State v. Hamilton

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49533

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: May 15, 2023
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
DANIELLE HAMILTON, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon
County. Hon. Thomas W. Whitney, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for attempted strangulation, domestic battery with
traumatic injury in the presence of a child, and battery, affirmed.

Bond Black & Nightengale; J.W. Bond, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; John C. McKinney, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

BRAILSFORD, Judge
Danielle Hamilton appeals from her conviction for attempted strangulation, domestic
battery with traumatic injury in the presence of a child, and misdemeanor battery. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
After Hamilton had an altercation with her husband, the State charged her with attempted
strangulation and domestic battery with traumatic injury in the presence of a child. Additionally,
the State charged Hamilton with misdemeanor battery for acts she committed against her neighbor.
Hamilton pled not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial.
On July 30, 2021, which was a few days before trial, the prosecutor and Hamilton’s defense
counsel signed a “Stipulation for Appearance of Limited License Intern for Purposes of Assisting
with Trial.” The stipulation was filed with the district court that same day. The stipulation

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specifically identified a limited-licensed intern (“licensed intern”) working for the State at that
time and provided that the prosecutor and defense counsel both agreed the licensed intern could
assist in the trial against Hamilton under Idaho Bar Commission Rule 226.
On August 2, the district court held a conference, the minutes of which reflect that
Hamilton waived her right to a jury trial; the prosecutor informed the court he and the licensed
intern would represent the State at trial; and defense counsel had stipulated to the licensed intern’s
appearance at trial. The following day, the licensed intern appeared at trial on behalf of the State,
presented the State’s opening statement, and conducted the direct examination of two witnesses.
At the beginning of the second day of trial, the prosecutor addressed the district court,
stating the clerk had notified him the stipulation had an incorrect heading. The court responded
the error was actually in the proposed order, explaining:
The order didn’t name [the licensed intern], and it also didn’t have a header on it
indicating who drafted it. So it’s just the order that needs to be resubmitted. You
don’t have to do the stipulation over again. Just put a header on the order and name
[the licensed intern], and we’re good to go.
....
. . . And when I sign it, I’ll just sign it nunc pro tunc to the first day of trial.
So we’re good.
Hamilton’s defense counsel did not object to or otherwise comment on the court proceeding in this
manner. Later that day, the court signed an order granting the licensed intern leave to appear at
trial and dated it “nunc pro tunc to 08/02/2121.” Hamilton’s defense counsel did not object to this
order’s entry.
At the conclusion of the two-day trial, after seven witnesses testified, the district court
found Hamilton guilty on all three counts. Hamilton timely appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS
Hamilton acknowledges Rule 226 of the Idaho Bar Commission Rules provides a legal
intern may “[p]articipate in proceedings before a district court, without the presence of the
supervising attorney, if the proceedings are based on a stipulation between the parties.” Hamilton
contends, however, that the State violated this rule. Specifically, she asserts “there was not a valid
stipulation and order from the parties at the time [the licensed intern] prosecuted Hamilton,”
describing the proposed order as “rife with egregious errors” and “the result of [the State’s]
egregious negligence.” She argues that “the failure to submit a stipulation and order which at a

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minimum properly identified [the licensed intern] as a limited license attorney, prior to him
engaging in the prosecution, must result in a reversal of the resulting conviction.”
As an initial matter, we note Hamilton’s argument that the State failed to submit a
stipulation properly identifying the licensed intern misrepresents the record. The record shows
that on July 30--a few days before trial commenced--the parties signed a stipulation which
specifically identified the licensed intern by name, included the parties’ agreement to his
participation in the trial, and was filed with the district court. Neither the court nor Hamilton
identified any errors or anomalies in this stipulation. Accordingly, Hamilton’s assertion that the
stipulation was not “valid” lacks merit.
Further, Rule 226 only requires a stipulation between the parties; it does not require a court
order. Hamilton does not cite any authority to the contrary or otherwise argue a licensed intern’s
limited practice under Rule 226 requires a court order or other approval. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) (ruling party waives appellate issue if either authority or
argument is lacking). Because Rule 226 provided for the licensed intern’s participation in the trial,
Hamilton’s assertion that she was prosecuted “by a person who was not legally entitled to engage
in the prosecution or appear before the [district court]” is without merit.
Because the licensed intern lawfully participated in the trial, we need not consider
Hamilton’s argument that this Court should adopt a per se rule invaliding her conviction because
it “result[ed] from prosecution by a person who was not legally entitled to engage in the
prosecution or appear before [the district court].” Regardless, the case on which Hamilton relies
in support of this argument, People v. Dunson, 737 N.E.2d 699 (Ill. Ct. App. 2000), is
distinguishable. In that case, Dunson was convicted following a trial in which an individual who
was not licensed to practice law represented the State. Id. at 700. Later, Dunson moved to vacate
the convictions, arguing “the prosecution of defendant by a person not licensed to practice law
contravened Illinois law and denied defendant due process of law.” Id. The trial court vacated
Dunson’s convictions and granted him a new trial. Id. at 701.
On appeal, the Illinois appellate court affirmed the district court’s decision. Id. at 706. In
doing so, the court concluded it was “unnecessary to determine whether a due process violation
occurred in the instant case.” Id. Rather, it held that an unlicensed prosecuting assistant’s
participation in the trial required that “the trial be deemed null and void ab initio and that the

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resulting final judgment [was] also void.” Id. Unlike Dunson, however, the licensed intern in this
case lawfully participated in Hamilton’s trial under Rule 226.
Finally, acknowledging she failed to object to either the licensed intern’s participation in
the trial, the district court’s manner of proceeding without an order, or the nunc pro tunc order,
Hamilton argues the participation of “an unlicensed prosecutor was fundamental or structural
error.”1 Hamilton, however, makes no arguments regarding either why a licensed intern’s
participation in trial to which she expressly consented was structural error or fulfilled the elements
of the fundamental error doctrine. See State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133
(2019) (requiring defendant to show violation of unwaived constitutional right and clear and
obvious error affecting substantial rights to establish fundamental error). Rather, Hamilton
generally argues the State violated her due process rights and “numerous provisions of Idaho Law,
the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Bar’s Rule permitting the practice of Limited License
attorneys, and public policy.” This general argument fails to establish either a structural or a
fundamental error.
III.
CONCLUSION
Hamilton fails to show the licensed intern’s participation in the trial was error or otherwise
violated her rights. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction.
Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY CONCUR.

1
Although the State does not argue Hamilton invited the purported error about which she
complains, the invited error doctrine precludes her from challenging the licensed intern’s
participation in her trial. The doctrine applies to estop a party from asserting an error when her
own conduct induces the alleged error. State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816, 819, 864 P.2d 654, 657
(Ct. App. 1993). One may not complain about an error in which one has consented or acquiesced.
State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985); State v. Lee, 131 Idaho 600, 605,
961 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1998). In this case, Hamilton consented by written stipulation to
the licensed intern’s participation in the trial.

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