Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-072

1981-072Kanag

Texte intégral

March 19, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81-7 2
Mr. Glenn D. Cogswell
Attorney at Law
310 Columbian Title Building
820 Quincy Street
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Drainage and Levees -- Drainage Districts Within
Counties or Cities -- Elections of District
Directors
Synopsis: Except as limited by the state constitution and
the grant of authority to the federal, government
by the federal constitution, the power of the
state legislature is absolute with respect to all
offices it creates. Such power includes the
authority to shorten or lengthen the term of a
public office, even though the effect may be to
curtail or extend an incumbent's unexpired term.
Thus, the provisions of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 24-412
which extend the terms of office of drainage
district directors elected in March of 1980 until
April of 1983 represent a valid exercise of leg-
islative authority. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 24-409, 24-412, Kan. Const., Art. 2, S18,
Art. 15, §1, L. 1980, ch. 107.
Dear Mr. Cogswell:
As attorney for the North Topeka Drainage District in Shawnee
County, you have requested our opinion as to whether the pro-
visions of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 24-412 validly operate to extend
the terms of office of drainage district directors elected on
March 4, 1980, until the election in April of 1983.
A response to your request requires a brief review of this
statute's recent legislative history. In 1979, the legislature
amended K.S.A. 24-409 and 24-412 (L. 1979, ch. 103, §§1,2) so
as to change the term of office and the time of electing
drainage district directors. Prior to these amendments, these
statutes collectively provided that all directors of a district
were to be elected at the same time to serve for terms of
three years, and the elections were to be held on the first
Tuesday in March. The 1979 amendments, however, reduced the
term of office to two years and also provided, in effect, that
the election of directors would be held on the first Tuesday
in April in odd-numbered years, commencing in April of 1981.
The obvious purpose of these amendments was to synchronize
the elections of drainage district directors with the regular
city and school district elections and, by so doing, to reduce
to some extent the proliferation of elections held by the
various political and taxing subdivisions of the state. To
assist in effectuating this objective, the 1979 Legislature
inserted the following language in 24-412: "Directors elected
in any district prior to March 21, 1981 shall hold their office
until successors are elected and qualified at the election in
April, 1981."
In apparent recognition that the latter amendment created a
situation where drainage district directors elected in March
of 1980 would serve only until the election in April of 1981,
the 1980 Legislature further amended 24-412 (L. 1980, ch. 107,
§1) by adding the following provision: "Directors elected in
any district on March 4, 1980, shall hold office until successors
are elected and qualified at the election in April, 1983."
Pursuant to the previously-mentioned provisions of that statute,
then, the successors elected in 1983 and each succeeding election
will be elected for two-year Items.
The manifest purpose of the 1-980 amendment was to avoid the
election of directors in two successive years, while at the
same time attempting to provide for the eventual coordination
of all drainage district elections with regular city and
school district elections. However, section 3 of the 1980
enactment amending 24-412 provided that the act would "take
effect and be in force from and after its publication in the
official state paper." L. 1980, ch. 107, §3. The records
of the Secretary of State, as evidenced by the 1980 Session
Laws of Kansas, reveal that this act was so published on
March 13, 1980. Id. at 493. Thus, the act became effective
nine days after the March 4, 1980, election to which the 1980
amendment applied, which fact has prompted you to inquire
whether K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 24-412 validly extends the terms
of directors elected on March 4, 1980, until the April elec-
tion in 1983.
In our opinion the provision in question is a valid exercise
of legislative authority.
Arguably, the 1980 act might be considered "retroactive" or
"retrospective" legislation. Regardless of whether the act
is to be viewed as having prospective or retrospective appli-
cation, though, such determination does not affect our conclu-
sion as to the effectiveness of the act's provisions relating
to the terms of office of directors elected on March 4, 1980.
As stated in State v. Hutchison, 228 Kan. 279 (1980):
"Regarding the retroactive argument, the gen-
eral rule of statutory construction is that a
statute will operate prospectively unless its
language clearly indicates that the legislature
intended that it operate retrospectively.
Nitchals V. Williams, 225 Kan. 285, 590 P.2d
582 (1979). The foregoing rule of statutory
construction is modified where the statutory
change is merely procedural or remedial in
nature and does not prejudicially affect the
substantive rights of the parties. Nitchals v.
Williams, 225 Kan. 285." Id. at 287.
Assuming arguendo that the statutory provision in question is
to be viewed as having retrospective application because of
its reference to an election which occurred prior to the time
the amended statute took effect, such fact, in light of the
rules announced in State v. Hutchison, supra, would not inval-
idate such provision, since the legislature's intended applica-
tion has been clearly expressed. Moreover, the act has no
effect on any substantive rights of the persons elected as
directors in March of 1980. It is well-established that the
holder of a public office
"has no contractual right or property interest
in the office. . . . [T]he tenure of the office
is not protected by constitutional provisions
which prohibit impairment of the obligation of
contract." (Footnotes omitted.) 63 Am. Jur. 2d
Public Officers and Employees §34.
Thus, irrespective of whether the 1980 amendment of 24-412 is
considered retrospective legislation, such consideration is not
in and of itself determinative of the amendment's validity.
Rather, the controlling issue is the extent of the legislature's
power to modify the tenure of a public office.
It is well established that the power of the state legislature
is absolute with respect to all offices that it creates,
except as restricted by the state constitution and the grant
of authority to the federal government by the federal consti-
tution. Leek v. Theis, 217 Kan. 784, 809 (1975); Higginbotham
v. Baton Rouge, 306 U.S. 535, 83 L. Ed. 968 (1938). From
our examination of both the state and federal constitutions it
is evident that neither, expressly or impliedly, restrict nor
impose duties upon the legislature in regard to drainage dis-
tricts or the directors thereof. Drainage districts are solely
creatures of the legislature. The only state constitutional
provisions having application to drainage districts are
those relating to the legislature's power to provide for the
election or appointment of officers not otherwise provided
for in the state constitution.
Article 2, Section 18 of the Kansas Constitution provides:
"The legislature may provide for the election or appointment
of all officers and the filling of all vacancies not other-
wise provided for in this constitution." And, using similar
language, Article 15, Section 1 of the Kansas Constitution
states: "All officers whose election or appointment is not
otherwise provided for, shall be chosen or appointed as may
be prescribed by law."
It is clear from these provisions that the framers of the
state's constitution intended the legislature to have broad
powers over the terms of officers not prescribed by the con-
stitution, and there are few constitutional restrictions
placed on the exercise of that power.
This determination is supported by the Kansas Supreme Court's
decision in State v- Monahan, 72 Kan. 492 (1905). There, the
Court was discussing the validity of requiring voters in
drainage district elections to be property owners. It had
been asserted that this violated the constitutional prohibi-
tion forbidding a property qualification for any office of
public trust. In upholding the property requirement, the
Court noted the separate nature of drainage district elec-
tions, stating:
"The elections referred to in the act under
consideration were not provided for by the
constitution, nor did the constitution impose
upon the legislature any duty to make provi-
sion for them. They were not required to be
held by reason of anything contained in the
fundamental law of the state. The drainage
district in question is wholly the creation
of the legislature, which had practically
unlimited discretion in the matter. The sta-
tute might have made the office of director
appointive instead of elective . . . ."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 500.
This broad power of the legislature over non-constitutional
officers is also recognized by the Court's statement in
State, ex rel., v. Doane, 98 Kan. 435, 438 (1916), that "it
is clearly within the power of the legislature to provide for
the election or appointment of all mere statutory officers in
any reasonable manner . . . ." To the same effect is the
following statement in Sartin v. Snell, 87 Kan. 485, 494 (1912):
"The constitution contains no inhibition upon
the power of the legislature to provide as it
may deem best the method for the appointment of
officers whose election or appointment is not
otherwise provided for. On the other hand, the
constitution expressly declares that 'all officers
whose election or appointment is not otherwise
provided for, shall be chosen or appointed as
may be prescribed by law.' (Const. art. 15, §1.)
It will thus be seen that the constitution has
placed in the legislature the power to regulate
the mode of appointing officers not otherwise
provided for." (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, from the foregoing we have concluded that the leg-
islature has broad, almost unlimited authority over the terms
of office of drainage district directors and the method of
selecting them. As to the legislature's authority to modify
an incumbent director's term of office, we note the decision
in Schumacher v. Rausch, 190 Kan. 239 (1962), wherein the
Court upheld the validity of a statute abolishing an office
during the incumbent's term of office. There, the Court
stated: "Generally speaking, that which is purely a creature
of the legislature is subject not only to the legislative
power to create, but also to the legislative power to modify,
dissolve or abolish." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 244.
This is in accord with general authorities. In 63 Am. Jur. 2d,
Public Officers and Employees §147, it is stated: "There is no
doubt of the power of the legislature which creates an office,
to abolish it or to change it, and the legislature may shorten
or lengthen the term of the office itself, in the absence of
constitutional inhibition." (Footnotes omitted.) Cited as one
authority for this encyclopedic statement is Lanza v. Wagner,
11 N.Y. 2d 317, 229 N.Y.S. 2d 380, 183 N.E. 2d 670; 97 A.L.R.
2d 344, app. dismd. 371 U.S. 74, 9 L.Ed.2d 163, 83 S.Ct. 177,
cert. den. 371 U.S. 901, 9 L.Ed.2d 164, 83 S.Ct. 205 (1962).
There, it was stated:
"Public offices are created for the benefit
of the public, and not granted for the bene-
fit of the incumbent, and the office holder
has no contractual, vested or property right
in the office . . . . Absent any express con-
stitutional limitation, the Legislature has
full and unquestionable power to abolish an
office of its creation or to modify its term,
or other incidents attending it, in the pub
lic interest, even though the effect may be
to curtail an incumbent's unexpired term."
(Citations omitted.) 97 A.L.R.2d at 350.
Although we have discovered no Kansas case precisely on point,
there are several decisions of our Supreme Court which have
upheld the legislature's power to postpone elections for the
purpose of establishing uniform terms and the power to pro-
vide for the filling of the interim period as it deems proper.
The principal case in this area is Wilson v. Clark, 63 Kan. 505
(1901), wherein the Court stated at 510:
"The policy of the statute, as we have seen,
is to secure uniformity in the beginning of
official terms, and also to avoid the expense,
agitation and other disadvantages of frequent
elections. The postponement of elections for
one year is a reasonable and, in fact, the
only practicable method of accomplishing the
beneficial purpose of the legislature. If
the legislature had postponed elections an
unreasonable length of time, longer than was
necessary to effect the avowed purpose, and
so long as to betray an intention to make the
offices appointive by preventing the people
from choosing their officers at stated inter-
vals and for regular terms, or, if it appeared
that it was done merely to extend official
terms and as a favor to incumbents of offices,
there might be occasion for judicial interfer-
ence and condemnation."
And, as subsequently stated in that opinion:
"The matter of dispensing with unnecessary
elections and of securing uniformity in the
commencement of official terms is one that is
purely political in its character, and within
the discretion of the legislature as well as
within its power." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 515.
This decision and the analysis behind it has been explicitly
affirmed and followed by subsequent cases. See, e.g., State v.
Andrews, 64 Kan. 474 (1902); Murray v. Payne, 137 Kan. 685
(1933). Furthermore, as the court in Wilson noted, "jt]he
question of legislative power to postpone elections and readjust
the commencement of official terms has been affirmatively
decided by courts of other states." 63 Kan. at 515.
From these cases it is clear that the legislature has the
power to postpone elections for a reasonable length of time,
in order to secure uniformity in terms of office and to avoid
the expense, agitation and other disadvantages of frequent
elections. They are also persuasive of the legislative power
to fill the resultant interim by holdover, appointment or
election. The only judicial constraints upon this power are
that its exercise not conflict with the constitution, the
postponement be for a reasonable length of time, that where
the office is constitutionally required to be elective the
"elective nature" not be destroyed and finally that the statute
is not enacted solely for the purpose of continuing the incum-
bents in office.
Although the 1980 amendment to 24-412 lengthened the terms of
office of directors elected in 1980, it is clear that the same
result would have obtained had the legislature postponed the
1981 election, in those drainage districts where these directors
were elected, until 1983. In our judgment, based on the cases
previously cited, had the legislature undertaken such post-
ponement,-such action would be a reasonable exercise of legis-
lative authority. It would not contravene any of the restric-
tions on the legislature's power to postpone elections set
forth in Wilson v. Clark, supra at 510.
First, as noted earlier, there are no constitutional con-
straints on the legislature's power to provide for the method
of selecting drainage district directors. Second, while the
Kansas courts have not specifically ruled that a two-year
postponement of an election would be reasonable, it appears
that such a postponement would be appropriate, in light of
the Wilson court's reliance on Jordan v. Bailey, 37 Minn. 174,
33 N.W. 778 (1887), which upheld a two-year postponement as
reasonable. Third, since the legislature can make the office
of drainage district director either elective or appointive,
the office cannot be deemed to have an "elective nature" which
the postponement would destroy. Even if the office can be
considered as having acquired an "elective nature" through
the passage of time, filling the interim with an officer
already elected does preserve that status to some extent.
Finally, we have found no evidence that the statute was enacted
for the purpose of extending the terms of particular incumbents.
Since the action taken by the 1980 legislature to lengthen
the terms of directors elected in March, 1980, is tantamount
to a two-year postponement of elections in those districts
wherein such directors were elected, we believe our conclu-
sion that such postponement would be valid is pertinent in
supporting our conclusion that the lengthening of such terms
is a valid exercise of legislative power.
In summary, therefore, it is our opinion that the provisions
of K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 24-412 which extend the terms of office
of drainage district directors elected in March of 1980 until
April of 1983 represent a valid exercise of legislative
authority.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN AttorneyGeneralofKansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:hle

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