State v. Muguira

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52144

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: December 23, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JOHN MICHAEL MUGUIRA, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, Canyon
County. Hon. Davis F. VanderVelde, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction and sentence of twenty-seven and one-half years with ten
years determinate for felony driving under the influence, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Sally J. Cooley, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Neil Paterson, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

GRATTON, Chief Judge
John Michael Muguira appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence of twenty-
seven and one-half years with ten years determinate for felony driving under the influence.
Muguira argues the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity.
Muguira also contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence
and denying his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Muguira was involved in an altercation in the parking lot of a bar. Upon arrival, officers
encountered multiple people in an intersection outside the bar. A yellow motorcycle was laying
in the middle of the road and Muguira was attempting to stand it up. An officer noticed the strong
odor of alcohol emanating from Muguira, his slurred speech, and unsteadiness on his feet. Muguira

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also had road rash, consistent with a motorcycle accident. Muguira acknowledged to officers that
he tried to drive out of the parking lot and crashed the motorcycle in the intersection. Muguira
failed field sobriety tests and registered a breath alcohol level of 0.158, refusing a second breath
test. After booking into the jail, Muguira made several recorded phone calls in which he
acknowledged that he tried to leave the area on the motorcycle and wrecked.
The State charged Muguira with the crimes of felony driving under the influence (DUI),
Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8005; two counts of misdemeanor battery, I.C. § 18-903; and
misdemeanor malicious injury to property, I.C. § 18-7001(1). Muguira was also alleged to be a
persistent violator, I.C. § 19-2514. During trial, Muguira requested an instruction on the defense
of necessity. Muguira argued the necessity instruction was warranted because there was evidence
there was a fight, he was fleeing his attackers, and he could take no other action than drive away
on the motorcycle. The State argued there was no reasonable view of the evidence that would
support a necessity instruction. The district court found the evidence was insufficient to warrant
giving the necessity instruction.
After trial, the jury acquitted Muguira on the battery and malicious injury to property
charges but could not reach a verdict on the DUI charge. Upon retrial, the jury convicted Muguira
of felony DUI. Muguira admitted to the felony enhancement and being a persistent violator. The
district court sentenced Muguira to a unified term of twenty-seven and one-half years with ten
years determinate. Muguira filed an I.C.R. 35 motion, which the district court denied. Muguira
appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether a jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise
free review. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430 (2009). When reviewing
jury instructions, we ask whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and
accurately reflect applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942, 866 P.2d 193, 199 (Ct.
App. 1993).

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III.
ANALYSIS
Muguira argues the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the defense of
necessity. Muguira also contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence and denying his I.C.R. 35 motion.
A. Necessity Instruction
Muguira claims his right to present a complete defense under the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution was violated when the district court failed to give a necessity instruction
to the jury.
A trial court presiding over a criminal case must instruct the jury on all matters of law
necessary for the jury’s information. I.C. § 19-2132; Severson, 147 Idaho at 710, 215 P.3d at 430.
In other words, a trial court must deliver instructions on the rules of law that are material to the
determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. State v. Mack, 132 Idaho 480, 483, 974 P.2d
1109, 1112 (Ct. App. 1999). Each party is entitled to request specific instructions. State v. Weeks,
160 Idaho 195, 198, 370 P.3d 398, 401 (Ct. App. 2016). However, such instructions will only be
given if they are “correct and pertinent.” I.C. § 19-2132. A proposed instruction is not “correct
and pertinent” if it is: (1) an erroneous statement of the law; (2) adequately covered by the other
instructions; or (3) not supported by the facts of the case. Severson, 147 Idaho at 710-11, 215 P.3d
at 430-31; State v. Weeks, 160 Idaho 195, 198, 370 P.3d 398, 401 (Ct. App. 2016).
There is no entitlement to a jury instruction on a legal theory of defense when no reasonable
view of the evidence supports the elements of the instruction. State v. Howley, 128 Idaho 874,
878, 920 P.2d 391, 395 (1996). If the requested instruction is not supported by the evidence, the
trial court must reject the requested instruction. Id. The question of whether there is a reasonable
view of the evidence that supports an instruction to the jury on the necessity defense is a matter of
discretion for the district court. Id. When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on
appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court:
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such
discretion; (3) acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before
it; and (4) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429
P.3d 149, 158 (2018).

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The defense of necessity is based on the premise that a person who is “compelled to commit
an illegal act in order to prevent a greater harm should not be punished for that act.” State v.
Hastings, 118 Idaho 854, 855, 801 P.2d 563, 564 (1990). “The elements of the defense are: (1) a
specific threat of immediate harm; (2) the circumstances which necessitate the illegal act must not
have been brought about by the defendant; (3) the same objective could not have been
accomplished by a less offensive alternative available to the actor; and (4) the harm caused was
not disproportionate to the harm avoided.” State v. Young, 157 Idaho 280, 285, 335 P.3d 620, 625
(Ct. App. 2014). Because the defense of necessity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears
the burden of production to make a prima facie showing the defense is supported by the evidence,
though the State bears the ultimate burden of proof as to the crime charged. State v. Chisholm,
126 Idaho 319, 321, 882 P.2d 974, 976 (Ct. App. 1994).
The district court addressed the four elements of the necessity defense and found that
Muguira had failed to present evidence to establish the second and third elements. Specifically,
the district court determined Muguira failed to show he did not bring about the circumstances that
created the threat of harm, and failed to show he could not have prevented the threatened harm by
less offensive alternatives.
As to the second element, Muguira argues there was at least some evidence that he was
attacked and did not bring about the threat. Muguira points to evidence that he told the officers
there was a fight, individuals were attacking him, he was in rightful possession of the motorcycle,
and officers saw a man trying to pull the motorcycle from Muguira. Muguira suggests the district
court may have been relying on evidence from the first trial which included that Muguira started
the fight with an individual he hired to repair a different motorcycle, broke the individual’s car
window, and punched him in the face. There is, however, nothing in the record indicating the
district court relied on those facts.
The State notes that, while there was evidence of a fight in the first trial, the only evidence
of a fight in the second trial was the reason officers were called to the scene. While bodycam
footage indicates that Muguira said people were attacking him, there is no evidence in the record
as to who started the altercation. Muguira points to an individual trying to grab the motorcycle
and prevent him from standing it up, but that evidence has nothing to do with who brought about
the circumstances that created the threat. Muguira had the burden to put forth evidence
establishing a prima facie case, including that he did not create the circumstances causing him to

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drive the motorcycle while under the influence of alcohol. We agree with the district court that he
failed to do so.
As to the third element, that Muguira could not have escaped the situation by less offensive
means, Muguira points to evidence that he tried to leave on the motorcycle and even after the fact
an individual was pulling on the motorcycle so Muguira could not stand it up. However, there is
no evidence that even addresses that Muguira could have escaped by less offensive means. There
is no evidence that Muguira could only have avoided the threat by driving away. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that no reasonable view of the evidence supports a prima
facie showing on each element of the necessity defense.
B. Sentence
Muguira contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence. Muguira argues the district court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors of
his desire for and efforts at sobriety and the support of his family and friends.
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the
length of a sentence, we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722,
726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Our role is limited to determining whether reasonable minds could
reach the same conclusion as the district court. State v. Biggs, 168 Idaho 112, 116, 480 P.3d 150,
154 (Ct. App. 2020). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we
cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.
C. Idaho Criminal Rule 35
Muguira contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his I.C.R. 35 motion
for leniency. Muguira argues the district court failed to adequately consider his family support
and his desire to become eligible for work camp so he could support his mother.
A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency,
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d
23, 24 (2006); State v. Allbee, 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting
an I.C.R. 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or

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additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State
v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). In conducting our review of the grant
or denial of an I.C.R. 35 motion, we consider the entire record and apply the same criteria used for
determining the reasonableness of the original sentence. State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 22, 740
P.2d 63, 64 (Ct. App. 1987). Upon review of the record, including any new information submitted
with Muguira’s I.C.R. 35 motion, we conclude no abuse of discretion has been shown.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Muguira fails to demonstrate that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on
the necessity defense. The district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing or in denying
Muguira’s I.C.R. 35 motion. Therefore, Muguira’s judgment of conviction and sentence and the
district court’s order denying Muguira’s I.C.R. 35 motion are affirmed.
Judge HUSKEY and Judge TRIBE CONCUR.

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