Patrick Lavern Holt v. State of Iowa

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-0681
Filed July 3, 2024

PATRICK LAVERN HOLT,
Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Colleen

Weiland, Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Karmen Anderson, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Richard J. Bennett, Special Counsel,

for appellee.

Considered Badding, P.J., Bower, S.J.,* and Gamble, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
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GAMBLE, Senior Judge.

Patrick LaVern Holt appeals the denial of his application for postconviction

relief (PCR). Because he failed to establish prejudice in the outcome of his trial,

Holt has not met his burden for his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims.

I. Background Facts & Proceedings.

In 2014, Holt befriended A.K. and her ten-year-old daughter. A.K. and the

child visited Holt frequently that summer. Holt bought the child clothing, swimwear,

and gifts, and took the mother and child on a couple daytrips over the summer.

According to the child, one day A.K. left her with Holt while she ran an errand, and

Holt took the child up to an upstairs bedroom. Holt played a pornographic video

on the computer, rubbed his penis, then touched the child’s vulva on top of and

then underneath her clothing for “about a minute.” A.K. returned to the house, and

the child ran down to meet her. A.K. testified the child was hysterical and sobbing

at the door and said Holt had touched her.

The incident was reported to the authorities a few years later. In 2018, a

jury found Holt guilty of lascivious acts with a child—fondle or touch. This court

affirmed his conviction on appeal, finding the verdict “was not contrary to the weight

of the evidence,” an expert’s testimony describing grooming behaviors and

delayed reporting “did not constitute improper vouching,” the inclusion of an intent

instruction was not an error, and the court did not abuse its discretion when

sentencing him. State v. Holt, No. 18-1266, 2019 WL 5067171, at *4–6 (Iowa Ct.

App. Oct. 9, 2019). Additional facts specific to Holt’s current claims are included

where relevant below.
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In May 2020, Holt filed an application for PCR, in which he asserted he

possessed photos showing his “medical condition making alleged incidents

impossible.” An amended application was filed with help from counsel, alleging

ineffective assistance of trial counsel from failure to properly question him on direct

examination at trial about the deterioration of his relationship with A.K. The PCR

court held Holt did not establish prejudice on either claim, so it denied and

dismissed his application.

Holt appeals on both issues.

II. Standard and Scope of Review.

“A PCR application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel raises a

constitutional claim, and we review postconviction proceedings that raise

constitutional infirmities de novo.” Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522

(Iowa 2021) (cleaned up) (citation omitted).

To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [an applicant]
must demonstrate . . . counsel failed to perform an essential duty that
resulted in prejudice. Counsel breaches an essential duty when
counsel makes such serious errors that counsel is not functioning as
the advocate the Sixth Amendment guarantees. We presume
counsel acted competently but that presumption is overcome if we
find [the applicant] has proved . . . counsel’s performance fell below
the normal range of competency. If the claim lacks prejudice, it can
be decided on that ground alone without deciding whether the
attorney performed deficiently.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “It is not enough for the

defendant to show that the errors had only some effect on the outcome of the

proceeding. Instead, typically, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different.” Smith v. State, __ N.W.3d ___, ___, 2024
4

WL 2868782, at *2 (Iowa 2024) (cleaned up) (internal citation omitted). “A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome.” Doss v. State, 961 N.W.2d 701, 709 (Iowa 2021) (cleaned up).

III. Analysis.

A. Photographs. Holt asserts trial counsel’s failure to present the

photographs from his medical records exhibiting his “buried penis syndrome” was

a breach of duty that prejudiced his trial. Holt argues the photographs were

“relevant and probative” and “would have been a powerful tool in corroborating

[the] testimony” of Holt and his doctor.1 But during Holt’s testimony at the PCR

trial, his attorney asked, “Do you believe the result of your trial would have been

different had those medical photographs been introduced?” And Holt answered,

“No.”

At the underlying trial, the deposition of a surgeon who had operated on

Holt in 2017 for his buried penis syndrome was read to the jury. The doctor

explained what the syndrome is and stated that despite a 2001 surgery, at the time

of Holt’s 2017 surgery, “I would say the only thing that you could see, reasonably

see when I first met him was the glans penis, which is the head of the penis. The

doctor stated that, before the surgery, it was not possible to reach down to the rest

of the penis. The doctor also explained, “[Y]ou can still have an erection . . . you

don’t actually see it. It’s kind of trapped underneath the skin.” Holt could

“occasionally get erections but not reliably.” But the development of the syndrome

1 The photos were not offered as evidence at the PCR trial either.
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was “a long process, it doesn’t happen overnight.” The doctor, who first saw Holt

in 2017, could not testify what Holt’s state was in 2014.

Holt told the PCR court there were photos from his 2001 surgery and that

they would have depicted his condition in 2014. The surgeon who operated on

Holt in 2017 testified he did not have photographic documentation of what Holt’s

condition looked like. Holt’s trial counsel testified via deposition that the pictures

“were actually during [the 2017] surgery from the medical records” and she did not

have any “before pictures.” She explained she didn’t use the photographs

“because they were all taken after the incident.” Counsel stated she did not think

the photographs would have changed the outcome of Holt’s trial. The PCR court

found the evidence presented at Holt’s criminal trial sufficiently explained his

condition, and it was not convinced “that seeing photographs of his condition would

have added anything helpful to Holt.”

Holt failed to introduce the photographs into evidence at the PCR trial, so

we are left to speculate on when they were taken and what they depict. The

photographs of Holt’s condition—which worsened over time—were taken either

thirteen years before or three years after the accused incident, and the photos

were taken during corrective surgery. The surgeon described Holt’s condition in

detail. We do not believe these photographs would have provided the jury any

additional insight as to what the child would have seen. Also, the version of

lascivious acts Holt was convicted was his fondling or touching the child’s genitals,

not the child touching him. We are not persuaded the admission of marginally

relevant photographs, which would not tend to prove or disprove any element of
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the relevant offense, would have led to a different result. See Smith, 2024

WL 2868782, at *2.

B. Direct Examination. For his claim about counsel’s direct examination of

him, Holt urges counsel should have done more to bring out the breakdown of his

relationship with A.K. as relevant for the jury’s credibility determination. Because

the case was largely decided based on credibility, Holt argues this failure was

prejudicial based on a reasonable probability the jury would have doubted A.K.’s

testimony. He further argues that counsel’s failure to develop evidence supporting

a theory of defense mentioned during opening statement “breeds mistrust of

counsel and consequently defendant.”

Holt told police in his initial interview that he and A.K. had “a falling out”

because “she had been taking his prescription medicine.” When questioned, A.K.

did not remember saying the friendship broke down because of drugs, admitting “I

had just been arrested; and to be completely honest, I was coming down off of

drugs. I don’t remember saying that.” At the PCR trial, Holt opined the child’s

accusation was “their way of retaliating” because “they were no longer to come to

my house.”

Even if counsel’s failure did constitute a breach, we agree with the PCR

court that Holt has not established prejudice. At most, Holt’s testimony would have

reflected on A.K.’s credibility. Holt’s counsel had already questioned A.K. about

her use of Holt’s prescription medications, and she had admitted to having drug

offenses and “coming down off drugs” when she spoke with police. But it was the

child’s testimony about what happened, not the mother’s, which provided the

factual basis for Holt’s conviction. Calling the mother’s credibility into question
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does not affect the credibility of the child and does not materially undermine our

confidence in the trial’s outcome. See Doss, 961 N.W.2d at 709.

To the extent Holt suggests the mother and child were retaliating for the

loss of the gifts and benefits Holt provided and A.K.’s access to Holt’s prescription

drugs, the circumstances following the incident persuade us otherwise. First, there

was evidence presented at the original trial about common grooming tactics to gain

trust and eventually access to the child—including gifts and other benefits, physical

contact, touching, and showing pornography. Also, the child had only reported the

incident one year before the trial—three years after the incident, which tends to

negate the idea of retaliation. Moreover, the child had been moved to her father’s

custody around two and a half years earlier, and A.K. testified she had not spoken

to the child in around three years, minimizing the likelihood of coaching or

collusion.

Holt has not established his testimony about the breakdown in his friendship

with A.K. would have affected the outcome of the trial. Because he has not

established counsel’s actions were prejudicial, Holt has not proved counsel was

ineffective.

AFFIRMED.