Murphy v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 50374

ERIN ANTHONY MURPHY, )
) Filed: June 14, 2024
Petitioner-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
STATE OF IDAHO, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Patrick J. Miller, District Judge.

Judgment summarily dismissing petition for post-conviction relief, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, Interim State Appellate Public Defender; Elizabeth A. Allred,
Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Justin R. Porter, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Erin Anthony Murphy appeals from a judgment summarily dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2018, Murphy pled guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a child. This Court affirmed
Murphy’s judgment of conviction, his sentence, and an order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion in an
unpublished opinion. See State v. Murphy, Docket No. 46806 (Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2020). In 2021,
Murphy filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief and accompanying

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affidavit/memorandum.1 The State answered and moved for summary dismissal of the petition.
In its brief in support of the motion for summary dismissal, the State indicated that Murphy’s
petition appeared to make four claims upon which he sought relief. Murphy filed an objection to
the motion for summary dismissal and addressed the same four claims identified by the State in
his supporting brief. The district court granted the State’s motion for summary dismissal, finding
no genuine issue of material fact. Murphy appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from an order of summary dismissal, we apply the same standards utilized by
the trial courts and examine whether the petitioner’s admissible evidence asserts facts which, if
true, would entitle the petitioner to relief. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929
(2010); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Over questions
of law, we exercise free review. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069
(2009); Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 370, 33 P.3d 841, 844 (Ct. App. 2001).
III.
ANALYSIS
Murphy contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for
post-conviction relief without addressing one of his claims. The State asserts that Murphy’s
argument is not preserved for appeal. The State further asserts that, even if preserved, the argument
fails on the merits because it was not specifically set forth as a ground for relief in Murphy’s
petition as required by I.C. § 19-4903. Finally, the State asserts that, even if preserved and properly
raised, Murphy has failed to show reversible error because he waived the claim below. We hold
that Murphy has failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his post-conviction petition for
three alternative reasons: (1) the claim Murphy contends was improperly dismissed was not
properly pled; (2) Murphy invited any error in the dismissal of the unpled claim by acquiescing in
the construction of the claims raised in his petition and conceding there was no factual basis for

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Murphy was subsequently appointed counsel, but no amended petition for post-conviction
relief was filed. Murphy’s petition included an “affidavit” which incorporated a memorandum.

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his unpled claim; and (3) Murphy’s arguments regarding the improper dismissal of his unpled
claim are not preserved.
A petition for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action.
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 56, 106 P.3d 376, 382 (2004). A petition must contain much more
than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under
I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1). A petition for post-conviction relief must “specifically set forth the grounds upon
which the application is based.” I.C. §19-4903. The petition must also present or be accompanied
by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the petition will be subject to dismissal. Wolf
v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011). When considering summary
dismissal, the district court must construe disputed facts in the petitioner’s favor, but the court is
not required to accept either the petitioner’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by
admissible evidence, or the petitioner’s conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647,
873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372
(Ct. App. 1986).
The district court identified the following four claims in Murphy’s petition: (1) the
presentence investigation (PSI) report was tainted and incomplete because Muphy’s trial counsel
did not inform Murphy that he could remain silent in the mandatory psychosexual evaluation;
(2) the PSI report was further tainted and incomplete because Murphy’s trial counsel did not
request that an MRI scan and neuropsychological examination be conducted and included; (3) the
State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its sentencing argument; and (4) Murphy did not
plead guilty voluntarily. After analyzing those claims, the district court found no issue of material
fact existed and granted the motion for summary dismissal. Murphy does not argue that summary
dismissal of these four claims was improper but, instead, contends that the district court failed to
consider his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor’s
overreaching statements. Murphy argues that, because it was the State that characterized his
petition as only containing four claims in its motion for summary disposition and the district court
only addressed those four claims in its order for summary dismissal, he did not have the requisite
notice and the remaining claim was improperly dismissed.
Murphy’s allegation regarding trial counsel’s failure to object to the prosecutor’s
overreaching statements is only asserted in conclusory fashion within a section of his

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affidavit/memorandum discussing prosecutorial misconduct. The allegation did not appear in the
section of Murphy’s petition which provided “all the grounds” on which the petition for
post-conviction relief was based nor did it appear in the section designated for ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. A review of those sections of the petition and the accompanying
headings in the affidavit support the district court’s finding that Murphy only alleged four claims
for relief. Thus, Murphy did not properly raise the other ineffective assistance of trial counsel
allegation as its own independent claim.
Even if Murphy’s petition could be construed as raising such a claim, Murphy abandoned
any such claim in district court by acquiescing in both the State’s and district court’s recitation of
the claims raised and by expressly conceding there was no basis for a claim based on prosecutorial
misconduct at sentencing. The doctrine of invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an
error when that party’s conduct induces the commission of the error. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho
816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657 (Ct. App. 1993). The purpose of the doctrine is to prevent a party
who caused or played an important role in prompting the trial court to take action from later
challenging that decision on appeal. State v. Barr, 166 Idaho 783, 786, 463 P.3d 1286, 1289
(2020). In short, invited errors are not reversible. State v. Gittins, 129 Idaho 54, 58, 921 P.2d 754,
758 (Ct. App. 1996).
Finally, Murphy’s complaint about the district court’s failure to address his unpled
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is not preserved because he is raising the argument for the
first time on appeal. If Murphy believed that the district court misconstrued the claims raised in
his petition, the proper forum to make that argument in the first instance was to the district court.
See Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 522 n.1, 236 P.3d 1277, 1282 n.1 (2010). The Supreme Court
has repeatedly held that arguments not raised in the trial court may not be raised for the first time
on appeal. Hall v. State, 172 Idaho 334, 352, 533 P.3d 243, 261 (2023); State v. Hoskins, 165
Idaho 217, 221, 443 P.3d 231, 235 (2019). It is disingenuous to argue, for the first time on appeal,
that the district court failed to address an alleged claim, particularly when the record of the trial
court proceedings reflect agreement with the district court’s recitation of the claims. Murphy has
failed to show error in the district court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction
relief.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
Murphy has failed to demonstrate error in the district court’s dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief. Accordingly, the judgment summarily dismissing Murphy’s petition for
post-conviction relief is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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