CourtListener 10854958•State of Idaho v. John Charles Conner
Texte intégral
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Docket No. 52100
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: October 10, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JOHN CHARLES CONNER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon
County. Hon. Gene A. Petty, District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and aggregate unified sentence of thirty years, with a
minimum period of confinement of fifteen years, for battery with intent to commit
a serious felony, second degree kidnapping, aggravated battery, and unlawful
possession of a firearm, affirmed.
Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kacey L. Jones, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
Before HUSKEY, Judge; LORELLO, Judge;
and TRIBE, Judge
________________________________________________
PER CURIAM
John Charles Conner entered Alford1 pleas to battery with the intent to commit a serious
felony--murder (I.C. § 18-911), second degree kidnapping (I.C. § 18-4503), aggravated battery
(I.C. § 18-907), and unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (I.C. § 18-3316). In
exchange for his guilty pleas, additional charges were dismissed. The district court sentenced
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See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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Conner to a unified term of twenty years, with a minimum period of confinement of fifteen years,
for battery with the intent to commit a serious felony; a concurrent unified term of twenty-five
years, with a minimum period of fifteen years, for second degree kidnapping; a concurrent
determinate term of fifteen years for aggravated battery; and a consecutive indeterminate term of
five years for unlaw possession of a firearm. Conner appeals, arguing that his sentences are
excessive.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the
length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,
726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could
reach the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150,
154 (Ct. App. 2020). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
Therefore, Conner’s judgment of conviction and sentences are affirmed.
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