State v. Bauer

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51497

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: September 19, 2025
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
JACKLYN LEE BAUER, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Derrick J. O’Neill, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled substance, affirmed.

Erik R. Lehtinen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds, Deputy
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Amy J. Lavin, Deputy Attorney General,
Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________
TRIBE, Judge
Jacklyn Lee Bauer appeals from her judgment of conviction for possession of a controlled
substance. Bauer claims the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An officer initiated a traffic stop of a vehicle driven by Bauer for multiple offenses
including an obstructed license plate. While speaking with Bauer, the officer observed a “torch
lighter” on the front passenger seat that he believed was an item commonly used to assist in
ingesting narcotics. The officer called for an additional officer and a narcotic-trained drug dog.
While the officer prepared a citation for the obstructed license plate, the second officer arrived
with his drug dog. Bauer was asked to exit her vehicle so the drug dog could conduct a free-air
sniff of the vehicle. The drug dog alerted “near the rear driver-side bumper and wheel of Bauer’s

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vehicle before jumping up and placing [its] paw on the front driver-side door and giving a final
indication at the driver-side front door.” The State does not challenge that the drug dog put its
paw on the vehicle prior to the final indication.
Based on the alert, the officers searched the vehicle. The officers found a pipe and a baggie
of what appeared to be methamphetamine. The State charged Bauer with possession of a
controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia. Bauer filed a motion to suppress the
evidence seized during the stop, arguing the warrantless search of her vehicle violated her rights
under the United States and Idaho Constitutions. After a hearing, the district court denied Bauer’s
motion to suppress.
The district court found that the search did not violate Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho
Constitution. Additionally, it found that Bauer did not consent to the drug dog placing its paw on
her vehicle. Finally, the district court found that:
[B]efore [the drug dog] touched [its] paw against the driver’s door, [its] behavior
of: head snapping, closed mouth sniffing intently, bracketing back-and-forth, and
[its] tail moving in a rotor-like manner, established that [the drug dog] was “in
odor” and that such a change in behavior constituted an alert that provided probable
cause for the search.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Bauer entered a conditional guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance (Idaho Code § 37-2732(c)), and the State dismissed the remaining charge.
Bauer appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).

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III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Bauer argues that this Court should disavow its ruling in State v. Ricks, 173
Idaho 74, 539 P.3d 190 (Ct. App. 2023). In Ricks, this Court held that probable cause may exist
even if the drug dog has not given its final indication pinpointing the odor’s strongest source.
Id. at 77, 539 P.3d at 193. On appeal, Bauer argues, to the extent the district court relied on Ricks
in finding the drug dog’s “signaling behavior evidenced that [it] was in odor prior to the final alert
and trespass, that case was wrongly decided and should be overruled by this Court.” The State
argues the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress. We have previously been asked
to overrule Ricks and have declined to do so. See State v. Fitzpatrick, ___ Idaho ___, ___ P.3d
___ (Ct. App. 2025); State v. Scheid, ___ Idaho ___, 567 P.3d 798 (Ct. App. 2025); State v.
Morgan, 175 Idaho 334, 565 P.3d 275 (Ct. App. 2025). We continue to adhere to those decisions
today.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and, therefore, violative of
the Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). A reliable
drug dog’s sniff of the exterior of a vehicle is not a search under the Fourth Amendment and does
not require either a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement. See Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, similarly provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue without probable cause shown by affidavit, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized.
The automobile exception to the warrant requirement allows police to search a vehicle
without a warrant when there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or
evidence of a crime. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982). Probable cause is
established when the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search
would give rise--in the mind of a reasonable person--to a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706,

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302 P.3d 328, 331 (2012). Probable cause is a flexible common-sense standard, requiring only a
practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is present. Id.
In Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), the United States Supreme Court noted that
evidence of a dog’s satisfactory performance in a certification or training program can itself
provide sufficient reason to trust his alert and that, if a bona fide organization has certified a dog
after testing his reliability in a controlled setting, a court can presume (subject to any conflicting
evidence offered) that the dog’s alert provides probable cause to search. Id. at 246-47. Finally,
the Court in Harris ruled that, if the State has produced proof from controlled settings that a dog
performs reliably in detecting drugs and the defendant has not contested that showing, the trial
court should find probable cause. Id. at 248.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between a drug dog’s general alert
behavior and the dog’s trained final indication. State v. Howard, 169 Idaho 379, 384, 496 P.3d
865, 870 (2021). The Court noted that the absence of a final indication is not ipso facto an absence
of probable cause. Id. The Court also noted the testimony of the dog’s handler is important for
proving a dog’s general alert to establish probable cause. The Idaho Supreme Court in State v.
Randall, 169 Idaho 358, 369, 496 P.3d 844, 855 (2021), stated the drug dog handler’s testimony
was necessary “to explain why [the dog’s] behavior was an objectively reliable indication that
narcotics were present.” See also United States v. Thomas, 726 F.3d 1086, 1098 (9th Cir. 2013)
(holding that “evidence from a trained and reliable handler about alert behavior he recognized in
his dog can be the basis for probable cause”); Howard, 169 Idaho at 384, 496 P.3d at 870
(explaining that, “without objective evidence bearing on the reliability of [the dog’s] behavior
before his trained alert, we are left with little more than our intuition about the significance of that
behavior”).
In Ricks, this Court held that probable cause may exist even if the drug dog has not given
its final indication pinpointing the odor’s strongest source. This Court also held that the “language
in Randall and Howard indicates the Idaho Supreme Court would adopt a rule allowing for
probable cause based on a dog’s general alert and despite the absence of a dog’s final indication.”
Ricks, 173 Idaho at 77, 539 P.3d at 193. This Court concluded “a dog’s signaling behavior of a
general alert--such as the dog’s breathing, posture, body movements, and verbal responses--can
constitute probable cause.” Id. at 79, 539 P.3d at 195.

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Bauer contends the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because, under
State v. Dorff, 171 Idaho 818, 526 P.3d 988 (2023), a warrantless search of her vehicle occurred
when, without her consent, the drug dog trespassed against her vehicle for the purpose of obtaining
information about (or related to) her vehicle. Bauer argues that this “Court should reject the Ricks
Court’s analysis and hold that probable cause is not established unless and until a trained and
reliable drug dog makes its final alert.” In support of her argument, Bauer claims that such a
bright-line rule “has the benefit of being easy to apply by officers in the field and by reviewing
courts.” She also argues that it “represents a properly narrow reading of the automobile exception
to the warrant requirement.”
The Supreme Court of the United States and the Idaho Supreme Court have made it clear
that the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment in general, and the probable cause
standard in particular, are based on the totality of the circumstances, not bright-line rules. See,
e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (holding that the “totality-of-the-circumstances
approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid demand
that specific ‘tests’ be satisfied” (footnote and internal citation omitted)).
In this case, the district court found the drug dog officer’s testimony credible and that his
testimony is consistent with what can be seen on his on-body video. The officer testified that he
and the drug dog are POST (Peace Officer Standards and Training) certified as a dual-purpose
team, working in both drug detection and apprehension. The officer estimated that he and the drug
dog had nearly one thousand training hours in drug detection and apprehension combined. Further,
the officer testified that the drug dog follows a consistent alerting process when it detects the odor
of an illegal drug. Although the drug dog is trained to signal a “final indication” as to the source
of narcotics--which it does by sitting and looking at the officer--the officer testified that,
notwithstanding the drug dog’s ability to signal a final indication, the drug dog’s alert to the
presence of narcotics is its change in behavior, while the sitting signal is only a final indication as
to the scent’s source. Accordingly, the district court found that the drug dog followed this alerting
process and that these behaviors each took place before the drug dog touched the vehicle and
provided probable cause to search the vehicle. The district court concluded that a “subsequent
touching, after probable cause was established, does not vitiate that finding.” We agree.

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The district court correctly applied the probable cause standard to the totality of the
circumstances known to the officers and properly denied Bauer’s motion to suppress. Those
circumstances included that, prior to any trespass or intermeddling with the vehicle, a trained drug
dog engaged in behavior showing it had detected the odor of a controlled substance, including
“head snapping, closed mouth sniffing intently, bracketing back-and-forth, and [its] tail moving in
a rotor-like manner.” The totality of the circumstances known to the officers at the time of the
search created a probability that illegal narcotics were in the vehicle. Therefore, Bauer has failed
to demonstrate error by the district court in determining that probable cause existed prior to the
drug dog’s trespass. Consequently, Bauer has failed to show that the district court erred in denying
her motion to suppress.1
IV.
CONCLUSION
Substantial evidence supports the district court’s probable cause findings. Accordingly,
the district court did not err in denying Bauer’s motion to suppress. Therefore, Bauer’s judgment
of conviction for possession of a controlled substance is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge HUSKEY, CONCUR.

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The district court concluded that Bauer consented to the drug dog “bumping” her vehicle
but did not consent to the drug dog placing its paw on Bauer’s vehicle. Because we conclude that
the drug dog alerted to the presence of illegal narcotics before placing its paw on Bauer’s vehicle,
we need not address whether Bauer’s ambiguous answers to the officer’s questions equaled
permission for the drug dog to place its paw on the vehicle.

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