CapEd FCU v. Lippa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52158

CAPITAL EDUCATORS FEDERAL )
CREDIT UNION, an Idaho Chartered ) Filed: December 19, 2025
Credit Union, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
v. ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
RONALD JAMES LIPPA, an individual, )
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Derrick O’Neill, District Judge.

Order denying motion to set aside default judgment, affirmed.

Ronald Lippa, Kuna, pro se appellant.

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP; Sheila R. Schwager, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Ronald James Lippa appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to set aside
default judgment. Lippa raises various arguments that are not properly before this Court and/or
lack sufficient argument with citations to legal authority, statutes, the transcript, or the record. We
hold Lippa has waived all issues on appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 35. The order denying
Lippa’s motion to set aside default judgment is affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Lippa executed a loan contract on January 3, 2022, for $52,300.98 to purchase a vehicle
from Northwest Motorsport XIV. The loan was financed by Capital Educators Federal Credit
Union (CapEd). Northwest Motorsport XIV then assigned the contract to CapEd. Pursuant to the
terms of the contract, Lippa agreed to repay the loan issued to him with interest and granted a

1
security interest in the vehicle to CapEd establishing CapEd as the primary lienholder. Lippa then
began making monthly payments until June 17, 2023.
After Lippa stopped making payments, CapEd attempted to contact Lippa to make
arrangements to cure the default on the loan. Approximately six months after Lippa’s payments
ceased, CapEd sent Lippa a letter explaining he was in default on his loan and if he did not cure
the default by December 28, 2023, CapEd would pursue legal action against him, including
possible repossession of the vehicle. Lippa responded by demanding CapEd send Lippa certain
information including “further proof of debt” and the “wet ink” original loan documents.
CapEd then served Lippa with a complaint for breach of contract and claim and delivery,
and a summons, which explained that Lippa had thirty days to file a response to the complaint.
Lippa attempted to file an answer, but the clerk of the court returned his submission because Lippa
had not paid the required filing fee associated with the response. Thereafter, CapEd moved the
district court to enter an order of default and default judgment, which the court granted. Lippa
moved the district court to set aside default judgment claiming, “I found that my truck loan is
fraudulent and inaccurate.”
At the hearing on Lippa’s motion to set aside default judgment, the district court found it
was undisputed that Lippa did not file an answer to CapEd’s complaint, provide CapEd a copy of
the materials he attempted to submit to the court, or pay the required filing fee to file an answer,
which resulted in the court clerk returning Lippa’s answer to him. As a result, the district court
found the default was properly entered. The district court then considered whether there were
grounds to set aside the default judgment under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and found
Lippa did not argue mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. The district court further
found Lippa’s summary denial of CapEd’s claims was insufficient because Lippa failed to set forth
facts which, if proven, would constitute a meritorious defense and Lippa did not file the required
separate memorandum to support his motion. The district court denied Lippa’s motion to set aside
default judgment. Lippa appeals.
II.
ANALYSIS
The only appealable issue before this Court is whether the district court erred in denying
Lippa’s motion to set aside default judgment. CapEd argues Lippa forfeited any alleged error on

2
appeal because his brief fails to meet the requirements set forth in I.A.R. 35(a). We hold the
significant deficiencies in Lippa’s opening brief result in a waiver of all issues on appeal.
Lippa’s opening brief fails to comply with I.A.R. 35(a) as follows: (1) the Table of
Contents does not comply with I.A.R. 35(a)(1) as there are no page references and it appears to be
a procedural history of the case; (2) the Table of Cases and Authorities contains no page numbers
as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(2); (3) the Statement of the Case does not indicate the nature of the
case (an appeal from the district court’s denial of the motion to set aside default judgment) or the
course of proceedings and its disposition as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(3); and (4) the Argument
section does not include a cogent argument supported by citations to authority, statutes, or relevant
parts of the transcript and record as required by I.A.R. 35(a)(6).
In addition to those deficiencies, we also note none of the issues listed in Lippa’s opening
brief are properly before this Court. Lippa raises five issues on appeal: (1) opposing counsel was
never ordered to answer Lippa’s “Affidavit of Truth Proof of Claim”; (2) judgment was entered
without Lippa being afforded due process; (3) Lippa was denied his “Color of Law rights” pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242; (4) Lippa was denied his right to a fair trial and to have his
interrogatories answered; and (5) Lippa has been discriminated against based on his “findings of
fraud” in the contract.
Issues (2), (3), and (5) were never raised in the district court. Issues raised for the first time
on appeal will not be considered or reviewed. Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d
1061, 1062 (1991). To the extent issues (1) and (4) were not raised in the district court, they, too,
would be subject to waiver. However, to the extent issues (1) and (4) were raised in the district
court, as explained below, Lippa fails to provide cogent argument or citations to relevant authority
in support of his arguments. Consequently, we decline to consider any of the issues on appeal.
In the Argument section of his opening brief, Lippa provides six paragraphs, summarized
as follows: (1) Lippa’s due process rights were violated because the district court would not permit
him to ask why CapEd had not answered his interrogatories; (2) CapEd failed to provide the
original “front and back” of the contract with Lippa’s “wet signatures”; (3) CapEd defaulted on
answering Lippa’s twenty-two interrogatories; (4) Lippa’s inquiry about ownership of the contract
and how counsel can prove Lippa owes CapEd “anything”; (5) Lippa’s inquiry about the role of
the law firm and counsel retained by CapEd; and (6) CapEd’s counsel “is an attorney and a debt
collector,” which is prohibited by federal law.

3
Lippa has failed to provide any citation establishing these arguments are preserved or,
alternatively, any explanation as to why they are properly before this Court. None of Lippa’s
arguments have any citation to authority or relevant pages in the transcript or record. None of the
paragraphs contain cogent argument. A party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or
authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct. App. 1997). It
is not the role of this Court to search the record on appeal for citation or argument. See Dickenson
v. Benewah Cnty. Sheriff, 172 Idaho 144, 150, 530 P.3d 691, 697 (2023).
In his reply brief, Lippa argues the district court abused its discretion under I.R.C.P. 60(b)
and “A Meritorious Defense Was At Least Plausibly Alleged” because Lippa did not know his
answer was rejected for lack of a filing fee and he raised material issues about “deceptive contract
terms, lien enforcement, and assignment issues.” This Court will not consider issues raised for the
first time in a reply brief. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122 (2005). Lippa also
argues “Strict Procedural Rules Should Not Defeat Substantive Justice” and “Pro Se Litigants
Deserve Procedural Fairness.” However, “[p]ro se litigants are not entitled to special consideration
or leniency because they represent themselves. Rather, pro se litigants must conform to the same
standards and rules as litigants represented by attorneys.” Owen v. Smith, 168 Idaho 633, 641, 485
P.3d 129, 137 (2021) (internal quotations omitted). Lippa’s failure to comply with I.A.R. 35(a)
results in a waiver of all issues on appeal, regardless of his status as a self-represented litigant.
Powell, 130 Idaho at 128, 937 P.2d at 440. Because we hold the claims are waived, we need not
address CapEd’s arguments that the district court did not err in denying Lippa’s motion to set aside
default judgment.1
CapEd requests attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to the terms and conditions of
the loan contract and Idaho Code §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121. The loan contract executed between
CapEd and Lippa provides: “If we hire an attorney who is not our salaried employee to collect
what you owe, you will pay the attorney’s reasonable fee and court costs, as the law allows. You
will also pay any reasonable collection costs we incur to enforce our security interest, as the law
allows.” Where a valid contract between the parties contains a provision for an award of attorney
fees, the terms of the contract establish a right to attorney fees. Gangi v. Debolt, 168 Idaho 815,

1
Nonetheless, as the district court held, Lippa failed to establish a viable defense, a
necessary showing in order to set aside a default judgment. Lippa’s conclusory allegations of
irregularities with the loan transaction are insufficient. I.R.C.P. 60.
4
819, 488 P.3d 483, 487 (2021). The pleadings in this case indicate that counsel for CapEd is not
a salaried employee of CapEd but, rather, a member of a law firm with whom CapEd has retained.
As the prevailing party, CapEd is entitled to attorney fees and court costs pursuant to their contract
with Lippa. Id. Because CapEd is entitled to an award of attorney fees and court costs pursuant
to their contract with Lippa, we do not address whether they are also entitled to an award of
attorney fees and costs under I.C. §§ 12-120(3) and 12-121.
III.
CONCLUSION
Lippa has waived all issues on appeal because his opening brief fails to comply with
I.A.R. 35(a). Therefore, the district court’s order denying Lippa’s motion to set aside default
judgment is affirmed. CapEd is awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

5