State v. Spencer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49966

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: June 6, 2024
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
WALTER H. SPENCER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Elmore County. Hon. Theodore Fleming, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Mark W. Olson, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Walter H. Spencer appeals from his judgment of conviction by a jury of one count of sexual
abuse of a vulnerable adult and one count of possession of a firearm by a felon. Spencer contends
there is insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict on the sexual abuse charge. Spencer
also argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. For the
following reasons, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Police executed a search warrant on Spencer’s motor home. Spencer, a sixty-year-old man,
resided in the motor home with L.R., an autistic and intellectually disabled twenty-five-year-old
woman whom Spencer referred to as his stepdaughter. Spencer answered the door and was led to
a nearby patrol car by Deputy Griffin. As Deputy Griffin was doing that, two other officers, a

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male and a female, entered the home and found L.R. sleeping naked in the only bed in the trailer.
L.R. panicked at the sight of the officers, began screaming, and attempted to tase one of the
officers. L.R. was subdued, placed in flex cuffs, and placed in the passenger seat of the motor
home. While the female officer spoke with L.R., the other officers looked around the motor home.
Officers observed that the bedroom where L.R. was found was covered in balloon-themed
wall covering with posters of cartoon characters such as Minnie Mouse, Daisy Duck, and
Strawberry Shortcake hanging on the wall. The trailer also contained a variety of toys and
activities designed for young children including plastic tea sets, baby dolls, mega blocks, coloring
books, and sippy cups. Officers found a large rifle pellet gun and a small caliber pistol near the
driver’s seat. During the search of the motor home, officers also found a tablet that contained
videos of L.R. dancing naked. Spencer confirmed the tablet was his.
Thereafter, Spencer was interviewed by officers. During that interview, Spencer explained
he dated L.R.’s mother for approximately six years, beginning when L.R. was approximately eight
years old. After the relationship ended, he became the primary caretaker of L.R. Spencer was
acting as L.R.’s guardian and takes care of L.R. by providing shelter, doing the shopping, cleaning,
taking out the trash, and other chores that L.R. doesn’t like to do or is unable to do. L.R.’s
biological mother granted temporary custody to Spencer when they separated, and Spencer is the
legal payee for the social security income L.R. receives due to her disabilities. Spencer began a
sexual relationship with L.R. when she was nineteen years old. Spencer admitted they had plans
to marry and had been trying to conceive a child. Spencer stated he had sexual intercourse with
L.R. two days prior. Spencer admitted he owned the firearms that were found and indicated they
were passed down through the family. The officers arrested Spencer.
After Spencer was arrested, L.R. was evaluated by the Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare (Department) to determine the possible need for commitment to the State of Idaho under
the Developmental Disabilities Act § 66-406. The report indicated L.R. had been diagnosed with
autism at a young age. The evaluation committee observed that L.R.’s “demeanor and mental
capacity was conducive to a seven- or eight-year-old child.” For example, L.R. indicated one of
her favorite activities is to watch Strawberry Shortcake movies and reads books intended for young
children. L.R. also stated Spencer cooks, cleans, and does laundry for her. The evaluation
committee found that L.R. is “extremely gullible/vulnerable and easily taken advantage of, she is
unable to manage her own financial resources, consent for medical care, and cannot independently

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meet essential requirements for her health and safety.” L.R. was civilly committed to the
Department.
The State charged Spencer with felony sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult, Idaho Code
§ 18-1505B(a), and felony unlawful possession of a firearm, I.C. § 18-3316. A jury trial was held,
and Spencer was convicted of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult and unlawful possession of a
firearm. Spencer was sentenced to a unified term of twenty years, with a minimum period of
incarceration of ten years, for the crime of sex abuse of a vulnerable adult, and a determinate
sentence of one year for the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm to be served consecutively.
Spencer timely appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A finding of guilt
will not be overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier
of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 1099,
1101 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 104, 822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct. App. 1991).
We will not substitute our view for that of the trier of fact as to the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 684, 701 P.2d 303,
304 (Ct. App. 1985). Moreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104, 822
P.2d at 1001.
When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Spencer contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support a
guilty verdict because the State failed to prove L.R. was a vulnerable adult under I.C. § 18-1505.

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Spencer argues this is because the State did not prove that L.R.’s mental deficits rendered her
incapable of consenting to sexual contact and an individual’s developmental disability does not
directly correlate to an inability to understand or consent to sexual contact. Spencer further argues
L.R. understood and enjoyed sex and consented to, and initiated, sexual relations with Spencer.
The State contends the definitions under I.C. § 18-1505 describe individuals who cannot protect
themselves from exploitation due to mental impairment and are therefore legally incapable of
giving valid consent. The State argues that because L.R. is legally incapable of giving consent and
because consent is not an element of the offense, it was not required to prove L.R. was not able to
consent to sexual activity.
Spencer also contends the district court abused its discretion in imposing an excessive
sentence because it did not exercise reason in reaching its conclusion. The State submits that the
district court properly considered the sentencing factors, and Spencer failed to demonstrate that
reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate.
A. L.R. Is a Vulnerable Adult Under I.C. § 18-1505B
Spencer argues L.R. is not a vulnerable adult because L.R. was capable of communicating
and implementing decisions regarding her person. According to Spencer, because L.R. was not a
vulnerable adult pursuant to I.C. § 18-1505B, she could legally consent to engage in consensual
sex. The State maintains L.R. is a vulnerable adult due to her intellectual deficits and autism and,
as a result, is legally incapable of giving consent. The State argues sufficient evidence was
presented to support the conclusion that L.R. is a vulnerable adult, and a rational juror could reach
the same conclusion based on their own observation of L.R. during the trial and their own
assessment of the testimony given by L.R. and the other witnesses.
Idaho Code § 18-1505B makes it “a felony for any person, with the intent of arousing,
appealing to or gratifying the lust, passion or sexual desires” of themselves, the victim, or a third
party, to “[c]ommit any lewd or lascivious act or acts” upon a vulnerable adult. A vulnerable adult
is defined as:
a person eighteen (18) years of age or older who is unable to protect himself from
abuse, neglect or exploitation due to physical or mental impairment which affects
the person’s judgment or behavior to the extent that he lacks sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions
regarding his person, funds, property or resources.
I.C. § 18-1505(4)(e).

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It is undisputed that L.R. is developmentally disabled with a measured IQ of fifty-five and
was diagnosed with autism when she was a child. Based on Spencer’s arrest and L.R.’s apparent
inability to care for herself, the Department evaluation committee was asked to perform an
emergency evaluation of L.R. to determine if she should be civilly committed, as she lacked other
viable care alternatives following the arrest of Spencer. The report created by the Department
committee during the emergency evaluation indicates L.R. was incapable of taking care of herself
and adequately providing for her own health and safety. Specifically, the committee found L.R.
to be “extremely gullible/vulnerable and easily taken advantage of” and demonstrated the
demeanor and mental capacity consistent with a seven- or eight-year-old child. The committee
was in the best position to evaluate L.R. because of their professional credentials and the temporal
proximity to the events. The report was admitted as an exhibit for jury consideration.
L.R.’s testimony was consistent with the conclusion reached in the evaluation. During her
testimony, L.R. testified she likes to “watch Strawberry Shortcake and Care Bears and My Little
Pony and Trolls, and [she] like[s] Peppa Pig too and Dora the Explorer and Tinker Bell.” L.R.
testified that she does not know how to handle money, she does not know how her rent is paid, she
struggles to use a debit card, and she did not understand why she was in court or what the jury
was. The State asked L.R., “Do you know what sex is?” and she answered, “No.” Later in her
testimony, she described the question as “confusing” and was concerned she would be arrested or
sued by the court for answering the question. L.R. then stated it embarrassed her to talk about sex.
L.R. also stated she knows how to cook orange chicken and vegetables, brushes her own hair, and
does laundry, although sometimes she needs help.
Spencer argues L.R.’s testimony showed that she was able to take care of herself because
she testified that she cooks, does laundry, and takes care of her hygiene. Spencer contends he was
not exploiting L.R. because they had plans to marry and have a child together. Spencer further
points to L.R.’s reaction when officers arrived at the motor home as indicative of her ability to
speak for herself and her capacity to protect her person against unwanted intrusions as she
repeatedly told the officers not to touch her and grabbed a stun gun.
Even if we considered the testimony to be conflicting, “It is the jury’s function to assess
the demeanor of the witnesses and make a determination of credibility. . . . This Court will not
second-guess the jury’s determination on credibility or the weight to be given to witnesses’
testimony.” State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996). Based on the testimony

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presented and the evidence admitted, there was substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier
of fact could find that L.R. met the definition of a vulnerable adult.
On appeal, Spencer argues the State did not present any evidence that L.R. lacked sufficient
understanding or capacity to make or communicate or implement decisions regarding sexual
contact with her person. We disagree, as L.R. testified she did not know what sex was or how
babies are conceived. Regardless, I.C. §§ 18-1505B and 18-1505(4)(e) did not require the State
to prove that L.R. lacked sufficient understanding regarding sexual contact. The statutory
definition of a vulnerable adult is one who is unable to protect herself from abuse or exploitation
due to impairment affecting her judgment or behavior to the extent she lacks sufficient understand
or capacity regarding decisions involving her “person, funds, property or resources.” I.C. § 18-
1505(4)(e).
The issue of consent was addressed in State v. Knutsen, 158 Idaho 199, 345 P.3d 989
(2015). There, Knutsen and the victim were patients at a psychiatric hospital. Id. at 200, 345 P.3d
at 990. Knutsen sexually assaulted the victim and was charged with, and found guilty by a jury,
of four counts of sexual abuse of a vulnerable adult pursuant to I.C. § 18-1505B. Id. at 201, 203-
04, 345 P.3d at 990, 993-94. Knutsen appealed, arguing, among other claims, that the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad because it restricted adults “from carrying out their constitutionally
guaranteed right to engage in sexual activity.” Id. at 203, 345 P.3d at 993. The district court
rejected that argument on several grounds. Relevant here, the Supreme Court reasoned that the
sexual conduct in Knutsen’s case was not:
between two adults with full and mutual consent from each other. Although the
victim was an adult, as a matter of law she was unable to consent to the sexual
conduct. Even though the word “consent” is not in the statute, it is a legislative
determination that vulnerable adults as defined in the statute are unable to consent
to the sexual conduct described in the statute.
Id. at 204, 345 P.3d at 994. The Court further held that, “In enacting Idaho Code section 18-
1505B, the legislature defined a specific group of adults who, as a matter of law, are unable to
consent to the proscribed sexual conduct.” Id. at 205, 345 P.3d 995.
In this case, the State presented ample evidence that L.R. was a vulnerable adult. Once
that was established, the State was not required to prove consent because as a matter of law, L.R.
could not consent to sexual conduct with Spencer.

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B. Spencer’s Sentence Was Within Appropriate Guidelines
Spencer contends the district court abused its discretion by failing to exercise reason when
it sentenced him to a unified term of incarceration of twenty years, with ten years determinate, for
the abuse of a vulnerable adult conviction and one year determinate for unlawful possession of a
firearm conviction, to run consecutively. Spencer contends the sentence was unduly harsh because
it was his first arrest in thirty years, he is not a threat to society, L.R. stated she did not feel like a
victim, and he loved her and wanted to marry her. Spencer suggests that in light of these factors,
he should only have received probation. The State argues the district court explained its reasoning
and considered I.C. § 19-2521, which requires a sentencing court to consider probation prior to
imposing a prison sentence. The State contends the district court appropriately determined that
Spencer was a risk to the community based on the details in the presentence investigation report
(PSI). The State argues the district court acted within its discretion and applied reason in imposing
the sentence.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). That discretion includes
the trial court’s decision regarding whether a defendant should be placed on probation. I.C. § 19-
2601(3), (4); State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 275, 278, 61 P.3d 632, 635 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Lee,
117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). Of the four prongs of the abuse of
discretion standard, only the exercise of reason is challenged on appeal. “The role of this Court,
in determining if the district court reached its decision by an exercise of reason, is to review the
process the district court engaged in to make its decision.” Palmer v. Spain, 138 Idaho 798, 801,
69 P.3d 1059, 1062 (2003). The hallmark of a discretionary decision that is not reached by an
exercise of reason is arbitrariness. See State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481, 483, 861 P.2d 51, 53 (1993).
Here, the district court explained its reasons for imposing the above sentence.
First, the district court acknowledged that its decision is guided by the factors in I.C. § 19-
2521 which encourages probation unless it would not be appropriate. The district court determined
probation would not be appropriate for several reasons: (1) probation would depreciate the
seriousness of the offense; (2) it seemed likely Spencer would continue to be in a relationship with

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L.R.; and (3) it would fail to send an appropriate deterrent message to Spencer and others. The
district court then articulated the four goals of sentencing: punishment; deterrence of Spencer and
others; rehabilitation; and protection of society, generally, and L.R., specifically.
In determining the length of the sentence, the district court explained that while it
considered the hearsay in the PSI to be reliable, the court gave unsworn statements lesser weight.
The district court did not draw any inferences from Spencer’s refusal to participate in the PSI.
More concerning to the district court was preventing Spencer from “taking advantage of [L.R.] in
the future because it’s clear to [the court] that she’ll let you,” and “it’s clear to [the court] that
you’re likely to go right back into that relationship when you’re released. You don’t feel it’s
inappropriate. You don’t express any desire to change.” The district court pointed to L.R.’s
inability to protect herself from future abuse, the jury’s finding that L.R. is a vulnerable adult, and
legislative intent that vulnerable citizens who are unable to make decisions about themselves be
legally incapable of consenting to certain activities. The district court noted this type of crime
goes “unreported for long periods of time because the vulnerable person doesn’t realize that they
are being exploited or abused because they’re vulnerable” and the sentence needed to serve as a
deterrent. The district court also discussed that some of Spencer’s comments “indicate to [the
court] that you are one of those people who puts lesser weight on following society’s rules than
perhaps the norm.” The district court considered the statements of Spencer’s son, his ex-wife, and
the letter of support. In announcing the sentence the district court stated,
Weighing all those things, I’m left with an abiding belief that you’re likely
to go back into this relationship as soon as you can if you think you’re not going to
get caught, and I need to change that attitude, and I need to dissuade you from
making that decision when you get the opportunity to [in] the future.
In regard to the unlawful possession of a firearm, Spencer’s prior felony conviction resulted
in his prohibition from possessing a firearm. The district court acknowledged it was a per se
violation, and the manner (or lack thereof) of securing the firearms would not be considered. The
district court reminded Spencer that he was aware he was not supposed to possess a firearm and
imposed a one-year determinate sentence in order to deter future behavior.
The district court explicitly laid out the reasons for the length of the sentence imposed and
why probation would be inappropriate. The record in this case shows that the district court
properly considered the information before it and determined that probation was not appropriate.

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Spencer has not shown that the district court failed to exercise reason or consider Spencer’s
situation.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Sufficient evidence was presented to support the guilty verdict by the jury. The district
court exercised reason in imposing sentence. We affirm the judgment of conviction and sentences.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge Pro Tem MELANSON, CONCUR.

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