People v. Oliver

2026 IL App (2d) 250073-U
No. 2-25-0073
Order filed October 16, 2026
NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not
precedential except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHARLES R. OLIVER, Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of McHenry County.
Honorable Tiffany E. Davis, Judge, Presiding.
No. 13-CF-176
JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Schostok concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: On remand from our reversal after holding that postconviction counsel provided
unreasonable assistance by failing to frame claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel to address trial counsel’s forfeiture of an evidentiary issue, new
postconviction counsel failed to cure the deficiency we identified. Therefore, we
again find unreasonable assistance of counsel and must reverse and remand for
further proceedings with new appointed counsel.
¶ 2 Following a February 2014 jury trial, defendant, Charles R. Oliver, was found guilty of
two counts of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2012)) and one count of
unlawful restraint (id. § 10-3(a)). Defendant filed a direct appeal, and we affirmed. See People v.
Oliver, 2016 IL App (2d) 140466-U (Oliver I).

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¶ 3 On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a pro se petition under the Post-Conviction
Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)), raising numerous claims of ineffective
assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. The trial court advanced the petition to the second
stage under the Act. See id. § 122-2.1(b). Postconviction counsel filed an amended petition and,
later, a second amended petition. The State moved to dismiss the second amended petition, and
the court granted the motion. Defendant appealed, contending that, although postconviction
counsel filed a facially valid certificate under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1,
2017), counsel provided unreasonable assistance in that he failed to properly amend defendant’s
pro se petition. See People v. Oliver, No. 2-19-0516 (2021), ¶ 2 (unpublished summary order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)) (Oliver II). We reversed and remanded the case with
directions to appoint new postconviction counsel and to allow defendant to replead his
postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 4 On August 27, 2024, on remand, newly appointed postconviction counsel filed a third
amended postconviction petition, incorporating the previous petitions by reference and adding two
new claims, along with a facially valid certificate under Rule 651(c). The State moved to dismiss
the third amended petition, and defendant filed a response. The trial court granted the State’s
motion to dismiss, and defendant timely appealed.
¶ 5 The trial court appointed the Office of the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to represent
defendant. Per Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and People v. Lee, 251 Ill. App. 3d
63 (1993), the appellate defender moved to withdraw as counsel, arguing that the appeal presented
no issues of arguable merit. Counsel asserted, among other things, that it would be frivolous to
argue that postconviction counsel did not provide reasonable assistance.

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¶ 6 On December 23, 2025, we denied the motion to withdraw without prejudice. People v.
Oliver, No. 2-25-0073 (Dec. 23, 2025) (unpublished minute order). We directed the appellate
defender to file either a new motion to withdraw or a brief addressing whether, given our decision
in Oliver II, postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance on remand. Rather than file a
new motion to withdraw, the appellate defender filed a brief.
¶ 7 On appeal, defendant contends that, although postconviction counsel filed a facially valid
certificate under Rule 651(c), counsel provided unreasonable assistance by incorporating the prior
postconviction petitions and adding new claims without curing the deficiencies recognized in
Oliver II. We agree. Thus, we reverse and remand.
¶ 8 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 9 A. Pretrial
¶ 10 On March 21, 2013, defendant was indicted on two counts of criminal sexual assault (720
ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(1) (West 2012)) and one count of unlawful restraint (id. § 10-3(a)), stemming
from events on November 6, 2012, involving the victim, L.B.
¶ 11 On November 12, 2013, defendant filed a motion to suppress statements made to
Woodstock police officers—including Detective George Kopulos Jr.—over the course of
interrogations following his January 28, 2013, arrest. Defendant alleged Miranda violations (see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)) as the basis for suppression. He also moved to quash
search warrants and suppress evidence obtained from searches of his residence and body. The trial
court denied the motions.
¶ 12 On January 7, 2014, the State filed a motion in limine to “admit proof of other crimes and/or
sexual conduct.” The State asked to admit evidence pertaining to six different women, including
B.H. In response, on January 23, 2014, defendant filed a motion to exclude evidence of sexual

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conduct involving unidentified individuals—specifically, “audio video recordings and
photographs of *** [d]efendant engaged in sexual conduct with unidentified individuals.”
¶ 13 On February 6, 2014, the trial court entered an order granting the State’s “other crimes
motion” in part and denying it in part. The court found “that the probative value [was] not
outweighed by undue prejudice regarding the testimony of other charged victims.” However, the
State was barred from “produc[ing] testimony of J.A. or P.A., uncharged victims.” At the hearing
on the motion, the court noted that four of the individuals referenced in the State’s motion were
victims of charged offenses and two individuals (J.A. and P.A.) were not victims of charged
offenses. The court stated:
“The [c]ourt finds based upon the facts presented, that the probative value of the
evidence the State seeks to admit is not outweighed by the prejudicial effect. The [c]ourt
is going to grant the State’s motion in part and deny it in part. The State may introduce
evidence of the other charged acts. The [c]ourt would deny the State’s request to introduce
acts involving JA and PA. Those are uncharged events. The [c]ourt does not want the other
crimes’ [sic] evidence to become the focal point of the trial.” The court explained further:
“The other crimes’ [sic] evidence which the [c]ourt is allowing would be admissible for
the purpose to show defendant’s propensity to commit sex offenses[.]” The court granted
“defendant’s [m]otion to [e]xclude video photo [sic] evidence of sexual conduct involving
unidentified women” but limited the ruling to the State’s case-in-chief, subject to the
defense “open[ing] the door regarding any of the acts depicted [in] [the] video.”

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¶ 14 B. Trial
¶ 15 Although the bulk of the testimony is from Oliver I, and Detective Kopulos’s testimony is
the portion most relevant to the present appeal, we begin by briefly summarizing the background
of the offenses through the testimony of L.B. and B.H. to provide the necessary context.
¶ 16 L.B. testified that, in November 2012, she responded to defendant’s Craigslist
advertisement for sex in exchange for money. She met him at the Rosemont CTA stop. She
voluntarily performed oral sex in his car and again later in his living room. Defendant then took
her to a basement laundry room, locked the door, told her she had no choice about what was going
to happen, and became aggressive—pulling her hair and forcing her to kneel—until she promised
not to try to escape. She accompanied defendant to an upstairs bedroom, where defendant set up
a camera, compelled oral sex, and had intercourse with her. She also testified that defendant
scanned her identification into his computer and threatened that he would know her identity if she
went to the police. He drove her back to the CTA stop and warned her not to report what had
happened. He told her that he had done similar things to other women. The next day, L.B. reported
the rape at Rush Hospital. The State played a portion of a DVD for the jury. L.B. identified a
video, recorded by defendant, showing them having sex in his bedroom. She also identified nude
photographs defendant took of her in his bedroom.
¶ 17 B.H. testified that, in January 2013, she met defendant through a Craigslist advertisement
that she had placed. She agreed to meet for possible sex in exchange for money. She met defendant
at a Woodstock Walmart, and they drove to his house. She removed her clothes in the living room.
She said that defendant’s demeanor changed when they went to the basement, where he forced her
into a laundry room with a modified doorknob, threatened to tie her up, and told her she could
leave only if she complied. She then went with defendant to a bedroom. B.H. testified that

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defendant acted violently, tried to choke her, and coerced oral sex and intercourse while insulting
her. During the oral sex, B.H. cut defendant’s scrotum with her fingernail. At one point, she saw
defendant rifling through her clothes. She later noticed that her driver’s license was missing. After
she got dressed, she went with defendant to his car. She thought he was taking her back to her car,
but he drove off in a different direction and threatened to take her to Rockford. She escaped by
jumping from the car. She went to a church for help and later told police what happened. The
State played a portion of a DVD for the jury. B.H. identified a video, recorded by defendant,
“show[ing] [them] in the [bedroom] and [her] cutting him.”
¶ 18 Kopulos testified that, on January 28, 2013, he served defendant with a body search
warrant. The purpose was to take nude photographs of defendant and document any cuts on his
scrotum. When told the warrant’s purpose, defendant began undressing. When the State asked
Kopulos whether defendant had said anything at that point, defense counsel objected and requested
a sidebar. Counsel argued that eliciting any statement by defendant that “he had been through this
before” would be inappropriate because “[p]rior bad acts have not be [sic] admitted.” The court
sustained the objection and said it would not allow the State to elicit any statement “that this is not
his first time.” Kopulos testified that defendant stated he “knew what [Kopulos] [was] looking
for” because “the Russian girl cut him in the leg.” When Kopulos observed a scab on defendant’s
scrotum, defendant said it was from “shaving as he was getting ready to pick up another one, a
prostitute, that night.” No objection was made.
¶ 19 Kopulos testified that, as defendant was taken to an interview room, defendant stated that
“he paid them, he could do what he want[ed] to them.” No objection was made. Defendant was
advised of his Miranda rights and agreed to speak. In the interview, defendant said “he had a
problem with prostitutes” and discussed a “church girl,” later identified as B.H. He said he argued

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with B.H. about money because she would not do what he wanted. Asked what else defendant
said, Kopulos answered, “He had to get a little physical with her. Detective Sergeant Parsons
asked if—.” Defense counsel interjected with a hearsay objection, which was sustained. Kopulos
then testified that B.H. cut defendant’s leg. When the State asked whether defendant said anything
about “strong-arming any of the girls,” defense counsel objected based on leading. The court
sustained the objection. The State asked whether defendant said anything else about having to
“get a little physical with her.” Kopulos replied, “I mean, he—he agreed that he had to get a little
physical with them. There was—.” Defense counsel interrupted: “Objection, no question
pending.” The court overruled the objection. When Kopulos then testified that defendant “agreed
that he had to strong-arm—,” defense counsel interrupted with another hearsay objection. The
court overruled the objection. The State asked Kopulos if defendant said that B.H. injured him.
According to Kopulos, defendant said that B.H. cut his leg. He denied that she caused his scrotum
injury and attributed it instead to shaving. He said he dropped B.H. off at a church in Woodstock,
then monitored a police scanner for any response. Later, defendant heard on the scanner that
Huntley police took B.H. back to her car.
¶ 20 According to Kopulos, defendant told him that “he grew up in Chicago” and that “it was
easy to get prostitutes in Chicago.” Defendant said he was never popular with girls and that “this
[was] more of a control thing.” Defendant said that “he likes rough stuff” and “likes calling them
names such as ‘bitch’ and ‘f*** bitch’ while he’s having sex with them.” Defendant explained that
he would typically meet women on Craigslist by placing an ad or responding to an ad. Defendant
told Kopulos that he video recorded the encounters using eyeglasses equipped with a camera.
¶ 21 Kopulos testified that defendant initially denied that he “tied up any women.” Defense
counsel moved to strike, arguing that the State was trying to elicit testimony that defendant had

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“tied up some black woman on one occasion.” Counsel argued that such evidence would violate
the court’s order excluding evidence of “uncharged, unidentified individuals.” The State
responded that it had not “play[ed] any videos of unidentified women.” The court overruled the
objection. Kopulos then testified that defendant, after initially denying that he had ever tied anyone
up, admitted that “he did tie up one black girl in the past.”
¶ 22 The State then asked Kopulos whether he asked defendant “about any specific things that
he would say to these women.” Defense counsel objected based on “asked and answered,” and
the objection was overruled. Kopulos testified that defendant told him that “he had rules” and that
“he’d bring them down there [in the basement] to discuss the rules.” Kopulos asked defendant “if
he ever told anybody that he had to cum three times,” and defendant responded that “he can’t do
that. He can only cum twice.”
¶ 23 Kopulos testified that, during a second interview on January 29, 2013, Kopulos asked
defendant about his “rules.” Defendant told him that there “was just one rule and the rule was that
he wasn’t going to wear a condom.” Defendant told Kopulos that he brought the girls to the
basement “because one girl actually escaped.” Defense counsel made a general objection, which
was overruled. Kopulos continued: “That one girl escaped from him out a window, so that’s why
he brought them in the basement.” Defendant told Kopulos that B.H. was “the only one he strong-
armed.” Kopulos clarified that defendant “didn’t say strong-armed. He said having to get rough
with them.”
¶ 24 In closing argument, defendant contended that the State did not prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the sexual intercourse in the bedroom was nonconsensual and the result of force.
Defendant argued that L.B. agreed to be picked up, agreed to be taken to defendant’s house, and
agreed to engage in oral and vaginal sex in exchange for $200.

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¶ 25 A jury found defendant guilty as charged.
¶ 26 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial. He contended that he was denied a fair trial, based
on, among other things, the admission of the following statements Kopulos attributed to defendant:
“a. In relation to being photographed nude, that *** [d]efendant stated he ‘knew
what police were looking for’ and that *** [d]efendant ‘had been through this before.’
b. *** Defendant sometimes had to ‘strong arm’ the girls.
c. *** Defendant had a ‘problem with prostitutes,’ ‘they were easy to get’ and now
it was a ‘control thing.’
d. *** Defendant liked ‘rough sex.’
e. *** Defendant had tied up one black girl but he paid extra for that.
f. *** Defendant went over the rules in the basement being that *** [d]efendant
does not wear a condom and gets to ‘cum three times.’
g. *** Defendant took girls in the basement to go over the rules because one girl
had escaped out of a window.”
Defendant argued that the admission of the foregoing statements was improper because they
(1) did not “meet the common law and statutory requirements for the admissibility of other crimes
evidence” and (2) were “in direct contradiction to the [c]ourt’s ruling excluding evidence of
uncharged sexual conduct involving unidentified individuals.”
¶ 27 In its response, the State noted that “[d]efendant’s motion regarding unidentified women
was specific to video and photo evidence.” In any event, the State noted, defendant’s statement to
Kopulos that he “knew what [the police] were looking for” was in reference to the scratch on his
scrotum, which was evidence relating to B.H. The State noted further that the court in fact barred
the State from eliciting any statement defendant made to Kopulos that defendant “had been through

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this before.” With respect to the remaining statements, the State argued that they were relevant to
the charges, demonstrated defendant’s callous attitudes toward L.B. and B.H., and corroborated
their testimony.
¶ 28 On May 8, 2014, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial, specifically addressing
only one of defendant’s posttrial claims—a claim concerning the trial court’s decision to
sua sponte direct the State to modify the Illinois Pattern Instruction (IPI) on consent.
¶ 29 Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive eight-
year terms of imprisonment for criminal sexual assault and to one year of imprisonment for
unlawful restraint, to be served concurrently.
¶ 30 C. Direct Appeal (Oliver I)
¶ 31 Defendant filed a direct appeal. See Oliver I, 2016 IL App (2d) 140466-U. He raised a
single claim: that he was denied a fair trial because the trial court admitted part of a recorded
telephone call between defendant and his father in which defendant purportedly repeated defense
counsel’s comment that “ ‘the girls’ stories are inconsistent but there’s some truth to ’em.’ ” Id.
¶ 14. He contended that the statement improperly revealed counsel’s opinion of his guilt;
alternatively, he claimed ineffective assistance for trial counsel’s failure to seek redaction of that
remark. Id. ¶ 21. We held that defendant forfeited the issue and that the admission of the statement
was not plain error. Id. ¶¶ 22, 24. We determined that, even if the statement were properly
attributable to counsel, the statement was not clearly tied to guilt, given undisputed facts showing
“some truth” to the victims’ accounts irrespective of guilt. Id. ¶ 24. We further held that the
ineffective‑assistance claim failed for lack of prejudice, where defendant made no argument that,
had counsel moved for redaction and the motion was granted, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. Id. ¶ 27. Thus, we affirmed. Id. ¶ 30.

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¶ 32 D. Defendant’s Pro se Postconviction Petition
¶ 33 On December 15, 2016, defendant filed a pro se petition under the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1
et seq. (West 2016)). Defendant claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue
that he was denied a fair trial in the following respects:
(1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of other sexual conduct, including
(a) portions of the phone call between defendant and his father; (b) testimony and evidence
concerning B.H., and (c) statements made by defendant to Kopulos;
(2) the trial court erred in admitting videos of defendant’s sexual encounters with
L.B. and B.H., because (a) the videos lacked a proper foundation and (b) the jury was
shown a photograph of the label of one of the DVDs played for the jury, and the label
included the names of other females, which constituted evidence of uncharged conduct;
(3) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to quash search warrants for
defendant’s residence and body and in not allowing a Franks hearing (see Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978));
(4) the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to suppress statements based
on a Miranda violation;
(5) the trial court erred in sua sponte instructing the State to provide a [non-IPI
instruction] on consent that added language about withdrawing consent;
(6) the trial court erred in prohibiting defendant from questioning officers about
why they did not submit buccal swabs from B.H.’s mouth to the crime lab.
¶ 34 Defendant also claimed in his pro se petition that trial counsel was ineffective for (1) failing
to object to the State playing the recording of his telephone conversation with his father and,
alternatively, to request that the recording be played in its entirety, (2) failing to challenge hearsay

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evidence from a jail officer at defendant’s sentencing hearing, and (3) failing to call a witness who
would have testified that, in January 2013, B.H. called and sent text messages to defendant asking
him for money for unpaid bills. (Defendant attached an affidavit from this witness.)
¶ 35 E. Proceedings on the Amended and Second Amended Postconviction Petition
¶ 36 On February 15, 2017, the trial court advanced defendant’s petition to the second stage and
appointed counsel. On March 1, 2018, postconviction counsel filed an amended postconviction
petition, which incorporated defendant’s pro se petition by reference and attached the various
motions, responses, and court orders referenced therein. Counsel claimed that appellate counsel
was ineffective for failing to raise any of the “numerous issues” included in trial counsel’s posttrial
motion.1 Counsel asserted only generally that “[a]ppellate counsel’s failure to address numerous
issues on direct appeal fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that “[defendant]
was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s deficient performance.” Counsel attached a Rule 651(c)
certificate.
¶ 37 On April 18, 2018, the State filed a brief motion to dismiss the amended petition. The State
noted that “[t]he issues raised by *** defendant could have been brought on direct appeal” and
that “defendant attempt[ed] to circumvent the doctrine of res judicata by claiming ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel.” The State noted, however, that appellate counsel is not required
to raise every conceivable issue. The State contended that defendant failed to establish deficient
1We note that the “numerous issues” included in the posttrial motion were the same issues raised
by defendant in his pro se postconviction petition, with one exception—the posttrial motion included a
claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the trial court erred in prohibiting
counsel from questioning B.H. about her conduct after the alleged assault, which purportedly showed her
lack of fear of defendant or concern that he could locate her.

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performance and, in any event, failed to argue that, even if counsel had raised any of the numerous
issues, the result of defendant’s appeal would have been different. The State concluded:
“[Defendant] is not entitled to simply attack the performance of appellate counsel because the
attorney handling the appeal did not raise every conceivable issue and attack every single ruling
of the trial court.”
¶ 38 On February 8, 2019, postconviction counsel filed a second amended postconviction
petition and a new Rule 651(c) certificate. The second amended petition again incorporated
defendant’s pro se petition and attached various exhibits. This time, postconviction counsel
claimed that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the following three issues on
appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
(2) the trial court erred in admitting “certain propensity evidence,” specifically, (a) defendant’s
statements during the telephone call with his father, (b) B.H.’s testimony about an alleged sexual
assault, and (c) “evidence of uncharged other acts of sexual conduct in the form of alleged
statements made by *** [d]efendant at the Woodstock [p]olice [station]”; and (3) the trial court
erred in admitting certain evidence—“testimonial, videotaped, and warrants”—which resulted in
undue prejudice and denied defendant a fair trial. With respect to each argument, postconviction
counsel concluded that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness and that defendant was prejudiced as a result.
¶ 39 On April 24, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss. On June
14, 2019, the court granted the motion in a written order. First, the court found that the evidence
was sufficient to prove defendant’s guilt. The court stated that, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, the jury could have reasonably found that, although L.B. may have
initially consented to sexual conduct, she later withdrew consent. Thus, it concluded that appellate

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counsel was not unreasonable for failing to raise a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge on appeal
and, further, that there was no reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have
been different had he done so.
¶ 40 Second, the trial court found that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise
claims regarding certain propensity evidence. With respect to the statements made by defendant
to his father, the court found that the claim was barred by res judicata as it was raised on direct
appeal. With respect to B.H.’s testimony, the court found that defendant failed to show that the
testimony was improperly admitted. Thus, the court concluded that appellate counsel was not
unreasonable for failing to challenge her testimony and that there was no reasonable probability
that, even if he had, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
¶ 41 With respect to defendant’s statements to Kopulos (which defendant claimed were
evidence of “uncharged other acts of sexual conduct”), the trial court noted that the statements
were not included in the second amended petition (they were included in defendant’s pro se
petition). Thus, the court used the motion for a new trial as a reference. The court found that,
although trial counsel did object to the admissibility of some of the statements, counsel did not
raise an objection on the basis now asserted, i.e., that the statements represented other-crimes
evidence. Thus, the court concluded that the challenge to the statements was forfeited and that
“appellate counsel was not ineffective for fail[ing] to raise these issues on appeal.” The court
explained:
“At no time prior to trial did [d]efendant file a motion in limine asking the [c]ourt to bar
[d]efendant’s statements based on other crimes or bad acts. He did, however, file a
[m]otion to [s]uppress [d]efendant’s statements based upon an alleged violation of Miranda
(Miranda v. Arizona, [384 U.S. 436 (1966))]. The [c]ourt held a hearing in [sic] the

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[m]otion to [s]uppress and after hearing testimony from the officers involved and ***
[d]efendant, denied same, on February 6, 2014. Defendant now asserts that it was error for
the [c]ourt to admit these statements[,] contending they represent other-crimes evidence
and were prejudicial to [d]efendant, a different theory regarding the admissibility of the
statements, then [sic] previously argued.
In order to preserve an error for review, a defendant must object to the error at trial
and include the objection in a post-trial motion. People v. McLaurin, 235 Ill. 2d 478, 485
(2009). [Illinois Rule of Evidence 103(a)(1) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015)] requires a timely
objection stating the specific ground of the objection. A mere objection is not enough to
preserve an error for review. People v. Watt, 2013 IL App (2d) 120183, citing York v. [El-
Ganzouri], 353 Ill. App. 3d 1, 17 (2004). To preserve an error, an objection must be timely,
meaning contemporaneous with the objectionable conduct, and the objecting party must
identify the same basis for the objection that he will argue on appeal. York, 353 Ill. App.
3d at 17-18. A general objection raises the question of relevancy and materiality only.
Failure to properly preserve an error operates as a forfeiture, as to that issue. People v.
Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 293 (1992). The statements [d]efendant takes issue with were
presented through the testimony of Detective George Kopulos, of the Woodstock Police
Department. As to the statement of [d]efendant that he ‘had been through this before’ an
objection was made and sustained ***; with respect to the statement he had to ‘strong arm
the girls,’ the State asked a question attempting to elicit this information three times. On
the State’s first attempt, [d]efendant made an objection based on hearsay, which was
sustained[;] on the State’s second attempt *** [d]efendant made an objection based on
leading, which was sustained[;] and on the third attempt no objection was made until the

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witness began his answer and defense objected, stating ‘no question pending’ which was
overruled. The [d]etective then testified ‘he (referring to [d]efendant) agreed that he had
strong armed the girls.’ Thereafter, another general objection based on hearsay was made
by defense interrupting the witness[’s] answer. That objection was overruled ***. With
respect to the testimony regarding [d]efendant’s statements that: [d]efendant had a
‘problem with prostitutes’ ‘they were easy to get[’] and now it was a ‘control thing’; he
([d]efendant) liked ‘rough sex’; he gets to ‘cum three times’, no objections were made.
*** . As to testimony that [d]efendant stated he had tied up the black girl, but paid extra
for that, [d]efendant objected based on a violation of a motion in limine, which was
overruled. *** The statement made by [d]efendant that he took girls to the basement to
go over the rules because one girl had escaped out of a window, an objection was made
stating asked and answered. That objection was also overruled. ***.
Based upon a review of the record herein, the [c]ourt finds that [d]efendant failed
to properly preserve these issues, and they are therefore forfeitured [sic]. While
[d]efendant did argue the issue regarding [d]efendant’s statements based on uncharged
sexual conduct in his post-trial motion, he did not make a proper objection
contemporaneous at the time of the questions. Defendant made several specific
objections[;] however[,] these objections were not based on other crimes or bad acts. The
theory he now argues in his post-trial motion. A specific objection forfeits all other,
unspecified objections. People v. Macri, 185 Ill. 2d 1, 75 (1998). Further, the general
objections made by [d]efendant, are construed as being only to the relevancy of the
proffered evidence. Defendant does not contend that his statements were not relevant.
Based on the foregoing and the trial court record, the [c]ourt finds, that the appellate

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counsel was not ineffective for failure to raise these issues on appeal, as there is not [a]
reasonable probability that if he had done so, it would not [sic] have changed the outcome
of the appeal. See: People v. Golden, 229 Ill. 2d 277 (2008).”
¶ 42 The trial court also rejected defendant’s claims that it erred by admitting the videos
involving L.B. and B.H. because foundation was lacking. Further, the court found that defendant
failed to make a substantial showing that the trial court erred by denying his motions to quash
search warrants. Finally, the court found that defendant did not establish that the trial court’s ruling
on his motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement was unreasonable or arbitrary. Thus,
the court concluded that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise the issues.
¶ 43 F. Appeal from the Dismissal of the Second Amended Petition (Oliver II)
¶ 44 Following the trial court’s grant of the State’s motion to dismiss the second amended
petition, defendant timely appealed. See Oliver II, No. 2-19-0516 (2021) (unpublished summary
order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).
¶ 45 On appeal, defendant contended that, although postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c)
certificate, he provided unreasonable assistance by failing to put certain claims regarding the
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel into proper legal form. Id. ¶ 2. Specifically, he asserted
that postconviction counsel (1) failed to modify his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to challenge the admission of uncharged sexual conduct to include an argument that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the error for review; (2) failed to argue that appellate
counsel’s failure to raise certain issues regarding the admission of evidence was objectively
unreasonable and that there was a reasonable probability that, absent such failure, defendant’s
convictions would have been reversed; and (3) failed to develop and properly shape certain claims
that defendant had included in his pro se petition by explaining how trial and appellate counsel’s

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failures to raise those claims was objectively unreasonable and how, absent such failures, the result
of the trial or appeal would have been different. Id. Defendant contended that, irrespective of
whether he suffered any prejudice from postconviction counsel’s unreasonable assistance, he was
entitled to a remand and appointment of new postconviction counsel. Id.
¶ 46 Defendant’s first argument—that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable assistance
by failing to modify defendant’s claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for not challenging
the admission of purported uncharged-conduct evidence (namely, defendant’s statements to
Kopulos)—was grounded in the trial court’s ruling that any challenge to the admissibility of those
statements had been forfeited. The forfeiture arose because trial counsel failed to properly object
to the various statements. Defendant noted that, while trial counsel objected to some of the
statements, those objections invoked different grounds. Only once did counsel object to a
statement based on the motion in limine—an objection the court overruled. Defendant stressed
that the trial court’s order granting his motion in limine excluded only videos and photographs, not
defendant’s statements. Thus, defendant argued that, because the trial court deemed the underlying
evidentiary claim forfeited, it concluded that appellate counsel could not be ineffective for failing
to raise a procedurally defaulted issue.
¶ 47 In response, the State did not contest that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable
assistance by failing to appropriately amend the petition to allege certain claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Id. ¶ 6. Instead, the State argued that, where postconviction counsel files a
Rule 651(c) certificate, a defendant must show that he suffered prejudice from unreasonable
assistance. Id. We disagreed. Id.
¶ 48 We held:

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“[T]he case law makes plain that, even if postconviction counsel files a Rule 651(c)
certificate and an amended petition, it is patently unreasonable for counsel not to avoid
forfeiture by alleging appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness. [Citation.] It is undisputed that
postconviction counsel here failed to properly amend the pro se petition regarding the
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. That failure was plainly
unreasonable.” ¶ 9.
Thus, we reversed the judgment and remanded the case with directions to appoint new
postconviction counsel and to allow defendant to replead his postconviction petition. Id. ¶ 10.
¶ 49 G. Proceedings Following Remand on the Third Amended Postconviction Petition
¶ 50 On remand, on February 9, 2022, the trial court appointed special public defender Brian
Stevens to represent defendant in the postconviction proceedings. On August 27, 2024, Stevens
filed a “Third Amended Post-Conviction Petition.”
¶ 51 In the third amended petition, Stevens presented the main argument as follows:
“[Defendant] received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and [defendant] was prejudiced by trial counsel’s
deficient performance. The State committed prosecutorial misconduct which led to a
deprivation of and violation of [defendant’s] rights. Further, [defendant] received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and for failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct, all of *** which
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and [defendant] was prejudiced by
appellate counsel’s deficient performance. All of the specific instances are as detailed
below.”

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After setting forth the relevant legal authority, Stevens then “reallege[d] and incorporate[d] by
reference, in [their] entirety,” each previously filed petition, “including all of the allegations, case
law, arguments and exhibits.” He did not elaborate on or specifically address any of the arguments
contained in any of those previously filed petitions.
¶ 52 Stevens also raised two additional claims. First, he claimed that defendant received the
ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his due process rights were violated, because trial
counsel failed to seek a motion for a change of venue due to prejudicial pretrial publicity. He
claimed further that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel’s
ineffectiveness on appeal, which “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that
“[defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s deficient performance.” Stevens cited 15
“news article[s]” but failed to attach them to the petition.
¶ 53 Second, Stevens claimed:
“[Defendant] received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and which resulted in cumulative error [sic], [defendant] was
prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance. Further, [defendant] received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and for failing to raise any issues of prosecutorial misconduct, related thereto,
all of which fell below an objective standard of reasonableness [sic] resulted in cumulative
error, and [defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s deficient performance.
[Defendant] will not repeat all of the errors that have been pointed out in this [p]etition, but
it should be noted that [defendant] believes that each of these errors is serious enough to
cause a new trial. Cumulatively, however, this is even more so.”
Stevens did not specify the “prosecutorial conduct” to which he referred.

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¶ 54 In accordance with Rule 651(c), Stevens certified as follows:
“1. I have consulted with the [d]efendant/[p]etitioner, Charles Oliver, by phone and
by mail, to ascertain his contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights.
2. I have examined the record of proceedings at trial.
3. I have made any amendments to the [p]etition that was filed [p]ro [s]e that are
necessary for adequate presentation of [d]efendant/[p]etitioner’s contentions.”
¶ 55 On October 9, 2024, the State filed a motion to dismiss the third amended petition,
contending that defendant’s “claims are procedurally barred and wholly insufficient, as a matter of
law, to establish a substantial violation of his constitutional rights.” (Emphasis in original.) The
State commented that “[defendant] employs numerous claims of ineffective assistance of trial and
appellate counsel as a vehicle to obtain consideration of procedurally defaulted claims. However,
all of [defendant’s] claims are wholly without merit.” The State then addressed the claims in turn.
¶ 56 First, the State addressed Stevens’s newly added claims related to prosecutorial misconduct
and trial counsel’s failure to file a motion for change of venue. The State argued that defendant’s
claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue of
“prosecutorial misconduct” was not well pled and should be rejected, noting that defendant failed
to identify the specific misconduct. The State next argued that defendant’s claims of ineffective
assistance of trial counsel for failing to move for a change of venue and ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel for failing to raise the issue were not properly pled or supported by the record,
statute, or case law.
¶ 57 Next, the State addressed the claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate
counsel raised in defendant’s initial pro se petition. Before doing so, however, the State
commented in a footnote:

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“Appointed post-conviction counsel again has chosen to adopt in its entirety the pro se
petition at the second stage proceedings. Given the unfortunate remand history, the People
will address the substance of each claim and do not seek a ruling based upon forfeiture.
See People v. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 39.”
The State then contended that appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise certain
claims asserted in defendant’s pro se petition, because they lacked merit. Specifically, the State
argued that (1) the “propensity evidence”—specifically, B.H.’s testimony—was properly admitted,
and res judicata barred any challenge to the admission of defendant’s statements to his father
during the phone call;2 (2) the videos of defendant’s sexual encounters with L.B. and B.H. were
supported by adequate foundation; (3) the trial court’s rulings on the motion to quash the search
warrants for defendant’s residence and body were proper; (4) the trial court properly denied
defendant’s motion to suppress his statements as there was no Miranda violation and defendant’s
statements were voluntary; (5) the trial court’s modification of the IPI instruction on the definition
of consent was appropriate; and (6) the trial court properly limited cross-examination of police
officers on why they did not pursue certain DNA evidence as to B.H. Thus, according to the State,
appellate counsel could not be deemed unreasonable for failing to raise meritless issues and,
further, defendant could not establish prejudice.
¶ 58 The State then addressed the ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims raised in
defendant’s pro se petition. The State argued that (1) res judicata barred defendant’s claim that
trial counsel should have objected to the admission of defendant’s recorded telephone call with his
father or, alternatively, requested that the entire recording be played; (2) counsel’s failure to
2The State did not comment on defendant’s claims regarding the admissibility of certain statements
made by defendant to Kopulos.

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challenge certain hearsay testimony at the sentencing hearing was not unreasonable as hearsay
evidence is admissible at sentencing; and (3) counsel’s failure to call defendant’s proposed witness
at trial was a strategic choice that cannot support an ineffectiveness claim.
¶ 59 Last, the State addressed the claim raised in the amended and second amended petitions
that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. The
State argued that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it was not
unreasonable or improper for the jury to find defendant guilty. Thus, the State maintained that
appellate counsel was not unreasonable for failing to challenge the evidence and that, even if he
had done so, there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of the appeal would have
been successful.
¶ 60 On November 20, 2024, Stevens filed a response. He did not file a new amended petition
or a new Rule 651(c) certificate. In his response, Stevens argued generally that
“[defendant] received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and trial counsel and that
ineffective assistance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and [defendant]
was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s and trial counsel’s deficient performances, and, thus,
[defendant] was denied a fair trial.”
Stevens then developed the arguments that were raised in defendant’s pro se postconviction
petition concerning appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness, which he had previously merely adopted
in the third amended petition. Stevens argued that “[a]ppellate [c]ounsel was ineffective in failing
to raise the issue that the trial court erred” by (1) “allowing into evidence [defendant’s] uncharged
and charged prior sexual conduct”; (2) “not quashing the [s]earch [w]arrants issued and executed
in this matter, and pursuant to [defendant’s] [m]otions to [q]uash [s]earch [w]arrants and [s]uppress
[e]vidence”; (3) “denying [defendant’s] [m]otion to [s]uppress [s]tatements”; (4) “giving,

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sua sponte, a non-IPI instruction over an IPI instruction”; and (5) “prohibiting questioning of law
enforcement regarding the failure to test certain evidence.” With respect to each argument, Stevens
asserted only generally that appellate counsel’s actions “fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and [defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s deficient performance.”
¶ 61 With respect to his argument regarding the admission of defendant’s statements as evidence
of uncharged conduct, Stevens asserted:
“The trial court allowed into evidence uncharged sexual conduct that was the result
of an interview between [defendant] and law enforcement during which statements were
made by [defendant], on or about January 28-29, 2013, including the alleged statements
that [defendant] ‘like [sic] rough sex’, that [defendant] had tied up a black girl but paid
extra for that, that [defendant] had certain rules for the prostitutes that he employed.
All of said statements amounted to uncharged sexual conduct, that did not include
witnesses or complainants in the case at bar, and therefore, should not have been admitted
into evidence. Further, they were inflammatory and the prejudicial effect far outweighed
the probative value of the uncharged sexual conduct and proclivities.
* * *
[A]ppellate counsel’s failure to raise the above issues was ineffective and *** fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness and [defendant] was prejudiced by appellate
counsel’s deficient performance.”
¶ 62 Stevens also addressed two of three ineffective-assistance-of-trial counsel claims that were
raised in defendant’s pro se postconviction petition. He asserted that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to (1) “object to the State playing selected portions of an audio/video conversation
between [defendant] and his father and/or for not offering the entirety of said audio/video into

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evidence in their case-in-chief,” and (2) “call a witness for [defendant] that would have impeached
a witness utilized in the [c]omplaint for the [s]earch [w]arrant.” Stevens also reiterated the claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for change of venue based upon unfair
pretrial publicity.
¶ 63 Finally, Stevens alleged generally that
“[defendant] received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, which fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and which resulted in cumulative error, [defendant] was
prejudiced by trial counsel’s deficient performance. Further, [defendant] received
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise the ineffective assistance of
trial counsel and for failing to raise any issues of prosecutorial misconduct, related thereto,
all of which fell below an objective standard of reasonableness resulted in cumulative error,
and [defendant] was prejudiced by appellate counsel’s deficient performance.”
¶ 64 A hearing took place on November 21, 2024. At the outset of the hearing, the State
contended, “[The claims] are not well pleaded and they are positively rebutted by the record and
not supported by any independent evidence ***. *** [T]his should be dismissed in its entirety
because all of these claims are procedurally barred. They’re insufficient as a matter of law.” The
State argued further: “[W]e only get here by the recurrent refrain of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel, and now every single one [of] those has raised appellate counsel as well.” The State
commented:
“Mr. Stevens *** suggests alternative strategies, but we don’t [sic] amount to anything
more than a bald conclusion that it should’ve been done this way and here’s a prejudice
piece. It’s simply a conclusion of law with no factual support underneath it and that is the
same with the prejudice prong.”

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The State then argued in support of its motion to dismiss.
¶ 65 In response, Stevens began his argument by reciting the Strickland standard and telling the
trial court that “the bulk of the issues here are appellate counsel ineffective assistance, that’s the
majority, and then there are some trial counsel ineffective assistance, and those are the ones I would
touch upon.” Stevens maintained that “all of these issues that are brought before the [c]ourt in the
postconviction [petition] that indicate the appellate counsel should have raised were all preserved
by either timely objections and/or posttrial motions by trial counsel.”
¶ 66 With respect to the claim concerning the admissibility of defendant’s statements to
Kopulos, Stevens argued:
“Judge, I would also point out that the [c]ourt—and the appellate counsel should
have raised this—that the [c]ourt made a ruling that the uncharged conduct would not be
allowed in. However, Judge, the uncharged conduct was allowed in in a backdoor way,
essentially through statements that the defendant *** gave during one of the various
interrogations, and it came in under that way where it was uncharged and generally
amorphous and didn’t really relate to any particular individuals and certainly no individuals
in the case at bar.
But those statements that were made, Judge, are part of the record and also part of
the motion for new trial that’s incorporated within here and incorporated in a second
amended petition by Mr. Mourelatos [(initial postconviction counsel)]. But essentially,
Judge, a lot of that uncharged sexual conduct in the form of statements was that—that came
into evidence was that the defendant sometimes had to strong arm girls, that they were easy
to get, that there was a control thing, the defendant liked rough sex, that he tied up one girl,
but paid extra for that, that one girl—they went over the rules, but she tried to escape out

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the window. None of those individuals were discussed in any names, Judge, but they were
essentially uncharged sexual conduct or conduct in general that was—ultimately was
allowed in. And *** appellate counsel *** should have brought that issue up because that
was not only uncharged, but it was in direct violation of the [c]ourt’s order saying that—
and a direct contradiction saying that the [c]ourt would not allow uncharged conduct.”
¶ 67 On January 31, 2025, the trial court entered an order dismissing the third amended petition
“[f]or the reasons stated on the record.” In issuing its oral ruling, the court agreed with the State
that defendant’s claims were “procedurally barred [and] wholly insufficient as a matter of law to
establish substantial violations of his constitutional rights.” The court found that “all of
[defendant’s] claims [were] not well pled.” The court stated that “[n]othing in *** [the] petition
*** establishe[d] deficient performance other than to list a variety of complaints regarding what
was or wasn’t appealed.” Thereafter, the court commented on the merits of each argument raised
in the petitions; however, it did not address the claim regarding appellate counsel’s failure to raise
the issue regarding the admission of defendant’s statements to Kopulos. With respect to Stevens’s
allegations that trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise claims of
prosecutorial misconduct, the court found that Stevens “[did not] identify the subject matter that
he [was] complaining about specifically” or “provide[ ] references to specific instances where his
trial counsel should have acted differently” with respect to any misconduct. The court noted that
“it is *** [d]efendant’s job to define the issues and bear the burden of argument.”
¶ 68 H. Appellate Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw
¶ 69 Defendant filed a notice of appeal, and the trial court appointed OSAD to represent
defendant. Per Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987), and People v. Lee, 251 Ill. App. 3d
63 (1993), the appellate defender moved to withdraw as counsel, stating he read the record and

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found no issue of arguable merit. Among other things, counsel asserted that it would be frivolous
to argue that postconviction counsel did not provide reasonable assistance. On December 23,
2025, we denied the motion to withdraw without prejudice. We directed counsel to file “either a
new motion to withdraw or a brief addressing whether, given [Oliver II], postconviction counsel
provided reasonable assistance on remand where he incorporated the previously filed
postconviction petitions into a third amended postconviction petition without curing any
deficiencies.” Oliver, No. 2-25-0073 (Dec. 23, 2025) (unpublished minute order). Counsel filed
a brief.
¶ 70 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 71 Defendant contends that, although postconviction counsel filed a facially valid Rule 651(c)
certificate, the presumption that counsel provided reasonable assistance is rebutted by the record,
because he (1) failed to comply with our instructions in Oliver II to put certain claims of ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel into proper legal form and (2) failed to shape defendant’s claims
regarding ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel into proper legal form, including by
failing to amend the petition to allege counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced that defendant.
Defendant asks us to reverse the dismissal of his postconviction petition and remand for further
second-stage proceedings, with the appointment of new postconviction counsel.
¶ 72 The Act allows a criminal defendant to raise a claim that his conviction resulted from a
substantial violation of his constitutional rights. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a)(1) (West 2022); Addison,
2023 IL 127119, ¶ 18. The Act provides a three-stage mechanism for adjudicating such a claim.
Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 18. At the first stage, the trial court independently reviews the petition
and determines whether to dismiss it as frivolous or patently without merit. 725 ILCS 5/122-
2.1(a)(2) (West 2022); Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 18. If a petition is not summarily dismissed at

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the first stage, it advances to the second stage, where the trial court may appoint counsel for an
indigent defendant and the State may either answer or move to dismiss the petition. 725 ILCS
5/122-2.1(b), 122-4, 122-5 (West 2022); Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 18. At the second stage,
dismissal of the petition is warranted “only when the allegations in the petition, liberally construed
in light of the trial record, fail to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation.” People
v. Hall, 217 Ill. 2d 324, 334 (2005). “Issues that were raised and decided on direct appeal are
barred by res judicata, and issues that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, are
forfeited.” People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. If the defendant makes a substantial showing
of a constitutional violation, the petition advances to the third stage, where the trial court conducts
an evidentiary hearing. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2022); People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472-
73 (2006).
¶ 73 “In a postconviction proceeding, there is no constitutional right to the assistance of
counsel.” Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 19. Rather, the right to counsel arises from the Act. People
v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42 (2007). Under the Act, a petitioner is entitled to “a ‘ “reasonable”
level of assistance’ ” at the second and third stages of postconviction proceedings. Addison, 2023
IL 127119, ¶ 19 (quoting People v. Flores, 153 Ill. 2d 264, 276 (1992)). To ensure the reasonable
level of assistance required by the Act, Rule 651(c) imposes three duties on postconviction counsel.
Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 42.
“[C]ounsel must: (1) consult with the petitioner either by mail or in person to ascertain the
contentions of deprivation of constitutional rights; (2) examine the record of the trial court
proceedings; and (3) make any amendments to the pro se petition necessary for an adequate
presentation of the petitioner’s contentions.” Id. at 42; Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1,
2017).

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¶ 74 Compliance with Rule 651(c) is mandatory. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 21. When
postconviction counsel files a Rule 651(c) certificate attesting that counsel has complied with the
rule, there is a rebuttable presumption that counsel has provided reasonable assistance. Id. In such
a case, it is the defendant’s burden to overcome the presumption. Id. The defendant may rebut the
presumption “by, inter alia, demonstrating that postconviction counsel did not make all necessary
amendments to the pro se petition.” Id.; People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 414 (1999). “This
includes making amendments that are necessary to overcome procedural bars.” Addison, 2023 IL
127119, ¶ 21; Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 44. When postconviction counsel fails to shape claims into
proper form, the defendant rebuts the presumption of reasonable assistance that arose from
counsel’s Rule 651(c) certificate, and remand is warranted, regardless of whether the claims were
meritorious. Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 44; see People v. Kulpin, 2025 IL App (2d) 240065, ¶ 14
(“ ‘Under Rule 651(c), postconviction counsel has an obligation to present a defendant’s
postconviction claims in the appropriate legal form, and the failure to do so constitutes
unreasonable assistance.’ ” (quoting People v. Nitz, 2011 IL App (2d) 100031, ¶ 18)). Whether
postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance is reviewed de novo. Kulpin, 2025 IL App
(2d) 240065, ¶ 15.
¶ 75 Here, Stevens filed a facially valid certificate showing his compliance with Rule 651(c).
Thus, we presume that counsel provided reasonable assistance. Nevertheless, defendant contends
that the record rebuts that presumption because Stevens “disregarded this [c]ourt’s order and failed
to properly amend [defendant’s] claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.” Defendant
asserts that, “[i]nstead of amending [defendant’s] claims, he added two new claims alleging that
[defendant] should have received a change of venue at trial and the State engaged in prosecutorial
misconduct.”

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¶ 76 In response, the State maintains that Stevens’s representation was reasonable. It argues
that Stevens complied with Oliver II, noting that “in the third amended postconviction petition,
[Stevens] not only incorporated all of the claims contained in defendant’s previous postconviction
petition, but also clearly argued that defendant received ineffective assistance of both trial and
appellate counsel as to each of the underlying claims previously raised.” The State further argues
that it understood defendant to be raising ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel
and that it did not move to dismiss based on forfeiture. The State also asserts that Stevens had no
obligation to advance frivolous claims.
¶ 77 We agree with defendant that the record rebuts Stevens’s Rule 651(c) certificate. The State
essentially asks us to conclude that Stevens’s addition of general allegations of ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel, along with the recitation of boilerplate legal principles, in
the third amended petition was sufficient to encompass all prior claims and to “clearly argue[ ]”
the requisite elements as to each underlying claim. Although such an interpretation could be
justified under some circumstances, it is not justified here.
¶ 78 Stevens incorporated into the third amended petition defendant’s pro se allegation—as
Stevens phrased it—that “[a]ppellate counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the issue that the
trial court erred in allowing into evidence [defendant’s] uncharged and charged prior sexual
conduct,” which included a challenge to the admissibility of many of defendant’s statements to
Kopulos. Stevens thus determined that this pro se claim, among others, was worth pursuing.
However, Stevens failed to shape it into the proper form. The trial court, in dismissing the second
amended petition, found that the issue regarding defendant’s statements had been forfeited, yet
Stevens did not acknowledge forfeiture. See People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611-12 (2010)
(to preserve an issue for review, a defendant must raise an objection both at trial and in his posttrial

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motion). Stevens argued that the statements were improperly admitted in violation of the “[c]ourt’s
order,” but that order barred evidence concerning two specific victims (J.A. and P.A.), and
defendant’s own motion in limine was specific to video and photo evidence. The court did not
consider, before trial, the admissibility of defendant’s statements purportedly related to uncharged
conduct. Thus, to preserve an issue regarding such statements, trial counsel needed to object both
at trial and in his posttrial motion. See id. Trial counsel’s failure to do so forfeited the issue on
appeal.
¶ 79 To overcome forfeiture on appeal, appellate counsel could have raised the issue as plain
error. “The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to by-pass normal rules of forfeiture
and consider ‘[p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights *** although they were not
brought to the attention of the trial court.’ ” People v. Eppinger, 2013 IL 114121, ¶ 18 (quoting
Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan.1, 1967)). This required establishing that admission of the statements
was “clear or obvious” error and either that (1) “the evidence [was] so closely balanced that the
error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against *** defendant, regardless of the
seriousness of the error,” or (2) the error was “so serious that it affected the fairness of ***
defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of
the evidence.’ ” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) See People v. Sebby, 2017 IL 119445, ¶ 48.
¶ 80 Additionally, appellate counsel could have argued that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to admission of the statements. See People v. Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th) 220914,
¶ 73 (raising a forfeited challenge to the trial court’s admission of evidence by arguing plain error
and, alternatively, ineffective assistance of counsel). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
is reviewed under the two-pronged Strickland test. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688,
694 (1984). To establish an ineffectiveness claim, appellate counsel would have had to show both

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that (1) counsel’s failure to challenge the evidence fell “below an objective standard of
reasonableness” and (2) “absent counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Gilker, 2023 IL App (4th) 220914, ¶ 77.
¶ 81 Accordingly, because the issue regarding the trial court’s admission of defendant’s
statements was forfeited (as noted by the trial court in dismissing the second amended petition),
Stevens could not simply allege that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that the
trial court erred in admitting defendant’s statements. The Strickland standard applies equally to
claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 496
(2010). Thus, under Strickland, Stevens was required to allege that appellate counsel’s failure to
raise the issue as either (1) plain error or (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel was objectively
unreasonable and that but for counsel’s failure to do so, there is a reasonable probability that the
appeal would have been successful. See id. at 496-47. He did not do so.
¶ 82 As noted, Stevens did not set forth any of defendant’s pro se claims in the third amended
petition. Instead, the third amended petition consisted of (1) boilerplate legal principles,
(2) incorporation by reference of all previous petitions with no discussion as to how the cited
principles applied to any of the incorporated claims, and (3) two new claims. Stevens’s response
to the State’s motion to dismiss developed, to some degree, the argument that the court erred in
admitting some of defendant’s statements to Kopulos, but Stevens did not amend the petition or
file a new Rule 651(c) certificate. Although he asserted that appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to raise the issue, he did not argue that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness for (1) failing to raise the issue as plain error or (2) failing to argue trial
counsel’s ineffectiveness. Nor did he do so at the hearing, where he argued only that “appellate

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counsel should have raised this.” Under the circumstances, this falls short of what was needed to
properly shape the claim.
¶ 83 The State argues that Stevens’s representation was reasonable and that no remand is
required. It notes that it “never sought to proceed with a forfeiture argument in its motion to
dismiss” and, instead, “chose to attack the merit of defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance of
trial and appellate counsel.” To be sure, in its motion to dismiss the third amended petition, the
State noted in a footnote that “[a]ppointed *** counsel again has chosen to adopt in its entirety the
pro se petition” but that “[g]iven the unfortunate remand history,” it would “address the substance
of each claim and *** not seek a ruling based on forfeiture.” However, the State’s footnote
suggests that Stevens did not comply with Rule 651(c) and that there were forfeiture arguments to
be made. The State’s decision not to argue forfeiture does not require us to overlook Stevens’s
unreasonable assistance.
¶ 84 The State also argues that “[d]efendant’s claim also does not rebut the presumption of
reasonable assistance because the underlying claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and
appellate counsel lack[ ] merit.” The State, quoting Kulpin, 2025 IL App (2d) 240065, ¶ 14, asserts
that “ ‘[f]ulfillment of the third obligation of Rule 651(c) does not require postconviction counsel
to advance frivolous or spurious claims on defendant’s behalf.’ ” While postconviction counsel
need not advance frivolous claims, here, Stevens reviewed the prior petitions and determined that
defendant’s claims—including defendant’s claim regarding the admission of his statements—were
worth pursuing. As the supreme court noted in Addison when rejecting a similar argument: “We
fail to see how it can be reasonable assistance of counsel for an attorney to identify claims worth
pursuing but then fail to shape them into proper form.” Addison, 2023 IL 127119, ¶ 26.

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¶ 85 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 86 For the reasons stated, we agree that the record rebuts Stevens’s Rule 651(c) certificate.
Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the third amended postconviction petition and remand
for further proceedings with new appointed counsel.
¶ 87 Reversed and remanded.

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