Termination: L D, et al. v. Indiana Department of Child Services

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-JT-568| October 21, 2026 Page 1 of 12
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this Memorandum Decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
In the Termination of the Parent-Children Relationships of:
M.D. and A.D. (Minor Children)
and
L.D. (Father) and D.D. (Mother),
Appellant-Respondents
v.
Indiana Department of Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner
October 21, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JT-568
Appeal from St. Joseph Probate Court
The Honorable Graham C. Polando, Magistrate

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Trial Court Cause No.
71J01-2407-JT-79
71J01-2407-JT-80
Memorandum Decision by Judge May
Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Vaidik concur.
May, Judge.
[1] On February 3, 2026, the trial court terminated the parental rights of L.D.
(“Father”) and D.D. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”) to M.D. and A.D.
(collectively, “Children”). Parents appeal the termination of their parental
rights and contend the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusions that the continuation of the Parents-Children relationship posed a
threat to Children’s well-being, that the conditions under which Children were
removed from Parents’ care would not be remedied, and that the Department of
Child Services (“DCS”) provided a satisfactory plan for Children’s care
following termination. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Parents are the adoptive parents1 of M.D., born December 2009, and A.D.,
born November 2010, and are Children’s biological great-grandparents. The
1 Parents adopted Children in 2010 and 2012 following the termination of the parental rights of Children’s
biological parents.

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family was involved with DCS in 2018 because of abuse, general neglect
involving toilet training, and educational neglect. As part of that case, Children
were adjudicated as Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”), but Parents
participated in services and DCS eventually returned Children to Parents and
closed the case.
[3] DCS became involved again in the summer of 2022, when Children began
repeatedly leaving home unsupervised for hours at a time. Between June and
August 2022, a South Bend police detective responded to roughly half a dozen
runaway calls. Police usually found Children at the nearby library where they
had been for hours without Parents calling to report Children missing. Parents
indicated they had been homeschooling Children, but the DCS investigator did
not find evidence thereof. The DCS investigator also learned that there were no
records that Children had seen a doctor or dentist since 2020. Parents entered
into a safety plan on August 18, 2022, but Children continued to leave the
home, so DCS removed them from Parents’ care on September 1, 2022.
[4] On September 6, 2022, DCS filed CHINS petitions that alleged abuse, general
neglect, and educational neglect. On November 1, 2022, Parents admitted that
Children were not enrolled in school and Parents had not provided them an
adequate education; that Parents could not stop them from running away; that
Children had gotten into cars with strangers; and that M.D. had not seen a
doctor in a long time and had never been to a dentist. On December 5, 2022,
the court entered dispositional orders declaring Children to be CHINS and
directing Parents to participate in individual therapy and family therapy if

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recommended; complete parenting and psychological assessments and follow
all recommendations; and attend supervised visitation with Children.
[5] Parents began individual therapy on February 3, 2023, but the provider
discharged Parents after four months because no therapeutic progress had
occurred. Parents participated in parenting education from late 2023 through
April 15, 2024, but completed only two of the four objectives. Throughout the
case Parents attended more than one hundred weekly therapeutically supervised
visits, but they never progressed to unsupervised visits. On July 16, 2024, the
trial court suspended family therapy. DCS filed its termination petitions on
July 22, 2024. The trial court suspended Mother’s supervised visits in January
2025 for inappropriate behavior but allowed Father to continue with supervised
visitation. Father attended one visit thereafter on March 30, 2025, and then
scheduled no additional visits. Mother did not attempt to resume visits.
[6] The trial court held fact-finding hearings on May 6, 7, and 8, 2025. Parents’
individual therapist testified that Parents denied the allegations and would not
accept accountability. Children’s therapist testified that, at removal, Children
lacked basic hygiene skills and were behind on social milestones. The visitation
supervisor testified that the visits were tumultuous – with roughly seventy
percent of visits involving confrontations or arguments – but Parents declined to
accept accountability. M.D., then fifteen years old, testified that he was happy
in foster care and did not want to return home.

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[7] The children’s therapist elaborated on the abuse Children disclosed in therapy
and its effects on Children. Children reported being beaten with the handle of a
broom and confined as punishment, and the therapist described a home in
which the windows were bolted closed, which was likened to “more like a
lockdown facility rather than a home.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 190.) The therapist
testified that the abuse affected Children psychologically and they had trauma.
Children also demonstrated lasting effects on their ability to complete basic self-
care tasks: A.D. was afraid of water because she had been scrubbed too hard
while in Parents’ care, Children had bathed only about once a month, and
M.D. did not understand what taking a bath meant. A psychologist who
evaluated M.D. diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder based on his
trauma symptoms. Testing also revealed M.D. had low scores in short-term
working memory, mathematics, and sustained attention. After removal,
Children worked through their trauma in therapy and made substantial
academic and social progress, including being on the honor roll.
[8] The family case manager testified Parents had not improved their ability to
parent. Regarding Children’s placement after termination, the family case
manager noted that while Children were not in a pre-adoptive home, the
current foster parent had adopted before and had said Children never needed to
leave her home. The family case manager also indicated that absent adoption,
Children could enter another planned permanent living arrangement that would
provide support for housing, college, life skills, and medical and mental-health

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care. On February 3, 2026, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights to
Children in a twelve-page order.
Discussion and Decision
[9] To terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must allege and prove that there
is a satisfactory plan for the child’s care and treatment, that termination is in the
child’s best interests, and one or more of the circumstances in Indiana Code
section 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). DCS must
provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d
1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009). Those Section 4(d) circumstances include a reasonable
probability the conditions resulting in the child’s removal or continued
placement outside the home will not be remedied, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3)
(2024), and “a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of
the child.” Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(4) (2024).
[10] When reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not reweigh evidence or judge
witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences
most favorable to the judgment. In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1043 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2025), trans. denied. In a proceeding to terminate the parent-child
relationship, the trial court is statutorily required to enter a formal order with
findings of fact that support its conclusions, and it must do so whether or not

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the parties requested findings under Trial Rule 52.2 Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c)
(2012); Z.B. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 900 (Ind. Ct. App.
2018), trans. denied sub nom. A.V. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 119 N.E.3d 91 (Ind.
2018). We therefore apply a two-tiered standard of review: “we determine
whether the evidence supports the findings [and] whether the findings support
the judgment.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147
(Ind. 2005). We will set the judgment aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Id.
[11] As we conduct our review, “[w]e accept unchallenged findings as true.”
Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Herein,
Parents do not challenge any of the trial court’s specific findings of fact; they
contend only that the evidence was insufficient to support the termination. (See
Appellants’ Br. at 14-17) (Argument section of brief). We therefore accept the
findings as true and consider only whether the trial court’s findings support the
conclusions and judgment. See In re: S.S., 120 N.E.3d 605, 611 (Ind. Ct. App.
2019) (“However, since Mother failed to specifically challenge any of the
juvenile court’s findings, we need only consider whether the findings support
the juvenile court’s conclusion.”).
2 A termination order that is “nothing more than a mere recitation of the conclusions the governing statute
requires” cannot be reviewed on appeal, but an order that contains a narrative setting out detailed findings of
fact supporting its conclusions is sufficient to permit review. In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1138 (Ind. Ct. App.
2023) (quoting In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed), trans. denied sub nom.
M.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 232 N.E.3d 642 (Ind. 2024). Here, although the trial court did not enter
separately enumerated findings, the narrative provided repeatedly finds facts, credits and adopts specific
testimony, and ties those findings to each statutory element, which is sufficient to permit meaningful
appellate review.

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1. Threat to Children’s Well-Being
[12] Parents contend the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat
to Children’s well-being. In determining whether a continued relationship
poses such a threat, the trial court may consider “a parent’s habitual pattern of
conduct” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152, while “taking into consideration evidence
of changed conditions.” Id. Such a “determination must be founded on
factually-based occurrences as documented in the record—not simply
speculative or possible future harms.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1146 (Ind.
2016).
[13] Regarding this element in particular, the trial court’s findings indicate:
The Court reiterates its findings above [including five pages of
the family’s history with the court and another five pages
explaining how circumstances had not been remedied], and
further finds that continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the children’s well-being. Unsurprisingly given
their spartan upbringing [with no books or toys in the house that
Children were prohibited from leaving], the children had
pronounced social deficits upon removal, being interested in
things far below their age level. [M.D.], for example, was fixated
on buses and garbage trucks—which the Court notes would be
some of his few opportunities for mental stimulation, as they
would pass by his windows.
The Children’s deficits did not end there. The Children
expressed anger at the trauma to which parents subjected them,
and worked through same with [their therapist]. [A.D.] in
particular had trouble with hygiene and bathing, apparently

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associating bathing with a traumatic incident in which she was
scrubbed too hard. But the problem was not unique to [A.D.]—
[M.D.] had a profound misunderstanding of the amount of water
needed for a “bath.”
(Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 39.)
[14] In the other areas of the findings that the court incorporated into that section,
the court entered numerous relevant findings, including those that follow.
“Children almost certainly ran away because of their deeply, profoundly, and
deliberately unstimulating environment.” (Id. at 34) (italics in original).
“Mother in particular fails to acknowledge any deficiencies in a home
environment that the Court finds unstimulating to the point of abuse.” (Id. at
36.) “Mother has subjected the Children to unreasonable, unlawful corporal
punishment.” (Id. at 38.) “Parents’ deficiencies are longstanding—predating
even these children’s births (and here the Court notes that it credits . . . parent’s
[sic] biological child’s testimony regarding horrific abuse she suffered living in
Parents’s home).” (Id. at 40.) The trial court’s copious findings about the long-
standing abusive environment that led to Children’s developmental delays and
trauma support its conclusion that the continuation of the parent-child
relationships posed a threat to Children’s well-being.3
3 Parents also argue the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions
under which Children were removed from their care would not be remedied. Because Indiana Code section
31-35-2-4(c) requires DCS to prove only one of the circumstances in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)
(2024), and we have concluded that the trial court’s conclusion regarding the threat to Children’s well-being
is supported, we need not address that argument. See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App.
2022) (statute regarding factors required to terminate parental rights is written in the disjunctive and, thus,

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2. Satisfactory Plan for Children’s Care Following
Termination
[15] Parents also argue the evidence was insufficient to support the trial court’s
conclusion that there was a satisfactory plan for Children’s care following
termination of Parents’ parental rights because DCS had not identified an
adoptive home. DCS’s plan for children’s placement after termination does not
need to “be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which
the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.” In re
C.D., 141 N.E.3d 845, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied sub nom. J.H. v.
Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 145 N.E.3d 118 (Ind. 2020). DCS need not guarantee
that adoption will occur, “only that DCS will attempt to find a suitable adoptive
parent.” Id. (quoting In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.
denied).
[16] The trial court found: “Common sense dictates that these older children will,
merely by virtue of their advanced age, already face trouble finding prospective
adoption, and the Family Case Manger credibly pointed out that she has never
had an adoptive couple step in pre-termination.” (Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at
39.) We can infer therefrom that the trial court hoped to increase the likelihood
of an adoption by terminating Parents’ rights. The trial court also found that,
DCS need prove only one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied. Nor do we need to address
Parents’ assertion that DCS provided inadequate services to help Parents remedy the conditions that led to
removal. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1048 (“a failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which
to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law”) (quoting In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied).

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even though there was no pre-adoptive placement, Children’s continued
placement with their foster parent was a satisfactory plan following termination
because it was clear that Parents would never be in a position where Children
could be returned to their care. The trial court explained:
Obviously, the entire point of the “satisfactory plan” requirement
is to prevent “legal orphans,” where children lack a permanent
placement, but a court has terminated their parents’ rights. In
some cases, then, when there is no clear pre-adoptive placement,
withholding termination on even the slim chance that parents
will, late in the game, remedy removal conditions might make
some sense. But that is simply not the case here. . . . Parents are
so resistant to change that there is essentially no chance of any
kind of even minor breakthrough.
* * * * *
The Court further finds that severing the parent-child relationship
would provide some psychological benefit to these older children
even if adoption never occurs. The Children had very little
attachment to their parents even before the current substantial
period of no contact. A need to simply “move on” from an
irreparable-but-still-legally present relationship, while likely not
appropriate in many TPR cases, is compelling in this one. Given
what these children endured for so long, there can be little doubt
that even the slim prospect of reunification is damaging. As
[Children’s therapist] put it, the Children, if returned, need
assurance that they will no longer be treated like five-year-olds.
The Court cannot provide that.
(Id. at 40.) The trial court’s findings are more than sufficient to support its
conclusion that there was a satisfactory plan for Children’s care following the

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termination of Parents’ parental rights. See In re E.P., 267 N.E.3d 531, 538 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2025) (holding plan to attempt to have Children adopted was
sufficient, even if the process could take years), trans. denied sub nom. E.C. v. Ind.
Dept. of Child Servs., 275 N.E.3d 498 (Ind. 2026).
Conclusion
[17] Parents do not challenge the trial court’s findings, and those findings support its
conclusions that the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a
threat to Children’s well-being and that there existed a satisfactory plan for
Children’s care following termination. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s
termination of Parents’ parental rights.
[18] Affirmed.
Tavitas, C.J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Ernest P. Galos
South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana