People v. Alexander

2026 IL App (4th) 260031-U
NO. 4-26-0031
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ONTARIO L. ALEXANDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Peoria County
No. 20CF663
Honorable
Katherine S. Gorman,
Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Steigmann and Justice Vancil concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, holding the trial court conducted an adequate
preliminary Krankel inquiry (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)).
¶ 2 In December 2021, the trial court sentenced defendant, Ontario L. Alexander, to an
aggregate 52 years’ imprisonment following his convictions for first degree murder (720 ILCS
5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2020)) and unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UPWF) (id. § 24-
1.1(a)). On November 19, 2025, following a remand from the Appellate Court, Third District, for
a preliminary Krankel inquiry (see People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984)), the court found
defendant was not entitled to the appointment of new counsel because his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel lacked merit. Defendant now appeals, arguing the court failed to conduct an
adequate inquiry into his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
FILED
October 16, 2026
Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
Court, IL
NOTICE
This Order was filed under
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is
not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed
under Rule 23(e)(1).

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¶ 4 At the outset, we note defendant’s sole contention on appeal relates to whether the
trial court conducted a sufficient preliminary Krankel inquiry into two of his claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Consequently, we have included only those facts necessary to address his
argument. For a more detailed recitation of the factual background, see People v. Alexander, 2024
IL App (3d) 210575-U, and People v. Alexander, 2025 IL App (4th) 241450-U. Additionally,
during defendant’s trial, there were references by multiple witnesses, including defendant, to two
different vans: a Saturn Relay van and a Chrysler minivan. However, the witnesses sometimes
referred to both vans as “the van.” For clarity, during our recitation of the facts, we will refer to
the vans as the Relay van and the Chrysler minivan, regardless of how each witness identified the
vans during their respective testimony. Lastly, during defendant’s interrogation, one of the officers
made a reference to “Anthony Booker.” However, it is clear from the surrounding circumstances
that the officer was referring to Anthony Brooks.
¶ 5 A. The Charges and Jury Trials
¶ 6 On November 18, 2020, the State charged defendant with first degree murder
(count I) (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2020)). The information alleged that on November 15, 2020,
defendant “shot Roosevelt Hunter ***, thereby causing the death of Roosevelt Hunter.” The State
later filed a bill of indictment, which charged defendant with UPWF (count II) (id. § 24-1.1(a)).
The trial court appointed Kevin Lowe to represent defendant.
¶ 7 1. Defendant’s First Jury Trial
¶ 8 Later in the proceedings, defendant waived his right to counsel, and he represented
himself throughout a four-day jury trial in May 2021. By agreement of the parties, the jury trial
was bifurcated. Following evidence and argument, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous
verdict on count I, and, as result, the trial court declared a mistrial. The parties then immediately

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proceeded to trial on count II, and the jury found defendant guilty. The State informed the court it
intended to retry defendant on count I, and the court set defendant’s retrial for August 2021.
¶ 9 2. Defendant’s Second Jury Trial
¶ 10 Prior to defendant’s retrial on count I, defendant requested the appointment of
standby counsel. The trial court denied defendant’s request but informed defendant it was willing
to reappoint counsel to represent him. At defendant’s next court appearance, he requested the
reappointment of counsel, and the court reappointed Lowe to represent him.
¶ 11 The following is a summary of the evidence presented at defendant’s retrial on
count I. Around 11 p.m. on November 15, 2020, Sergeant Robert McMillen received a ShotSpotter
report, which indicated gunshots had been fired at Landmark Apartments. When McMillen arrived
at the Landmark Apartments complex, he found an individual, later identified as Hunter (also
known as “Buddy”), lying at the base of a stairwell. Hunter appeared to have been shot in the face
and did not have a pulse. McMillen did not see any other individuals in the area.
¶ 12 Sergeant David Buss with the Peoria Police Department’s crime scene unit arrived
on scene and began taking photographs and collecting evidence. Buss collected five cartridge cases
located around Hunter’s body, a “partial jacketing from a bullet,” which was on Hunter’s chest,
and a “partial projectile” found underneath Hunter’s body.
¶ 13 Detective Roberto Vasquez, with the assistance of other officers, obtained
surveillance video from Landmark Apartments and a nearby Shell gas station from the night of the
shooting. The surveillance video from the Shell gas station, which was admitted as State’s exhibit
No. 38, showed a silver Chrysler minivan arriving at the gas station at 10:41 p.m. and parking at
one of the gas pumps. An individual in a white hooded sweatshirt and face mask, who Vasquez
identified as Hunter, exits the front passenger’s seat and enters the gas station. Hunter purchases

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an item at the counter, exits the gas station, and reenters the Chrysler minivan. The Chrysler
minivan then drives away from the gas station at 10:43 p.m.
¶ 14 Black and white surveillance video from Landmark Apartments, which was
admitted as State’s exhibit No. 13, showed a Saturn Relay van entering the parking lot of the
Landmark Apartments complex at 11:01 p.m. The Relay van then backs into a parking space, and
two individuals exit the Relay van. The driver appears to be wearing a light-colored hooded
sweatshirt, and the passenger seems to be wearing a white hooded sweatshirt. The two individuals
stand by the Relay van for a few moments and then begin walking toward the apartments to their
right. According to Vasquez, the individuals are walking “toward where Mr. Hunter was
murdered.” The individual in the light-colored sweatshirt is walking behind the individual in the
white hooded sweatshirt. As the pair continue walking, a flash of light can be seen between the
two, and the individual in the white hooded sweatshirt falls to the ground. The individual in the
light-colored sweatshirt runs back toward the Relay van and gets in the driver’s seat. The Relay
van then exits the Landmark Apartments complex at 11:04 p.m.
¶ 15 Vasquez reviewed the surveillance videos and a video from a license plate reader
located at the entrance to the Landmark Apartments complex. Based on his review, he identified
the following distinctive features of the Relay van: there was a “seven-day window sticker” on the
rear window; there was a dent on the rear hatch; and the driver’s side slider door “was partially
ajar as if maybe it was broken.” Vasquez also determined the Relay van in the surveillance video
was registered to Anthony Brooks.
¶ 16 On November 16, 2020, officers performed a traffic stop on a silver Chrysler
minivan registered to Brooks’s girlfriend, Diana Herren. According to Vasquez, this was the same
Chrysler minivan seen on the Shell gas station’s surveillance video. When officers stopped the

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Chrysler minivan, four individuals were located inside: Teotis Johnson, who was the driver;
Brooks; Torrance Irving; and Troy Irving. Officers searched the Chrysler minivan and found an
unfired 9-millimeter bullet in one of the compartments behind the front seats.
¶ 17 The next day, November 17, 2020, Officer Jacob Beck located the Relay van at a
residence on West Augustana Street. After Beck located the Relay van, he observed defendant
walking away from the residence. Defendant returned “a short time later” and entered the
residence. After “approximately an hour,” defendant exited the residence, got into the driver’s seat
of the Relay van, and drove away. Officers followed the Relay van to a residence on Millman
Street. Defendant parked the Relay van in the backyard and entered the residence. While
surveilling the residence, Officer Morris Franklin observed defendant and two other individuals
exit the residence. When the three individuals exited the residence, defendant had two firearms.
Defendant then walked to the driver’s side of the Relay van and “popped the hood.” Officers then
“converged” on defendant and placed him under arrest. After defendant was arrested, Beck
approached the Relay van and observed two firearms “in plain view inside the vehicle.” One of
the firearms was a silver 9-millimeter pistol with an extended magazine.
¶ 18 Officers then executed a search warrant on the Millman Street residence. Detective
Richard Linthicum collected a gray sweatshirt located in defendant’s bedroom.
¶ 19 Jason List, a forensic scientist with the Illinois State Police, examined the five
cartridge cases collected from the scene and determined they were fired from the silver 9-
millimeter pistol located in the Relay van. The parties then stipulated that the DNA samples
collected from the handgrip and trigger of the silver 9-millimeter pistol were “inconclusive and
unsuitable for comparison to any known standard.”
¶ 20 After defendant was arrested, Vasquez and another detective interviewed him at the

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police station. A redacted version of defendant’s interview was admitted as State’s exhibit No. 29-
A and played for the jury. During the interview, defendant stated he did not know who owned the
Relay van but admitted it belonged to “somebody that I hang with” and that “everybody drives it.”
When Vasquez informed defendant that his mother stated he drove the Relay van “all the time,”
defendant responded, “Mmhmm. Yeah.” Defendant told Vasquez he had the Relay van for the past
three days. Vasquez then asked about the handguns found during defendant’s arrest, and defendant
acknowledged he had two handguns when he came out of his mother’s house before he was
arrested, but he insisted they did not belong to him. According to defendant, the handguns slid out
from under the seats of the Relay van when he pressed the brakes hard. After defendant discovered
the handguns, he took them inside his mother’s house for safekeeping because the Relay van’s
door did not shut all the way and he wanted to ensure the handguns were returned to the owner.
¶ 21 When Vasquez asked defendant what he was doing on Sunday evening (the night
of Hunter’s murder), defendant stated he was drinking and hanging out with some friends.
According to defendant, he and his friends drove to a friend of a friend’s apartment for dinner. The
apartment was in the Cityscape apartment complex. While at the Cityscape apartment, the group
ate dinner, continued drinking, listened to music, and played cards. At some point, defendant left
the apartment, and when he returned, Buddy was at the Cityscape apartment. Defendant explained
that he was driving a Chrysler minivan that belonged to Brooks, and Brooks wanted the Chrysler
minivan back. When defendant left to return the Chrysler minivan to Brooks, a few people asked
him for rides, including Buddy, who asked for a ride to Landmark Apartments. Before defendant
dropped Buddy off, he drove to his cousin’s house near the Shell gas station because he had the
Relay van parked there. Defendant and Buddy then got into the Relay van and drove off. According
to defendant, the Relay van overheated easily. Therefore, after picking up the Relay van, defendant

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told Buddy he could not take him all the way to Landmark Apartments because the Relay van
would overheat. Defendant dropped Buddy off near Gateway because “he [would] have a straight
shot to walk to Landmark.” After dropping Buddy off, defendant drove to his mother’s house on
Millman Street. He sat in the Relay van for a bit to let it cool off and then he drove to his girlfriend’s
house on Augustana Street. Defendant denied dropping Buddy off inside the Landmark Apartment
complex.
¶ 22 During the interview, Vasquez asked defendant whether he and Buddy went to the
Shell gas station around 10:40 p.m., and at first, defendant denied it, but when Vasquez told
defendant there was surveillance video of Buddy in the Chrysler minivan at the Shell gas station,
defendant then stated he could not remember whether they stopped at the gas station. A few
minutes later, defendant told Vasquez that someone pulled a gun on Buddy at the gas station, and
the man with the gun referenced a dispute involving defendant.
¶ 23 At trial, defendant testified on his own behalf. According to defendant, he and
Hunter were “real close” and he “considered [Hunter] to be a brother.” Defendant asserted he did
not kill Hunter. On November 15, 2020, defendant was “riding around drinking alcohol” with
some friends. Sometime that evening, Torrance drove the group to an apartment in the Cityscape
apartment complex. Torrance was driving a Chrysler minivan, which defendant believed belonged
to Brooks’s girlfriend. Defendant and his friends continued to hang out and drink while at the
Cityscape apartment. Eventually, defendant drove the Chrysler minivan to a liquor store,
purchased more alcohol, and returned to the Cityscape apartment. Hunter was there when
defendant returned. Later, Brooks called defendant’s friends, who were with defendant at the
Cityscape apartment, to ask for the Chrysler minivan back. Defendant testified Brooks could not
call him because his cell phone was “off” and only worked on Wi-Fi. When defendant left to return

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the Chrysler minivan to Brooks, a few people asked defendant for rides. While defendant was
giving rides, Brooks called an individual named Randyn Duncan, who was with defendant, and
told Duncan he wanted the Chrysler minivan back now. Defendant dropped Duncan off and then
dropped Hunter off “[b]y the Red Cross,” which was approximately a block away from the
entrance to the Landmark Apartments complex, before meeting Brooks to return the Chrysler
minivan. According to defendant, he was supposed to meet Brooks at an apartment across the
street from the Shell gas station, but when defendant arrived, Brooks was not there, so defendant
began to drive to a residence on Saratoga Street, where he and Brooks “always meet up at.” Before
defendant arrived at the residence, he saw Brooks in a Suburban about a block away from the
residence. Defendant then returned the Chrysler minivan to Brooks and walked the rest of the way
to the residence on Saratoga Street, where the Relay van was parked. He got in the Relay van and
drove it to his mother’s house on Millman Street. Defendant parked the Relay van in his mother’s
driveway and smoked a few cigarettes. He then drove to his house on Augustana Street, went
inside, and “passed out.” The next day, he drove the Relay van to his mother’s house, which is
where he was arrested. Defendant had his cell phone in his possession when he was arrested, and
it was seized by the officers.
¶ 24 On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged he dropped Hunter off after 10:43
p.m. but denied he was the one driving the Chrysler minivan when it pulled into the Shell gas
station at 10:43 p.m. Defendant asserted he was not the only person who drove the Chrysler
minivan that night, and other individuals had access to both the Chrysler minivan and Relay van.
He acknowledged he had been driving the Relay van for the past three consecutive days and
admitted the only time the Relay van was out of his possession was when it was parked at the
residence on Saratoga Street. Defendant agreed the Relay van he had been driving was the same

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Relay van on the surveillance video from the Landmark Apartments complex but insisted he was
not driving the Relay van at that time.
¶ 25 The State presented the following information on rebuttal: “Judge, the rebuttal
would be by way of a stipulation to the transcript from a hearing on May 26th of 2021, and the
stipulation is that under oath the Defendant was asked this question: But you were driving that
Chrysler all night, and his answer, yes, sir.”
¶ 26 Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of first degree
murder, and it further found defendant personally discharged a firearm during the offense.
¶ 27 C. Sentencing and Direct Appeal
¶ 28 The trial court conducted defendant’s sentencing hearing on December 10, 2021.
Defendant made a statement in allocution. During his statement, defendant maintained his
innocence and raised multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, including that his
attorney withheld evidence from him. Following defendant’s statement, the court sentenced him
to an aggregate 52 years’ imprisonment.
¶ 29 Defendant then filed a direct appeal, which raised multiple contentions of error.
The Third District held the trial court erred by failing to conduct a preliminary Krankel inquiry
following defendant’s statements at sentencing and remanded the case for a preliminary Krankel
inquiry. Alexander, 2024 IL App (3d) 210575-U, ¶ 46.
¶ 30 D. Preliminary Krankel Hearing
¶ 31 On July 10, 2025, the trial court held a preliminary Krankel inquiry. At the outset,
the following exchange occurred between Lowe, the court, and defendant:
“MR. LOWE: I guess as a preliminary matter just to make it clear on the
record regarding the purpose and procedure of a Krankel inquiry, first of all, the

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ultimate purpose is for the Court to determine whether or not my client’s allegations
show possible neglect of the case such that new counsel should be appointed to
replace me and further investigate those claims, and as the Appellate Court decision
on remand noted, that’s a two-step process.
The initial process should be the Court making an inquiry of my client,
talking to him about his claims. The State really should not participate or should
show de [minimis] participation. I think their participation would be limited to very
basic questions about procedural history and whatnot, but the opinion of the State
doesn’t matter in this type of a proceeding.
So, with that said, I believe the Court should initially inquire of [defendant]
regarding his claims.
THE COURT: All right. So, [defendant], I actually have an independent
recollection of you and of both trials, and you during your statement of allocution
inquired about the public defender and the State’s Attorney withholding evidence
from you, and you also questioned a jury instruction.
So, I am—you just tell me what you’d like me to know about those two
inquiries. Okay? And then I’m going to ask Mr. Lowe—I will let you tell me
whatever it is that you think I need to know about that, and then I’m going to ask
Mr. Lowe some questions. Okay?
[DEFENDANT]: Okay. Well, because I have like a full note here to put
down everything in a professional manner. So, that’s in here, and everything is
specifically about my ineffective assistance of counsel that I’m claiming about him.
So, you want me to just—

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THE COURT: You just go—you can tell me whatever it is you think I need
to know with respect to Mr. Lowe and his performance. Okay?”
¶ 32 Defendant then provided a lengthy statement to the trial court, in which he raised
multiple claims. Relevant to this appeal, defendant alleged Lowe failed to subpoena (1) Herron to
testify at his second jury trial and (2) defendant’s cell phone records. When discussing Herron,
defendant stated:
“I requested Mr. Lowe *** subpoena Ms. Herron, the owner of the Chrysler
[mini]van, because her interrogation fills in the blanks that were missing on timing
and proves my innocence. His response was I want to keep it how you got it like
anybody could have done it. Mr. Lowe failed to subpoena Ms. Herron for my
defense violating 4-5.2 of the American Bar Association’s standards for criminal
justice.
Had Mr. Lowe subpoenaed Ms. Herron in my defense, the jurors would
have had somebody credible to rely on about—had Mr. Lowe subpoenaed Ms.
Herron in my defense, the jurors would have had somebody credible to rely on
about the defense of my innocence since I was impeached for prior convictions and
in my—it may have helped them return a not guilty verdict, but therefore, Mr. Lowe
was ineffective to that extent.”
With respect to the issue of defendant’s cell phone records, defendant alleged:
“[M]y cell[ ]phone records was [sic] part of my discovery which is used in some
cases where the defendant’s whereabouts at the time of commission of the offense
is an issue, and that’s the case here.
Had Mr. Lowe subpoenaed my phone records it would have proved my

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testimony true that I never went to the Landmark Apartments that day at all and
prove my innocence of the crime and also would have rendered a not guilty verdict.
Therefore, Mr. Lowe was ineffective to those extents.”
¶ 33 Following defendant’s statement, the trial court allowed Lowe to respond to the
allegations raised by defendant. At the beginning of his response, Lowe stated: “There was a lot
of information. I’ve taken certain notes. I’ll address what I can. If the Court needs some follow up
or requests some additional details, I will certainly try to provide it.” Lowe then detailed the
procedural history of his representation and addressed many of defendant’s contentions. However,
Lowe failed to address defendant’s claims about subpoenaing Herron and defendant’s cell phone
records.
¶ 34 After hearing Lowe’s response, the trial court indicated it was going to take the
matter under advisement so it could “refresh [its] recollection on a few matters that would be
contained within the record of the transcripts.”
¶ 35 On November 19, 2025, the trial court issued a three-page, handwritten order. The
order recounted the procedural history of defendant’s case and provided an overview of what
occurred at the preliminary Krankel hearing. The court’s order then stated:
“The Court has considered [defendant’s] testimony relating to his claims
and Mr. Lowe’s testimony concerning his diligence and consideration of the facts
of this case and the law. The Court finds that [defendant’s] claims lack merit and
Mr. Lowe took adequate and appropriate steps in his defense of [defendant] and
those issues where disagreement arose between the two related to matters of trial
strategy.
***

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Accordingly, the Defendant *** has failed to meet the threshold
requirement of Krankel that would justify appointment of new counsel at this
stage.”
¶ 36 Defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal on December 22, 2025, and the Office of
the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) filed a motion for leave to file a late notice of appeal
pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(5), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017) and Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 606(d) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) on January 15, 2026. This court granted OSAD’s motion
that same day.
¶ 37 This appeal followed.
¶ 38 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 39 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry
into his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant asserts the court did not sufficiently
explore two of the posttrial claims he raised in his statement at the preliminary Krankel inquiry.
Those two claims were that Lowe failed to subpoena (1) Herron as a witness for trial and
(2) defendant’s cell phone records.
¶ 40 “A pro se posttrial claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by
the common-law procedure developed by the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Krankel.”
People v. Patton, 2022 IL App (4th) 210561, ¶ 101. When a defendant makes a posttrial claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, “the [trial] court should first examine the factual basis of the
defendant’s claim.” People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 35. If, after this examination, the court
“determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court
need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. [Citation.] However, if the
allegations show possible neglect of the case, new counsel should be appointed.” Id. This process

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is often referred to as a “preliminary Krankel inquiry.” People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 30. Our
supreme court has held:
“The goal of Krankel is to ‘facilitate the trial court’s full consideration of a
defendant’s pro se claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and thereby
potentially limit issues on appeal.’ [Citation.] Moreover, ‘[b]y initially evaluating
the defendant’s claims in a preliminary Krankel inquiry, the circuit court will create
the necessary record for any claims raised on appeal.’ ” People v. Ayres, 2017 IL
120071, ¶ 21 (quoting Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶¶ 29, 38).
A preliminary Krankel inquiry “give[s] the defendant an opportunity to flesh out his claim of
ineffective assistance so the court can determine whether appointment of new counsel is
necessary.” Id. ¶ 20. “The trial court, most familiar with the proceedings at issue, remains best
situated to serve the interests of judicial economy by extinguishing conclusory claims.” Roddis,
2020 IL 124352, ¶ 56.
¶ 41 “The issue of whether the circuit court properly conducted a preliminary Krankel
inquiry presents a legal question that we review de novo.” Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 28. In
determining whether a trial court’s inquiry was sufficient, a reviewing court should consider the
following three factors:
“(1) whether there was some interchange between the trial court and defense
counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective
representation, (2) the sufficiency of defendant’s pro se allegations of ineffective
assistance, and (3) the trial court’s knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at
trial and the sufficiency of the defendant’s allegations on their face.” People v.
Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71.

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However, “[n]one of these factors are mandatory, and no bright-line rule exists about what is a
sufficient inquiry and what is not.” Id.
¶ 42 Before we begin our analysis, we note the parties disagree about the applicable
standard of review in this case. The State asserts, because the trial court ruled that defendant’s
posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit following the hearing, the
applicable standard of review is for manifest error. See People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 98.
However, in this case, on appeal defendant only challenges whether the court conducted an
adequate preliminary Krankel inquiry and does not appeal the court’s ultimate finding that his
claims lacked merit. Therefore, the applicable standard of review is de novo. Id.
¶ 43 In this case, defendant argues the trial court failed to conduct an adequate
preliminary Krankel inquiry because, with respect to his specific allegations that Lowe failed to
subpoena Herron and defendant’s cell phone records, “[d]efense counsel offered no response to
these allegations, and the circuit court did not seek any clarification.” In support of this argument,
defendant cites People v. Wilhelm, 2020 IL App (4th) 170008-U. Defendant asserts Wilhelm is
“directly on point” to this case. However, Wilhelm is an unpublished order filed before January 1,
2021, and thus may not be cited, even for persuasive authority. See Illinois Supreme Court Rule
23(e)(1) (eff. Jun. 3, 2025). “The proper remedy for improper use of a nonprecedential case in an
appellate brief is to strike the references to the case.” Valenti v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of America,
Inc., 332 Ill. App. 3d 969, 972 (2002). Therefore, we strike reference to this case in defendant’s
brief.
¶ 44 Based on our review of the record, we conclude the trial court conducted an
adequate preliminary inquiry into defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We note
that the court provided defendant an opportunity to discuss all his contentions of error and provided

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Lowe an opportunity to respond. Defendant’s statement to the court was lengthy, and he covered
multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Similarly, Lowe provided a detailed statement,
in which he recounted the procedural history of his representation and responded to almost all
defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance. Additionally, the judge who presided over the
preliminary Krankel inquiry was the same judge who presided over both of defendant’s jury trials
in this case. Consequently, the court was exceptionally familiar with the facts and circumstances
of defendant’s case and defense counsel’s performance at trial. In fact, the court noted multiple
times during the preliminary Krankel hearing that it had “an independent recollection” of
defendant’s trials. Moreover, the court did not only rely on its own independent recollection but
also took the matter under advisement so it could review the transcripts before issuing its ruling.
¶ 45 Defendant bases his claims on the assumption that because Lowe failed to respond
to two of defendant’s claims, “the court had no basis to find that counsel was not ineffective with
regard to his decision not to call a potentially exculpatory witness, or procure potentially
exculpatory phone records.” According to defendant, Lowe’s failure to respond automatically
requires this court to remand for the trial court to make further inquiry. However, this assumption
is incorrect because it fails to take into account that the court could also consider its knowledge of
the facts from defendant’s two jury trials and defense counsel’s performance, as well as the
sufficiency of defendant’s claims. Schnoor, 2019 IL App (4th) 170571, ¶ 71.
¶ 46 The first claim defendant argues the trial court did not properly address was that
Lowe was ineffective for failing to subpoena Herron because, according to defendant at the
preliminary Krankel hearing, Herron’s testimony “proves [his] innocence,” and her testimony
would “fill[ ] in the blanks that were missing on timing.” However, we note defendant, in his
statement at the preliminary Krankel hearing, asserted, when he discussed obtaining Herron’s

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testimony with Lowe, Lowe’s response was, “I want to keep it how you got it like anybody could
have done it.” Therefore, any response by Lowe to this claim was unnecessary because, based on
defendant’s own statement, the court knew Lowe and defendant discussed the possibility of
subpoenaing Herron, and Lowe determined Herron would not be a beneficial witness. Moreover,
defendant did not claim Herron would be an alibi witness at the Krankel hearing; instead, he stated
Herron’s testimony would provide someone “credible” for the jury to rely on. “ ‘Whether to call
certain witnesses and whether to present an alibi defense are matters of trial strategy, generally
reserved to the discretion of trial counsel.’ ” Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 106 (quoting People v.
Kidd, 175 Ill. 2d 1, 45 (1996)). Because defendant’s own statement at the preliminary Krankel
inquiry provided enough information to demonstrate Lowe’s decision not to subpoena Herron was
trial strategy, there was sufficient information for the court to find there was no possible neglect
of defendant’s case with respect to this issue. See id. ¶ 101 (“If the trial court determines that the
claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new
counsel and may deny the pro se motion.” (Emphasis added and internal quotation marks
omitted.)).
¶ 47 Defendant also alleged Lowe failed to subpoena his cell phone records, which,
according to defendant, “would have proved my testimony true that I never went to the Landmark
Apartments that day at all and prove my innocence of the crime and also would have rendered a
not guilty verdict.” This statement by defendant is conclusory. Moreover, there was sufficient
information in the record for the trial court to determine this claim did not show possible neglect
of defendant’s case. Notably, defendant testified at trial that his cell phone was shut off and only
worked on Wi-Fi. Therefore, it is unlikely his cell phone records would have shown his location.
Additionally, defendant’s conclusory statement that his phone records would have “prove[d] his

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innocence” discounts the other evidence linking him to the crime, such as the surveillance video
and his possession of the firearm used to kill Hunter. Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, the
records could establish the cell phone’s location was not at Landmark Apartments, that is not the
equivalent of establishing without question defendant was not at that location. It does not take
much to imagine the State arguing in response that defendant intentionally left his cell phone in a
different location and highlighting that the other evidence linked defendant to the crime. (In fact,
we note the State suggested the same during oral argument before this court.) Consequently, there
was sufficient information in the record for the court, without further inquiry of Lowe or defendant,
to determine this conclusory claim of ineffective assistance of counsel did not show possible
neglect of the case and warrant the appointment of new counsel.
¶ 48 We find the purpose of a preliminary Krankel inquiry was satisfied in this case.
Defendant had ample opportunity to present his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel to the
trial court, and defense counsel provided a lengthy response, in which he addressed a number of
defendant’s claims. While admittedly, during a preliminary Krankel hearing “some interchange
between the trial court and trial counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the
allegedly ineffective representation is permissible and usually necessary,” such was not required
for defendant’s two claims under the circumstances in this case. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68,
78 (2003). Although defense counsel did not specifically address the two claims defendant
discussed on appeal, the trial court’s inquiry, coupled with the facts evident from the record, was
sufficient to determine there was no “possible neglect” of defendant’s case. Roddis, 2020 IL
124352, ¶ 35. Consequently, we conclude although defense counsel did not specifically address
the two claims defendant discusses on appeal, the court’s inquiry under the specific facts of this
case was sufficient to determine there was no “possible neglect” of defendant’s case. Id.

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¶ 49 Although we conclude the trial court conducted an adequate preliminary Krankel
inquiry in this case, we would be remiss if we did not suggest the best practice is for the court to
specifically address every issue raised by a defendant at the preliminary Krankel hearing with
defense counsel. Moreover, in a case such as this, where the court, commendably, took the matter
under advisement so it could review the record, it would be best if the court’s written order
addressed every claim raised by the defendant and provided its rationale as to why each of the
articulated claims demonstrated or failed to demonstrate possible neglect by defense counsel.
¶ 50 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 51 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 52 Affirmed.

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