Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-092

1981-092Kanag

Texte intégral

April 14, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-92
Neil R. Shortlidge
First Assistant City Attorney
City of Overland Park, City Hall
8500 Santa Fe Drive
Overland Park, Kansas 66212
Re: Cities and Municipalities--City of Overland Park--
Veto Power of Mayor
Synopsis: The attempted veto of a resolution by the mayor of
Overland Park, after the resolution has been approved
and published, is ineffective and invalid.
Dear Mr. Shortlidge:
You request our opinion as to the effectiveness of an attempted
veto of a resolution by the mayor of the city of Overland Park.
You advise that Resolution No. 1613 (copy attached hereto as
Appendix A) was adopted by a vote of six to four at the regular
meeting of the Overland Park City Council on March 16, 1981,
and that the Mayor was present at said meeting. Following the
meeting, the city clerk presented the resolution to the Mayor,
the Mayor signed it, and it was published for the first time
on March 20, 1981. You also state that subsequent to the signing
and first publication of the resolution, the Mayor became aware,
for the first time, that, pursuant to Charter Ordinance No. 4
of the city of Overland Park, he had the power to veto a resolution
before the first regular meeting of the Council following adoption
of the resolution. He then attempted, on March 26, 1981, to veto
Resolution No. 1613. The second publication of the resolution
occurred on March 27, 1981, and the first regular meeting of the
City Council, following adoption of the resolution, took place
on April 6, 1981. In this factual context, you ask our opinion
as to whether the Mayor's signing of the resolution on March 16,
1981, precluded the exercise of his veto power on March 26, 1981.
Section 1 of Charter Ordinance No. 4 of the city of Overland Park
provides, in part, as follows:
"The Mayor shall be the titular head of the
City and shall preside at all meetings of the
Council. He shall sign all ordinances and
resolutions passed by the Council: Provided,
That he shall have the power to veto any ordinance
or resolution passed by the Council, except the
Mayor shall have no power to veto a Charter
Ordinance, or appointments by the Council
for vacancies on the Council. Any ordinance
or resolution vetoed by the Mayor may be
passed over the veto by the vote of two-thirds
of the whole number of the Councilmen-elect,
notwithstanding the veto; and if the Mayor has
failed to sign or veto such ordinance or resolution
by the first regular meeting following the adoption
of such ordinance or resolution, the same shall
take effect without his signature." (Emphasis
added.)
The power of the Mayor to veto resolutions under the underscored
portion of the above-quoted charter ordinance is, in some respects,
similar to the gubernatorial veto power over legislative bills.
In this regard, it was stated in The State v. Whisner, 35 Kan. 271,
281 (1886), that once a bill is approved and signed by the governor,
and is deposited with the secretary of state, it has passed
beyond the control of the governor, and its status is fixed and
unalterable. This rule has been applied in other jurisdictions
to the mayoral veto power, so as to render ineffective a mayor's
attempted veto of an ordinance previously approved by him. City
of Atlanta v. East Point Amusement Co., 152 S.E.2d 374 (Ga., 1966).
The rule has not been applied, however, to certain administrative
and judicial orders. See Trans Word Airlines v. Civil Aeronautics
Board, 184 F.2d 66, 71 (1950).
In our judgment, the Whisner and Atlanta cases, supra, are
dispositive of the question you have raised. The Mayor's purported
veto of Resolution No. 1613, after he had signed it and it had
been published for the first time, is, in our judgment, ineffective
and invalid. The fact that the mayor was unaware of his veto
power, at the time he signed the resolution, is immaterial and of
no consequence. After a resolution is signed and published,
citizens are entitled to act in reliance thereon, and the executive
approval cannot be withdrawn because of "ignorance of the law."
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Terrence R. Hearshman
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:TRH:jm

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