Smith v. Smith

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51882

NICOLE CHRISTINE SMITH, )
) Filed: December 9, 2025
Petitioner-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JASON KELLEY SMITH, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Gooding
County. Hon. Rosemary Emory, District Judge. Hon. Casey U. Robinson,
Magistrate.

Decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from the magistrate court,
affirming decree of divorce, affirmed.

Jason Kelley Smith, Eloy, Arizona, pro se appellant.

Nicole Christine Smith, Ogden, Utah, respondent, did not participate on appeal.
________________________________________________

LORELLO, Judge
Jason Kelly Smith appeals from the decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal
from the magistrate court, affirming a divorce decree. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Jason and Nicole Christine Smith were married. In 2022, Nicole filed a petition for divorce,
citing irreconcilable differences. Jason filed a response contending that, in his opinion, the parties’
marriage was reconcilable. The magistrate court scheduled a trial. Jason also filed a stipulation
that only he signed. At a hearing prior to trial, the magistrate court inquired about the stipulation
and the parties’ intentions going forward. Ultimately, both parties indicated they were prepared
to proceed to trial. The day before trial, a second stipulation was filed--signed by both

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parties--agreeing that irreconcilable differences existed and that dissolution of the marriage was
appropriate. Nicole attended the trial in person while Jason, who is serving a prison sentence in
Arizona, appeared by phone. The magistrate court inquired about the second stipulation. Jason
confirmed he signed the second stipulation but indicated he was unaware Nicole intended to file
it. He also objected to appearing at trial by phone and stated he wanted to participate by video.
After some discussion, the magistrate court explained that it could either accept the second
stipulation or proceed to trial at that time. Ultimately, the parties asked the magistrate court to
accept the second stipulation. As a result, the magistrate court entered the divorce decree. Jason
appealed to the district court, which affirmed. Jason again appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
For an appeal from the district court, sitting in its appellate capacity over a case from the
magistrate court, we review the record to determine whether there is substantial and competent
evidence to support the magistrate court’s findings of fact and whether the magistrate court’s
conclusions of law follow from those findings. Pelayo v. Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 858-59, 303 P.2d
214, 217-18 (2013). However, as a matter of appellate procedure, our disposition of the appeal
will affirm or reverse the decision of the district court. Id. Thus, we review the magistrate court’s
findings and conclusions, whether the district court affirmed or reversed the magistrate court and
the basis therefor, and either affirm or reverse the district court.
III.
ANALYSIS
Jason argues the district court erred in affirming the divorce decree because the magistrate
court violated his “right to be present” at trial by “forcing [him] to appear by phone instead of
video.” Jason also asserts the magistrate court abused its discretion by accepting “a coerced
stipulation for divorce” because he did not agree that irreconcilable differences were grounds for
divorce. We hold that Jason has waived his claims on appeal and that he has failed to show the
district court erred in affirming the magistrate court.
A. Presence at Trial
The essence of due process is the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); State, Bureau of Child Supp. Servs. v.

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Garcia, 132 Idaho 505, 510, 975 P.2d 793, 798 (Ct. App. 1999). It is well established that prisoners
have a constitutional right to access the courts for purposes of directly or collaterally challenging
their convictions or sentences or the conditions of their confinement. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 355 (1996); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 535, 944 P.2d 127, 132 (Ct. App. 1997).
However, this does not mean that an inmate has an absolute right to be personally present at trial
in civil litigation. Garcia, 132 Idaho at 510, 975 P.2d at 798. Rather, due process is a flexible
constitutional principle and calls for such procedural protection as the particular situation demands.
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334. This Court has held that, in civil cases unrelated to the prisoner’s
conviction, due process requires that a trial court weigh the prisoner’s interest in being present at
trial against the State’s interest in maintaining the prisoner’s confinement. Garcia, 132 Idaho at
510, 975 P.2d at 798. The United States Supreme Court has identified three factors to consider in
determining the specific due process requirements applicable in a particular circumstance: (1) “the
private interest that will be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation
of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) the State’s “interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
At trial, Nicole appeared in person, while Jason appeared by phone because he is
incarcerated in Arizona. After the magistrate court asked the parties how they wanted to proceed,
Jason asked to speak with Nicole privately to “straighten things out.” The magistrate court
explained that it could not force Nicole to speak with him and that it could either accept the second
stipulation or proceed to trial. In response, Jason objected to attending the trial by phone and
indicated he wanted to participate by video. According to Jason, appearing by phone prejudiced
him because he was unable to interpret “social queues [sic].” The magistrate court disagreed and
reiterated that it could either accept the second stipulation or the parties could proceed to trial.
Ultimately, the parties asked the magistrate court to accept the second stipulation.
Jason appealed, asserting the magistrate court violated his rights by refusing to allow him
to appear by video at trial. The district court disagreed and concluded that, although Jason cited
“general case law regarding prisoner access to courts,” he failed to cite “any specific authority that
supports his position that he should have been allowed to appear by video” or that it was reversible

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“error to only allow telephone access.” The district court also determined that Jason failed to
demonstrate “it was an abuse of discretion for the magistrate [court] to allow Jason access by phone
rather than video.” The district court further noted that “no testimony was presented at the hearing,
rather the [magistrate] court made inquiries relative to whether there was a stipulation or if there
would be a court trial.” Because Jason “ultimately agreed that the [magistrate] court could accept
the stipulation, even if he did so reluctantly,” the district court concluded that he “failed to
demonstrate reversible error.”
On appeal to this Court, Jason argues the district court erred in affirming the magistrate
court, contending the magistrate court abused its discretion when it refused his request to appear
at trial by video. According to Jason, excluding “a party from the court room, even partially by
restricting senses,” violates due process. Jason complains that “forcing [him] to appear by phone”
violated his “right to be present” at trial--a right he maintains he did not waive. The record does
not support Jason’s assertions. Contrary to Jason’s argument, the record establishes that he waived
his right to trial when he signed the second stipulation and approved the magistrate court’s
acceptance of the stipulation in lieu of proceeding to trial. The second stipulation specifically
provides that the parties waived their rights to appear in court to present testimony. The second
stipulation further provides that the parties requested the magistrate court enter the divorce decree
without a hearing and the parties waived “entry of findings of fact and conclusions of law.”
Moreover, Jason has failed to cite any specific authority in support of his argument that he should
have been allowed to appear by video or that it was reversable error to only allow phone access.
A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130
Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct. App. 1997). Consequently, Jason has waived this issue on
appeal.
B. Second Stipulation
Stipulations for the settlement of litigation are regarded with favor by the courts and will
be enforced unless good cause to the contrary is shown. Conley v. Whittlesey, 126 Idaho 630, 634,
888 P.2d 804, 808 (Ct. App. 1995). The validity of a stipulation or agreement regarding matters
before the court is predicated upon both parties’ agreement to its terms. First Sec. Bank of Idaho
v. Neibaur, 98 Idaho 598, 605, 570 P.2d 276, 283 (1977). A stipulation is ineffective when it is
clear from the record that the parties never assented to it. Id.

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At trial, the magistrate court asked about the second stipulation. Jason confirmed he had
signed it but stated he was unaware Nicole intended to file it. Jason also alleged that no
irreconcilable differences existed in their marriage because he thought reconciliation was a
possibility because that is what he wanted. The magistrate court explained that it could either
accept the second stipulation or proceed to trial. The following exchange took place:
[JASON]: I don’t think there’s irreconcilable differences. We’ve been
working this out all this time until I got transferred to Arizona, and
then things got really difficult.
THE COURT: Well, let’s put evidence on about the grounds for divorce,
and then we’ll go from there.
[JASON]: And that’s why I want to talk to her privately, because this
should be a private decision of why--
THE COURT: It’s not a decision. It’s a trial.
[JASON]: Nicole, do you want me to accept the stipulation or just go
to trial?
[NICOLE]: I’m already here. We either have to take it and do a hearing
or do a trial, and I’m already here. I work full time. I’m already
here. Let’s do this.
[JASON]: I know, and I’m asking if you want me to accept the
stipulation or not?
[NICOLE]: You already did, so let’s take it to trial.
THE COURT: [Nicole], do you want me to sign the agreed upon
stipulation?
[Jason], if she says yes, I’ll sign that. If not, we’ll have a
trial.
[JASON]: Okay.
[NICOLE]: Yes.
THE COURT: So she wants me to sign that agreed upon stipulation. Do
you understand that, [Jason]?
[JASON]: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: And from the feeling I got from your question to her was if
she wanted that, then you were good with that--is that right?--that
you would agree to it? Not good with it, but agree to it?
[JASON]: Yep.
THE COURT: Okay. I will sign that and we’ll send you your copy. Okay?
[JASON]: All right [sic].
THE COURT: Thanks.
[JASON]: Thank you, Your honor.
THE COURT: We’ll be in recess.
On intermediate appeal to the district court, Jason argued the magistrate court abused its
discretion when it accepted the second stipulation. Jason contended the second stipulation was

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“unconscionable,” “one-sided,” and “oppressive.” Jason also argued the magistrate court erred
because it “did not make substantive findings of fact” and asked the district court to remand the
case so the magistrate court could either make findings or hold a court trial. The district court
noted that the magistrate court “accepted the stipulation of the parties,” which “was signed by
Nicole and Jason with both parties certifying under penalty of perjury that the ‘foregoing is true
and correct.’” The district court also noted that the stipulation “waived the parties’ right to appear
personally in court to present testimony” and “asked the [magistrate] court to enter the decree
without a hearing.” In addition, the stipulation indicated the parties agreed to “waive entry of
findings of fact and conclusions of law.” The district court relied on Jason’s acknowledgement
that “he signed the stipulation and did agree that the magistrate [court] should accept it, albeit
reluctantly.” As a result, the district court concluded that Jason’s arguments were “without merit”
and that he “failed to demonstrate the magistrate [court] abused [its] discretion in accepting the
stipulation.” The district court, therefore, affirmed the magistrate court.
On appeal to this Court, Jason argues the district court erred in affirming the divorce decree.
Specifically, Jason asserts the magistrate court abused its discretion by accepting the second
stipulation because he “was coerced and forced to choose between an unfair trial or agree[ing] to
the [second] stipulation.” According to Jason, because he expressed his belief that the marriage
was reconcilable, there was “no valid ground to warrant a divorce.” We disagree. Contrary to
Jason’s arguments, the record shows that he signed the second stipulation and ultimately agreed to
the magistrate court accepting the stipulation. That Jason “has repeatedly declared that he believed
the marriage is reconcilable and wanted marriage counseling every chance he had” does not mean
he was coerced into signing the stipulation, nor does it render the stipulation unconscionable. A
divorce sought on grounds of irreconcilable differences allows courts to “grant either spouse a
divorce without assigning fault to either of the parties.” 24 AM. JUR. 2D Divorce & Separation
§ 2, Westlaw (database updated Nov. 2025). Additionally, a party in a properly pled “no fault
divorce” may “not contest the grounds for the divorce and claim that the relationship is not
irretrievably broken.” Id. Moreover, Jason cites no specific authority supporting his assertion that
his belief the marriage was reconcilable precluded the magistrate court from accepting the second
stipulation. A party waives an issue on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking. Powell,
130 Idaho at 128, 937 P.2d at 440. Consequently, Jason has waived this issue on appeal.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
Because Jason failed to support his arguments with citation to authority, he has waived
those arguments on appeal. Jason has, therefore, failed to show any error in the magistrate court’s
entry of the divorce decree. Jason has likewise failed to show the district court erred in affirming
the magistrate court. Accordingly, the decision of the district court, on intermediate appeal from
the magistrate court, affirming the divorce decree is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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