Reginald Joseph Carter v. State of Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-PC-3126 | October 16, 2026 	Page 1 of 17
Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take
any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not
binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value
or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
I N 	T H E
Court of Appeals of Indiana
Reginald Joseph Carter,
Appellant-Petitioner
v.
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Respondent
October 16, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-PC-3126
Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
The Honorable Salvador Vasquez, Judge
The Honorable Mark S. Watson, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
45G01-2404-PC-7
Memorandum Decision by Chief Judge Tavitas

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Judges Bradford and Felix concur.
Tavitas, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[1] 	Reginald Carter filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his
convictions for murder, a felony, and arson, a Level 4 felony. The post-
conviction court (“PC Court”) denied Carter’s motion for summary disposition
and, subsequently, denied Carter’s petition. We affirm.
Issues
[2] 	Carter presents two issues, which we restate as:
I. 	Whether the PC Court erred by denying Carter’s motion
for summary disposition.
II. 	Whether the undisputed facts show that Carter was denied
the effective assistance of trial counsel.
Facts
[3] 	On direct appeal, we set forth the facts underlying Carter’s convictions as
follows:
Yolanda Mitchell had four daughters: Yoasha, Yoshesha,
Yomesha, and Yokeca. Yolanda owned a Honda Odyssey,
which contained a bottle of bleach for cleaning and doing
laundry.

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In 2019, Yoasha was dating Carter. Yoasha and Carter lived
with Yolanda; Yoshesha; Yokeca; Yoasha’s, Yoshesha’s, and
Yokeca’s children; Nefertiri Jones; and Nefertiri’s son, Dwayne
Jones, in a house in Gary, Indiana.
Yoasha and Carter had a “toxic” relationship. Tr. Vol. IV p.
161. The two frequently fought, and Carter previously strangled
Yoasha to the point of unconsciousness on at least two
occasions. When confronted regarding his strangling of Yoasha,
Carter said, “[A]t least I brought her back.” Id. at 38. In mid-
October 2019, Yoasha and Carter had an argument, and Carter
pushed Yoasha into the wall, which damaged the drywall.
Yoasha owned a nine-millimeter handgun, to which Carter had
access. On or about October 23, 2019, Carter made an
announcement to Yoasha and her family that “the next time
[Carter and Yoasha were] arguing and she reach [sic] for that gun
. . . it’s either going to be me or Yoasha . . . and it’s definitely not
going to be me.” Id. at 174. Additionally, at some point during
2019, Carter told members of Yoasha’s family, “[I]f I ever kill
somebody, . . . I’m using bleach, I’m using gloves. No face, no
case.” Id.
On October 25, 2019, at approximately 8:15 a.m., Carter drove
Yolanda’s Honda to pick up Yokeca in Illinois, and he dropped
Yokeca off at a gas station. During the car ride, Carter and
Yoasha argued over the phone regarding Yoasha’s need for the
vehicle. Carter returned to the house, and at approximately 9:30
a.m., he and Yoasha had another argument, which the next-door
neighbor and her home health aid[e] overheard. According to
the neighbor and her aid, Carter accused Yoasha of leaving with
another man, and Yoasha “was pleading no, I didn’t” and
“whimpering and begging and crying.” Id. at 99, 117.
Sometime after 10:00 a.m., the house was on fire. Word spread,
and the family began gathering outside the house; however, they
were unable to locate Yoasha, Nefertiri, and Dwayne.

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Carter drove Yolanda’s Honda to the house and arrived over an
hour after everyone else. He was also wearing different clothing
than he had worn that morning. When he arrived, Carter
“jumped on the hood, rolled over, [and] slid down,” which
observers described as a “performance.” Id. at 167. Carter’s
demeanor was “antsy,” “aggravated,” and “dramatical,” and he
did not demonstrate “any grief or sorrow.” Id. at 169; Tr. Vol.
VII p. 26. Law enforcement confronted Carter and told him that
there “[m]ight be kids in” the house. Tr. Vol. IV p. 135. Carter
responded, “[A]in’t no kids in there.” Id. Yolanda asked Carter
where Yoasha was, and Carter told her that Yoasha “ran off with
a n****r.” Id. at 41. At some point, Carter removed his boots
and, despite wearing socks, washed his head, hands, and feet
with a water bottle.
Several members of Yoasha’s family noticed a “strong odor of
bleach” in the Honda, which they had not previously noticed.
Tr. Vol. VI p. 11. Subsequent DNA testing of the bleach bottle in
the Honda revealed “very strong support” that Carter had
touched the bottle. Id. at 76. Additionally, after law
enforcement removed items from the Honda, Yolanda observed
a used pair of gloves in a waste bag and saw that Carter’s
backpack contained a folded towel, which, she claimed, bore the
impression of a handgun.
After the fire was extinguished, law enforcement began
investigating the cause of the fire. An accelerant-sniffing dog
alerted to the presence of accelerants at several locations in the
home, which laboratory analysis later revealed to contain
gasoline and other flammable substances. Additionally, an
accelerant-sniffing dog alerted to the presence of accelerants on
Carter’s shoes, socks, and boxer shorts. Law enforcement
determined that the fire was “intentionally set.” Tr. Vol. V p. 71.
Inside the house, law enforcement located the bodies of Yoasha,
Nefertiri, and Dwayne, all of whom had gunshot wounds. Police
recovered: (1) a spent bullet from the .35 caliber family, which
“include[s] . . . 9 millimeter” bullets, from Nefertiri’s body; (2) a

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“9 millimeter caliber” bullet fragment in the room where
Nefertiri’s body was located; (3) a “spent copper jacket
fragment[,] which is the outer jacketing of a bullet,” outside of
the northwest corner of the house; and (4) a “mutilat[ed]” piece
of metal consistent with copper and lead in the Honda’s glove
compartment. Tr. Vol. VI pp. 134-36. Law enforcement did not
recover Yoasha’s nine-millimeter firearm.
The coroner determined that Yoasha, Dwayne, and Nefertiri
died from gunshot wounds before the fire was set. Yoasha and
Dwayne were shot in the head from close range, and Nefertiri
was shot twice in the back. Yoasha’s and Nefertiri’s bodies
smelled like “fuel.” Tr. Vol. V p. 163.
On October 28, 2019, the State charged Carter with three counts
of murder, a felony, and one count of arson, a Level 4 felony.
On June 24, 2022, Carter filed a notice of intent to introduce,
pursuant to Evidence Rule 404(b), evidence regarding an arson
that occurred on December 23, 2016, at the apartment of Yoasha
and her then-husband, Willie Carter (“Willie”). Yoasha and
Willie were both determined to be suspects in the 2016 arson;
however, the case was never solved.
The trial court held a pretrial conference on August 12, 2022.
The trial court ruled that evidence regarding the 2016 arson
would be inadmissible at trial . . . .
Carter v. State, No. 22A-CR-2437, slip op. at 2-6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (mem.)
(footnote omitted).
[4] 	Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that evidence regarding the 2016 arson would
be inadmissible pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 403. A jury trial was held
in August 2022, and the jury found Carter guilty on all four counts. The trial
court entered judgments of conviction on the jury’s verdict and sentenced

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Carter to consecutive sentences totaling 205 years. Carter directly appealed his
convictions and claimed that the trial court committed fundamental error by
excluding evidence of the 2016 arson under Evidence Rule 404(b). We rejected
this argument and affirmed Carter’s convictions. Id. at 11.
[5] 	On April 24, 2024, Carter filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. After
the State Public Defender’s Office was appointed to represent Carter, he filed an
amended post-conviction petition on July 11, 2024. In his amended petition,
Carter claimed that his trial counsel (“Trial Counsel”) provided ineffective
assistance in several respects. Specifically, Carter alleged: (1) Trial Counsel
failed to conduct legal research or investigate the admissibility of the accelerant-
sniffing dog1 alerts to Carter’s clothing and failed to move to suppress or object
to that evidence at trial; and (2) Trial Counsel failed to request a reasonable-
theory-of-innocence jury instruction and failed to object to its absence. Carter
claimed that, had Trial Counsel taken these steps, there was a reasonable
probability the jury would have acquitted him on all counts or that this Court
would have reversed on direct appeal. Carter also raised a cumulative-error
claim, asserting that, even if no single error independently warranted relief, the
combined effect of Trial Counsel’s deficiencies undermined confidence in the
trial’s outcome.
1 Carter refers to the dog as an “ignitable liquid detection canine” or “IGL canine.” Appellant’s Br. p. 12.
The testimony at trial described this particular dog, named “Misty,” as an “arson dog,” or “fire K9.” Direct
Appeal Tr. Vol. V pp. 90, 107.

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[6] 	On October 23, 2024, Carter filed a motion for summary disposition. After the
parties submitted designated evidence, the PC Court denied Carter’s motion for
summary disposition on January 9, 2025. On July 21, 2025, the PC Court held
an evidentiary hearing on Carter’s petition, and on November 13, 2025, the PC
Court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon denying Carter’s
petition. The PC Court concluded that Trial Counsel was not deficient in his
handling of the dog-sniff evidence or in his decision not to request a reasonable-
theory-of-innocence instruction because Trial Counsel’s strategy of challenging
the reliability of the police investigation was a reasonable defense strategy. The
PC Court also concluded that, even had Trial Counsel been deficient in either
respect, Carter failed to establish prejudice. Carter now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Post-Conviction Standard of Review
[7] 	Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may
present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence. Gibson v.
State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). The
petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id.; P.-C.R. 1(5). Thus, when, as here, the petitioner “appeals from a
negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he ‘must establish that the
evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion
contrary to the post-conviction court’s decision.’” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681
(quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000)).

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[8] 	When reviewing the post-conviction court’s order denying relief, we will “not
defer to the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions,” and the “findings and
judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which
leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019). When a petitioner “fails
to meet this ‘rigorous standard of review,’ we will affirm the post-conviction
court’s denial of relief.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting DeWitt v. State, 755
N.E.2d 167, 169-70 (Ind. 2001)).
II. The PC Court did not err by denying Carter’s motion for summary
disposition.
[9] 	Carter first claims that the PC Court erred by denying Carter’s motion for
summary disposition. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g) provides:
The court may grant a motion by either party for summary
disposition of the petition when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations
of fact, and any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The court may ask for oral
argument on the legal issue raised. If an issue of material fact is
raised, then the court shall hold an evidentiary hearing as soon as
reasonably possible.
[10] 	“A PC court is permitted to summarily deny a petition for [post-conviction
relief] only if the pleadings conclusively show the petitioner is entitled to no
relief as a matter of law.” Brown v. State, 131 N.E.3d 740, 743 (Ind. Ct. App.
2019) (citing Gann v. State, 550 N.E.2d 803, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)). “The

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necessity of an evidentiary hearing is avoided when the pleadings show only
issues of law.” Id. “The need for a hearing is not avoided, however, when a
determination of the issues hinges, in whole or in part, upon facts not resolved.”
Id. On appeal, we review a PC Court’s ruling on a motion for summary
disposition in the same manner as a motion for summary judgment in a civil
matter. Id. at 742 (citing Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. 2008)).
That is, “summary disposition—like summary judgment—is a matter for
appellate de novo review.” Id.
[11] 	Carter claims that the PC Court erred by denying his motion for summary
disposition because, he insists, the facts are undisputed. Carter notes that he
did not dispute any facts raised by the State in response to his motion for
summary disposition. Thus, he argues: “This case is not about witness
credibility or resolving conflicting evidence. It is just about applying the well-
known standard for ineffective assistance of counsel to the undisputed facts
developed during post-conviction discovery and found in the underlying
record.” Appellant’s Br. p. 22. He then summarily claims that the PC Court,
therefore, erred in denying his motion for summary disposition.
[12] 	The State contends that Carter waived this claim by failing to make a cogent
argument. We agree. Waiver notwithstanding, we affirm the denial of
summary disposition on the merits. Even if no genuine issue of material fact
existed, that showing alone would not have entitled Carter to summary
disposition; instead, Carter was also required to show that he was entitled to

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judgment as a matter of law.2 See P.-C.R. 1(4)(g). As set forth in Section III
below, we consider the undisputed facts and conclude, on de novo review, that
the these facts do not entitle Carter to judgment as a matter of law on his claims
of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
III. The undisputed facts do not show that Carter was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
[13] 	The brunt of Carter’s argument is that the undisputed facts show that he was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claims of ineffective assistance of
trial counsel. We disagree.
A. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
[14] 	To prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a defendant must
show that: (1) his counsel’s performance fell short of prevailing professional
norms; and (2) his counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 682 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984))). A showing of deficient performance “requires proof that legal
representation lacked ‘an objective standard of reasonableness,’ effectively
depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.” Id. (quoting
Overstreet v. State, 877 N.E.2d 144, 152 (Ind. 2007)). We strongly presume that
counsel exercised “reasonable professional judgment” and “rendered adequate
2 We also note that Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g) does not require the PC Court to enter summary
disposition; the plain language rule merely permits it. See id. (providing that the PC Court “may” grant a
motion for summary disposition if “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.”). Accordingly, a PC Court has discretion to proceed to an evidentiary
hearing rather than summarily dispose of a petition.

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legal assistance.” Id. Defense counsel enjoys “considerable discretion” in
developing legal strategies for a client. Id. This “discretion demands deferential
judicial review.” Id. Finally, counsel’s “[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy,
inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render
representation ineffective.” Id.
[15] 	“To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a
different outcome.” Id. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Failure to
satisfy either prong will cause the claim to fail. Grinstead v. State, 845 N.E.2d
1027, 1031 (Ind. 2006). Most ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be
resolved by a prejudice inquiry alone. Id.
B. Failure to Object to Dog-sniff Evidence
[16] 	Carter claims that Trial Counsel’s performance was deficient because he failed
to research the admissibility of the accelerant-sniffing dog’s alerts. Carter
claims that there was readily available authority supporting the position that
such alerts should not be admitted at trial without subsequent laboratory testing
confirming the presence of accelerants, referring to the 2021 edition of the
National Fire Protection Association 921: Guide for Fire and Explosion
Investigations (the “NFPA Guide”). The NFPA Guide provides that the
purpose of an accelerant-sniffing dog is to identify the “possible presence of
ignitable liquids” and that an alert to the presence of such liquids by an
accelerant-sniffing dog should not be considered as confirmation of the presence

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of an accelerant. Ex. Vol. III p. 33. Thus, Carter claims that Trial Counsel
should have objected to evidence regarding the dog sniff alert on Carter’s
clothing and should have argued that laboratory testing was required to confirm
the presence of any accelerant.3
[17] 	Even assuming that Trial Counsel’s performance was deficient for failing to
investigate and object to the dog-sniff evidence,4 Carter has not shown that
there is a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been
different had Trial Counsel objected to the dog sniff evidence. See Gibson, 133
N.E.3d at 682. Setting aside the evidence regarding the alert from the
accelerant-sniffing dog on Carter’s clothing, the State presented substantial
evidence of Carter’s guilt.
[18] 	Just a few days before the murders, Carter told Yoasha’s sister that “the next
time [he and Yoasha were] arguing and she reach[ed] for that gun, it’s either
going to be me or Yoasha . . . and it’s definitely not going to be me,” and he
told other family members, “if I ever kill somebody, . . . I’m using bleach, I’m
3 We note that the dog sniff alerts to the presence of accelerants at the scene of the fire were confirmed by
laboratory testing. See Trial Tr. Vol. VI pp. 106-09 (testimony of forensic chemist identifying gasoline, and in
one sample an additional ignitable liquid, in fire debris collected from the scene).
4 Carter acknowledges that “the admissibility of unconfirmed IGL canine evidence has not yet been litigated
in [Indiana] appellate courts.” Appellant’s Br. p. 28. It is well settled that, as a general rule, “an ineffective
assistance claim cannot be based upon counsel’s failure to argue legal reasoning of cases not yet decided at
the time of appeal.” Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1197 (Ind. 2006). There is an exception to this general
rule: failing to raise an issue of first impression may be sufficient to establish deficient performance “where a
plain reading of the statute demonstrates that [the defendant] is entitled to immediate relief.” Id. But Carter
does not refer to the plain reading of any statute that would demonstrate that he was entitled to immediate
relief. Indeed, the NFPA Guide is not a statute, nor does it control the admissibility of evidence in our
courts. It is, instead, as its name suggests, a guide.

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using gloves.” Trial Tr. Vol. IV p. 174. On the morning of the fire, witnesses
heard Yoasha pleading and whimpering with Carter; roughly an hour later, she
and two family members were found shot to death inside the burning house.
When Carter arrived at the scene, he “jumped on the hood, rolled over, [and]
slid down,” which others described as a “performance” and said that Carter
appeared “antsy,” “aggravated,” and “dramatical,” without any sign of grief.
Id. at 167, 169; Id., Vol. VII p. 26. He then falsely told police that no children
were inside and falsely claimed Yoasha “ran off” with another man, before
removing his boots and washing his head, hands, and feet with a water bottle
despite still wearing socks. Id., Vol. IV p. 41. The victim’s family members
later smelled bleach in the vehicle Carter had driven, where police found a
bleach bottle bearing Carter’s DNA and a bag of used gloves. Carter also
admitted to police that he had argued with Yoasha that morning.
[19] 	Given this strong evidence of Carter’s guilt, the evidence that an accelerant-
sniffing dog detected the presence of accelerants on Carter’s clothing was not
the cornerstone of the State’s case. Simply put, Carter has not shown that, had
Trial Counsel successfully challenged the admissibility of the dog-alert
evidence, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of his trial would have
been different. His claim of ineffective assistance based on Trial Counsel’s
failure to object to this evidence, therefore, fails.5
5 Carter also claims that the outcome of his direct appeal would have been different because a properly
preserved objection to the dog-sniff evidence would have entitled him to claim on direct appeal that the
admission of the dog-sniff evidence was not harmless error. We disagree. The same evidence of Carter’s

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C. Failure to Submit a Reasonable-Theory-of-Innocence Instruction
[20] 	Carter also claims that Trial Counsel was ineffective for failing to submit or
object to the lack of an instruction regarding a reasonable theory of innocence.
In Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 491 (Ind. 2012), our Supreme Court held:
[W]hen the trial court determines that the defendant’s
conduct required for the commission of a charged offense,
the actus reus, is established exclusively by circumstantial
evidence, the jury should be instructed as follows: In
determining whether the guilt of the accused is proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you should require that the proof be so
conclusive and sure as to exclude every reasonable theory of
innocence.
(italics in original). This instruction is not required, however, where there is
direct evidence of the actus reus. See id. “Direct evidence is ‘[e]vidence that is
based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves a fact
without inference or presumption.’ Conversely, circumstantial evidence is
‘[e]vidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation.’”
Id. at 489 (quoting B LACK ’S LAW D ICTIONARY 636 (9th ed. 2009)).
[21] 	Carter claims that all the evidence here was circumstantial because it required
an inferential step, e.g., that Yoasha reached for the gun, that he then shot her,
and that he cleaned up with bleach and gloves. He, therefore, claims that all
guilt that we have detailed above would have also established that the admission of the dog-sniff evidence
was, at most, harmless. See Stewart v. State, 167 N.E.3d 367, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting that evidentiary
error is harmless if its probable impact on the jury, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor
so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties), trans. denied.

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the evidence of the actus reus was circumstantial rather than direct, especially as
to the arson, since Carter never said anything about fire at all.
[22] 	Even if we agreed that the instruction was required, Carter would not succeed
on his petition for post-conviction relief. To succeed on this claim, Carter must
show that, in addition to any deficient performance, there is a reasonable
probability that the result of his trial would have been different. Gibson, 133
N.E.3d at 682. We perceive no such reasonable probability here.
[23] 	Again, the State presented evidence of Carter’s pre-offense statements about the
gun, the bleach and gloves; Carter arrived at the scene over an hour after other
family members and in different clothing than he had worn that morning;
Carter staged an apparent performance of surprise; he falsely told law
enforcement no children were inside and that Yoasha had run off; he washed
his head, hands, and feet while still wearing socks; and a bleach bottle and used
gloves were later found in the vehicle he had driven, with DNA evidence
showing that Carter handled the bottle. This evidence is sufficiently strong that
we conclude, even if Trial Counsel had requested the reasonable-theory-of-
innocence instruction, the result of the jury trial would have been the same.6
[24] 	Carter also contends that the instructions given by the trial court were not
adequate substitutes for the missing instruction and that Final Instruction No.
6 Carter also argues that, even if neither of his claims of error independently establish prejudice, their
combined, cumulative effect does. We disagree. The independent evidence of Carter’s guilt is substantial
regardless of whether the dog-alert testimony and the missing instruction are considered separately or
together. Carter’s cumulative-prejudice argument, therefore, fails.

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12—which informed the jury that a conviction may rest solely on circumstantial
evidence—actually undercut the purpose the reasonable-theory-of-innocence
instruction serves. See Hawkins v. State, 100 N.E.3d 313, 318-19 n.7 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2018) (holding that the failure to give a reasonable-theory-of-innocence
instruction is harmless on direct appeal only if the other instructions given
adequately convey its substance and that a general reasonable-doubt instruction
alone does not adequately convey the substance of a reasonable-theory-of-
innocence instruction). At issue in Hawkins, however, was whether an
instructional error was harmless on direct appeal. Here, the question is whether
Carter has shown Strickland prejudice in a post-conviction proceeding. And,
here, the evidence recounted above is sufficiently strong that we have little
hesitation in concluding that, even if the jury had been given a reasonable-
theory-of-innocence instruction, the result of the trial would have been the
same.
IV. The PC Court’s denial of Carter’s petition for post-conviction
relief is not clearly erroneous.
[25] 	Finally, Carter argues that the PC Court erred by denying his petition for post-
conviction relief after the evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Carter makes the
same arguments that he made regarding the denial of his motion for summary
disposition. For the same reasons that Carter’s motion for summary disposition
fails, we also conclude that the PC Court’s denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief is not clearly erroneous.

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Conclusion
[26] 	The PC Court did not err by denying Carter’s motion for summary disposition,
because the undisputed evidence does not show that Carter was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. The PC Court also did not err in determining that
Carter was not denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because the
undisputed evidence establishes that Carter was not prejudiced by Trial
Counsel’s allegedly deficient performance. Accordingly, we affirm the PC
Court’s judgment.
[27] 	Affirmed.
Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
Amy E. Karozos
Public Defender of Indiana
Archer “Randy” Rose, Jr.
Deputy State Public Defender
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Steven J. Hosler
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana