IDHW v. Jane Doe

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 52762

In the Matter of: John Doe I, )
A Child Under Eighteen (18) Years of )
Age. )
STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF )
HEALTH AND WELFARE, ) Filed: July 25, 2025
)
Petitioner-Respondent, ) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
)
v. ) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
JANE DOE (2025-10), ) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
)
Respondent-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the Magistrate Division of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, State of Idaho, Ada County. Hon. Andrew Ellis, Magistrate.

Judgment terminating parental rights, affirmed.

Eric D. Frederiksen, State Public Defender; Joshua M. Wickard, Deputy Public
Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Peter A. Mommer, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.
________________________________________________

HUSKEY, Judge
Jane Doe appeals from the magistrate court’s judgment terminating her parental rights to
her child, John Doe I (Child). Doe argues the magistrate court erred in admitting a previous
judgment terminating her parental rights from another case to consider whether it is in Child’s best
interests to terminate Doe’s parental rights in this case. The magistrate court’s judgment
terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Doe is the biological mother of Child. Child was born in October 2024 and umbilical cord
testing indicated Child had methamphetamine in his system at the time of his birth; as a result,

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Child was placed in the temporary custody of the Idaho Department of Health and
Welfare (Department) and then placed in foster care. At the time Child was placed in foster care,
Doe had an open Child Protection Act (CPA) case involving two of her other children. This case
was opened as a separate case because the prior CPA case began in August 2022 and the
termination trial in that case was held ten days after Child’s birth. Doe’s parental rights to her
other two children were terminated when Child was approximately three weeks old.1
The Department caseworker assigned to this case was the same caseworker assigned to
Doe’s other active CPA case because of the timing overlap between the two cases and the
caseworker’s familiarity with Doe and her circumstances. In this case, Doe admitted to using
methamphetamine twice in the months preceding Child’s birth, as well as two days before his
birth. Based on the results of Child’s umbilical cord testing, Doe was charged with one count of
felony possession of a controlled substance. As a condition of pretrial release on the drug charge,
Doe was required to wear drug detecting adhesive patches. Doe tampered with one of the patches,
which was treated as a presumptive positive test for controlled substances, and ultimately refused
to wear any additional patches. Based on the prior involuntary termination of Doe’s parental
rights, the Department filed a motion for a finding of aggravating circumstances; the magistrate
court granted the motion and suspended the Department’s obligation to make any further efforts
towards reunification between Doe and Child, although Doe continued to have weekly visits with
Child.
The Department moved to terminate Doe’s parental rights to Child on three grounds:
(1) that her parental rights to two of her other children had been terminated; (2) Doe neglected
Child because Child was without proper parental care and control as a result of Doe’s ongoing and
untreated substance use disorder and her ongoing mental health conditions impaired her ability to
safely parent Child; and (3) Doe neglected Child because Child was without proper parental care
and control based on Doe’s inability to maintain a safe and stable home free from domestic
violence. Following the termination trial, the magistrate court issued written findings. The
magistrate court declined to terminate Doe’s parental rights pursuant to Count I, finding it was not
a statutory basis for terminating parental rights, but found the Department proved by clear and
convincing evidence that Doe neglected Child as alleged in Counts II and III. The magistrate court

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The termination of Doe’s parental rights to her other children was affirmed on appeal in
Doe v. State, Docket No. 52443 (Ct. App. Mar. 14, 2025) (unpublished).
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found that Doe had a lengthy and chronic untreated substance abuse disorder; Doe had two
convictions and a third charge pending for felony possession of a controlled substance; and Doe’s
substance abuse impaired her ability to parent as it interferes with her ability to maintain housing,
obtain employment, and stay out of jail. Given Doe’s history, the magistrate court indicated it had
no confidence in Doe’s ability to treat her addiction and achieve or maintain sobriety.
The magistrate court also noted Doe had no intent on ending her relationship with the
putative father and was dependent upon him for her housing. The magistrate court found the
relationship was marked by domestic violence, instability, and mutual encouragement to use
controlled substances. Because of the relationship, the magistrate court found the home was not a
safe, stable, or an appropriate home for Child.
The magistrate court also noted that Doe had another open CPA case since August 2022.
During that case, Doe failed to comply with her court ordered case plan to address her substance
abuse, her mental health issues, and her lack of housing and employment. After having thirty-one
months to reunify with her other two children, Doe had done little to mitigate any of the safety
concerns, resulting in those two children and Child all being placed in foster care. Ultimately, the
magistrate court concluded that the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that Doe
neglected Child due to her ongoing substance abuse issues.
The magistrate court found that as a result of the neglect, it is in Child’s best interests to
terminate Does parental rights.2 Doe appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
On appeal from a decision terminating parental rights, this Court examines whether the
decision is supported by substantial and competent evidence, which means such evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Doe v. Doe, 148 Idaho 243,
245-46, 220 P.3d 1062, 1064-65 (2009). The appellate court will indulge all reasonable inferences
in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an order that parental rights be
terminated. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court has also said that the substantial evidence test requires
a greater quantum of evidence in cases where the trial court’s finding must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence than in cases where a mere preponderance is required. State v. Doe, 143

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The magistrate court entered an order of non-establishment of paternity in the case.
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Idaho 343, 346, 144 P.3d 597, 600 (2006). Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood
to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.
Roe v. Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006). Further, the magistrate court’s
decision must be supported by objectively supportable grounds. Doe, 143 Idaho at 346, 144 P.3d
at 600.
III.
ANALYSIS
On appeal, Doe challenges the magistrate court’s admission of the findings of facts,
conclusions of law and decree terminating parental rights (Exhibit 2) from Doe’s previous CPA
case. Doe argues that the magistrate court’s admission of Exhibit 2 was an abuse of discretion
because the basis upon which the magistrate court admitted Exhibit 2 was that the document was
“certainly relevant at the previous trial and [Doe] was represented by counsel.” Doe argues the
magistrate court did not act consistently with the applicable legal standard because it did not
conduct the proper Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 balancing test. Doe further argues the magistrate
court heavily relied on the facts in Exhibit 2 as a basis for terminating Doe’s parental rights in the
current case and the error was not harmless because the Department did not present sufficient
evidence to justify termination other than the document from the prior case.
The Department argues that Doe has waived any challenge to the magistrate court’s
findings regarding the statutory bases for terminating her parental rights because Doe fails to
challenge either the factual findings or the legal conclusions of the magistrate court related to its
findings of neglect. The Department makes a similar argument as to the findings regarding the
best interests analysis which resulted in the termination of Doe’s parental rights to Child. Finally,
the Department argues the magistrate court did not err in admitting Exhibit 2.
A. Statutory Bases for Terminating Doe’s Parental Rights
Doe does not directly challenge the magistrate court’s findings that she neglected Child on
two alternative statutory bases. Doe only argues that the magistrate court erred in admitting and
considering Exhibit 2 as a basis for terminating Doe’s parental rights. The State argues the
magistrate court could properly consider past and current behavior when considering whether
grounds exist to terminate parental rights. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for
termination. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007). The appellate court
will indulge all reasonable inferences in support of the trial court’s judgment when reviewing an

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order that parental rights be terminated. Doe, 148 Idaho at 245-46, 220 P.3d at 1064-65. Here, the
magistrate court found two alternate statutory bases upon which Doe’s parental rights could be
terminated; if the record supports either of those bases, we can affirm the magistrate court’s
findings. In this case, independent of any information contained in Exhibit 2, the record
demonstrates clear and convincing evidence that Doe neglected Child based upon her substance
abuse disorder.
Doe argues that without Exhibit 2, the Department did not establish by clear and convincing
evidence that Doe neglected Child. However, the testimony at the termination trial provided clear
and convincing evidence that Doe neglected Child based on her chronic substance abuse, even
without the admission of Exhibit 2. For example, the Department moved for a finding of
aggravated circumstances and the motion was addressed during an adjudicatory hearing on
November 15, 2024. That transcript is not included in the record on appeal, but the court minutes
indicate the magistrate court made certain findings. At the termination trial, the State moved to
admit exhibit 6, which was the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order regarding aggravated
circumstances that was entered by the magistrate court earlier in the case; Doe did not object to
that document. When a party appealing an issue presents an incomplete record, this Court will
presume that the absent portion supports the findings of the lower court. Gibson v. Ada Cnty., 138
Idaho 787, 790, 69 P.3d 1048, 1051 (2003).
Moreover, the evidence presented at the trial supports the magistrate court’s findings
regarding Doe’s substance abuse resulting in her neglecting Child. For example, the State called
the individual responsible for documenting Doe’s drug testing and compliance during the
pendency of the case. That witness testified that there were three periods when Doe wore a drug
detecting patch and that during two of those periods, Doe tested positive for methamphetamine.
While the magistrate court sustained the objection to information from the first period, it admitted
the same information from the second period in which Doe tested positive for methamphetamine.
The worker testified that during a fourth period, Doe removed the drug monitoring patch, which
was viewed as a positive test for illegal drugs. While it is true there was no case plan requiring
Doe to comply with drug testing in this case, Doe did not move to exclude the evidence on that
basis and the magistrate court could properly consider that evidence as relevant to Doe’s ongoing
substance abuse disorder and its effect on Doe’s ability to safely and appropriately parent Child.

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Officer Love testified that he responded to the hospital after receiving information that
Child tested positive for methamphetamine at birth. Doe admitted to Officer Love that she used
methamphetamine twice in the two months prior to Child’s birth and again two days prior to
Child’s birth.
The caseworker, who was the same caseworker in Doe’s prior CPA case, also testified.
The caseworker testified that she had been in contact with Doe since the previous CPA trial, which
ended approximately three weeks after Child’s birth. The caseworker confirmed that Doe had
obtained housing with Child’s putative father but given the ongoing domestic violence and the
mutual enabling of drug use, the housing was not a safe placement for Child. The caseworker
testified that although Doe reported she was employed, Doe never provided proof of income or
any other financial benefits that would provide support for Child. The caseworker also agreed that
despite completing a substance abuse and mental health treatment program, Doe continued to
suffer from substance use disorders. The caseworker also testified the Department was concerned
about Doe’s ability to care for Child given that Doe’s substance abuse history was chronic, Doe
had not been able to demonstrate a period of sobriety, and Doe failed to comply with the drug
testing requirements in her pending criminal case. The caseworker also testified that Doe had
weekly visitation with Child, the visits had gone well, and Doe had a bond with Child. The
caseworker was also concerned about Doe’s relationship with the putative father because the two
enabled each other to minimize their substance abuse and need for treatment. Finally, the
caseworker testified that Child needed to have a secure attachment to a caregiver and in light of
Doe’s history in the child protection system, and in her life generally, Doe had not shown she was
able to prioritize Child’s needs over her own. The caseworker also testified that Child was doing
very well in his foster placement.
The guardian ad litem testified that she reached out via text messaging to Doe
approximately twice a month during the pendency of the case and had three text messages, in total,
from Doe and that the messages were erratic, rambling, and “unkind.” The guardian ad litem
testified that her concerns about Doe’s ability to care for Child stemmed from Doe’s “extremely
long” history of substance use, Doe’s inability to maintain sobriety, and Doe’s long-term inability
to maintain stable housing and stable, gainful employment. For example, the guardian ad litem
testified that Doe and the putative father admitted that Doe had used methamphetamine during the
pregnancy and that the putative father had obtained the methamphetamine for Doe. Doe’s decision

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to continue to reside with the putative father caused the guardian ad litem to conclude that Doe
was not making decisions that would support her sobriety and permit her to adequately parent
Child. The guardian ad litem agreed that Child had positive interactions with Doe during visitation
but disagreed that Child was bonded to Doe because indications of a bond in light of Child’s age
(approximately four months old) would not be recognizable in any relationship outside of Child’s
relationship with his primary caregiver, the foster parents. The guardian ad litem was also
concerned about Doe’s involvement in her most recent criminal case, as Doe was facing two new
felony charges and Doe’s future incarceration status was unknown. Finally, the guardian ad litem
testified that Child was a very happy child and was thriving in his foster home and that terminating
Doe’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests because of Doe’s inability to meet Child’s basic
needs and Doe’s inability to understand why Child was removed and how Doe’s actions negatively
impacted Child.
During closing argument, Doe argued that absent Exhibit 2, there was no indication of
domestic violence between Doe and the putative father, that there was appropriate interaction
between Doe and Child during visits, there was no evidence that the residence Doe shared with
the putative father was unsafe, and there was no active case plan, so the magistrate court could not
find that Doe failed to complete any tasks relative to a case plan. The Department agreed that
some of the factual information was not elicited at the trial because the magistrate court admitted
Exhibit 2, which contained some of the factual support for the Department’s allegations of neglect.
We need not address whether the magistrate court erred in admitting Exhibit 2 without conducting
the I.R.E. 403 balancing test because the magistrate court explicitly found that Doe neglected Child
by failing to provide proper care and control due to her chronic and on-going substance abuse and
the evidence, excluding Exhibit 2, provided sufficient evidence to support the magistrate court’s
finding of neglect.
B. Best Interests
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must next
determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship.
Tanner v. State, Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 120 Idaho 606, 611, 818 P.2d 310, 315 (1991). A
court may consider past conduct in determining whether grounds exist for terminating parental
rights. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare v. Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 959, 277 P.3d 400, 406 (Ct. App.
2012). When determining whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the trial court may

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consider the parent’s history with substance abuse, the stability and permanency of the home, the
unemployment of the parent, the financial contribution of the parent to the child’s care after the
child is placed in protective custody, the improvement of the child while in foster care, the parent’s
efforts to improve his or her situation, and the parent’s continuing problems with the law. Doe
(2015-03) v. Doe, 159 Idaho 192, 198, 358 P.3d 77, 83 (2015); Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare
v. Doe, 156 Idaho 103, 111, 320 P.3d 1262, 1270 (2014). A finding that it is in the best interests
of the child to terminate parental rights must still be made upon objective grounds. Doe, 152 Idaho
at 956-57, 277 P.3d at 403-04.
In finding that it is in Child’s best interests to have Doe’s parental rights terminated, the
magistrate court held that it is in Child’s best interests to be raised in a safe and stable home with
a sober, consistent caregiver, and that since August 2022, Doe had shown she was unable to meet
that basic threshold. The magistrate court found that Doe was unsuccessfully battling her addiction
to methamphetamine and marijuana and was unable to obtain safe and stable housing. The
magistrate court also noted that Doe had new criminal felony charges which could jeopardize her
liberty. Finally, the magistrate court noted that Doe had not demonstrated in the past thirty-one
months that she can meet the needs of any of her children.
Like its finding of neglect, there is sufficient evidence in this case, outside of the
information contained in Exhibit 2, to support the magistrate court’s conclusion that terminating
Doe’s parental rights is in the best interests of Child. Doe did not object to the magistrate court
admitting and considering the finding of aggravated circumstances based on the termination of
Doe’s parental rights to two of her children in the case that was active at the time the current case
was open. Because that transcript is not in the record, we presume that any findings made during
that hearing support the decision in this case. Evidence in this case indicated that approximately
three weeks after Child’s birth, Doe’s parental rights were terminated to two of her other children.
The district court properly considered that evidence, along with the other evidence in this case,
including the testimony of the witnesses, and concluded that terminating Doe’s parental rights is
in the best interests of Child. The magistrate court did not err in so finding.

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IV.
CONCLUSION
The magistrate court did not err in finding that termination of Doe’s parental rights is in
Child’s best interests because its findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
Therefore, the judgment terminating Doe’s parental rights is affirmed.
Chief Judge GRATTON and Judge TRIBE, CONCUR.

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