Kansas Attorney General Opinion 1981-021

1981-021Kanag

Texte intégral

January 23, 1981
ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION NO. 81- 21
The Honorable Denny D. Burgess
Representative Sixtieth District
Pottawatomie and Wabaunsee Counties
Rt. 1 -- Box 292
Wamego, Kansas 66547
Re: Schools--Members of Board of Education of Unified
School District--Compatibility with Other Offices
Synopsis: There are no statutory obstacles to a member of the board
of education of a unified school district simultaneously
holding either of the offices of county attorney or municipal
judge of a city of the second class. Moreover, the common
law doctrine of incompatibility of offices does not preclude
either of such simultaneous incumbencies. Cited herein:
K.S.A. 19-702, 19-704, 19-705.
Dear Representative Burgess:
You have inquired whether a member of a board of education of a
unified school district may simultaneously hold the office of county
attorney (presumably, although your request was not so limited, of
a county in which all or a portion of such school district is located).
You have further inquired whether a municipal judge of a city of the
second class may be elected to a position on the board of education
of a unified school district.
In considering both of your questions, we have discovered no statutory
provisions which would compel a negative answer to either of these
questions. We have noted the provisions of K.S.A. 19-705 which
preclude a county attorney from holding "any judicial or other
county office whatsoever." Clearly, a position on a school board is
not a judicial office, and this office has consistently advised that
such school board position is not a county office. (See, e.g.,
Attorney General Opinion Nos. 76-127 and 79-255.) Such advice has
been predicated, in part, on the case of State v. Fleming, 61 Kan.
90 (1899), in which the Kansas Supreme Court held that high school
trustees were not county officers.
With respect to your second question, we also have reviewed pertinent
election laws and have found no statutory preclusion of a municipal
judge of a city of the second class being a candidate for or being
elected to a position on a school district's governing body.
Thus, absent any statutory statement as to the compatibility of these
particular offices, resolution of your inquiry depends upon application
of the common law doctrine of incompatibility of offices. That doctrine
has been defined, discussed and applied in a number of opinions issued
by this office (see, e.g., Attorney General Opinion Nos. 79-242,
79-248 and 79-251), and in order to avoid unduly burdening this
opinion by a restatement of the principles announced in those prior
opinions, we are enclosing copies of the opinions noted above for your
consideration. Suffice it to state, though, that all of these opinions
concluded that the applicable Kansas cases, as well as pertinent general
authorities, indicate that incompatibility of offices requires more than
a physical impossibility to discharge the duties of both offices at
the same time. Moreover, there must be an inconsistency in the
functions of the two offices, to the extent that a performance of
the duties of one office interferes with the performance of the duties
of the other, thus making it improper, from a public policy standpoint,
for one person to retain both offices.
In addition to the opinions of this office noted above and enclosed
for your consideration, Attorney General Opinion No. 78-315 has
pertinence to your request. In that opinion, Attorney General Curt
Schneider concluded that the office of county attorney is not incompatible
with the office of a member of a board of education of a unified school
district. The basis for such conclusion was stated as follows: "It
is clear that the duties of the county attorney in no way operate at
cross purposes with the statutory obligations of a board of education,
and that the two offices are not incompatible because of the respective
duties and obligations of the two offices." Id., p. 2. Although stated
in a rather summary fashion, it is our opinion that the conclusion
expressed in that prior opinion is correct.
We have formed our opinion by applying the principles enunciated in the
enclosed opinions, and in so doing have found no inconsistency in the
functions of the two offices. In our judgment, the performance of
the duties of one office does not interfere with the performance of
the duties of the other. However, in reaching this conclusion, we have
not been unmindful of Attorney General Opinion No. 79-255, in which we
determined that the common law doctrine of incompatibility of offices
precludes one person from simultaneously holding the offices of county
commissioner and member of a board of education of a unified school
district. Nevertheless, it is our considered opinion that the duties
and obligations of a county attorney are distinguishable from those of
a county commissioner, such that the application of the principles
forming the basis of Opinion No. 79-255 to the situation considered
herein produces a different result.
In that prior opinion, we found that the respective duties and obligations
of a county commissioner and school board member were such that one
person could not "faithfully, impartially and efficiently discharge
the duties of both offices." Att'y Gen. Op. No. 79-255, at p. 4. More-
over, it was determined that such simultaneous incumbency offended
public policy from the standpoint that
"'[e]ven if the incumbent of one office were to
abstain from discussing, participating in or voting
on matters affecting his or her incumbency of the
other office, such abstention deprives one constituency
or the other of a representative who is free to make
independent judgments on such matters.'" Id.
In distinguishing the foregoing conclusions from the one expressed
herein, it should be recognized that a person simultaneously holding
the offices of county commissioner and school board member is engaged
in making policy decisions, some of which potentially will not be in
the best interests of both of his or her respective constituencies. We
do not believe that is true of a person simultaneously holding the offices
of county attorney and school board member, however, since a county
attorney does not exercise similar policy-making authority. Although
K.S.A. 19-704 requires a county attorney to "give opinions and advice to"
the board of county commissioners and other county officers, the county
attorney, in carrying these particular duties, merely serves as a
counselor and adviser regarding legal matters in which the county
is interested. Even though such advice and counsel may touch upon
matters of mutual concern to the school board of which the county attorney
is a member, we do not find such situations to create an inherent
repugnancy in the two offices. Clearly, in these instances, the county
attorney is not making policy decisions which might adversely affect
one or the other of his or her respective constituencies. Similarly,
we find nothing in the performance of the prosecutorial duties ascribed
to the county attorney's office (K.S.A. 19-702) that is inherently
repugnant to the county attorney's simultaneous service on a school
board. Therefore, it is our opinion that the doctrine of incompati-
bility of offices does not preclude one person from simultaneously
holding the offices of county attorney and member of a board of
education of a unified school district.
With respect to our consideration of the compatibility of the offices
of municipal judge of a city of the second class and member of a
board of education of a unified school district, we have found the
October 25, 1972, opinion of Attorney General Vern Miller to be of
assistance. That opinion considered whether the offices of municipal
judge of a third class city and board member of a unified school district
are compatible, and concluded thusly: "A comparison of the statutory
duties of the respective positions does not suggest that any incom-
patibility exists which would prevent one individual from holding both
offices. It is, accordingly, our opinion that the individual in
question may fill both positions at the same time." VII Op. Att'y
Gen. 546 (1974).
Even though Attorney General Miller's opinion does not relate to the
precise issue you have presented, in that one of the offices considered
therein was a municipal judge of a third class city, we believe that
the conclusion reached therein is equally applicable where the offices
are a municipal judge of a second class city and school board member.
We have applied the same considerations to these offices that we discussed
above with respect to the offices of county attorney and school board
member, and we have concluded that there is no inherent repugnancy
regarding the respective duties and obligations of these offices. Thus,
we have determined that one person may faithfully, impartially and effi-
ciently discharge the duties of both offices.
In summary, therefore, it is our opinion that there are no statutory
obstacles to a member of the board of education of a unified school
district simultaneously holding either of the offices of county attorney
or municipal judge of a city of the second class. Moreover, the common
law doctrine of incompatibility of offices does not preclude either
of such simultaneous incumbencies.
Very truly yours,
ROBERT T. STEPHAN
Attorney General of Kansas
W. Robert Alderson
First Deputy Attorney General
RTS:WRA:phf
Enclosures: Attorney General Opinion Nos. 79-242, 79-248 and 79-251

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.