State of Idaho v. Ahmed Majed Abdulhamza

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52004

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: May 15, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
AHMED MAJED ABDULHAMZA, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Patrick J. Miller, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and aggregate unified sentence of twenty years, with a
minimum period of incarceration of seven years, for aggravated assault enhanced
by the use of a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, intimidating a
witness, and two counts of violation of a no-contact order, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kierra W. Mai, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. Kierra W. Mai argued.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kale D. Gans, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent. Kale D. Gans argued.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Ahmed Majed Abdulhamza appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated assault
enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon, unlawful possession of a firearm, witness intimidation,
and two counts of violation of a no-contact order. Abdulhamza argues the district court abused its
discretion when it increased the severity of his sentence based solely on dismissed charges and
when it imposed an excessive sentence. The State argues the district court did not sentence
Abdulhamza based solely on the dismissed charges and did not impose an excessive sentence. We
hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering the dismissed charges as it did not
sentence Abdulhamza based solely on the dismissed charges. The district court also did not impose
an excessive sentence. Abdulhamza’s judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.

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I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Abdulhamza was on parole when the facts of this case occurred. Abdulhamza and the
victim, B.M., were in a romantic relationship but had ended their relationship the previous day.
Abdulhamza, while outside of B.M.’s home, repeatedly texted B.M. requesting that she open the
door and then threatened to “bust down [the] door.” Abdulhamza eventually broke into B.M.’s
home and forced his way through her locked bedroom door. B.M. was inside the bedroom along
with her male friend, J.I., the other victim in this case. Abdulhamza hit J.I. on the side of his head
with a firearm; made J.I. empty his pockets; took a knife from J.I.; and then instructed J.I. to leave
B.M.’s home, which he did.
Abdulhamza then hit B.M. in the face, pulled her by her hair down the staircase, and told
her that he was going to kill her. Abdulhamza took B.M.’s cell phone from her and forced her into
his vehicle. Once inside the vehicle, Abdulhamza continued to hit and threaten B.M. by waiving
the knife toward her and pointing the firearm at her. Abdulhamza drove B.M. to his mother’s
house where he continued hitting B.M.; when she tried to leave, Abdulhamza blocked the door
and pushed B.M. into a closet. Abdulhamza got on top of B.M. and began to choke her. B.M.
described feeling light-headed and her hands going numb. Abdulhamza then forced B.M. to
perform oral sex on him and have vaginal sex with him. Before going to sleep, Abdulhamza
threatened B.M. that if she tried to leave while he was asleep, she better “run far” or he would find
her and kill her.
The next morning, while Abdulhamza was in the bathroom, B.M. called her mother and
used a code word the two of them had set up to signal that she needed help. When Abdulhamza
saw that B.M. had called her mother, Abdulhamza told B.M. she was not going anywhere with her
mother and was not allowed to leave his house until the visible injuries on B.M.’s face and body
had healed. Eventually, Abdulhamza allowed B.M. to leave with her mother, but only under the
condition that he go with them. After getting coffee and breakfast, B.M. and her mother dropped
Abdulhamza off at his mother’s house and told Abdulhamza they were going furniture shopping.
B.M.’s mother then took B.M. to the hospital where she eventually disclosed the sexual
assault and physical abuse. B.M. spoke to law enforcement and then underwent a forensic
examination. In the following days, Abdulhamza repeatedly contacted B.M. and asked her to talk
to his probation officer and recant her statement about the sexual assault and physical abuse. After

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failing to report to a meeting with his probation officer, Abdulhamza was arrested; he maintained
that he did not kidnap or rape B.M.
Abdulhamza was indicted by a grand jury for the following offenses: first degree
kidnapping, Idaho Code §§ 18-4501, -4502 (Count I); rape, I.C. § 18-6101 (Count II); attempted
strangulation, I.C. § 18-923 (Count III); aggravated assault, I.C. §§ 18-901(b), -905(a) (Count IV);
unlawful possession of a firearm, I.C. § 18-3316 (Count V); aggravated assault, I.C. §§ 18-901(b),
-905(a) (Count VI); two counts of intimidating, impeding, influencing, or preventing the
attendance of a witness, I.C. § 18-2604 (Counts VII and VIII); use of a firearm or deadly weapon
during the commission of a crime, I.C. § 19-2520 (Count IX); and burglary, I.C. § 18-
1401 (Count X). The charges were then consolidated with a different case in which Abdulhamza
was charged with battery on J.I., I.C. § 18-903(a) (Count XI) and two counts of violation of a
no-contact order, I.C. § 18-1920 (Counts XII and XIII). The State also filed an Information Part II
alleging Abdulhamza was a persistent violator pursuant to I.C. § 19-2514.
Abdulhamza pleaded guilty to Count V, Count VI as enhanced by Count IX, Count VII,
Count XII, and Count XIII. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the remaining charges and the persistent
violator sentencing enhancement were dismissed. The plea agreement provides that “the State
may use as aggravating factors as part of its sentencing argument all facts of all charged or
dismissed cases or counts and/or any crimes/cases not filed.” The district court sentenced
Abdulhamza to a unified term of twenty years, with a minimum period of incarceration of seven
years, for Count VI as enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon; concurrent terms of five years
indeterminate for Count V and Count VII, to also run concurrently with Count VI; and credit for
time served for Count XI and Count XII. Abdulhamza appeals.

II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellate review of sentencing decisions is based on an abuse of discretion standard. State
v. Greer, 171 Idaho 555, 558, 524 P.3d 386, 389 (2023). When a trial court’s discretionary
decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine
whether the lower court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within
the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the
specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera,
164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
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III.
ANALYSIS
Initially, we note that Abdulhamza phrases the first issue differently throughout his brief.
For example, in the issues statement section, Abdulhamza lists the first issue as: “Did the district
court abuse its discretion by explicitly considering dismissed charges to impose a harsher
sentence?” In the argument section, the issue is rephrased as: “The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Considering Dismissed Charges As The Basis To Impose A Harsher Sentence.”
However, in the related subheading, the issue is stated as: “The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Considering Dismissed Charges As The Sole Basis To Impose A Harsher Sentence.”
Then, either as another rephrasing or as an alternate iteration of the issue, Abdulhamza argues the
district court “failed to act consistently with the applicable legal standards and failed to exercise
reason when it determined that there was ‘strong proof’ that [Abdulhamza] kidnapped and raped
[B.M.]” despite those charges being dismissed. For purposes of this opinion, we will assume
Abdulhamza intended to assert the district court abused its discretion in two distinct ways: (1) by
increasing the sentence based solely on a consideration of the dismissed charges; and (2) by finding
the dismissed charges were supported by “strong proof” and therefore, could be considered as an
aggravating factor. Additionally, Abdulhamza argues that the district court abused its discretion
by failing to acknowledge “several relevant mitigating factors” when it imposed his sentence.
The State argues the district court acted within its discretion when it considered the
dismissed charges; consideration of the dismissed charges was not the sole basis of the increase in
Abdulhamza’s sentence, but rather one factor of many; and, regardless of the existence of “strong
proof” of a dismissed charge, a court can consider uncharged criminal conduct in fashioning an
appropriate sentence. The State also argues the district court acknowledged mitigating factors and
acted well within its discretion in its sentencing decision.
A. Consideration of Dismissed Charges
The differences in the way Abdulhamza phrases the issue matters. This is because as even
Abdulhamza recognizes, a sentencing court may properly conduct an inquiry broad in scope,
largely unlimited, either as to the kind of information considered or the source from which it may
come. State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1027 (Ct. App. 1991); see also
I.C. § 19-5306. This Court addressed the issue of sentencing a defendant based on elements not
before the sentencing court in State v. Granger, 170 Idaho 136, 508 P.3d 335 (Ct. App. 2022).

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There, Granger was charged with forcible rape, but the charge was reduced to statutory rape
pursuant to a plea agreement. Id. at 139-40, 508 P.3d at 338-39. The district court considered the
element of force when sentencing Granger following his guilty plea to statutory rape. Id. at 146,
508 P.3d at 345. The district court noted, “ I do believe you forced the issue, but, again, as I said,
you pled guilty to statutory rape.” Id. On appeal, Granger argued that the district court sentenced
him for an uncharged crime (forcible rape) instead of the crime he pleaded guilty to (statutory
rape) because the court “placed undue emphasis on alleged facts of forcible rape.” Id. at 145-46,
508 P.3d at 344-45. We held that during sentencing, a court may consider criminal conduct not at
issue and the district court was not required to disregard the allegation of force merely because the
amended charge did not include said element. Id. at 146, 508 P.3d at 345.
Abdulhamza argues Granger is distinguishable because “there was only one offense and
one victim, despite the charge being amended. Furthermore, the [district] court did not ‘overly
focus on that fact.’” However, as we noted in Granger, “a court may consider criminal conduct
not at issue.” Id. To the extent Abdulhamza is arguing Granger is distinguishable because the
district court in Granger did not “overly focus” on the original charge as a factor to consider in
imposing sentence, Abdulhamza’s argument fails. In this case, the dismissed charges were not the
sole factor the district court considered in fashioning an appropriate sentence; however, they were
a factor the district court considered sufficiently aggravating to increase Abdulhamza’s sentence.
Thus, it was not improper for the district court to consider the dismissed charges and
account for that consideration in the sentence imposed.
B. Dismissed Charges as the Sole Basis to Increase a Sentence
A sentencing court may, with due caution, consider the existence of a defendant’s alleged
criminal activity for which no charges have been filed, or where charges have been dismissed.
State v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 409, 411, 825 P.2d 506, 508 (Ct. App. 1992). However, it is not proper
for a sentencing court to increase the severity of a sentence solely based on conduct not before the
court and for which a defendant has already been sentenced. See State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho
228, 230, 984 P.2d 716, 718 (Ct. App. 1999). Abdulhamza argues that Findeisen is analogous to
this case because the district court here “explicitly increased [Abdulhamza’s] sentence and
‘essentially imposed sentence for offenses other than the one that was before the court.’” In
Findeisen, we held that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Findeisen because the
district court went beyond its authority and “essentially imposed sentence for offenses other than

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the one that was before the court” and for which Findeisen had already been sentenced. Id. at 229,
984 P.2d at 717. Findeisen was charged with burglary and petit theft; then, several weeks later, he
was charged in a separate but related case with kidnapping, intimidating a witness, and aggravated
battery. Id. at 228-29, 984 P.2d at 716-17. Pursuant to a plea agreement encompassing both cases,
Findeisen pleaded guilty to burglary in the first case and all three charges in the second case. Id.
Findeisen was sentenced for the kidnapping, witness intimidation, and aggravated battery charges
and was sentenced for the burglary charge later the same day. Id. However, when sentencing
Findeisen for the burglary charge, the district court specifically mentioned the facts of the
kidnapping, witness intimidation, and aggravated battery charges and the injuries to the victim.
Id. at 230, 984 P.2d at 718. We stated:
Perhaps the intensity of the trial court’s focus on the other offenses would
be appropriate if they were acts for which the defendant was not otherwise being
punished. But in this case, the defendant had already been sentenced specifically
for those offenses with a term of incarceration of fifteen years to life.
Id. We went on to note that the State focused almost exclusively on the other charges in its
argument to the district court and asked that the burglary sentence run consecutively to the
sentences in the second case. Id. We explained that: “Although the prosecutor may have been
dissatisfied with the severity of the sentences imposed by [the district court in the second case], it
is not a permissible remedy for that dissatisfaction to sentence Findeisen again for those same
offenses.” Id.
In this case, unlike in Findeisen, Abdulhamza had not already been sentenced on the
dismissed charges and was not being sentenced twice for the same offenses. Also unlike in
Findeisen, the State did not focus exclusively on the dismissed charges in arguing its sentencing
recommendation in this case. The State focused on the crimes in front of the district court,
Abdulhamza’s criminal history, and the fact that, while on parole for less than six months, he
committed new crimes, possessed a firearm, used drugs and alcohol, did not respond to his parole
officer, and lied to his parole officer. Additionally, Abdulhamza received more than twenty-two
negative write-ups during his pretrial incarceration in the county jail on this case and received
multiple violations while he was in prison serving his sentence on a previous robbery charge--the
same charge for which he was on parole. Further, the offenses committed in this case were crimes
of violence. The State then addressed the goals of sentencing and the Toohill1 factors to explain

1
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
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the reason for its requested sentence. Although the district court wanted to discuss the dismissed
conduct, the State did not engage in a discussion of the dismissed conduct but only agreed with
the district court’s statements. Moreover, the State did not overly focus on the dismissed charges
in its closing argument.
Another distinction from Findeisen is that Abdulhamza explicitly agreed as part of the plea
agreement that, “the State may use as aggravating factors as part of its sentencing argument all
facts of all charged or dismissed cases or counts and/or any crimes/cases not filed.” Thus,
Abdulhamza knew and agreed the dismissed and uncharged crimes could be argued by the State
as aggravating factors, which would likely increase his sentence. It is illogical to agree the district
court may consider an aggravating factor for purposes of sentencing but cannot, in the exercise of
its discretion, increase the sentence based on that same aggravating factor.
In deciding Abdulhamza’s sentence, the district court reviewed Abdulhamza’s criminal
history, noting it included juvenile adjudications as well as the felony robbery conviction for which
he served five years in prison and for which he was on parole when he committed the instant
crimes. The district court noted that after Abdulhamza was released on parole, he “immediately
acquires a gun and commits an admitted heinous act of pistol whipping a guy.” The district court
noted that in considering the protection of the community, Abdulhamza is “a young person with a
violent history who on parole immediately engages in criminal activity, and that’s undisputed.”
The district court also indicated it had reviewed the medical evidence, the grand jury transcript,
the police reports, and B.M.’s mother’s victim impact statement. The district court considered the
support for Abdulhamza and noted that while the support constituted some mitigation, that support
did not diminish Abdulhamza’s potential dangerousness or that he was manipulative, as evidenced
by the violation of the no-contact order. The district court then stated:
So I do have to consider the collateral circumstances. If I--to be clear, if I
were sentencing just on the crimes to which [Abdulhamza] admitted to, I--this
sentence would not be as severe. But finding that he did commit those crimes, the
admitted crimes, while on parole with a gun that he was prohibited from having a
short period of time after parole by itself demonstrates a dangerous person. The
fact that he has lots of support doesn’t to me--it mitigates it in some way.
....
So, again, to be clear, absent the collateral circumstances, my sentence
would be different. I want to make that clear should somebody want to review my
sentencing decision. But I do believe I can consider those collateral circumstances
because of the strength of proof of those.

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So then I have to get to an appropriate sentence. I am sentencing for the
crimes to which [Abdulhamza] pled guilty, and those are the--the battery--the
aggravated assault committed with a firearm, the firearm [Abdulhamza] wasn’t
entitled to have, and the violation of the no-contact order.
To make even more clear that the district court was not sentencing Abdulhamza on the
dismissed charges, the district court stated: “The sentence would be harsher if I had actual proof
of the rape. It is a strong--it’s strong proof of it, but it’s not actual conviction. But that type of
behavior combined with [Abdulhamza’s] criminal history is most concerning to the Court.”
A review of the sentencing transcript indicates the district court found several aggravating
factors warranted a harsher sentence including Abdulhamza’s criminal history, the short time
between his release to parole and the commission of the instant offenses, the dismissed conduct,
and the “heinous” aspect of the battery to which he pleaded guilty.
Abdulhamza argues that because it is an abuse of discretion for a sentencing court to
impose a sentence for offenses other than the offense before the court, “[i]t logically follows that
it is also an abuse of discretion to consider dismissed charges as the sole basis to increase the
severity of a sentence.” We disagree. There is no question that “it is entirely appropriate for the
court to consider a spectrum of evidence bearing upon the defendant’s character, including the
defendant’s history of criminal offenses other than the one for which he appears at sentencing.”
Findeisen, 133 Idaho at 229, 984 P.2d at 717. The district court explained its reason for
considering the dismissed charges and stated: “If there’s collateral information which suggests
that a person is a danger to himself or others or particularly to others, then I can consider that in
sentencing for the crimes that were pleaded to.”
The district court is correct. The first goal of sentencing to be considered by the court is
the protection of society. I.C. § 19-2521(1)(a); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707,
710 (Ct. App. 1982). To hold that a sentencing court cannot decide whether dismissed charges are
an aggravating factor that warrant an increase in the sentence imposed would mean, practically
speaking, a sentencing court cannot consider that aggravating factor or accord it any weight in
fashioning an appropriate sentence. That is not a correct statement of the law. Sentencing factors
“appropriately describes a circumstance, which may be either aggravating or mitigating in
character, that supports a specific sentence within the range authorized by the jury’s finding that
the defendant is guilty of a particular offense.” State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 932, 104 P.3d 969,
974 (2005) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).

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It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to consider Abdulhamza’s dismissed
charges as an aggravating factor when deciding what sentence to impose and whether that
aggravating factor, along with other considerations, warranted a greater sentence. Just because the
district court accorded more weight to one aggravating factor (the dismissed charges) than others
does not mean Abdulhamza was sentenced only on that factor. But even if Abdulhamza’s sentence
was increased because of a single aggravating factor (the dismissed charges), that does not
demonstrate an abuse of the district court’s sentencing discretion.
C. Strong Proof of Dismissed Charges
Abdulhamza argues that it was illogical for the district court to conclude there was “strong
proof” of the allegations of rape and kidnapping when the factual allegations had only been
presented in a grand jury proceeding and therefore were not subject to cross-examination. The
State responds that because Granger permits courts to consider alleged criminal activity for which
no charges have been filed, there is no requirement that the dismissed charges need to go through
cross-examination to be considered.
We recognize that the district court used the words “strong proof” in regard to the dismissed
charges, but the strength of proof is irrelevant because, as previously stated, sentencing courts can
consider uncharged criminal conduct and criminal conduct not at issue, either where it has been
dismissed or reduced. Barnes, 121 Idaho at 411, 825 P.2d at 508; see State v. Chavez, 174 Idaho
745, 762, 560 P.3d 488, 505 (2024) (holding that during sentencing, a court may consider prior
criminal conduct for which the defendant was tried and acquitted); see also State v. Ogden, 171
Idaho 258, 274-75, 519 P.3d 1198, 1214-15 (2022) (holding that the court did not err in sentencing
when it considered portions of the defendant’s presentence investigation report describing conduct
for which the defendant was acquitted). As set forth in State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735, 739, 932
P.2d 363, 367 (Ct. App. 1997):
In sentencing a defendant, the court may consider hearsay evidence,
evidence of previously dismissed charges against the defendant, or evidence of
charges which have not yet been proved, so long as the defendant has the
opportunity to object to, or rebut, evidence of his alleged misconduct. However, it
is error for the district court to consider such information if there is no reasonable
basis to deem it reliable, as where information is simply conjecture or speculation.
(Citations omitted.) Additionally, and as noted above, the plea agreement explicitly authorized
the district court to “use as aggravating factors as part of its sentencing argument all facts of all

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charged or dismissed cases.” Thus, regardless of the quantum of proof, Abdulhamza cannot now
complain that the district court did precisely what he agreed it could do.
Here, Abdulhamza had the opportunity to object to and rebut evidence of the alleged
misconduct and did so at the sentencing hearing. Abdulhamza submitted multiple letters of support
and had several people who appeared, but did not testify, on his behalf at the sentencing hearing.
Regarding the rape and kidnapping charges, Abdulhamza noted the charges were dismissed and
explained that “the State does not drop these kinds of cases if they have the proof.” He also
challenged the victim’s credibility, noting several people reported that B.M. said Abdulhamza did
not “do anything” to her. Abdulhamza then challenged B.M.’s version of events that included an
ongoing threat by Abdulhamza the day after the incident while B.M. was with her mother.
Because there was a reasonable basis to deem the conduct underlying the dismissed charges
reliable, it was not improper for the district court to consider it, regardless of whether the claims
had been tested through an adversarial proceeding.
D. Excessive Sentence
As stated above, Abdulhamza pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm;
aggravated assault enhanced by the use of a deadly weapon; intimidating, influencing, or
preventing the attendance of a witness; and two counts of violation of a no-contact order. In
exchange for his guilty pleas, additional charges were dismissed including an allegation that he is
a persistent violator. The district court imposed an aggregate unified sentence of twenty years,
with a minimum period of incarceration of seven years. Abdulhamza argues the district court
abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence. Specifically, Abdulhamza argues that
the district court failed to consider several relevant mitigating factors when imposing the sentence.
The specific mitigating factors Abdulhamza argues the district court failed to consider are: (1) the
trauma he experienced in his childhood; (2) his substance abuse struggles; and (3) the support of
his family and community.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984);
Toohill, 103 Idaho at 568, 650 P.2d at 710. When reviewing the length of a sentence, we consider
the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).

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Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as
the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150, 154 (Ct. App. 2020).
Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that
the district court abused its discretion.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Abdulhamza has failed to show the district court abused its discretion in considering the
dismissed charges when imposing Abdulhamza’s sentence. Abdulhamza has also failed to show
the district court imposed an excessive sentence. Therefore, Abdulhamza’s judgment of
conviction and sentence are affirmed.
Chief Judge TRIBE and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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