State v. Watts

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51757

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: October 6, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
ROBERT WILLIAM WATTS, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, State of Idaho,
Bingham County. Hon. Darren B. Simpson, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Kimberly A. Coster, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Michael MacEgan, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Judge
Robert William Watts appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. On appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Blackfoot City Police Officer Manny Delacruz stopped Watts after observing him drive his
vehicle over the solid white line into a bike lane. Officer Delacruz asked Watts for his driver’s
license, registration, and insurance. Watts provided his driver’s license but took some time to
unsuccessfully search for the other items. During their interaction, Officer Delacruz noticed that
Watts appeared nervous, shaky, talkative, his pupils were constricted, and he was missing teeth.
Officer Delacruz later testified that, based on his training and experience, Watts’s behavior and
physical appearance were consistent with someone who is under the influence of an illegal

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substance. Officer Delacruz returned to his patrol vehicle to check Watts’s information. Officer
Pentrack arrived on the scene. As Officer Delacruz was waiting for dispatch to return his request
for information, he asked Officer Pentrack to look at Watts’s eyes (to help train Officer Pentrack
with information Officer Delacruz had received at a recent Drug Recognition Expert (DRE)
training). Officer Pentrack confirmed that Watts’s pupils were constricted.
Based on the officer’s on-body camera video, before Officer Delacruz received any
response from dispatch, and without issuing Watts a ticket or a warning, the officer returned to
Watts’s vehicle and asked him to step out to address the officer’s suspicions about Watts’s use of
illegal substances. Watts admitted to using illegal substances previously but declined Officer
Delacruz’s request to search Watts’s vehicle. Watts also asked the officer about the legal
consequences of having marijuana and PCP in his vehicle. Eventually, Watts admitted he had
methamphetamine in his vehicle and voluntarily gave a pill bottle with the substance in it to Officer
Delacruz.
The State charged Watts with one count of possession of a controlled substance (Idaho
Code § 37-2732(c)(1)). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Watts pled guilty to the charge, reserving
his right to appeal the motion to suppress. Watts timely appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
III.
ANALYSIS
Watts argues the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress. According to
Watts, Officer Delacruz unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop absent reasonable suspicion;

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therefore, the district court should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence obtained
during the traffic stop. In response, the State alleges the district court correctly determined that
the extension of the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. “The stop of a vehicle by law enforcement constitutes a seizure of its occupants to
which the Fourth Amendment applies.” State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 607-08, 389 P.3d 150, 152-
53 (2016). The reasonableness of such a stop is analyzed as an investigative detention. Rodriguez
v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354 (2015). An investigative detention does not require an officer
to have probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, but the detention must be based
on something “more than a mere hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.” State v.
Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 673, 450 P.3d 315, 321 (2019). The detention must be supported by
specific, articulable facts, that the detained party has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a crime. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968).
The district court found that the following circumstances justified Officer Delacruz
expanding the scope of Watts’s detention: (1) Officer Delacruz noticed Watts had constricted
pupils; (2) Watts was shaky and talkative; (3) Watts appeared nervous; (4) Watts was missing
teeth; and (5) Officer Delacruz had just finished training that focused on recognition of illegal
substance use. The State does not argue, and we do not hold, that any of the circumstances
independently created reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify extending the traffic detention
for further investigation. See State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710, 366 P.3d 193, 195 (Ct. App. 2016)
(holding strange or unusual behavior by itself is not enough to establish reasonable suspicion); see
also State v. Grigg, 149 Idaho 361, 364, 233 P.3d 1283, 1286 (Ct. App. 2010) (holding that
bloodshot eyes alone are not enough to establish reasonable suspicion of intoxication). Instead,
the State contends that, under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Delacruz had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to extend the scope of the traffic stop to question Watts about his use of illegal
substances.
Officer Delacruz had not completed the initial traffic stop when he requested Watts exit his
vehicle and started discussing Watts’s potential use of illegal substances. If the duration of the
stop is not prolonged and the stop was otherwise lawful, the scope of the stop can be lawfully
expanded to include an unrelated check without independent reasonable suspicion. State v.

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Pylican, 167 Idaho 745, 754, 477 P.3d 180, 189 (2020). A traffic stop’s purpose to cite a driver
for a traffic violation is complete once an officer prepares, serves, and explains a traffic citation,
and returns the driver’s documentation. State v. Galindo, 171 Idaho 526, 529-30, 522 P.3d 1284,
1287-88 (Ct. App. 2022). The purpose of a stop is not fixed at the time the stop is initiated, and
any routine traffic stop might turn up suspicious circumstances which could justify an officer
asking questions unrelated to the initial purpose for the stop. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357,
362, 17 P.3d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 2000); State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct.
App. 1990).
Watts does not contest the legitimacy of the initial traffic stop. The record shows that
Officer Delacruz initiated his inquiry into Watts’s possible use of illegal substances approximately
six minutes after the initial traffic stop began. At that point, Officer Delacruz had not yet received
a response from dispatch with Watts’s information, nor had Officer Delacruz indicated that he was
ready to issue a citation or warning for the traffic violation or for Watts’s failure to provide proof
of insurance. Nothing in the record indicates that Officer Delacruz could or should have been able
to run Watts’s information and issue him a warning or a citation within those six minutes. In fact,
during the initial stop, Officer Delacruz observed behavior and physical cues that, based on his
training and experience, were indicative of an individual who was under the influence of illegal
substances. Therefore, Officer Delacruz’s inquiry about Watts’s use of illegal substances was
reasonable, and Officer Delacruz was still pursuing reasonable inquiries as the encounter with
Watts progressed. Accordingly, the record does not show that the purpose of the stop had ended
at the time the officer initiated questioning about Watts’s potential illegal substance use.
Even if the purpose of the traffic stop was concluded, the circumstances observed before
Officer Delacruz extended the encounter provided reasonable suspicion that Watts was under the
influence of illegal substances, thereby justifying Officer Delacruz’s inquiry into matters beyond
the initial purpose of the stop. Where a detention is justified by a traffic violation, “[a]uthority for
the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are--or reasonably should have
been--completed.” State v. Hale, 168 Idaho 863, 867, 489 P.3d 450, 454 (2021). “[A] traffic stop
may be permissibly extended if, during the course of effectuating the stop’s mission, officers
develop reasonable suspicion of some unrelated criminal offense.” Id. at 868, 489 P.3d at 455.

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Whether an officer’s suspicion is reasonable is evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981).
Officer Delacruz testified that, when he approached Watts’s vehicle, Officer Delacruz
immediately observed that Watts had constricted pupils, appeared nervous, spoke rapidly, and was
shaking. Officer Delacruz had recently completed advanced drug recognition training and, given
his training and experience, could not find a sufficient explanation for Watts’s constricted pupils
outside of illegal substance use. According to Officer Delacruz, Watts’s physical appearance,
namely his missing teeth, also suggested potential use of illegal substances. In Officer Delacruz’s
training and experience, Watts exhibited multiple signs that he was under the influence of illegal
substances during the traffic stop. Based on the record and Officer Delacruz’s testimony, we
conclude that Officer Delacruz possessed reasonable suspicion--independent from the reason for
the initial traffic stop--that Watts was driving under the influence of illegal substances. Thus,
Officer Delacruz was justified in extending the duration of the traffic stop to further investigate
the potential use of illegal substances. Based on a review of the totality of the circumstances,
Watts has failed to show that the district court erred in finding that Officer Delacruz possessed
reasonable suspicion sufficient to allow for further inquiry into Watts’s potential use of illegal
substances.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Watts fails to demonstrate that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.
Consequently, Watts’s judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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