State v. Sanchez, Jr.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 49235

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: April 14, 2023
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
HENRY SANCHEZ, JR., ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Respondent. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Jerome
County. Hon. Rosemary Emory, District Judge.

Order granting suppression motion, reversed and case remanded.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for appellant.

Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

BRAILSFORD, Judge
The State appeals from the district court’s order granting Henry Sanchez, Jr.’s motion to
suppress. We reverse and remand.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The parties do not dispute the district court’s factual findings in its decision granting
Sanchez’s suppression motion. Those facts show that in January 2021, Sergeant Wethern assisted
in executing a search warrant for stolen items on a property in Jerome, which he described as “the
main residence, a camper to the east, a camper to the west, and several outbuildings.” Sergeant
Wethern secured the western camper by removing its occupants, including locating Sanchez in the
camper and detaining him. While securing the camper, Sergeant Wethern smelled the odor of
“burnt marijuana,” but he did not search the camper.

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Sergeant Wethern then arrested all the western camper’s occupants, including Sanchez, for
frequenting a place where controlled substances are known to be located. Idaho Code § 37-
2732(d). Sanchez was taken to jail where he was searched and methamphetamine was found on
his person. After Sergeant Wethern secured the western camper, law enforcement obtained a
second warrant to search the property for narcotics based on the marijuana odor detected in the
camper and on narcotics “observed by other teams that had searched the main residence.”
The State charged Sanchez with possession of methamphetamine, marijuana, and
paraphernalia. Sanchez moved to suppress the methamphetamine found on his person at the jail
following his arrest for frequenting a place where controlled substances are known to be located.1
In support, Sanchez argued “an unreasonable search and seizure” occurred because “there was no
cause to stop, detain or arrest” him.
At the suppression hearing, the State presented Sergeant Wethern’s testimony. During his
direct examination, the prosecutor inquired about the second search warrant; Sanchez’s counsel
objected to the relevance of that warrant; and the district court sustained the objection, ruling the
second warrant was irrelevant. Following this exchange, the prosecutor asked Sergeant Wethern
no further questions.
After the suppression hearing, the parties briefed the motion. Sanchez asserted that
probable cause did not support his arrest for frequenting and that the inevitable discovery doctrine
was inapplicable because “the second search warrant was not issued until after [he] had been
arrested, transported to the Jerome County Jail, and methamphetamine was presumptively found
upon his person.” The State responded that probable cause supported Sanchez’s arrest, but if not,
that the district court should reconsider its ruling that the inevitable discovery doctrine did not
apply and should “re-open the suppression hearing for further testimony so that the [State could]
meet its burden of proof.”
In support of the State’s request to “re-open” the suppression hearing, the State outlined
the additional evidence it intended to submit at such a hearing. For example, the State asserted
that it would present evidence that while executing the second search warrant, law enforcement

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Sanchez did not identify in his suppression motion the evidence he sought to exclude.
During the suppression hearing, however, Sanchez’s counsel requested suppression of “the
methamphetamine that was found once [Sanchez] was transported to the Jerome County Jail.”
Sanchez’s counsel also stated the charges related to the second search warrant “aren’t before the
Court.”
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discovered and seized methamphetamine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and Sanchez’s driver’s
license in the western camper; after this discovery, it would have arrested Sanchez, if he had not
already been arrested; and then, it would have lawfully discovered methamphetamine on Sanchez’s
person. The district court entered a written decision granting Sanchez’s suppression motion.
Further, the court rejected the State’s request to reopen the hearing.
The State timely appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Probable Cause
The State argues the district court erroneously found Sergeant Wethern lacked probable
cause to arrest Sanchez. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides “[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A warrantless search is
presumptively unreasonable unless it falls within certain special and well-delineated exceptions to
the warrant requirement. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v.
Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 479, 988 P.2d 700, 705 (Ct. App. 1999). A search incident to a valid
arrest is among those exceptions and does not violate the Fourth Amendment proscription against
unreasonable searches. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); State v. Moore, 129
Idaho 776, 781, 932 P.2d 899, 904 (Ct. App. 1996). Pursuant to this exception, the police may
search an arrestee incident to a lawful custodial arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,
235 (1973); Moore, 129 Idaho at 781, 932 P.2d at 904. The permissible scope and purpose of a

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search incident to an arrest is not limited to the removal of weapons but includes the discovery and
seizure of evidence of crime and articles of value, which the arrestee might use to facilitate an
escape if left in his possession. Moore, 129 Idaho at 781, 932 P.2d at 904.
Evidence obtained during a search incident to a lawful arrest is generally admissible, but
evidence obtained during a search subsequent to an unlawful arrest is not. State v. Bishop, 146
Idaho 804, 816, 203 P.3d 1203, 1215 (2009). For an arrest to be considered lawful, probable cause
must exist to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Id. “Probable cause exists when the
facts and circumstances known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense
has been [or is being] committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Probable cause is the
possession of information that would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe or
entertain an honest and strong presumption that such person is guilty. State v. Islas, 165 Idaho
260, 264, 443 P.3d 274, 278 (Ct. App. 2019). In analyzing whether probable cause existed, this
Court must determine whether the facts available to the officers at the moment of the seizure
warranted a person of reasonable caution to believe that the action taken was appropriate. Id. The
facts making up a probable cause determination are viewed from an objective standpoint. Id.
In this case, Sergeant Wethern arrested Sanchez for frequenting in violation of I.C. § 37-
2732(d). That statute prohibits “any person to be present at or on premises of any place where he
knows illegal controlled substances are being manufactured or cultivated, or are being held for
distribution, transportation, delivery, administration, use, or to be given away.” This Court has
previously held in State v. Crabb, 107 Idaho 298, 303, 688 P.2d 1203, 1208 (Ct. App. 1984), that
a violation of this statute requires a showing that the arrestee had knowledge that an illegal
substance was located at the place frequented.
In Crabb, an undercover officer received a telephone call from Robert Shook, who offered
to sell the officer cocaine. Id. at 301, 688 P.3d at 1206. Shook, however, indicated he had not yet
obtained the cocaine from his source, would meet the officer at a truck stop, and would bring the
source to that meeting. Id. Following this phone call, Shook, who was under surveillance, went
to a mobile home, picked up another man, went to the truck stop, met the officer, sold him cocaine,
and was arrested. Id. The officer then obtained a search warrant for the mobile home. Id. When
officers executed the warrant, they encountered Crabb at the home and arrested him for frequenting
a place where controlled substances were known to be located. Id. at 303, 688 P.2d at 1208.

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On appeal of the denial of Crabb’s suppression motion, this Court addressed whether the
officers lawfully arrested Crabb for frequenting in violation of I.C. § 37-2732(d). Crabb, 107
Idaho at 303, 688 P.2d at 1208. The Court concluded violating this statute requires more than
simply being present at a place “where controlled substances are sold.” Id. Rather, it requires “a
person frequent a place where he knows illegal controlled substances are being held . . . .” Id. The
Court concluded that, because the officers did not have reason to suspect “Crabb knew that illegal
controlled substances were being held” at the mobile home, they unlawfully arrested him “for his
mere presence at a place suspected of containing controlled substances.” Id. Accordingly, the
Court concluded the search of Crabb’s person was not incident to a lawful arrest. Id.
In this case, the State attempts to distinguish Crabb and argues Sergeant Wethern “could
have reasonably found Sanchez was knowingly present in a place containing a controlled
substance” because Sergeant Wethern “smelled burnt marijuana inside the camper, and knew
additional drugs were on the rest of the property.” Specifically, Sergeant Wethern’s testimony
was that “there was [sic] narcotics observed by other teams that had searched the main residence.”
As the district court noted, however, the prosecutor never asked Sergeant Wethern “if he had any
information tying Sanchez to the main residence.” That Sergeant Wethern knew narcotics were
discovered in the main residence does not show Sanchez knew the main residence contained
narcotics. Absent evidence that Sanchez knew narcotics were located in the main residence, the
presence of those narcotics does not support a probable cause finding.
We disagree with the State’s argument to the contrary that “an officer can consider facts
beyond a suspect’s own knowledge in weighing the totality of the circumstances for a frequenting
arrest.” In support of this argument, the State relies on State v. Williams, 162 Idaho 56, 394 P.3d
99 (Ct. App. 2016). In that case, officers were surveilling an apartment, which they believed to be
the residence of a person subject to an arrest warrant. Id. at 59, 394 P.3d at 102. After conducting
surveillance for thirty minutes, the officers saw four individuals, including Williams, exit the
apartment and stand in front of the apartment door. Id. An officer smelled the strong odor of
marijuana emanating from the apartment and asked the apartment owner if there was marijuana
and drug paraphernalia inside the apartment, and she admitted there was. Id. Based on this
evidence, the officers arrested Williams for frequenting a place where controlled substances are
known to be located. Id. Reviewing the denial of Williams’ suppression motion, this Court

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concluded substantial evidence supported a probable cause finding to arrest Williams for
frequenting. Id. at 66, 394 at 109.
The State argues Williams “is nearly identical” to this case “on the facts” and that “a
frequenting arrest” can be “justified with just one more fact that has nothing to do with the
suspect’s personal knowledge.” We disagree. In Williams, substantial evidence supported a
probable cause finding because Williams was present in the apartment; an officer detected the odor
of marijuana emanating from the apartment; and the apartment owner admitted the presence of
marijuana in the apartment. Id. at 59, 394 P.3d at 102. From these facts, the officer could
reasonably infer Williams knew marijuana was present in the apartment where he had also been
present.
In contrast to Williams, no evidence in this case supports that Sanchez was at the main
residence where drugs were present or that Sergeant Wethern knew that drugs were located in the
western camper before arresting Sanchez for frequenting. As a result, the only fact known to
Sergeant Wethern at the time he arrested Sanchez was that Sergeant Wethern smelled the odor of
burnt marijuana in the camper. This fact alone is insufficient to support a probable cause finding.
Although an odor of burnt marijuana might indicate that, at some point in time marijuana may
have been present in the camper, it does not establish that marijuana was present in the camper
when Sanchez was or that he knew marijuana was in the camper. Accordingly, no reasonable
inference can be made that Sanchez knew marijuana was located in the camper, and the district
court did not err by concluding insufficient evidence existed to support a probable cause finding
for his arrest.
B. Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
Alternatively, the State asserts that, even if Sergeant Wethern lacked probable cause to
arrest Sanchez for frequenting a place where he knew controlled substances to be located, the
officers would have inevitably discovered methamphetamine on Sanchez’s person after the second
search warrant’s execution on the western camper. Based on this assertion, the State argues the
district court “erred by determining the second [search] warrant was irrelevant to showing the
suppressed jail-search evidence would have been inevitably discovered” and “by not reconsidering
this ruling.”
As an initial matter, the parties dispute the applicable standard of review for evaluating the
district court’s denial of the State’s request for reconsideration of its evidentiary ruling on the

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second search warrant’s relevance. Sanchez asserts the multi-tiered abuse of discretion standard
applies. Under this standard, an appellate court inquires whether the trial court: (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion;
(3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and
(4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d
149, 158 (2018). The State disagrees, cites civil case law, and argues that there is a “conflict [in
the case law] over which standard applies and that the standard is the ‘same standard of review the
[district court] used in deciding the motion for reconsideration.’”
The State, however, never identifies on appeal what that “same standard” is. Further, we
note that in the State’s brief in opposition to Sanchez’s suppression motion, the State asserted “the
decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of
the trial court” and set forth the multi-tiered analysis. Meanwhile, the State identified the issue for
reconsideration as the district court’s ruling on the relevancy of the second search warrant.
Generally, courts review questions of relevance de novo. State v. Jones, 167 Idaho 353, 358, 470
P.3d 1162, 1167 (2020); State v. Aguilar, 154 Idaho 201, 203, 296 P.3d 407, 409 (Ct. App. 2012).
Regardless of the applicable standard of review, we conclude the district court erred by
ruling the second search warrant was not relevant to the inevitable discovery doctrine’s
application. Under this doctrine, the State must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence
that law enforcement would have discovered the unlawfully obtained evidence by a lawful method.
State v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 787, 352 P.3d 506, 509 (Ct. App. 2015). Although the lawful
method of discovery does not need to be the result of a wholly independent investigation, it must
result in some action, actually taken or in the process of being taken, which would have inevitably
led to the discovery of the unlawfully obtained evidence. Id. The rule does not permit a court to
speculate on the course of action the investigation could have taken absent a constitutional
violation. State v. Maxim, 165 Idaho 901, 909, 454 P.3d 543, 551 (2019). “The question is not
what legal path the police would have inevitably taken which could have yielded the evidence.
The question is what legal path the police actually took which would have inevitably yielded the
evidence.” Id.
During the suppression hearing, Sergeant Wethern testified that he detained Sanchez while
the first search warrant was being executed; “anybody on the premises is going to be secured so
they’re not a threat while we execute the search warrant”; “normally we would detain all of them

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until the search warrant [was] complete”; a second search warrant was obtained to search for drugs;
and “normally [law enforcement] would detain people on the premises while [they] secured a
second search warrant.” Thereafter, the prosecutor inquired about the second search warrant, and
the following exchange occurred:
Q. And so was a second search warrant obtained?
A. It was.
[Defense]: Your Honor, I’m going to object. The witness has already testified
that [Sanchez] was placed under arrest prior to the second search
warrant. As the Court’s aware, it’s an objective standard, and it’s
based upon the knowledge that the officer had at the time of
[Sanchez’s] arrest. [The officer has] also testified as a result of
arrest that [Sanchez] was taken and searched in the jail, so I think
any subsequent search warrant is irrelevant.
The Court: What is the relevance?
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, there’s the doctrine of inevitable discovery that could
be applied in this circumstance, and so the procedure for the
subsequent detention and search of the property would have still
manifested the same drugs and, therefore, inevitable discovery
would have--
The Court: How does inevitable discovery apply to an arrest if he was already
arrested?
[Prosecutor]: Well, Your Honor, he would have been detained--normally would
be detained out at the premises. By being detained out there, they
would have--if they would not have arrested him for the frequenting,
he would have subsequently been arrested under the inevitable
discovery doctrine, still transported to the jail, and still found the
meth in his pocket.
The Court: Care to respond to that, [Defense Counsel]?
[Defense]: No, Your Honor. I don’t think the inevitable discovery exception
applies to this. It’s simple. I think the police report and the
testimony’s clear. [Sanchez] was arrested for frequenting based on
smell, he was transported to the jail, and that was found in his
pocket. Thereafter, a second warrant was issued, and those charges
aren’t before the Court.
The Court: Well, I agree with [Defense Counsel]. I don’t believe the inevitable
discovery doctrine applies in this case in the absence of some arrest
warrant that was already issued for [Sanchez’s] arrest for some other
crime. I don’t see how this is inevitable discovery, so I’m going to
sustain the objection.
Contrary to the district court’s statement at the suppression hearing, however, the inevitable
discovery doctrine’s application is not dependent on the issuance of “some arrest warrant that was
already issued for [Sanchez’s] arrest for some other crime.” Similarly, the doctrine’s application
does not turn on “testimony supporting probable cause for the arrest of Sanchez,” as the court
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stated in its written order denying the suppression motion. Rather, the relevant inquiry under the
inevitable discovery doctrine is “what legal path the police actually took which would have
inevitably yielded the evidence.” Maxim, 165 Idaho at 909, 454 P.3d at 551. As the prosecutor
stated, that legal path in this case was “the subsequent detention and search of the property” for
drugs under the second search warrant “which would have still manifested the same drugs.”
Proof that the officers discovered both illegal substances in the western camper and
evidence linking Sanchez to those substances is essential to any analysis of whether the officers
would have inevitably discovered the methamphetamine on Sanchez’s person. Accordingly, the
facts regarding the second search warrant--including its execution and the evidence discovered--
would tend to make more or less probable that law enforcement would have inevitably discovered
the drugs Sanchez sought to suppress. See Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 (defining relevance as
having tendency to make existence of fact more or less probable). For this reason, the district court
erred by ruling the second search warrant was irrelevant and by declining to reconsider this ruling.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred by granting Sanchez’s suppression motion and by denying the
State’s motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, we reverse the court’s order granting suppression
of the evidence discovered on Sanchez’s person at jail and denying reconsideration and remand
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Chief Judge LORELLO and Judge GRATTON CONCUR.

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