Best v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49974

WADE ALEXZANDER BEST, )
) Filed: May 13, 2024
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District, State of Idaho, Bonner
County. Hon. Barbara A. Buchanan, District Judge.

Judgment and order summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief,
affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Wade Alexzander Best appeals from the district court’s judgment and order summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. Best argues the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his petition without providing the twenty-day notice required by Idaho Code § 19-
4906(b). Best was sufficiently notified of the bases of dismissal asserted by the State in its motion
for summary dismissal. Even if Best was entitled to additional notice, Best failed to preserve the
argument that he was deprived of the notice set forth in I.C. § 19-4906(b) because he did not raise
that claim in the district court. Further, because Best stipulated to have the motion decided without
further evidence or a hearing, he forfeited any claim that the district court was required to give him
any additional notice. Finally, the district court did not sua sponte dismiss any of Best’s claims
because the dismissal was based, in part, on grounds argued by the State. Therefore, we affirm
the district court’s judgment and order dismissing Best’s petition for post-conviction relief.

1
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Best entered an Alford1 plea to lewd and
lascivious conduct with a child under sixteen, I.C. § 18-1508, and the district court sentenced him
to a unified sentence of twenty years, with ten years determinate. Best appealed his sentence,
which this Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. State v. Best, Docket No. 47515 (Ct. App.
July 16, 2020). Subsequently, Best filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and affidavit
alleging various claims that can generally be grouped into two categories. First, Best alleged trial
errors which the district court interpreted as: (1) officers violated his Fifth Amendment right by
not providing him with Miranda2 warnings before recording a confrontation call between Best and
the victim’s mother; (2) the court imposed an excessive bail amount; (3) the plea agreement
violated a previous plea agreement from a separate Kootenai County case; (4) there was
insufficient evidence to charge or prosecute him for the crime; and (5) the affidavit of probable
cause contained inaccurate information. Second, Best alleged a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, which contained several subparts. The district court construed the ineffective assistance
of counsel claims as Best’s trial counsel: (1) failed to adequately review the terms of the Alford
plea with him for him to understand its terms and coerced him into signing the plea; (2) failed to
suppress a confrontation call between Best and the mother of the victim and misinformed him as
to the contents of the call; (3) negotiated a plea agreement that violated a previous plea agreement
in a separate Kootenai County case; and (4) failed to devote sufficient time to discuss the case with
Best or prepare for his case. For ease of reference, these categories will be referred to as the trial
error claims and the ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
In response to Best’s petition for post-conviction relief, the State filed a motion for
summary disposition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c), on the “general basis that in light of the
pleadings, answers, admissions and the record of the underlying criminal case, the Petition fails to
raise a genuine issue of material fact.” The motion also alleged that Best’s claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel “fail to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding both deficient
performance of trial counsel and resulting prejudice.” The State supported the motion with a
memorandum, citing the pleading standards for a petition for post-conviction relief, as well as the

1
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
2
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
burden of proof for claims, generally, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, specifically.
The State addressed individually Best’s claims two, three, and four of ineffective assistance of
counsel. The State’s memorandum then noted that the petition could be summarily dismissed if
either the “allegations are clearly disproven by the record” or “if the Petitioner has not presented
evidence making a prima facia case as to each essential element of the claims or if the Petitioner’s
allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law.” The State also filed an affidavit from Best’s
trial counsel detailing the work she performed on the underlying criminal case.
Thereafter, Best filed a “stipulation to submit motion,” wherein the parties agreed to have
the motion for summary disposition decided without submitting any further evidence or holding
oral argument. Best also filed an affidavit “incorporat[ing his petition and supporting affidavit of
facts] by reference instead of reiterating both documents verbatim here.” In that affidavit, Best
provided additional details regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result,
the district court issued an order to consider the State’s motion based on the affidavits filed and
without further evidence or oral argument.
In a memorandum decision, the district court denied Best’s claims and summarily
dismissed the petition. The district court addressed all of Best’s claims. The district court
dismissed Best’s trial error claims pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b) because they could have been
raised on direct appeal and, thus, could not be considered in a post-conviction proceeding. Next,
the court rejected Best’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims as “disproven by the record in the
criminal action or [] unsupported by admissible evidence.” The district court concluded Best was
not entitled to relief as a matter of law and dismissed his petition. Best timely appealed.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929
(2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (2008). Over questions of law,
we exercise free review. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250, 220 P.3d at 1069; Downing v. State, 136
Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).

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III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Best argues the district court erred in summarily dismissing his entire petition
because he did not receive notice of the reasons for dismissal for each individual claim.
Specifically, he alleges he did not receive reasons for the dismissal of his trial error claims or any
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel not explicitly addressed by the State in its motion for
summary disposition. For those individual claims not explicitly addressed by the State, Best
argues he should have been, but was not, given the statutorily required notice pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906(b) of the court’s intent to dismiss the claims sua sponte. The State argues Best had proper
notice of dismissal for all claims because the State’s motion for summary dismissal and supporting
memorandum addressed all claims and stated the grounds for dismissal with legally sufficient
particularity. Alternatively, the State argues Best was not entitled to the additional twenty-day
statutory notice because the district court did not sua sponte dismiss any claims. This is so, argues
the State, because the district court’s denial was based upon grounds related to the grounds set
forth in the State’s motion for summary disposition.
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is civil in nature. I.C. § 19-
4907; Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); State v. Bearshield, 104
Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323,
1326 (Ct. App. 1992). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, the petitioner must prove by a
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is
based. Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002). A petition for
post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. Dunlap v. State, 141
Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). A petition must contain much more than a short and plain
statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
8(a)(1). Rather, a petition for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within
the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations must be attached or the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not
included with the petition. I.C. § 19-4903. In other words, the petition must present or be
accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the petition will be subject to
dismissal. Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011).

4
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction
relief, either pursuant to a motion by a party or upon the court’s own initiative, if it appears from
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact,
together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When considering summary dismissal,
the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is not required
to accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence,
or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.
App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986).
Moreover, the district court, as the trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of
the party opposing the motion for summary disposition; rather, the district court is free to arrive at
the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho
353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App. 2008). Such inferences will not be disturbed on appeal if
the uncontroverted evidence is sufficient to justify them. Id.
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner’s allegations are clearly disproven by
the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima
facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner’s allegations do not justify
relief as a matter of law. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushé
v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal of a claim
for post-conviction relief is appropriate when the court can conclude, as a matter of law, that the
petitioner is not entitled to relief even with all disputed facts construed in the petitioner’s favor.
For this reason, summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition may be appropriate even when
the State does not controvert the petitioner’s evidence. See Roman, 125 Idaho at 647, 873 P.2d at
901.
Because a post-conviction proceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure,
a motion for summary dismissal must, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1), state the grounds for dismissal
with particularity. DeRushé, 146 Idaho at 601, 200 P.3d at 1150. “If the ground for summary
disposition is that there is no admissible evidence on an essential element of a claim, reasonable
particularity only requires pointing that out.” Id. For an ineffective assistance of counsel claim,
reasonable particularity only requires pointing out that there is a lack of evidence showing deficient

5
performance or prejudice pursuant to the Strickland3 standard. See DeRushé, 146 Idaho at 601-
02, 200 P.3d at 1150-51. It does not require explaining what further evidence is necessary to
substantiate a petitioner’s claim. Id. at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151. If a petitioner believes the grounds
for dismissal alleged by the State in its motion for summary dismissal are insufficient, he must
object in the court below. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522 n.1, 236 P.3d at 1282 n.1. A petitioner cannot
challenge the sufficiency of the State’s grounds for dismissal for the first time on appeal. DeRushé,
146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151.
In this case, the State’s motion for summary dismissal alleged on a general basis, “in light
of the pleadings, answers, admissions and the record of the underlying criminal case, the Petition
fail[ed] to raise a genuine issue of material fact.” This is sufficient notice pursuant to DeRushé.
The Supreme Court made clear in DeRushé that a generalized statement regarding the deficiency
of a claim is sufficient when it held, “If the ground for summary disposition is that there is no
admissible evidence on an essential element of a claim, reasonable particularity only requires
pointing that out.” Id. at 601, 200 P.3d at 1150. Indeed, the pleading standard is so general that if
the other party cannot assert surprise or prejudice, the requirement is met. Id. Here, the State’s
reference to the universal deficiencies in the petition sufficiently notified Best that all his claims
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact for the reasons set forth by the State. The State’s
additional explanation regarding the deficiencies of Best’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims
set forth in the amended petition does not invalidate the general notice that all of Best’s claims
failed as a matter of law for various reasons.
In essence, Best is arguing the State’s motion for summary disposition provided
insufficient notice as to any claim not specifically addressed. If Best thought the notice provided
in the State’s motion for summary disposition was insufficient, he was required to raise that issue
in the trial court to preserve it for appeal. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522 n.1, 236 P.3d at 1282 n.1;
DeRushé, 146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151. Best had multiple opportunities to address the issue
of notice in the trial court. Kelly is instructive in illustrating Best’s options. For example, Kelly
could have objected to:
the motion for summary dismissal on the basis that it fails to provide him with
sufficient notice. Likewise, the petitioner could object to the sufficiency of the
notice at the summary dismissal hearing before the district court. Finally, if the

3
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
6
district court grants the State’s motion for summary dismissal, the petitioner may
file an I.R.C.P. 11 motion for reconsideration.
Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522 n.1, 236 P.3d at 1282 n.1.
Best had precisely the same opportunities as Kelly but chose to forego those opportunities
by stipulating to no further proceedings. This Court will not engage in a sufficiency-of-the-notice
analysis under the guise of considering whether an appellant was provided with any notice at all.
Best was given notice that all the claims in his petition failed to allege a genuine issue of material
fact; nothing in DeRushé or Kelly requires the State to address each claim, as opposed to the
petition as a whole, when all claims suffer from various, universal deficiencies. Consequently, we
hold that Best was provided sufficient notice as to the grounds for dismissal for the claims in his
petition for post-conviction relief. To the extent the notice was insufficient, because Best failed to
raise a claim of insufficient notice in the district court, we will not consider the argument for the
first time on appeal.
Next, Best argues he was entitled to the twenty-day notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b)
because the district court’s dismissal of his petition did not rely on the same arguments presented
by the State in dismissing Best’s claims of trial error and ineffective assistance of counsel and thus,
amounted to a sua sponte dismissal. The State argues the district court relied, in part, on grounds
asserted by the State in its motion for summary disposition and memorandum in support and, thus,
the dismissal was not sua sponte. Alternatively, the State argues that a different analysis should
apply when claims are dismissed pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901(b) as opposed to I.C. § 19-4906(b) or
(c). The State argues Best’s trial claims were forfeited unless and until he established the claims
could not have been raised in the direct appeal. The State further argues that Best failed to meet
that threshold showing and, thus, his claims were not dismissed on the merits because they were
never properly before the district court.
Idaho Code § 19-4906(b) provides in relevant part:
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or
motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief
and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the
parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The
applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed
dismissal.
A review of I.C. § 19-4906(b) demonstrates a claim that a district court failed to provide notice
requires the petitioner to show both that the district court did not provide twenty-days’ notice and

7
that it did not provide its reasons for the dismissal. Establishing only one of the two elements
establishes that the notice was insufficient, not that notice was lacking.
In Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 25 P.3d 110 (2001), Ferrier argued the district court
erred in granting the State’s motion for summary dismissal without providing him twenty-days’
notice of the hearing on the State’s motion. Id. at 799, 25 P.3d at 112. The Idaho Supreme Court
held that Ferrier had not preserved the claim for appeal because Ferrier’s counsel did not object to
the lack of twenty-days’ notice or request a continuance. The Court held: “If Ferrier believed that
he was entitled to twenty days within which to respond to the State’s motion to dismiss, he was
required to raise that issue before the district court. Having failed to do so, he cannot now raise
the issue on appeal.” Id. Thus, according to Ferrier, an argument that the district court provided
its reasons for dismissal but did not give twenty-days’ notice, is a claim of insufficient notice and
must be raised in the district court to be preserved on appeal. By way of logical analogy, then, a
similar claim that the district court provided twenty-days’ notice but not its reasons for dismissal
is also a claim of insufficient notice and must also be raised in the district court to be preserved.
As a petitioner must already address one of these elements to preserve a claim of insufficient
notice, it is not an onerous burden to require a petitioner to address both elements in the trial court
to preserve a claim of no notice.
The Court in DeRushé cited Ferrier’s holding in support of its holding that a petitioner in
a post-conviction case cannot challenge the sufficiency of the notice of dismissal for the first time
on appeal. DeRushé, 146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151. A little more than a year later, in Kelly,
the Court addressed whether a claim that the district court did not provide twenty-days’ notice
could be raised for the first time on appeal. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522, 236 P.3d at 1282. Specifically,
the Court identified the issue as:
Kelly also alleges that several of his claims were dismissed without any notice at
all, and DeRushé does not preclude an appellant from asserting this claim for the
first time on appeal. In Kelly’s petition for post-conviction relief he claims, in
relevant part, ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney’s failure to file
a motion to suppress evidence. The district court dismissed this claim without
providing twenty days of notice, and Kelly claims that the State’s MSD and Memo
contained no notice of the grounds on which this claim was dismissed. We
disagree.
Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522, 236 P.3d at 1282.

8
In Kelly, the Court neither explicitly addresses whether DeRushé precludes raising a claim
of no notice for the first time on appeal nor explicitly holds that a claim of no notice is preserved
for appellate review, despite failing to raise the claim in the trial court. One can infer that because
the Supreme Court analyzed Kelly’s claim on the merits, it must have implicitly concluded the
issue was preserved. However, with no analysis explaining why the holdings in Ferrier and
DeRushé would not apply to a claim of lack of notice, we cannot reconcile the holding of Kelly
with more recent precedent.
Both the Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly cited Kelly for the proposition that
a petitioner may assert for the first time on appeal that the post-conviction claims were dismissed
without any notice. However, it appears that none of the subsequent opinions analyze why this
claim, unlike others, need not be raised in the trial court to be preserved for appellate review. In
addition to this lack of explanation, since Kelly was issued, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that arguments not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time on appeal. State v.
Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217, 221, 443 P.3d 231, 235 (2019). This preservation requirement has also
been consistently and repeatedly applied to other civil cases. See Taylor v. Taylor, 169 Idaho 806,
813, 504 P.3d 342, 349 (2022) (holding Court will not address substantive issues raised for first
time on appeal); Gordon v. Hedrick, 159 Idaho 604, 612, 364 P.3d 951, 959 (2015) (holding Court
will not address constitutional claims raised for first time on appeal); Needs v. Hebener, 118 Idaho
438, 441, 797 P.2d 146, 149 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding Court will not address claims of procedural
error for first time on appeal).
The preservation requirement applies to claims in a direct appeal of a criminal conviction,
Hoskins, 165 Idaho at 226, 443 P.3d at 240; to claims in a capital post-conviction case, Hall v.
State, 172 Idaho 334, 352, 533 P.3d 243, 261 (2023); and to other types of civil cases, some
examples of which are listed above. Given Idaho appellate courts’ almost universal holding that
issues not raised in the trial court are not preserved for purposes of appellate review, we can discern
no principled reason why the same requirement should not apply to claims of lack of notice in a
non-capital post-conviction proceeding, a proceeding to which decidedly fewer constitutional
protections apply.4

4
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel in collateral attack on conviction); State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 830, 419 P.3d 1042, 1128
(2018) (capital defendant’s constitutional due process rights did not require evidentiary hearing
9
It appears this Court first addressed the issue of dismissing a petition on grounds not
asserted by the State in Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758, 759, 653 P.2d 813, 814 (Ct. App. 1982).
The rationale for the rule was reiterated by this Court in Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859, 243 P.3d
675 (Ct. App. 2010), where this Court held:
Our Supreme Court has held that a district court cannot “dismiss a claim on
a ground not asserted by the State in its motion unless the court gives the twenty-
day notice required by Section 19-4906(b).” DeRushé, 146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d
at 1151. The notice procedure is necessary so that the applicant is afforded an
opportunity to respond and to establish a material issue of fact if one exists. Flores
v. State, 128 Idaho 476, 478, 915 P.2d 38, 40 (Ct. App. 1996). If a district court
dismisses on grounds not contained in the state’s motion, the applicant does not
have the opportunity to respond and attempt to establish a material issue of fact.
Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533, 537, 82 P.3d 445, 449 (2003) [abrogated on other
grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889, 265 P.3d
502 (2011)].
Baxter, 149 Idaho at 865, 243 P.3d at 681 (emphasis added). However, the last sentence of the
above quotation is not a correct statement of the law. It is not correct because a petitioner does
have an opportunity to respond to the lack of twenty-days’ notice, and/or a lack of explanation of
the bases of dismissal, and to attempt to establish a material issue of fact both before and after a
final judgment is entered. For example, as noted in Kelly, a petitioner could file an I.R.C.P. 11.2(b)
motion to reconsider the summary dismissal order before the dismissal becomes final. In an
I.R.C.P. 11.2(b) motion, the petitioner could bring to the district court’s attention that the petition
was summarily dismissed without the twenty-days’ notice to respond, seek clarification of the
bases of dismissal, or provide additional factual support and note the dismissal is improper in light
of the additional evidentiary support for the claim(s). In an I.R.C.P. 11.2(b) motion, the Supreme
Court has explained:
“[w]hen considering a motion [to reconsider], the trial court should take into
account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the correctness
of the interlocutory order.” Johnson v. N. Idaho Coll., 153 Idaho 58, 62, 278 P.3d
928, 932 (2012) (quoting Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of N. Idaho,
118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)). However, I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B)
“does not expressly contain a new evidence requirement.” Id. This Court has
explained that “[a] motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the court--
when new law is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are applied

and no due process rights were violated by summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition);
Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 402, 973 P.2d 749, 754 (Ct. App. 1999) (holding procedural
due process not violated by limitation of discovery in post-conviction proceeding).
10
to previously presented law, or any combination thereof--to reconsider the
correctness of an interlocutory order.” Id.
Int'l Real Est. Sols., Inc. v. Arave, 157 Idaho 816, 819, 340 P.3d 465, 468 (2014). Once a final
judgment is entered, an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(1) motion permits a district court to grant relief from a
judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, which provides an
opportunity for a petitioner to claim he was surprised by the district court summarily dismissing a
petition for post-conviction relief without providing the twenty-days’ notice of dismissal, the
reasons for the dismissal, or both. Thus, there are procedural rules that provide a mechanism for
a petitioner to address in the district court a claim for which he was not given notice of dismissal
and an opportunity to address any deficiencies in his petition for post-conviction relief both before
and after a final judgment is issued. In light of the line of cases regarding preservation, we can see
no reason to excuse a petitioner from raising a claim in the trial court that he was not provided
twenty-days’ notice and the reasons for the dismissal to preserve a claim of no notice of the
dismissal of his petition for appellate review.
Requiring the lack of notice issue be raised in the trial court provides the necessary context
and record for this Court to review a claim on appeal. It further clarifies, for example, whether the
district court dismissed the petition on the grounds set forth by the State in a motion for summary
dismissal, or on grounds that rested, in part, on grounds set forth by the State, or its own grounds
distinct from those grounds set forth by the State’s motion. This process places the burden on the
parties, rather than this Court, to identify and clarify the issues that will properly be before the
appellate court. As discussed in State v. Islas, 165 Idaho 260, 443 P.3d 274 (Ct. App. 2019):
There are a variety of reasons the preservation doctrine exists. “First, preservation
requirements serve the division of labor between trial courts and appellate courts,
whereby trial courts find facts and appellate courts focus on law.” John F. Muller,
The Law of Issues, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1325, 1332 (2014). Second,
“preservation requirements limit the costs of litigation, both for parties and for
courts. Litigation, as the Supreme Court has stated, is a ‘winnowing process,’ and
preservation rules are ‘part of the machinery by which courts narrow what remains
to be decided.’” Id. (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 487 n.6
(2008) (quoting Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 531 (1st Cir. 1993))).
“Third, preservation requirements help ensure that courts are exposed to the
strongest possible arguments as they craft decisions applicable beyond the parties
to the dispute.” John F. Muller, The Law of Issues, 49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1325
at 1332-33. Finally, preservation defines the bounds of judicial power; courts may
not speak the law when they have no authority to do so. Id. at 1355-56.
Islas, 165 Idaho at 265-66, 443 P.3d at 279-80.

11
Thus, we conclude post-conviction claims regarding lack of notice as to either the twenty
days or the substantive reasons that form the bases of the dismissal by the district court must be
raised in the district court in order to be preserved for appellate review. Similarly, post-conviction
claims regarding lack of notice as to the substantive reasons that form the bases of the dismissal
by the State must be raised in the district court in order to be preserved for appellate review. To
the extent prior opinions of this Court hold otherwise, we disavow those opinions on that issue.
Because Best did not raise the issue of no notice in the district court, it is not preserved for appeal.
However, even if we addressed Best’s claim, it fails. The Idaho Supreme Court has held
that when a district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition relying, in part, on the
same grounds presented by the State in its motion for summary dismissal, the notice requirement
has been met. See Kelly, 149 Idaho at 523, 236 P.3d at 1277. Kelly argued the district court erred
in dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief because the State’s motion for summary
dismissal contained no notice of the grounds on which his claims were dismissed, and the district
court dismissed several of his claims on grounds entirely different than the grounds argued by the
State. The State’s motion sought dismissal on all claims on the ground that Kelly had “no
evidentiary basis to support his claims.” Id. at 522, 236 P.3d at 1282. The Supreme Court held
that although the district court considered Kelly’s petition under several grounds not raised by the
State, the district court’s holding that “Kelly’s petition for post-conviction relief fails because his
affidavits do not contain admissible facts to support his allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel” and its statement that “Kelly failed to submit admissible facts in support of” his claim,
were holdings based, in part, on the grounds argued by the State and, thus, Kelly was not entitled
to any additional notice of dismissal Id. at 523-24, 236 P.3d at 1283-84.
In this case, Best was not entitled to the twenty-day notice provided in I.C. § 19-4906 for
two reasons. First, as we held above, Best was provided sufficient notice of dismissal based on
the State’s motion for summary dismissal. On appeal, Best concedes that because he agreed to
have the motion for summary disposition decided without submitting any further evidence or
holding oral argument, he forfeited his right to respond to the claims addressed by the State in its
motion for summary disposition. Best argues, however, that the stipulation did not forfeit his right
to respond to any claims that were not addressed by the State. Best’s argument is without merit
because the State’s notice addressed all the claims in Best’s petition. Therefore, Best forfeited the
right to respond to any of the claims in his petition and, thus, was not entitled to additional notice.

12
Second, the district court’s summary dismissal did not amount to a sua sponte dismissal
that would trigger the twenty-day notice requirement of I.C. § 19-4906(b) because the district court
dismissed the petition, in part, on grounds alleged by the State. The State’s basis for dismissing
the petition was on the “general basis that in light of the pleadings, answers, admissions and the
record of the underlying criminal case, the Petition fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”
The State’s memorandum noted generally that summary judgment was appropriate “if the
Petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facia [sic] case as to each essential element
of the claims or if the Petitioner’s allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law.” The State
addressed individually Best’s claims two, three, and four of ineffective assistance of counsel,
identifying the deficiencies with each claim and pointing to the affidavit of trial counsel, the record
in the underlying case, or both in support of its argument. The district court dismissed the trial
error claims because, as a matter of law, the claims could not be raised in a petition for post-
conviction relief. The district court found Best’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were
“clearly disproven by the record in the criminal action or are unsupported by admissible evidence.”
Thus, as to the trial error claims, the district court relied on some of the State’s
arguments--that Best was not entitled to relief as a matter of law. As to Best’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, the district court dismissed the claims on the same grounds as alleged
by the State: the claims were disproven by the record or were unsupported by admissible evidence.
Thus, the district court relied, at least in part, on the grounds raised by the State in its decision to
summarily dismiss Best’s petition. Consequently, the district court’s dismissal was not a sua
sponte dismissal for which Best was entitled to an additional twenty-days’ notice set forth in I.C.
§ 19-4906(b).
IV.
CONCLUSION
Because the State’s motion for summary disposition and its memorandum in support
identified the bases for summarily dismissing all the claims in Best’s petition for post-conviction
relief, Best was not entitled to additional notice. Best failed to preserve his argument that he was
deprived of the notice set forth in I.C. § 19-4906(b) because he did not raise that claim in the
district court. Additionally, because Best stipulated to have the motion decided without further
evidence or a hearing, the district court was not required to give Best twenty-days’ notice. Even
if Best was entitled to additional notice, the district court did not sua sponte dismiss any of Best’s

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claims. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment and order dismissing Best’s petition for
post-conviction relief.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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