In the Interest of J.M., M.M. and J.S., Minor Children

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
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No. 26-0478
Filed June 24, 2026
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In the Interest of J.M., M.M., and J.S., Minor Children,
J.M., Mother,
Appellant,
J.M., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County,
The Honorable Hunter W. Thorpe, Judge.
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AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS
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James W. Thornton, Ankeny, attorney for appellant mother.

Katherine R.J. Scott, Ames, attorney for appellant father of J.M. and M.M.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney
General, attorneys for appellee State.

Nancy Pietz, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem
for minor children.
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1
Considered without oral argument
by Schumacher, P.J., and Ahlers and Badding, JJ.
Opinion by Ahlers, J.

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AHLERS, Judge.

This case centers around a blended family—a married couple, his
older child from a prior relationship, her older child from a prior relationship,
and the two children they share together. The father consented to the
termination of his parental rights to his older child. 1 The juvenile court
terminated his parental rights to his two youngest children. And the court
also terminated the parental rights of the mother with respect to all three of
her children.2

The mother and father separately appeal from the termination of their
parental rights to their respective children. The father challenges the
statutory grounds authorizing termination, including an argument that the
Iowa Department of Health and Human Services failed to make reasonable
efforts toward reunification. The mother also argues the department failed
to make reasonable efforts toward reunification and indirectly challenges the
statutory grounds for termination. She also argues that termination is not in
the children’s best interests and that she should be given additional time to
work toward reunification.

We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re A.B.,
957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Although we are not bound by the juvenile
court’s factual findings, we give them respectful consideration, especially
when assessing the credibility of witnesses. Id.

1
The father’s parental rights to this child are not at issue in this appeal. The father
also has another child who lives in another state and is also not at issue in this appeal.
2
The juvenile court did not terminate the parental rights of the father to the
mother’s oldest child. All subsequent references to “the father” in this opinion will refer
to the father of the two youngest children at issue.

3
Our review follows a three-step process of determining whether
statutory grounds for termination exist, whether termination is in the child’s
best interests, and whether an exception should apply to prevent termination.
Id. at 294. But we do not address any step in this process that is not
challenged on appeal. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). “After
addressing any challenged steps of the three-step process, we then address
any additional claims raised by a parent.” In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532
(Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc).

We begin with the statutory grounds for termination. The juvenile
court terminated both parents’ respective parental rights pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(e) and (f ) (2025). As termination was ordered on
multiple grounds, we may affirm if any is supported by the record. See In re
A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We elect to address grounds for
termination under section 232.116(1)(f ) as to both parents. That ground
permits termination upon sufficient proof that (1) the child is four years of
age or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance;
(3) the child has been removed from the physical custody of the parents for
at least twelve of the last eighteen months; and (4) the child cannot be
returned to the custody of the parents. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f ).

Both parents limit their challenges to the last element—whether the
children could have been safely returned to the respective parents at the time
of the termination trial. See In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App.
2024) (interpreting “at the present time” as used in section 232.116(1)(f )(4)
to mean at the time of the termination trial). Following our review of the
record, we agree with the juvenile court that the children could not be safely
returned to the custody of either parent at the time of the termination trial.

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This family’s involvement with the juvenile court began after the
department received reports that the father’s older child, who was seven at
the time, was being abused by the parents after the child turned up with a
broken nose. The department was also told that the mother was dosing the
children with high levels of melatonin. When police officers went to the
family home to investigate, they found the youngest two children, then four
and two years old, locked in their room, with the locks on the outside of the
door. Neither child had been potty trained, and neither child could speak.
They also found marijuana and drug paraphernalia in the home. Based on
these circumstances, the children were removed from parental custody. The
father was charged with assault for his actions against his older child and four
counts of child endangerment. The mother was charged with four counts of
child endangerment and possession of a controlled substance. The mother
pleaded guilty to two counts of child endangerment and possession of
marijuana and received a suspended sentence. The father pleaded guilty to
two counts of child endangerment and one count of assault causing bodily
injury and received deferred judgments.

Once removed from the family home, the mother’s older child
disclosed that he had been subjected to abuse in the home as well. In a letter
he wrote to his mother and stepfather he stated, “if you want me back, you
have to admit that . . . you were abusing me [and the other children].” The
department agreed it was critical that the parents acknowledge their abuse of
the children and accept responsibility for it. But both parents have struggled
to meaningfully do so.

The case manager explained at the termination trial that it is critical
for the parents to acknowledge their role in the past abuse and neglect,
otherwise they will not be able to make meaningful changes and the abuse is

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likely to recur. And she explained that neither parent has taken meaningful
accountability for their past actions. She expanded on the issue by explaining
that, while both parents have participated in services, neither has internalized
the information and effectuated change in themselves or understands how
their conduct has traumatized their children. The juvenile court found the
case manager’s testimony “to be both credible and informed,” and we defer
to that credibility determination.

Further, the parents’ own testimony at the termination trial supports
the case manager’s conclusion that the parents have not taken accountability
for their actions and do not understand how their actions have impacted the
children. The mother denied the factual basis for her guilty plea to child
endangerment and testified she only pleaded guilty to “hurry up and close
the case.” Likewise, the father denied he broke his older child’s nose and
testified he pleaded guilty to “move the process along.”3

As such, we agree that the children could not be returned to their
respective parents at the time of the termination trial. In doing so, we reject
the father’s contention that we cannot consider his past conduct toward both
his older child and the mother’s older child when determining whether his
younger two children could be safely returned to him. His past conduct
toward any child under his supervision is highly probative of his ability to
serve as a safe caregiver. See, e.g., In re R.A., No. 25-1825, 2026 WL 221722,
at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2026) (taking into consideration a father’s abuse
of all four children in his home when determining whether it was in his child’s
best interests to terminate the father’s parental rights).

3
The father claimed the child broke his nose when he slipped and fell on some ice
and not during an incident of corporal punishment as the child reported.

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But both parents argue that the inability to reunify at the time of the
termination trial is due to the department’s failure to make reasonable efforts
toward reunification. While not a strict substantive requirement for
termination, “[t]he State must show reasonable efforts [toward reunification]
as a part of its ultimate proof the child[ren] cannot be safely returned to the
[custody] of a parent.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019) (first
alteration in original) (quoting In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Iowa 2017)).
As this implicates the fourth element under section 232.116(1)(f ), we must
address the mother’s and father’s reasonable-efforts arguments before
reaching a final conclusion as to whether the statutory grounds for
termination are met.

Both parents complain that they did not receive more visitation with
the children and argue that additional visitation would have provided more
opportunities to demonstrate safe parenting skills and led to reunification.
Certainly visitation is an important service for families working toward
reunification. But the relevant inquiry is whether the additional services
requested by a parent “relate to the ongoing need for removal and remedy
that need.” In re I.T., No. 24-1209, 2024 WL 4620509, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App.
Oct. 30, 2024). The underlying problem here is that the parents refused to
accept responsibility for their past actions or appreciate the harm they caused
their children through abuse and neglect. The parents do not explain—and
we do not discern—how additional visits would have fixed that underlying
problem and led to reunification. So we cannot find that the need for removal
would have been meaningfully addressed through additional visitation. See
In re C.M., No. 25-0435, 2025 WL 1706340, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18,
2025) (recognizing the additional services requested must go to the ongoing
basis for removal). We therefore reject both parents’ reasonable-efforts

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challenges and conclude the State has established a statutory ground for
termination as to both parents.

Next, we address the mother’s contention that termination is not in
the children’s best interests. When making a best-interests determination,
we “give primary consideration to the child[ren]’s safety, to the best
placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the
child[ren], and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of
the child[ren].” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)).
We conclude termination is in the children’s best interests. Her oldest child
is developing his relationship with his biological father and wants to live with
him in another state. The child does not want to go back to his mother’s
custody, describing her home to the caseworker as “a hellhole.” And when
that child disclosed suicidal ideation to other adults, the mother reprimanded
him rather than expressing concern for his mental health. As for the younger
two children, they are making significant progress while in the care of their
pre-adoptive foster parents. They have made significant progress with their
speech development and in several other areas as well. Because the oldest
child does not feel safe with the mother and the development of the younger
two children would be best facilitated by adoption into their foster home, we
conclude that termination of the mother’s rights is in the children’s best
interests.

Finally, the mother requests additional time to work toward
reunification. This is a permissible option under the statute if termination is
denied. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (permitting the court to enter a
permanency order under section 232.104 if it decides not to terminate
rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a permanency option of giving
a parent an additional six months to work toward reunification). But to

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exercise this option, the court must be able to “enumerate the specific
factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis
for the determination that the need for removal of the child[ren] from the
child[ren]’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month
period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b).

We note that the parents were already given a prior six-month
extension, but no meaningful progress toward reunification occurred. And
the mother fails to identify any changes she expects to occur within the next
six months that would remove the barriers to reunification—her refusal to
take accountability for her past neglect of the children and the harm she has
caused them—to effectuate reunification at the end of an additional six
months. So we have no basis to grant the mother additional time.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

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