Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-050

1981-050Kanag

Texte intégral

February 19, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 50
The Honorable Paul Hess
State Senator, 30th District
State Capitol, Room 123-S
Topeka, Kansas 66612
Re: Cities and Municipalities--Public Officers--Acting as
Attorney Adversely to City's Interests
Synopsis: An attorney who has been appointed to any board, commission
or authority of a city is a "public officer" under K.S.A.
12-1601, and is therefore precluded from representing
a client in any litigation or controversy in which the city
is interested, either directly or indirectly. This pre-
clusion extends to even those matters which do not involve
the particular body to which the individual has been appointed,
but does not include other members of a law firm of which
he or she may be a part. Cited herein: K.S.A. 12-1601,
12-1602.
*
Dear Senator Hess:
You request the opinion of this office regarding the scope of K.S.A.
12-1601, which is commonly known as the conflict of interest law.
You posit a situation where an attorney is appointed as a member of
a board, commission or authority in a Kansas city, and wish to know
whether the scope of K.S.A. 12-1601 prevents such a person from
representing clients in any legal matter, even one distinct from the
area of authority of the particular body on which he or she is serving.
In our opinion, such a result is mandated by the statute as it is
presently worded.
As revised in 1970 (L. 1970, ch. 366, §7), K.S.A. 12-1601 states:
"It shall be unlawful for any elected or appointed public
officer of any city to act as attorney, counselor or
adviser adversely to such city in any litigation or
controversy in which said city may be directly or in-
directly interested."
Prior to being amended, the statute covered only mayors and elected
members of city commissions or councils, and extended only to actual
litigation. However, today, in addition to the more expansive pro-
hibitions of 12-1601, K.S.A. 12-1602 further forbids any individual
covered by the above to "appear and be heard" in any court in which
litigation involving the city has been brought.
An essential element in the application of this statute is the
determination of whether a member of an appointive city board, commission
or authority should be considered a "public officer" for the purposes
of K.S.A. 12-1601. In Sowers v. Wells, 150 Kan. 630, 633 (1939), the
Court stated thus:
"What is a 'public office' and who is a 'public
officer'? While the authorities are not in
complete harmony in defining the term 'public
office,' or 'public officer,' it universally has
been held that the right to exercise some definite
portion of sovereign power constitutes an indispensable
attribute of 'public office.' . . . In Kingston
Associates v. La Guardia,, 281 N.Y.S. 390, 156 Misc.
116, in distinguishing between 'public office,' and
an 'employment,' the New _York court said:
"'There is, however, one indispensable attribute of
public office, namely, the right to exercise some
portion of the sovereign power. 'Public office' has
been defined by Mechem in his work on Public Officers,
. . . as 'the right, authority and duty, created and
conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating
power, an individual is invested with some portion of
the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public.'"
And, in Miller v. Ottawa County Comm'rs, 146 Kan. 481, 484 (1937), the
court states other helpful criteria thus:
"The distinction between an officer an .an employee is
that the responsibility for results is upo n one and
not upon the other. There is also upon an officer the
power of direction, supervision and control."
Finally, in State v. Ottawa, 84 Kan. 100, 105, (1911), an office was
distinguished from employment in that the former involved tenure,
duration, emolument and duty. See also McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
§12.29, 3rd rev. ed. (1973).
While no specific Kansas authority exists as to whether members of
appointive bodies such as a park board, planing commission or housing
authority would be public officers of the city, in our opinion such
must be the case. The purpose of such bodies is to exercise "some
definite portion of sovereign power" which has been allocated to them
by statute or ordinance, and which, in their absence, would have to
otherwise be exercised by elected city officials. Members of such
bodies are responsible for the operation of the bodies or functions
which have been entrusted to them by the city:, are appointed for a
definite term and are held accountable by those who appointed them,
i.e., mayor or city commission or council. X11 of these factors
separate the members of such. bodies from mere employees, such as an
attorney who may be hired to render advice or counsel, or from members
of autonomous bodies whose authority derive ;-from state statute and
which are merely "triggered" into existence by city action. See,
e.g., K.S.A. 27-315 et seq. (airport authority). Additionally, it
is to be noted that other jurisdictions have. reached this same result
in numerous instances. McQuillin, supra at1 §12.31, n. 42.
Given the above conclusion that attorneys who are appointed to city
boards, commissions or authorities are public, officials of the city,
how far does the statute go to preclude them from representing clients
who are involved in controversies or litigation with the city? In
view of the plain language of the statute, which bars adverse action in
"any" litigation or controversy in which the city has an interest,
direct or indirect, we see virtually no are where they may act, even
if the matter involves only a traffic ticket in municipal court. While
it might be reasonable to do so, no distinction is made between matters
involving the specific body on which they sit and others partially or
totally apart from their area of concern. Also, while initial repre-
sentation of a client might not involve litigation, it is our opinion
that any disputed claim against the city would constitute a controversy
of the type included in the statute, and would be barred.
i	It would further be our opinion that the statutorily imposed disability
extends no further, and does not include partners or associates of the
firm in which the individual might be a member. Thus, solely by virtue
of K.S.A. 12-1601 and 12-1602, members of that firm are not disqualified
from participating as attorneys, counselors or advisors adversely to
the city in any litigation or controversy in which the city may be directly
or indirectly involved. However, inasmuch as this issue also raises a
question concerning the Canons of Professional Responsibility for
Attorneys, concerning which this office is not authorized to issue
opinions, our conclusion is limited solely to the reach of the statutes
themselves.
In conclusion, an attorney who has been appointed to any board, commis-
sion or authority of a city is a "public officer" under K.S.A. 12-1601,
and is therefore precluded from representing a client in any litigation
or controversy in which the city is interested, either directly or
indirectly. This preclusion extends to even those matters which do not
involve the particular body to which the individual has been appointed,
but does not include other members of a law firm of which he or she
may be a part.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Jeffrey S. Southard
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:JSS:phf

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