IDHW v. Jane Doe (2025-28)

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 53076

In the Interest of Jane Doe I, A Child )
Under Eighteen (18) Years of Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH & WELFARE, ) Filed: December 30, 2025
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JANE DOE (2025-28), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fifth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Jennifer Bergin, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Eric D. Fredericksen, Idaho State Public Defender; Adam J. Ondo, Deputy Public
Defender, Twin Falls, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Richard W. Roberts, Deputy Attorney
General, Caldwell, for respondent.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Jane Doe (2025-28) appeals from the judgment terminating her parental rights. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the mother of the minor child in this action, who was born in 2023. Both Doe and
the child tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines at delivery, and Doe admitted
that she used methamphetamine during pregnancy. At a shelter care hearing, the magistrate court
awarded legal custody to the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare. Following an adjudicatory
hearing, the magistrate court found the child was within the Child Protective Act (CPA) and

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ordered continued foster placement. The magistrate court approved a case plan requiring Doe to
complete substance abuse treatment and testing, obtain stable housing and income, and participate
in a mental health evaluation and counseling. Although Doe completed an initial assessment
recommending outpatient treatment, she did not begin treatment or drug testing.
In February 2024, Doe was arrested in Nevada for assault with a deadly weapon and related
charges, later convicted, and incarcerated in Nevada with a projected release date more than four
years after the termination trial. The magistrate court found that, before incarceration, Doe missed
multiple visits and failed to make progress on her case plan and that, afterward, contact was limited
to telephone and video calls.
In October 2024, the Department filed a petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights.
Paternity testing excluded Doe’s husband, and no biological father was identified. Following a
termination trial, the magistrate court terminated Doe’s parental rights based on a finding of
neglect resulting from her inability to adequately address her substance abuse issues or prioritize
the child’s needs above Doe’s own, and because she had not completed her case plan.1 Doe
appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be terminated.
Id. The substantial evidence test requires a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial
court’s finding must be supported by clear and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere
preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear
and convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be
proved is highly probable or reasonably certain. Roe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057,

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The magistrate court also terminated the legal father’s and biological father’s parental
rights. The decision to terminate the fathers’ parental rights is not at issue in this appeal.

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1060 (2006). Further, the trial court’s decision must be supported by objectively supportable
grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
Doe asserts that the magistrate court erred in terminating her parental rights. The
Department responds that clear and convincing evidence exists that supports the magistrate court’s
termination decision. We hold that the magistrate court’s findings are supported by substantial
and competent evidence and affirm the termination of Doe’s parental rights.
A. Statutory Basis for Termination
A parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her
child. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Doe v. State, 137 Idaho 758, 760, 53 P.3d 341,
343 (2002). This interest is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). Implicit in the
Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act is the philosophy that, wherever possible, family
life should be strengthened and preserved. I.C. § 16-2001(2). Therefore, the requisites of due
process must be met when terminating the parent-child relationship. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 383,
386, 146 P.3d 649, 652 (2006). Due process requires that the grounds for terminating a
parent-child relationship be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Because a fundamental
liberty interest is at stake, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a court may
terminate a parent-child relationship only if that decision is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982); see also I.C. § 16-2009; Doe v. Dep’t of
Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 759, 761-62, 203 P.3d 689, 691-92 (2009); Doe, 143 Idaho at 386,
146 P.3d at 652.
Idaho Code Section 16-2005 permits a party to petition the court for termination of the
parent-child relationship when it is in the child’s best interests and any one of the following five
factors exist: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between
the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities
for a prolonged period that will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or
(e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each
statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. Doe, 144 Idaho at 842, 172 P.3d at 1117.

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Idaho Code Section 16-2002(3)(a) defines “neglect” as any conduct included in I.C.
§ 16-1602(31). Section 16-1602(31)(a) provides, in pertinent part, that a child is neglected when
the child is without proper parental care and control, or subsistence, medical or other care or control
necessary for his or her well-being because of the conduct or omission of his or her parents,
guardian, or other custodian or their neglect or refusal to provide them. Neglect also exists where
the parent has failed to comply with the court’s orders or the case plan in a CPA case and the
Department has had temporary or legal custody of the child for fifteen2 of the most recent
twenty-two months and reunification has not been accomplished by the last day of the fifteenth
month in which the child has been in the temporary or legal custody of the Department. I.C.
§ 16-2002(3)(b).
In this case, substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s finding
that Doe neglected the child. The magistrate court found that Doe never began substance abuse
treatment, failed to submit to drug testing, did not obtain housing or employment, and failed to
participate in mental health services. Although Doe completed an evaluation recommending
outpatient treatment, she made no progress before her arrest and incarceration. The magistrate
court found that Doe’s incarceration further prevented her from caring for the child or addressing
any portion of the case plan.
The magistrate court also found the Department made reasonable efforts to facilitate
reunification. Caseworkers referred Doe for treatment and testing, arranged visitation, and
explored family placements in Idaho and Nevada. Despite these efforts, Doe did not engage with
the services offered, missed approximately one-third of her scheduled visits before incarceration,
and provided no proof of program completion while incarcerated. The magistrate court further
found that Doe’s ongoing instability (frequent moves, unemployment, and untreated substance
abuse) left her unable to meet the child’s basic needs.
On appeal, Doe identifies no evidence contradicting these findings. Instead, she argues
that incarceration explains her lack of progress. However, incarceration does not preclude a
finding of neglect when a parent fails to take advantage of services before incarceration and

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At the time the Department filed the petition to terminate Doe’s parental rights, the
statutory timeframe under I.C. § 16-2002(3)(b) was fifteen out of the most recent twenty-two
months. Subsequently, the statute was amended to twelve of the most recent twenty-two months.

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remains unable to provide a safe home thereafter. See Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe
(2016-32), 161 Idaho 754, 759, 390 P.3d 1281, 1286 (2017) (holding that compliance with case
plan was possible despite the parent’s various periods of incarceration); Idaho Dep’t of Health &
Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 959, 277 P.3d 400, 406 (Ct. App. 2012) (affirming termination
where the parent failed to make progress before incarceration and remained unable to provide
stability or care). The magistrate court reasonably concluded that Doe’s circumstances, both
before and during incarceration, demonstrate continuing neglect and an inability to safely parent
the child within a reasonable time. Doe has failed to show the magistrate court erred in finding
that she neglected the child.
B. Best Interests of the Child
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). When
determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may consider the
parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best
interests of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Doe,
152 Idaho at 956-57, 277 P.3d at 403-04.
Here, the child has lived exclusively in foster care since birth, is bonded with the foster
family, and is thriving in a stable and nurturing home. The foster parents have provided consistent
medical care and developmental support. In contrast, Doe has been unable to provide stability or
meet the child’s daily needs. Doe’s incarceration leaves her unavailable for the foreseeable future.
Moreover, Doe has not addressed the substance abuse and mental health issues that were central
requirements of her case plan.
Doe challenges the magistrate court’s basis for finding that termination of her parental
rights is in the best interests of the child, arguing that the magistrate court abused its discretion

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when it failed to consider the progress she made prior to her incarceration and her inability to make
further progress due to being incarcerated. Doe argues that the magistrate court lacked substantial
and competent evidence to conclude by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the child’s best
interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights. We disagree.
The magistrate court acknowledged that incarceration alone was not dispositive. Rather,
it was Doe’s continued inability to address her substance abuse and mental health issues and
successfully demonstrate she could care for the child’s developmental needs within a timeframe
consistent with those needs. Doe argues the magistrate court’s finding--that she will be
incarcerated for at least another four years--does not consider that she could be successful in her
criminal appeal. Even if Doe were released immediately, she would require sustained sobriety,
stable housing, and reliable income before reunification could occur. During that time, the child’s
custodial status would remain uncertain. The magistrate court concluded that delaying
permanence would not serve the child’s best interests. This conclusion is consistent with precedent
recognizing that children are entitled to permanence and security within a reasonable period of
time. See Doe (2013-15), 156 Idaho at 111, 320 P.3d at 1270. The evidence supports the
magistrate court’s determination that termination will allow the child to achieve long-term stability
and the opportunity for adoption into a safe, permanent home.
Doe also complains that the magistrate court did not adequately consider placing the child
with fictive kin rather than terminating Doe’s parental rights. Doe’s preferred alternative
placement options do not, however, demonstrate that termination of Doe’s parental rights is not in
the child’s best interests.
Doe’s arguments on appeal seek to have this Court reweigh the evidence presented at trial.
This Court’s review, however, is limited to whether substantial and competent evidence supports
the magistrate court’s decision. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243, 245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65
(2007). This Court will not reweigh the evidence. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe
(2017-5), 162 Idaho 400, 407, 397 P.3d 1159, 1166 (Ct. App. 2017). The magistrate court’s
findings of fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence and supports its holding, by
clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child for Doe’s parental rights
to be terminated. Doe has failed to show that the magistrate court erred in finding that terminating
her parental rights in the child’s best interests.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate court’s determination that Doe
neglected the child and that termination of her parental rights is in the best interests of the child.
Doe has failed to show error in the magistrate court’s decision to terminate her parental rights.
Accordingly, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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