Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-044

1981-044Kanag

Texte intégral

February 12, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 44
The Honorable Edward F. Reilly
Senator, Third District
Room 255 E
Statehouse
Topeka, Kansas
Re: Automobiles and Other Vehicles -- Size, Weight, and
Load of Vehicles -- Penalties for Weight Violations
Synopsis: Through the imposition of fines for unlawful conduct,
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1901(d) imposes criminal liability.
In addition, subsection (a) of that statute does not
appear to violate the United States Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause, although it only imposes
liability upon a limited class of persons. Moreover,
that subsection appears to convey a sufficiently
definite warning as to the conduct proscribed therein,
so as to avoid being unconstitutionally vague and
uncertain. Cited herein: K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1901,
8-1909, K.S.A. 8-2116, 8-2204, 21-3105, K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 21-4503, U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
Dear Senator Reilly:
You ask our opinion on three issues concerning K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1901.
Your first question arises as a result of an amendment to this statute
by the 1980 Kansas Legislature. (See L. 1980, ch. 44, §1.) Prior to
that amendment, 8-1901 declared certain conduct to be a misdemeanor,
but such conduct is now declared to be "unlawful," and you have inquired
whether violation of the proscribed conduct constitutes a crime.
To determine whether K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1901 still imposes criminal
sanctions, it is necessary to refer to K.S.A. 21-3105, which defines a crime
as follows:
"A crime is an act or omission defined by law
and for which, upon conviction, a sentence of
death, imprisonment or fine, or both imprisonment
and fine, is authorized. Crimes are classified as
felonies and misdemeanors.
"(1)A felony is a crime punishable by death or
by imprisonment in any state penal institution.
"(2)All other crimes are misdemeanors." (Emphasis supplied.)
With this definition in mind, we note that subsections (b) and (c) of
8-1901 prescribe fines for persons who are convicted of violating the
various provisions of Article 19 of Chapter 8 of Kansas Statutes Annotated.
It is clear, therefore, that such violations constitute criminal conduct
which is classified as a misdemeanor pursuant to K.S.A. 21-3105. In
reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the rule of statutory
construction that an amendment or revision of a statute raises the
presumption that a change in the law was intended. Shawnee Township
Fire District v. Morgan, 221 Kan. 271 (1977). However, with respect to
the 1980 amendment to 8-1901, it is apparent that the pertinent change
intended by the legislature was to revise the penalties applicable to
violations of Article 19, Chapter 8.
K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1901 is part of the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic
on Highways (see K.S.A. 8-2204), as it was revised and re-enacted in
1974 (see L. 1974, ch. 33). This act contains a general penalty provision,
as follows:
"Every person convicted of violating any of the provisions
of this act for which another penalty is not provided
shall be guilty of a class C misdemeanor, except that
upon a second such conviction within one (1) year thereafter
such person shall be guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and
upon a third or subsequent conviction within one (1)
year after the first conviction, such person shall be guilty
of a class A misdemeanor." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 8-2116.
Prior to its amendment in 1980, 8-1901 declared the conduct proscribed
therein to be a misdemeanor, but did not specify any penalties. Thus,
the provisions of K.S.A. 8-2116 quoted above were applicable, and the
penalties applicable to such violations were those set forth in the
Criminal Code for the various classes of misdemeanors. (See K.S.A. 1980
Supp. 21-4503.) Therefore, it is our opinion that, rather than preclude
violations specified in 8-1901 from being considered criminal, the
legislative purpose in amending this statute in 1980 was merely to change
the penalties for such violations.
You also ask whether K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1901(d) violates the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, by imposing liability only upon persons who cause or
knowingly permit excess loading at places where "there is available
a stationary scale, the accuracy of which is certified in accordance
with law." In determining whether the classification in the statute
violates the Equal Protection Clause, it first must be ascertained
whether the classification establishes a suspect category or infringes
upon a fundamental right. The classification does not appear to
involve a suspect category, as it does not involve alienage, race or
nationality [Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 29 L.Ed.2d 534
(1971)]; nor does it appear to involve a fundamental right guaranteed
by the Constitution, such as voting, freedom of speech or religion.
See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 82 L.Ed. 1235,
1239 at n. 4 (1937). Therefore, the appropriate test is whether the
classification is rationally connected to the purpose of the statute,
not whether the legislature could have established a better classification.
"We will not overturn such a statute [not involving
a suspect category or fundamental right] unless the varying
treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated
to the achievements of any combination of legitimate
purposes that we can only conclude that the legislature's
actions were irrational." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93,
97, 59 L.Ed.2d 171, 176 (1979).
See also Zerr v. Tilton, 224 Kan. 394 (1978), and Manzanares v. Bell,
214 Kan. 589 (1974).
To satisfy the Equal Protection Clause the classification need not be
perfect and may be either exclusive or nonexclusive as "perfection is
by no means required." Vance v. Bradley, supra, citing Phillips Chemical Co.
v. Dumas School District, 361 U.S. 376, 4 L.Ed.2d 384 (1960). Therefore,
in our judgment subsection (d) does not appear to be in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause, in that it appears that imposing liability only
on those having available a "stationary scale, the accuracy of which
is certified in accordance with law" is related to the purpose of
keeping overloaded vehicles off the highways of Kansas. Although the
statute does not impose liability on all persons who "cause or knowingly
permit" a vehicle to be overloaded, it is not necessary for a statute
to include all areas within a field. See Vance v. Bradley, supra.
We believe it is legitimate for the legislature to single out and
impose liability only on those persons who are most likely to know
the weight of a loaded vehicle, due to the availability of an accurate,
stationary scale. Thus, in our opinion, subsection (d) satisfies the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, since the
classification established therein appears to be rationally related to
the purpose of the statute, and such a classification evinces a legitimate
policy consideration of the legislature.
Your third question concerns whether K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1901(d) is
void for being unconstitutionally vague and uncertain. Specifically,
you ask whether one is liable solely by reason of the vehicle being
overloaded, or must the overloaded vehicle be operated on the highway
before any liability exists. While we recognize that this statutory
provision does not reflect the most artful draftsmanship, we do not
believe that it is unconstitutionally vague. Subsection (d) of 8-1901
provides as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to cause or
knowingly permit the owner or lessee of any vehicle
or combination of vehicles to be loaded with gross
weight of such vehicle or combination of vehicles
exceeding any limitation stated in article 19 of
chapter 8 of Kansas Statutes Annotated, if at the
time and place of such loading there is available
a stationary scale, the accuracy of which is certified
in accordance with law." (Emphasis supplied.)
While a literal reading of these provisions, particularly the emphasized
portion thereof, might suggest that liability attaches at the time and
place where the vehicle is overloaded, such interpretation is not in
harmony with the spirit of the law. As noted previously, the manifest
purpose of these provisions is to prevent overloaded vehicles from being
operated or moved upon the highways of this state. In fact, the entirety
of Article 19 of Chapter 8 of Kansas Statutes Annotated is designed to
regulate the size and weight of vehicles operated or moved on the
state's highways. Thus, to construe 8-1901(d) as imposing liability for
the act of overloading itself is inconsistent with the underlying
legislative intent, and in our opinion, a person's liability for causing
or knowingly permitting a vehicle or combination of vehicles to be
overloaded exists only if such vehicle or combination of vehicles is
moved or operated on the highways.
It is to be noted that, to be overloaded, a vehicle or combination of
vehicles must exceed applicable weight limitations prescribed elsewhere
in Article 19. Certain of these limitations are prescribed in K.S.A.
1980 Supp. 8-1909(a), which provides in relevant part:
"Except as provided in subsection (b) no vehicle or
combination of vehicles shall be Roved or operated
on any highway or bridge when the gross weight
thereof exceeds the limits specified below:"
(Emphasis added.)
While the weight limitations which follow the above-quoted provisions
exist regardless of whether a vehicle or combination of vehicles is moved
or operated on the highways, such limitations have no meaning in the
abstract. They have application as a regulatory provision only when
the vehicle or combination of vehicles is moved or operated on the
highways.
Similarly, we believe that the reference to these limitations in 8-1901(d)
can have meaning only when such reference is construed as being to
limitations that are applied to the movement or operation of vehicles or
combinations thereof on the highways. A contrary interpretation would
mean that a vehicle which is loaded in excess of such weight limitations,
but which is operated only on private property, would subject the person
to criminal liability for causing or permitting the vehicle to be so
overloaded. We find absolutely no basis for imputing such intent to
the legislature. Moreover, since violation of these provisions results
in criminal liability, as previously discussed, such alternative
interpretation must be rejected as being the least favorable to a
person charged with liability thereunder. It is a well-established rule
in this state "that penal statutes must be strictly construed against
the state." State v. Mauldin, 215 Kan. 956, 959 (1974).
Although 8-1901(d) is susceptible of alternative constructions, we do
not believe that renders it unconstitutionally vague. As noted in
State v. Kirby, 222 Kan. 1 (1977):
"The test to determine whether a criminal statute is
unconstitutionally void by reason of being vague and
indefinite is whether its language conveys a sufficiently
definite warning as to the conduct proscribed when
measured by common understanding and practice. If a
statute conveys this warning it is not void for vagueness.
Conversely, a statute which either requires or forbids
the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application is violative
of due process. At its heart the test for vagueness
is a commonsense determination of fundamental fairness.
( Kansas City Millwright Co., Inc. v. Kalb, 221 Kan. 658,
562 P.2d 65.) This court has always held that the
constitutionality of a statute is presumed, that all
doubts must be resolved in favor of a statute's validity,
and that before it can be stricken it must clearly. appear
that the statute violates the constitution. If there is
any reasonable way to construe a statute to be constitutionally
valid, the court should do so. ( Brown v. Wichita State
University, 219 Kan. 2, 547 P.2d 1015.)" Id. at 4.
Applying this test to 8-1901(d), we cannot conclude that it is
unconstitutionally vauge and indefinite. Certainly the proscribed
conduct of causing or knowingly permitting a vehicle or combination
of vehicles to be overloaded is made abundantly clear. The only question
of interpretation arises as to the point in time when such conduct
results in liability. Even here, however, we believe that "persons of
cannon intelligence" rust recognize the legislature's manifest purpose
of regulating the weight of vehicles and combinations of vehicles moved
or operated on the highways. This purpose is clearly expressed in
subsection (a) of this statute, and it is clearly expressed in other
sections of Article 19 of Chapter 8. Recognizing such manifest legislative
intent, we do not believe that persons of common intelligence must guess as
to this statute's meaning. We believe it conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct.
In summary, it is our judgment that K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 8-1901 does impose
criminal (misdemeanor) sanctions through imposition of the fines provided
in subsections (b) and (c). Moreover, subsection (d) of that statute
does not appear to be in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the United States Constitution, although liability is imposed only
upon a limited class of persons; and in our judgment, subsection (d)
conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct
so as to avoid being unconstitutionally vague and uncertain.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
Thomas D. Haney
Deputy Attorney General
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