Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-043

1981-043Kanag

Texte intégral

February 11, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 43
Ms. Mary Kathleen Babcock
Foulston, Siefkin, Powers & Eberhardt
700 Fourth Financial Center
Broadway at Douglas
Wichita, Kansas 67202
Re: Schools--Miscellaneous Provisions--Auxiliary School
Services
Synopsis: The provisions of K.S.A. 72-5392 et seq. do not repeal,
by implication, the provisions of K.S.A. 72-1204 et seq.
The latter remain in full force and effect, and there
is no transfer of the responsibility to provide "basic
hearing screening" to public school districts only.
The provision of a special education program that is
designed to impact and involve every aspect of a child's
remedial educational experience does not involve an
excessive entanglement between church and state, even
though designed by a public employee for a parochial
school child, so long as said program is not forced
upon parochial school teachers for inclusion in the
classroom activities of the parochial school. Attorney
General Opinion No. 81-27 affirmed.) (Cited herein:
K.S.A. 72-1204, 72-1205, 72-5392, 72-5393.
*
Dear Ms. Babcock:
On behalf of the Board of Education of Unified School District
No. 259, Sedgwick County, Kansas, you seek our opinion on several
questions concerning the provisions of K.S.A. 72-5392 et seq.
As you explain, the statutes deal with the provision, by public
school districts, of certain "auxiliary school services."
Regarding these statutory provisions, you ask:
"1. Does §§72-5392, et seq., implicitly amend
or repeal K.S.A. S572-1204, et seq., and transfer
the responsibility for all basic hearing screening
to public school districts?
"2. Does the fifth sentence of §72-5393 contemplate
that the enumerated therapeutic services and
Special Education are to be provided on nonpublic
school premises if practical?
"3. If the answer to Question 2 above is yes,
does the provision of such services on parochial
school premises violate either the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution or the Kansas
Constitution?
"4. Is the provision of a Special Education program
that is designed to impact and involve every aspect
of a child's educational experience excessively
entangling if designed by a public school for a
parochial school child?"
Our office has received a number of inquiries concerning the
provisions of K.S.A. 72-5392 et seq. Dr. Merle Bolton, Kansas
Commissioner of Education, was one of those who inquired about
said provisions. We responded to Dr. Bolton's inquiry by
issuing Attorney General Opinion No. 81-27, a copy of which is
enclosed herein. We believe the opinion to Dr. Bolton answers
the second and third questions you present; thus, in this opinion,
we shall respond to your first and last inquiries only.
Your first inquiry concerns the possible repeal, by implication,
of K.S.A. 72-1204 et seq., by the enactment of K.S.A. 72-5392 et seq.
Repeal by implication occurs where there is an irreconcilable
conflict between the provisions of two statutes. In such cases,
the latest expression of the legislature upon the subject must be
regarded as the law, and it operates to repeal the earlier provision
to the extent of the repugnancy in the two acts. See, Mannel v.
Mannel, 186 Kan. 150 (1960) and the cases cited therein at 153.
However, as stated by the Court in Jenkins v. Newman Memorial
Hospital, 212 Kan. 92 (1973): "Repeals by implication are not
favored in the law and a former act will not be held to have been
repealed by implication unless a later enactment is so repugnant
to the provisions of the first act that both cannot be given force
and effect." Id. at Syl. 11. See also, In re Estate of Suesz,
228 Kan. 275, Syl. 11 (1980); City of Salina v. Jaggers, 228 Kan.
155, Syl. 12 (1980); and City of Overland Park v. Nikias, 209
Kan. 643 (1972).
The provisions of K.S.A. 72-1204 et seq. were enacted in 1969.
See, L. 1969, ch. 361. Under those statutory provisions, the board
of education of any school district and the governing authority
of any nonpublic accredited school is required to "provide basic
hearing screening without charge to every pupil in its schools
during the first year of admission and not less than once every
three (3) years thereafter." (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 72-1205.
The provisions of K.S.A. 72-5392 et seq. were enacted in 1980.
See, L. 1980, ch. 212. While the term "basic hearing screening"
is not employed in those statutes, K.S.A. 72-5393, in relevant
part, provides: "Speech and hearing diagnostic services . . . if
provided in the public schools of the school district, shall be
provided in any private, nonprofit elementary or secondary school
which is located in the school district." (Emphasis added.)
The provisions of K.S.A. 72-1204 et seq. have not been repealed
expressly by the legislature. However, the question has arisen
whether the later enactment, K.S.A. 72-5392 et seq., repeals,
by implication, the provisions of the earlier enactment, K.S.A.
72-1204 et seq. Given the above-quoted statements of the Court,
the question resolves to whether there is such an irreconcilable
conflict between K.S.A. 72-5392 et seq. and 72-1204 et seq. that
the provisions of both acts cannot be given force and effect.
We believe no such irreconcilable conflict exists. The above
emphasized language of K.S.A. 72-5393 clearly implies that the
"speech and hearing diagnostic services," which the legislature
had in mind when it enacted said statute, may or may not be provided
in the public school district. However, under K.S.A. 72-1204 et seq
"basis hearing screening" is required to be provided. From these
facts, we conclude the legislature did not intend to equate "speech
and hearing diagnostic services" with "basic hearing screening."
In our judgment, the former involves a much more sophisticated
analyses than the latter. By statute, "basic hearing screening"
means simply "a hearing testing program for each child conducted
with a calibrated audiometer." K.S.A. 72-1204(c). Consequently,
we concur in your assertion that the "hearing diagnostic services"
contemplated by the legislature in K.S.A. 72-5393 apparently involve
hearing diagnostic services beyond the basic hearing screening. If
this interpretation is given to the two enactments, there is no
irreconcilable conflict between the provisions of K.S.A. 72-5392
et seq., and those of K.S.A. 72-1204 et seq. Said acts can be
harmonized and both may operate independently without conflict,
and there is no repeal by implication. Thus, in our judgment,
both acts remain in full force and effect, and there is no transfer
of the responsibility to provide basic hearing screenings to public
school districts only.
The other inquiry to be addressed in this opinion is whether the
provision of a special education program "that is designed to
impact and involve every aspect of a child's educational experience"
is excessively entangling if designed by a public school for a
parochial school child.
This inquiry stems from a portion of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 97 S.Ct. 2593,
53 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). In that case, the Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of an Ohio statute, the wording of which is quite
similar to K.S.A. 72-5393. The persons who challenged the statute
asserted that the provisions thereof violated the principle of
separation of church and state, established by the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution.
Paragraphs (H) and (I) of section 3317.06 of the Ohio statute
authorized the expenditure of public funds:
"(H) To provide guidance and counseling services
to pupils attending nonpublic schools within
the district. Such services shall be provided
in the public school, in public centers, or in
mobile units located off of the nonpublic
premises as determined by the state department
of education. If such services are provided in
the public school or in public centers, trans-
portation to and from such facilities shall be
provided by the public school district in which
the nonpublic school is located.
"(I) To provide remedial services to pupils
attending nonpublic schools within the dis-
trict. Such services shall be provided in the
public school, in public centers, or in mobile
units located off of the nonpublic premises as
determined by the state department of education.•
If such services are provided in the public
school or in public centers, transportation to
and from such facilities shall be provided by
the public school district in which the nonpublic
school is located." 53 L.Ed.2d at 730, footnote 12.
In discussing these provisions, the Court said the persons
challenging the law conceded that the provision of remedial,
therapeutic and guidance services in public schools, public centers
or in mobile units is constitutional, if both public and nonpublic
school students are served simultaneously. This concession by
the appellants concerned Justice Marshall, as is made clear in
footnote 13 of the opinion. See 53 L.Ed.2d at 731. The footnote
states:
"13. We believe the concession reflects
appellants' understanding that the programs
are not intended to influence the classroom
activities in the nonpublic schools. Our
Brother Marshall argues that certain stipulations
regarding paragraph (H) announce that guidance
counseling will include planning and selection
of particular courses. Post, at 261, 53 L.Ed.
2d 740. We agree that such involvement with
the day-to-day curriculum of the parochial
school would be impermissible. We, however, do
not so read the stipulations. Rather, we under-
stand them to recognize that a guidance counselor
will engage in broad-scale, long-term planning
of a student's career choices and the general
areas of study that will further those choices.
Our Brother Marshall also argues that the
stipulations refect an understanding that remedial
service teachers under paragraph (I) will plan
courses of study for use in the classroom. Ibid.
Such a provision would pose grave constitutional
questions. The stipulations, however, provide
only that the remedial service teacher will keep
the classroom teacher informed of the action taken.
App 49. We do not understand the stipulations to
approve planning of classroom activities." (Emphasis
added.) 53 L.Ed.2d at 731.
In the text of the opinion, the Court states:
"We recognize that, unlike the diagnostician,
the therapist may establish a relationship with
the pupil in which there might be opportunities
to transmit ideological views. In Meek the Court
acknowledged the danger that publicly employed
personnel who provide services analogous to those
at issue here might transmit religious beliefs
in their activities. But, as discussed in Part V,
supra, the Court emphasized that this danger arose
from the fact that the services were performed in
the pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the church-
related school. 421 U.S., at 371, 44 L.Ed.2d 217,
95 S.Ct. 1753. See also Lemon, 403 U.S. at 618-619.
29 L.Ed.2d 745, 91 S.Ct. 2105. The danger existed
there, not because the public employee was likely
deliberately to subvert his task to the service of
religion, but rather because the pressures of the
environment might alter his behavior from its normal
course. So long as these types of services are
offered at truly religiously neutral locations,
the danger perceived in Meek does not arise.
"The fact that a unit on a neutral site on occasion
may serve only sectarian pupils does not provoke
the same concerns that troubled the Court in Meek.
[Footnote omitted.] The influence on a therapist's
behavior that is exerted by the fact that he serves
a sectarian pupil is qualitatively different from
the influence of the pervasive atmosphere of a
religious institution. The dangers perceived in
Meek arose from the nature of the institution, not
from the nature of the pupils.
"Accordingly, we hold that providing therapeutic
and remedial services at a neutral site off the
premises of the nonpublic schools will not have
the impermissible effect of advancing religion.
Neither will there be any excessive entanglement
arising from supervision of public employees to
insure that they maintain a neutral stance. It
can hardly be said that the supervision of public
employees performing public functions on public
property creates an excessive entanglement between
church and state. Sections 3317.06(G), (H), (I),
and (K) are constitutional." (Emphasis added.)
53 L.Ed.2d at 731-732.
In our judgment, the Court, in the footnote above quoted, was
expressing its concern over public employees, i.e., therapists
and remedial education teachers, planning courses of study for
use in the parochial school classroom; that is, having a public
employee dictate to an employee of a parochial school the content
of instruction to be offerred in the parochial school classroom.
It is unrealistic to interpret the Court's decision as providing
that the therapist or remedial education teacher could not plan
therapeutic programs or remedial education classes to be offerred
the child outside his or her regular classroom. Such, in our
judgment, is made clear by the above-emphasized statements of
the Court in the text of the opinion, and also is supported by
statements made by Justice Marshall in his separate opinion.
Specifically, in that opinion, he states:
"Paragraphs (I) and (K) provide remedial
services and programs for disabled children.
The stipulation of the parties indicates that
these paragraphs will fund specialized teachers
who will both provide instruction themselves
and create instructional plans for use in the
students' regular classrooms. Id., at 47-48.
These 'therapeutic services' are clearly in-
tended to aid the sectarian schools to improve
the performance of their students in the class-
room. I would not treat them as if they were
programs of physical or psychological therapy."
(Emphasis added.) 53 L.Ed.2d at 741.
Thus, in our judgment, the provision of a special education program
that is designed to impact and involve every aspect of a child's
remedial educational experience is not excessively entangling,
if designed by a public school for a parochial school child, so
long as said program is not forced upon parochial school teachers
for inclusion in the classroom activities of the parochial school.
To paraphrase the Court, it can hardly be said that the supervision
of public employees, i.e., remedial education teachers, to insure
that they maintain a religiously neutral stance when performing
their public function of providing remedial educational services
to exceptional children, while on public premises, creates an exces-
sive entanglement between church and state. So long as there is no
supervision of parochial school employees by public employees on
parochial school premises in providing the auxiliary school services
specified in K.S.A. 72-5392, it is our judgment the provisions of
K.S.A. 72-5392 et sea. do not foster an excessive entanglement of
church and state.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
V
Rodney J. Bieker
Assistant Attorney General
RTS:BJS:RJB:jm
Enclosure: Attorney General Opinion No. 81-27

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