Traci Lynn Porretta v. Metropolitan Title of Indiana, LLC, et al.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PL-1583 | October 20, 2026 	Page 1 of 12
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Traci Lynn Porretta,
Appellant
v.
Metropolitan Title of Indiana, LLC and Jamie Lee Rodriguez,
Appellees
October 20, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-PL-1583
Appeal from the Kosciusko Superior Court
The Honorable Christopher D. Kehler, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
43D04-2510-PL-95
Memorandum Decision by Judge Brown
Judges Kenworthy and Scheele concur.

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Brown, Judge.
[1] 	Traci Lynn Porretta, pro se, appeals the Kosciusko Superior Court’s order
denying her motion to transfer venue to Wabash County. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] 	On October 29, 2025, Metropolitan Title of Indiana, LLC (“Metropolitan”)
filed a Complaint for Interpleader in the Kosciusko Superior Court naming
Porretta and Jamie Lee Rodriguez as defendants (together, “Defendants”). On
November 6, 2025, Metropolitan filed an Amended Complaint for Interpleader
alleging that it and Defendants entered into an escrow agreement1 by which the
sum of $36,850.18 was deposited with it as escrow agent, that “[s]ubsequent to
execution of the Escrow Agreement and closing of the transaction, it was
determined that the payoff amount” of the mortgage “was understated by
$6,019.50,” “[a]s a result, [it] reduced the net proceeds of the transaction by
$6,019.50 and paid the necessary amount” to the mortgage company, and
“[t]hereafter, the net proceeds being held pursuant to the Escrow Agreement
were $30,830.68.” Appellee Metropolitan’s Appendix Volume II at 4.
Metropolitan stated that a dispute existed between Defendants as to the
1 Following the signatures of Defendants on the last page of the escrow agreement, the following appears:
ESCROW AGENT
Metropolitan Title of Indiana
9604 Coldwater Rd, Ste. 105
Fort Wayne, IN 46825
ATTN: _______________
Appellee Metropolitan’s Appendix Volume II at 7.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PL-1583 | October 20, 2026 	Page 3 of 12
distribution of sums held by it as escrow agent and that it would tender the sum
of $30,830.68 to the clerk of the court.
[3] 	On November 18, 2025, Rodriguez filed an answer and cross-claim for
damages. In her cross-claim, Rodriguez alleged that she and Porretta were joint
owners of certain property in Wabash County, they jointly sold the property in
or before November 2020 and deposited the net proceeds from the sale into an
escrow account with Metropolitan, the total remaining net proceeds after
necessary payments on the mortgage were $30,830.68, the net proceeds were to
be paid equally to her and Porretta as the joint owners of the property, and she
is entitled to half of the amount held in escrow less half the fees Metropolitan
incurred in filing the action. On January 5, 2026, Metropolitan filed a motion
for default judgment, and on January 7, 2026, Rodriguez filed a consent to
judgment.
[4] 	On January 20, 2026, Porretta, pro se, filed a response and objection to the
motion for default judgment. Porretta stated that, in 2008, her mother, Patricia
Egolf, executed a warranty deed transferring her property to Defendants while
retaining a life estate for herself and that, upon Egolf’s death in 2019, the life
estate terminated by operation of law and the property vested in Defendants
and was not part of Egolf’s probate estate. Porretta argued, “[a]fter my mother
relocated to Utah due to declining health and following her passing, the
property required continued maintenance in order to preserve its value and
permit sale,” “[d]uring this period, I paid ongoing property-related expenses,
including: Utilities[,] Insurance[, and] Property-related maintenance expenses,”

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“[m]y sister has consistently refused to contribute to any portion of these
expenses, despite equal ownership interest in the property,” and “[t]he
interpleader action exists solely because the co-owners were unable to reach
agreement regarding allocation of these necessary expenses.” Id. at 19.
Porretta stated: “I am not requesting reimbursement at this time. I respectfully
request that the Court determine a 50/50 allocation of qualifying property
expenses prior to any distribution of escrow funds.” Id. Porretta further stated
that she objected to venue in Kosciusko County.
[5] 	Also on January 20, 2026, Porretta filed a motion to transfer venue to Wabash
County. She argued “[t]he property that is the subject of this interpleader
action is located in Wabash County, Indiana,” the deed transferring ownership
of the property to Defendants, the mortgage on the property, and the release of
the mortgage were recorded in Wabash County. Id. at 23. Porretta stated that
she resides in Utah and Rodriguez resides in Arizona. Porretta argued,
“[b]ecause the property, relevant recordings, and factual nexus of this matter
are centered in Wabash County, and because neither Defendant resides in
Kosciusko County, venue in this Court is improper or, at minimum,
substantially inconvenient.” Id.
[6] 	On April 29, 2026, Porretta filed a counterclaim alleging that Metropolitan
improperly distributed the sum of $6,019.50 and a cross-claim alleging that she
had paid expenses totaling $1,749.86 to preserve the property before its sale and
that Rodriguez had not contributed her share of the expenses and requesting the
court to order that the sum of $874.93, representing one-half of the expenses, be

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deducted from Rodriguez’s share of the escrow funds prior to distribution. On
May 11, 2026, Porretta filed an amended cross-claim alleging that she had paid
expenses totaling $2,113.89 related to the property and that Rodriguez had not
contributed her share of the expenses and requesting the court to order that the
sum of $1,056.95, representing one-half of the expenses, be deducted from
Rodriguez’s share of the escrow funds prior to distribution. On May 17, 2026,
Porretta filed a notice of related proceedings stating that an estate action was
initiated in the Wabash Circuit Court on June 23, 2025. On June 10, 2026,
Porretta filed a motion asking the court to rule on her motion to transfer venue.
[7] 	On June 11, 2026, Metropolitan filed an Objection to Change of Venue.
Metropolitan argued that it “maintains an office in Kosciusko County,
Indiana,” Defendants are non-residents of the State of Indiana, and Ind. Trial
Rule 75(A)(10) authorized the filing of the complaint in Kosciusko County.
Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 49. The trial court issued an order denying
Porretta’s motion to transfer venue pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(10). On
June 15, 2026, Porretta filed a notice of appeal. On June 16, 2026, Porretta
filed a motion to stay trial court proceedings pending interlocutory appeal. On
June 25, 2026, Rodriguez filed an objection to the motion to stay. On June 26,
2026, Porretta filed a reply.2 On June 29, 2026, the court granted Porretta’s
motion to stay.
2 In her reply, Porretta states that Metropolitan’s “principal office and company headquarters is located at
4100 Edison Lakes Parkway, Suite 120, Mishawaka, Indiana, 46545 — in St. Joseph County, not Kosciusko

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Discussion
[8] 	Porretta argues the trial court erred in denying her request to transfer venue
from Kosciusko County to Wabash County. Porretta proceeds pro se. Pro se
litigants are held to the same legal standards as licensed attorneys. Basic v.
Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied. As such, pro se
litigants are required to follow the established rules of procedure. Id. at 983-
984. We will not become an advocate for a party. Id. at 984.
[9] 	Whether a county is a preferred venue is a question of law that we review de
novo. CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Poluciano, 272 N.E.3d 1009, 1012 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2025) (citing Morrison v. Vasquez, 124 N.E.3d 1217, 1219 (Ind. 2019)).
Interpretation of our trial rules, such as Ind. Trial Rule 75, is a question of law
that we review de novo. Id. Also, where factual determinations are made from
a paper record, those determinations are reviewed de novo. Id. (citing Scribbles,
LLC v. Wedgewood by Wedgewood, 101 N.E.3d 844, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018),
trans. denied). Generally, we will affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is sustainable
on any basis found in the record. See Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d
516, 518 (Ind. 2009) (addressing motion to dismiss).
[10] 	This Court has held:
County.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 56. She also states: “[Metropolitan] maintains a branch office
at 122 W. Main Street, Warsaw, Indiana 46580 in Kosciusko County. A branch office is not a principal
office for purposes of Indiana Trial Rule 75(A)(10).” Id.

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Indiana Trial Rule 75, which governs venue requirements in
Indiana, provides that a plaintiff may bring a case in any county in
Indiana. See Ind. Trial Rule 75(A) (“Any case may be venued,
commenced[,] and decided in any court in any county[.]”).
Additionally, Trial Rule 75(A) provides that a party can file a
motion to transfer venue and requires a trial court to transfer venue
if the party “properly filing such motion” shows both that “the
county . . . where the action was filed does not meet preferred venue
requirements . . . and that the . . . county selected has preferred
venue[.]” Id. (emphasis added). See also Ind. High School Athletic
Ass’n, Inc. v. Garcia, 876 N.E.2d 350, 354 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)
(explaining that “Indiana Trial Rule 8(C) provides that a claim of
improper venue is an affirmative defense, which the pleading party
must prove” and that the party moving to transfer venue has “the
burden of proof in challenging venue”), trans. denied. Trial Rule
75(A) “contains ten subsections, each setting forth criteria
establishing ‘preferred’ venue.” CTB, Inc. v. Tunis, 95 N.E.3d 185,
187 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.
CSX Transportation, 272 N.E.3d at 1013.
[11] 	Ind. Trial Rule 75(A) provides:
Preferred venue lies in:
* * * * *
(2) the county where the land or some part thereof is located
or the chattels or some part thereof are regularly located or
kept, if the complaint includes a claim for injuries thereto or
relating to such land or such chattels, including without
limitation claims for recovery of possession or for injuries, to
establish use or control, to quiet title or determine any
interest, to avoid or set aside conveyances, to foreclose liens,
to partition and to assert any matters for which in rem relief
is or would be proper; or

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* * * * *
(8) the county where a claim in the plaintiff’s complaint may
be commenced under any statute recognizing or creating a
special or general remedy or proceeding; or
* * * * *
(10) the county where either one or more individual plaintiffs
reside, the principal office of any plaintiff organization or
governmental organization is located, or the office of any such
plaintiff organization or governmental organization to which
the claim relates or out of which the claim arose is located, if
the case is not subject to the requirements of subsections (1)
through (9) of this subdivision or if all the defendants are
nonresident individuals or nonresident organizations without a
principal office in the state.
“The rule does not create a priority among the subsections establishing
preferred venue.” Garcia, 876 N.E.2d at 351 (citation omitted).
[12] 	To be entitled to a transfer of venue from Kosciusko County to Wabash
County, Porretta as the party requesting the transfer had the burden to show
both that Wabash County was a county of preferred venue and that Kosciusko
County was not a county of preferred venue. See CSX Transportation, 272
N.E.3d at 1013 (transfer of venue required only where requesting party shows
both that county where action was filed does not meet preferred venue
requirements and that the “county selected has preferred venue”) (quoting Ind.
Trial Rule 75(A)).
[13] 	Porretta first asserts that Wabash County is a county of preferred venue under
Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2). She argues every instrument relating to the property is

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recorded in Wabash County and the escrow funds at issue are the proceeds of
the sale of the property. This Court has held that the test to determine whether
a claim relates to land under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2) is “whether a sufficient
nexus exists between the land and the underlying action.” Trs. of Purdue Univ. v.
Hagerman Const. Corp., 736 N.E.2d 819, 820-821 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting
Diesel Const. Co., Inc. v. Cotten, 634 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)),
trans. denied. We have also held that, if a plaintiff’s claims concerned “only a
question of debt,” the nexus test is not satisfied. Diesel Const., 634 N.E.2d at
1354 (“If the trial court finds that Cotten’s claims concern only a question of
debt, the nexus to the land would be too remote to meet T.R. 75(A)(2).”). See
Bayless Specialties v. Affordable Hous., Inc., 637 N.E.2d 840, 841 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) (Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2) not applicable where claims were “mere
requests for repayment of debts”), reh’g denied, trans. denied.
[14] 	Under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2), a county where land is located is a county of
preferred venue where “the complaint includes a claim for injuries thereto or
relating to such land,” including claims for recovery of possession, to quiet title,
to set aside conveyances, to foreclose liens, to partition, and “to assert any
matters for which in rem relief is or would be proper.” Metropolitan’s
complaint does not assert any such claim relating to the property previously
owned by Egolf and later owned by Defendants. Indeed, the property was sold
in November of 2020, the complaint does not raise any claims regarding
possession of, title to, or liens affecting the property, and the property’s current
owners are not parties. The complaint does not raise any matter “for which in

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rem relief is or would be proper.” Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2). The complaint
relates only to the proper distribution of the funds held in escrow. We conclude
that Porretta has not shown on this record that Wabash County is a county of
preferred venue under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(2).
[15] 	Porretta further asserts “[t]he escrow transaction governed by IC § 27-7-3.7[3]
arose from the sale of Wabash County real property” and “[s]ubsection (8)
provides an additional basis for Wabash County preferred venue.” Appellant’s
Brief at 14. Porretta’s motion to transfer venue did not cite Ind. Trial Rule
75(A)(8). In any event, under Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(8), a county is a county of
preferred venue where “a claim in the plaintiff’s complaint may be commenced
under any statute recognizing or creating a special or general remedy or
proceeding.” This Court has held that Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(8) “adopts special
venue statutes into the regulatory scheme of T.R. 75” and that “[s]ubsection (8)
retains the ‘statutory’ venue as an alternative venue, thereby avoiding any
conflict.” MacLeod v. Guardianship of Hunter, 671 N.E.2d 177, 179 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996) (citation omitted) (discussing Ind. Code § 29-3-2-2 governing venue
for appointment of guardian and protective proceedings), trans. denied.
Metropolitan’s complaint does not invoke a statute conferring a special venue.
Moreover, Ind. Code Chapter 27-7-3.7 relates to Porretta’s counterclaim, not
Metropolitan’s complaint, and in addition, Porretta does not point to any
special venue statute in Ind. Code Chapter 27-7-3.7. Porretta has not shown
3 Ind. Code Chapter 27-7-3.7 governs escrow transactions in real estate transactions.

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that Wabash County is a county of preferred venue under Ind. Trial Rule
75(A)(8).4
[16] 	Because Porretta has not established that Wabash County meets the criteria of a
county of preferred venue, the trial court did not err in denying her motion to
transfer venue. See CSX Transportation, 272 N.E.3d at 1014 (because defendants
did not show Hendricks County was a county of preferred venue, trial court did
not err in denying their motion to transfer venue to Hendricks County). Also,
because Wabash County is not a county of preferred venue, we need not
determine whether Kosciusko County is a county of preferred venue under Ind.
Trial Rule 75(A)(10).5 See id. at 1013.
[17] 	For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.
[18] 	Affirmed.
Kenworthy, J., and Scheele, J., concur.
APPELLANT PRO S E
Traci Lynn Porretta
Eagle Mountain, Utah
4 In a heading in her appellant’s brief, Porretta states that Ind. Trial Rule 75(A)(1) supports the conclusion
that Wabash County is a county of preferred venue. However, she develops no argument related to that
subsection.
5 In her reply brief, Porretta argues, “The existing record supplies substantial connections to counties other than
Kosciusko: Wabash County through the identified real estate and net proceeds, Allen County through the Fort
Wayne escrow-agent address on Metropolitan’s own filed agreement, and a filed assertion identifying
Metropolitan’s principal office in St. Joseph County.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 5-6. Porretta’s motion to transfer
venue did not request a transfer of venue to Allen County or St. Joseph County, her argument in her reply brief is
much more expansive than the request in her motion to transfer venue to Wabash County, and we decline to
address whether Allen County or St. Joseph County may constitute counties of preferred venue.

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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE METROPOLITAN T ITLE OF INDIANA , LLC
Stephen R. Snyder
Snyder Morgan & Kuchmay LLP
Syracuse, Indiana