State v. Coleman,
224Kan.447(1980),whereinanoffdutypoliceofficerworkingasan
employee in detecting shoplifters was held to be a law enforcement officer
engaged in performance of his duty.] The critical issue in both questions
you raise is whether a special deputy appointed pursuant to K.S.A. 19-805a
is a "law enforcement officer." We conclude that special deputies may
assert the general powers of a law enforcement officer only while actually
engaged in the performance of their statutorily authorized duties.
K.S.A. 19-805a provides the sheriff of counties having a population in
excess of 100,000 with authority "to appoint so many special deputies
as he or she may think proper." The authority of a special deputy to
act as a law enforcement officer is governed by K.S.A. 19-805b, which
provides:
"Such special deputies may be limited in their authority
to perform the acts of a peace officer in or about certain
specified premises or relating thereto, but shall have a-
general right in event of riot, sabotage or serious dis-
turbances or breach of the peace to call upon and deputize
any other peace officer or private citizen to assist him
in quelling such riot or disturbance."
In the case of State v. Hargis, 5 Kan.App.2d 608 (1980), this statute
was construed as follows:
"[t]he appointment of special deputies and the authority
of these deputies is controlled by specific provisions
in K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 19-805a and K.S.A. 19-805b. These
deputies have the statutory right to assert the general
powers of law enforcement officers only in the event of
"riot, sabotage or serious disturbances or breach of the
peace." Id. at 610-11.
Comparing the authority of a special deputy with the definition provided
by K.S.A. 21-3110(10), we do not find that a special deputy is generally
"vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to make arrests
for crimes." Nor do we find that a special deputy has authority for
"specific crimes" as contemplated by K.S.A. 21-3110(10). The authority
of a special deputy is limited to certain specified premises except in
certain emergency situations. Thus, it is our conclusion, that the
power of a special deputy is not equal to that of a law enforcement
officer. State v. Hargis, supra. Hence, we believe that such a person
may exercise general law enforcement powers only on the premises for
which the commission as a special deputy has been granted or in the
event of riot, sabotage, serious disturbances or breach of the peace.
Your final question is whether a special deputy may carry a concealed
firearm when not on duty. The carrying of a concealed firearm is
prohibited by K.S.A. 21-4201(1)(d), with certain exceptions. One of
those exceptions is granted to law enforcement officers, K.S.A. 21-4201(2)(a).
Having previously concluded that a special deputy appointed pursuant to
K.S.A. 19-805a is not a "law enforcement officer" except for a specific
premises or emergency situations, we find that the carrying of a concealed
firearm by a special deputy is prohibited when not acting in such capacity.
That is, a special deputy's authority to carry a concealed firearm extends
only while the deputy is actually engaged in the performance of his or her
statutorily authorized duties.
We would note that in your request you indicate Wyandotte County special
deputies perform duties such as process server and the transporting of
prisoners. If these activities are conducted under the authority of an
appointment pursuant to K.S.A. 19-805b, we believe that such activities
are beyond the scope of the authority conferred by that statute: As
indicated in the Hargis decision, the general power conferred upon a
special deputy to act as a law enforcement officer is limited to certain
emergency situations. Additionally, the sheriff may also grant to a
special deputy limited "authority to perform the acts of a peace officer
in or about certain specified premises." K.S.A. 19-805b. We do not
believe this limited authority extends to such general activities as
transporting prisoners or acting as a process server.
Very truly yours,
ROBERTT.STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Kurt V. Sherri
Assistant Atto
RTS:JEF:KJS:may

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.